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For millions of Shanghainese who lost their homes to the great urban 
transformation and the victims of the Expo-induced domicide who have 
so generously shared their time and knowledge with me.  
 
 






With the ascendency of neoliberal ideology, mega-events have been increasingly 
used by ruling elites as part of a narrative of competitive progress in order to attract 
investment capital. Unfortunately, the dark side of mega-events has not received 
enough attention in existing literature, especially the critically important question of 
displacement and forced eviction because of such events. 
This thesis contributes to the literature by debunking the myths of mega-events and 
examining the domicide effects through an in-depth case study of the Shanghai 
World Expo. Theoretically, the thesis develops the notion of domicide by 
incorporating the literature on domination and subordination. It attempts to negotiate 
the tension between the subjective experience of victimhood and the objective 
process of victimisation in domcide. In analysing the domicide experiences, this 
thesis proposes to look into both the temporalities and spatialities of domicide, and to 
examine the variegated ways the displaced appropriate them. It questions how the 
morally, legally and politically problematic act of domicide is committed without 
effective forms of resistance. Empirically, this thesis offers a post hoc impact 
assessment of the ‘best ever’ World Expo and voices the suppressed outcries from 
those on the receiving end.  It supplies a detailed account of the social production of 
domicide with a case from the Global South, and in doing so; it explores ‘actually 
existing neoliberalism’ in the Chinese context, expanding the geographical horizon in 
existing literature and enhancing our understanding of the articulation of 
neoliberalism in different localities. Although contextualised through the lens of 
mega-events, the conditions, mechanisms, process and tactics that provide the fertile 
soil for domicide as identified in this thesis can teach us a great deal about urban 
spatial practices elsewhere. 
The thesis draws upon the data collected through site-intensive ethnographic 
fieldwork, mixing the use of interviews, (non-)participatory observation, survey, 
unorthodox focus groups and media content. It argues that the exceptionality of the 
World Expo revokes political, moral and legal boundaries in causing pain to affected 
citizens in order to facilitate the accumulation of capital. Such exceptionality is 
constructed through various normative discourses. Those discourses and values 
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naturalise and legitimatise the process of domicide, produce symbolic violence, and 
undermine the solidarity of the powerlessness. The submission of the displaced to the 
dominant power enables the production and reproduction of a repressive social and 
spatial structure. These are vitally important questions given the international focus 
on China’s economic growth and urbanisation. 
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engaged researcher who aims to change the world. I also appreciate all the time, 
efforts and ideas Jamie invested in my project. He set a high standard for me to write 
politically, clearly and coherently and this has been motivating me since our first 
meeting. His numerous insightful comments on the draft of this thesis pushed me to 
think more critically and thoroughly. I would also like to thank Dr Yiping Fang who 
has been offering intellectual and career guidance to me since I was studying in the 
Netherlands. She provided so many sharp comments on many pieces of my writing 
and the survey design for this project. I cannot forget the support from my advisor, 
Professor Emily Brady, for organising the first year review panel and taking care of 
the progress reports. I am deeply indebted to the efforts from all of them, without 
whom, the completion of this thesis would be impossible.  
My thanks also go to the thesis examination panel, Dr. Rowan Ellis and Dr. Hyun 
Bang Shin, for challenging me to spell out the meanings of home and to rethink 
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appreciate the request from Dr. Shin asking me to remove or edit my critiques of his 
papers so as not to ‘mischaracterse’ his ‘critical’ studies. Regardless, I am indebted 
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losing their homes and communities to the Expo. To protect their identity and keep 
them away from possible censorship of this work, I cannot disclose their names and 
acknowledge their support personally here. But, I must emphasise that it is their 
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bixu   必须   must 
buchong xieyi 补充协议 supplement agreement  
chaiqian  拆迁  displacement and resettlement  
chengzhongcun  城中村  villages in the city due to land appropriation  
danwei  单位  work units 
dangshiren 当事人  relevant party  
doufuzha gongcheng 豆腐渣工程 projects with extremely poor quality 
fanshen  翻身  turn over the body  
guanxi   关系  interpersonal relations  
guodu fang 过渡房  transitory housing before moving into resettlement housing 
hukou  户口  household registration 
jia  家  home 
jiapo renwang 家破人亡 family breakdowns and members dead 
jiefang  解放  emancipation, liberation  
jidi   基地   bastion 
junshi  军师   military commanders or military strategists  
koujing  口径   fine-grained regulations, coordinated political speech 
lianzuo  连坐  collective responsibility, a method of punishment  
lilong  里弄  lane housing  
mianzi  面子  face 




nangao  难搞  someone who is difficult and tough to deal with 
penghuqu  棚户区  simple shacks settlement  
qiangqian 强迁  forcible eviction 
qifang  期房  presold housing 
quanli  权力  power 
quanli  权利  rights 
quanyi  权益  interests  
sixiang gongzuo 思想工作 thought work 
shangpinfang  商品房  commercial housing  
shangshan xiaxiang 上山下乡 up to the mountains and down to the countryside 
shangzhijiao  上只角  upper quarter 
shu rentou 数人头  compensation counting numbers of registered people  
shu zhuantou 数砖头  compensation counting floor size  
shui zhi qing ze wu yu 水至清则无鱼 No fish can survive the cleanest water 
subei  苏北  roughly refers to people from Northern Jiangsu Province 
suku   诉苦  speaking bitterness (CPC’s political tactic) 
suzhi  素质  human quality  
waidi ren 外地人  migrants, non-locals  
weiwen  维稳  maintaining social stability  
xiafang  下放  sent down to the countryside  
xiazhijiao 下只角  lower quarter 
xian chaiqian tengdi hou chuli jiufen 先拆迁腾地，后处理纠纷  
eviction first and resolve conflicts later 
xiangxia  乡下  the countryside, the rural area 
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xinfang  信访   letters and visits, a permissible petitioning tactic 
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zhihuibu 指挥部  command centres 
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zhiqing  知青  educated youth forced to leave the city 
zhufang kunan  住房困难 housing difficulty  






On a windy afternoon in early April 2012, a thin woman intercepted me in a 
resettlement neighbourhood and asked me if I wanted to hear her family’s story of 
being displaced. ‘I am now ren bu xiang ren, gui bu xiang gui (half human, half 
ghost)’, she bitterly commented on her stigmatised self, ‘when I was displaced, I was 
a little overweight. Neighbours called me Miss Big. Look at me now’. Her eyes soon 
filled with tears when she related her suicide attempt during eviction day. Without 
consultation or offered any compensation package, her three-story house built from 
scratch by her parents over the years was bulldozed to pieces. On eviction day, she 
jumped off the roof of her house in a desperate act of protest. She was rescued but 
with permanent scars: broken ribs, dental implants, clinical depression. ‘I feel so 
unfairly treated. Are they government officers?’ she asked me, ‘they are thugs. No, 
they are worse than thugs, far worse’. After saying this, she had a sudden emotional 
breakdown, hysterically crying aloud in a public space. With the help from her 
neighbours, she finally calmed down a bit but wept constantly while I was there 
listening to her story. She then recalled her long journey in seeking justice, and 
narrated her pain, ‘At night, my eyes are always wide open. I have this knot in my 
heart. It is so aching that I could not fall asleep. My mother passed away last month. 
I keep dreaming about her. I am angry that she did not take me with her’. I felt it an 
insult to comfort her and help her during such enormous amount of loss and grief. 
But, that was what I did on that day. I kept telling her that there was still hope in her 
life and justice would be served, eventually. I walked her to her apartment. Her son 
was at home that day but refused to come out and look after her. ‘Like his father, he 
thinks I am insane. I am not. I just cannot accept this eviction. I cannot move on’, she 
bitterly explained her son’s coldness and estrangement, and went on; ‘my family 
‘If only the city could speak, what would it say to us? Would it tell of its moral 
angst over racial inequalities and ethnic discrimination? Would it talk of 
crumbling infrastructure and fiscal strains? Would we hear of vibrant 
neighbourhoods, myriad cultural activities, dedicated school teachers, and 
dynamic industrial districts? Would a rich public life be claimed, one 
characterised by widespread democratic debate? What would we be told?’ 
Robert Beauregard, If only the city could speak  
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perished a long time ago. I tried to kill myself three times now. I just see no point to 
live.’ 1 
 
The story I am relaying above is from a woman who lost her home and her family to 
the ‘best ever’ Shanghai World Expo. She however was only one of many victims I 
had the great opportunity to work with and learn from during my fieldwork in 
Shanghai. To pave the way for this six-month temporary mega-event, more than 
18,000 households, according to official statistics, lost their homes and communities. 
For the ruling elites, those families are inevitable sacrifices to make way for urban 
development and national fame. At the time of my fieldwork, apart from the road 
names and the renovated factories, there is no indication of the history of the people 
who lay down their roots deeply in this soil and the violent process that severed those 
roots. The violent prelude to Shanghai’s ‘glorious’ expo is rapidly fading in time.  
 
It is the intent that by the contribution of this thesis to give voice to those victimised, 
marginalised and silenced, and to reconstruct the history of the Expo-induced 
displacement. I wish to bring to the front the suffering and the pain of those families 
and to tell their side of the story about the ‘best ever’ Expo. I hasten to argue that 
such socio-psychological costs should be placed at the centre of intellectual inquiry 
to any development programmes that involve the annihilation of people’s homes and 
communities because it powerfully questions the moral and political limits of abusive 
power. Much of my thesis is written with this in mind to show the ways people were 
mercilessly displaced and victimised by concerted efforts from the political, 
economic and cultural elites for the sake of a transitory event and to question the 
morality and politics of chaiqian (literally translates as displacement and 
resettlement) in contemporary Chinese cities. Although the focus of this thesis is on 
the Expo, these stories can shed light on the human lives caught up in Shanghai’s, as 
well as China’s neoliberal urban transformation. The ultimate goal is to problematise 
China’s ‘miraculous’ urban revolution and reveal the real costs in the pursuit of a 
land-centred accumulation regime. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I 
shall first justify the significance of studying mega-events induced displacement and 
forcible eviction. I then introduce the theoretical approach before moving to provide 
a short background of mega-events in China and the geography of Shanghai. This is 
                                                            
1 An earlier version of this story was published online. See  
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/fieldresearch/2014/04/04/the-vulnerable-observer/ To protect the anonymity of 
many displacees, I removed the dates of some formal or informal interviews, small talks, or 
conversations in the thesis.  
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Mega-events, in Ritchie’s words (1984: 2) are ‘major one time or recurring events of 
limited duration, developed primarily to enhance awareness, appeal and profitability 
of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term’. Over the past three decades, 
enthusiasm for constructing such transient spectacles has grown in cities from both 
developed and developing countries. The narratives underlying their motivations are 
strikingly similar everywhere: to attract ever footloose capital investment, to 
stimulate economic growth and/or to distinguish them out from their competitors 
(Cochrane et al., 1996, Essex and Chalkley, 1998, 2004, Chalkley and Essex, 1999, 
Roche, 2000, Burbank et al., 2001, Gold and Gold, 2010). It is widely believed by 
the elites in the bidding cities that those events are cash cows in generating tourism 
revenues, upgrading local infrastructures, creating new business opportunities and 
increasing job positions.  
Amongst much irrationality of mega-events (e.g. cost overruns, marginalisation, etc.) 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Horne, 2007), event-induced displacement has been a long 
neglected dark side. The brutal destruction of people’s homes makes the rationale for 
hosting mega-events rather dubious. Event-led home annihilation is a global 
epidemic. Let me first quote some numbers from the report by the Centre of Housing 
Rights and Eviction (COHRE) (2007) to show the sheer scale of people who lost 
their homes to these mega-events. For hosting the Seoul Olympics in 1988, 720,000 
people were evicted from their homes and approximately 90 per cent of the 
displacees did not receive replacement housing within the redevelopment site. For 
the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the number of families who lost their homes to event-
related development soared to 1.25 million. However, we should remain mindful of 
the underestimation of the real scale of displacement due to the conceptual 
challenges in defining displacement. There is a tendency to narrow the statistical 
scope to the last residents whereas residents who are prohibited from entering into 
the housing market or who are pressured to move out due to the gentrification effect 
surrounding the event facilities are very likely to be excluded2.   
                                                            
2 Those latter two types of displacement are what Peter Marcuse (1985) calls exclusionary 
displacement and displacement by pressure.  
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Those conservative numbers are capable of painting the long history of horrible 
violations of basic human rights to adequate housing on such an extraordinary scale 
by those mega-events across the globe. Despite the astonishing scale, there are only a 
handful of studies to this day that look into the heartbreaking effects of event-
induced displacement upon the residents who sacrificed their homes (Olds, 1998, 
Lenskyj, 2002, Greene, 2003, Porter, 2009, Shin and Li, 2013). This is perhaps partly 
due to the methodological difficulty to track down the displacees, as ‘by definition, 
displaced residents have disappeared from the very places where researchers and 
census-takers go to look for them’ (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 27). This however 
should not prevent us from taking our institutional responsibility and constantly 
trying to uncover the real human costs in hosting mega-events. Displacement matters 
because those displaced are equal human beings in our polity, rather than members 
of an impersonal political category comprised of the impacted population in political 
calculation. They are who ‘deserve[s] respect for their homes, livelihoods and well-
being, and treated with dignity and care’ (Porter, 2009: 398-399). It matters because 
of the vital importance of home for human survival. It seems to me unnecessary here 
to reiterate the import of home. We all need a home to dwell, to reproduce and to feel 
secure. As the most basic social and spatial unit, home is the first and most essential 
place in the development of our attachment structure and our identities since our 
early childhood. Home gives us an anchor. From here, we build our mazeway in the 
interaction with the external environment. This is the protective bubble that offers us 
familiarity, assurance and comfort (Fullilove, 2005). Losing it against our will is a 
threat to our ontological security in the world. It is likely to cause frustration, anger 
and grief as it is in our human nature to resist overly drastic change of familiar and 
meaningful environment (Marris, 1974). Although the acute pain may slowly ebb 
over time, the wounds stays with us and may never heal. Fullilove (2005) explains 
that this is because we keep retelling and reliving those past stories in our life. The 
human costs from displacement then put an even greater challenge to the political 
and moral legitimacy of hosting mega-events given that place annihilation is 
frequently justified by a cost-benefit calculus: how is it possible to put a price tag on 
people’s suffering and pain? How is it possible to legitimatise such suffering as 
necessary or inevitable for a transient spectacle?  
The thesis aims to question the underlying rationalities and interests in hosting mega-
events. It does so through an original and in-depth study of displacement caused by 
the Shanghai World Expo 2010 upon the families on the receiving end. The selection 
of Shanghai was practical because two giant sites called the Expo Homeland were 
purposely planned and built to rehouse eligible families from the Expo site and the 
Introduction │ 5 
 
resettlement sites. I take displacement at the heart of my inquiry because first, this is 
a hugely under-explored dark side of mega-events. By taking displacement seriously, 
I wish to debunk the myths surrounding mega-events and attack their legitimacy. The 
second reason in studying event-induced displacement comes from my 
disappointment in the theoretical and empirical impasse in researching displacement 
in general. Political economic theories in urban geography, especially Harvey’s 
thesis (1978, 1985a, 1985b) on urban process under capitalism, teach us a great deal 
about why displacement occurs. Yet, we know so little about how displacement is 
practised and contested; how it feels and what the consequences are.   
Although  China’s astonishing scale of chaiqian in the past several decades offers us 
a great opportunity to examine the process sysmetically and advance our knowledge 
of the social and affective dimensions of displacement, only a handful of studies 
have considered this direction and interrogated the politics and morality of chaiqian 
in Chinese cities. Qin’s (2013) recent work on domicide in Shanghai, a timely critical 
intervention, stands out.  Her ethnography, with rich details and numerous 
heartbreaking accounts of the pain of the evicted, suggests compellingly questions as 
to the human costs of Shanghai’s rapid neoliberal urbanism. I am deeply inspired by 
her courage to document state violence in Shanghai and to speak truth to power. A 
substantial critique of this outstanding study is hardly possible and frankly dishonest. 
However, I wish to suggest where critical scholarship could push further in order to 
enrich and sharpen our critiques of domicide in China and to dismiss compeletely 
those apathetic writing and violent ideas in the academic world. These points are also 
the contributions this thesis wishes to make. Firstly, seen from a Bourdieusin 
perspective, I refuse to make any concession to the rhetoric that chaiqian is not 
always a bad thing or that not all affected by demolition are victims of domicide 
because resettlement housing may improve the living conditions of many families or 
welcomed by some families. Under current accumulation regime, no displacees 
affected by demolition can escape from being vicitmised. To make a concession here 
is at significant risk of losing the edge of critical scholarship. It softens our critique 
of the systemic problems of the current land-centred accumulation regime. My focus 
on symbolic violence complicates the picture Qin critically examined. This is based 
on my theoretical commitment to reconcile objective and subjective truths of 
chaiqian. Second, one analytical thread of my thesis focuses on the infusion of 
material and symbolic violence rather than questions the legitimacy of abusive 
material violence alone as in Qin’s work. The focus on the symbolic dimension of 
violence relates to the third difference in our approach. Instead of treating the 
displacees as a unified group, I seek to show how symbolic violence exercised 
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through dominant values and discourses divides the displacees and prevents them 
from effective resistance.  This is another major contribution of this thesis.  
Domination, Domicide and Exceptionality  
In pursuing this line of reasoning, this thesis picked up several theoretical notions 
from existing literature. Chapter 2 offers a synthesis of the conceptual tools that 
assisted my understanding. Here, I shall summarise how those tools are used to 
advance the theoretical and empirical studies on displacement in this thesis.  
Following Bourdieu, the thesis follows the conflict tradition in social theories dating 
back to Karl Marx. Society is highly stratified to different social groups and their 
interests are always in conflict. Both dominated and dominant groups attempt to 
improve or maintain their respective positions in society. The contestation for power 
therefore is constant. Yet, it may take diverse forms, both material and symbolic. 
Given the uneven distribution of valued resources in society, the outcome of such 
struggles is likely to reproduce the existing social order, albeit sporadic resistance. 
Displacement is an expression of such conflicts. It is about the contestation in 
defining the meaning of lived spaces and reconfiguring urban spaces between the 
everyday users, the technocrats and the dominant elites. The repertories for the 
dominated are many, such as ideological indoctrination shaping the wants and 
desires of the displaced or abusive exercise of centralised, legitimate violence by the 
state terrorising them. Mega-events complicate the struggle by creating temporal and 
spatial exceptionality through association with nationalist sentiments. The pressure to 
deliver an event on time may be used as a powerful weapon to justify the exceptional 
circumstance of their plans and defend the transgression of political and moral norms 
in the event zones (Burbank et al., 2001, Shin, 2014). It increases the likelihood to 
resort to state violence to raze the planned area for the events. For those facing the 
threat of displacement, this means that they may not have enough time to mobilise 
political support and exhaust all potential channels before they are uprooted.  
The murder of homes by external forces is what Porteous and Smith (2001) call 
domicide, a moral evil as the authors claim. The reactions from the loss of home are 
compared to the loss of a beloved person (Fried, 1966, Marris, 1974). The domicide 
effects have been taken up in my thesis (see chapters 5 and 8), as I attempted to 
capture and represent grief throughout the thesis, as well as shared my concerns 
raised by a burgeoning literature on emotion and affect in human geography 
(Valentine, 1989, Pain, 2000, 2009, Bondi, 2005, Horton and Kraftl, 2009, Pile, 
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2010).  The ‘emotional turn’ (Bondi, 2005: 9) in geography is a critical intervention 
to the obsession with technological reason in literature, rendering the discipline ‘an 
emotionally barren terrain’, ‘devoid of passion’. Exclusion of emotions is a denial of 
them as ‘ways of knowing, being and doing’(Anderson and Smith, 2001: 7), an 
integrated part of our experience of the world. By quickly dismissing emotions, we 
are not only eschewing away a crucial source of knowledge but also missing the 
opportunity to understand places and events as lived, meaning-making processes 
(after Tyler, 2013: 4). Furthermore, an emotional register may shed light on lay 
normativity, allowing us to understand why things matter to people (Sayer, 2011). 
Emotions are not simply informative but also evaluative, conveying critical messages 
of values:  ‘our emotions are about something: we are proud or ashamed of 
something, angry about something, grateful to someone for doing something, and so 
on’ (Sayer, 2011: 36). Sayer (2005: 948) suggests that  ‘[s]entiments such as pride, 
shame, envy, resentment, compassion and contempt are not just forms of “affect” but 
are evaluative judgements of how people are being treated as regards what they value, 
that is things they consider to affect their well-being’. Grief syndrome as the thesis 
attempts to capture therefore is more than an overdue account of painful experiences 
of displacement. It is an additional access to the lay normativity of the displacees.   
In documenting the domicide experience, my approach is more in line with 
humanistic and feminist approaches to study emotion and affect and dismisses the 
approach that splits emotion and affect and pursues pre-cognitive, inhuman or 
transhuman, ungraspable affect under the influence of non-representation theory 
(NRT) (see Bondi, 2005, Pile, 2010). The hypocritical contradictions of NRT are 
forcefully outlined by Pile (2010). Affectual geography – if it exists as such –
pursuing non-representation theory is inherently contradictory for ‘first, that it is 
fundamentally a representational practise…second, that is not a theory, but a chain 
gang of metaphors (or resources, or assumptions)’ (Pile, 2010: 16). What also makes 
me rather doubtful of NRT approach lies in its emphasis on transhuman and the 
impersonal ‘things’(Thien, 2005). It strangely turns away from capturing human 
subjectivity: feelings, emotions and lived experiences (Lees and Baxter, 2011). This 
also exposes a major weakness of NRT’s political project – the unreal and apolitical 
basis (Thien, 2005). Moreover, NRT’s narrow focus on the assembled 
undifferentiated subject, as Cresswell (2012) rightly points out, is unable to attend to 
a group subject marked by class, gender and race. Furthermore, affect as 
manipulation mediated by infrastructure of public space brings greater troubles rather 
than opportunities for the lack of engagement with explicit reason in politics and the 
self-defeating political strategy and questionable ethics of mobilising affective 
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register and reflexive disclosure of such strategies (Barnett, 2008: 395). Its political 
focus on the ‘emerging’ and ‘eruption’ of creative possibility further reveals the 
limits of NRT - the incapacity of explaining the production and reproduction of some 
of the more durable structures and categories in shaping human life, experience and 
political agency (Cresswell, 2012); a central theme in Bourdieusian theory of 
practice which this thesis subscribes to.  
With humanistic geographers, I look into individual/collective subjective experience, 
the meaning-making process and the emotional qualities of places, a long standing 
theme in geography (Tuan, 1974, 1979, Relph, 1976). Particularly, I focus on the 
social and political construction of fear, uncertainties, anxieties, terror and suffering 
(Shirlow and Pain, 2003, Pain, 2009). The interplay between a dying and abandoned 
place inside the zone of domicide and the emotional life of the displacees constitute a 
major theme of my dissection of layered experience of displacement and eviction. 
This is done through a relational understanding of emotions in the exchange between 
the participants and myself (England, 1994, Rose, 1997), juxtaposing my feelings 
and observations with translated narratives from the displacees.   
My interests, however, have never rested on supplying a full list of emotions. Nor 
have I intended to entrap my work on individual subjective experiences. I wish to 
keep a balanced (maybe more) analysis of the concrete and the material, in contrast 
to the literature on emotions (also see Lees, 2002, Lees and Baxter, 2011). I also 
wish to highlight the political register in my thesis. The lived experiences of 
domicide is an entry point for me to explore more disturbing issues around morality, 
ethics and human conditions. This is done with Bourdieu’s radical intervention in 
‘ordinary suffering’ in my mind, locating the structural causes for personal pain 
(Bourdieu, 1999d).  There, I borrowed vocabularies from feminist contributions to 
emotions, and medical anthropological and sociological literature on suffering and 
pain (Scarry, 1985, Valentine, 1989, Pain, 2009, Kleiman and Kleinman, 1985, 
Kleinman, 2011, Kleinman et al., 1997, Sayad, 2004). The psychiatric notion of 
somatization underpins most of my analysis. Individual subjective experiences 
registered in the psychological bodies are reflective of and influenced by wider social 
relations. They can only be understood through critical engagement with social and 
cultural forces. By doing so, I wish to problematise and question the limits of abusive 
power and the enabling conditions for domicide. I wish to reveal the hidden power 
dynamics that facilitates domicide and paralyse progressive imagination. Three 
unsettling questions are of great significance to me. First, how abusive state power is 
exercised and experienced. Second, under what conditions morally and cognitively 
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competent bulldozer agents not only become indifferent to the suffering of others but 
also actively inflict pain on others. Third, why strong emotions of and energy from 
anger, distrust, frustration and resentment, failed to - but should have - translate into 
effective political actions.  These analytical questions mark the difference between 
my project from emotional and affectual geographies. Emotion is only a dimension 
of my ethnographic account, a point of departure from which I explore more deeply 
problematic issues on human nature, morality, politics and collective (in)actions.  
Dwelling on the notion of domicide, this thesis explores the mechanism, the process 
and the consequences of domicide. Influenced by Bourdieu, a major theoretical 
contribution of this thesis is to reconcile the subjective victimhood with objective 
victimisation in domicide. I argue that, by narrowing the lens to subjective 
experience of victimhood as in the original conceptualisation, we are missing the 
opportunity to interrogate the injustice produced by the urban process under 
capitalism. In taking the approach I am proposing in this thesis, an important step is 
to investigate the cycle of disinvestment and reinvestment in relentlessly shaping the 
built environment in the historical and geographical context. This then needs to be 
reconciled with the variegated subjective experiences of the inhabitants to understand 
the conditions that engender political opportunities of domicide, which sometimes 
occurs with consent from those who are about to lose their homes. In doing so, we 
can also dismiss the rhetoric of ‘happy’ movers or that displacement is not a bad 
thing. Moreover, it allows us to tease out the mechanisms that reproduce an 
alienating and oppressive socio-spatial order.  
Mega‐events in late Socialist China: ‘City makes life better’3 
Between 2008 and 2010, two global mega-events and one regional sporting event 
were hosted in China’s three regional centres, namely the Beijing Olympics, the 
Shanghai World Expo and the Guangzhou Asian Games. As Horne (2007) 
legitimately comments, for cities from developing countries, hosting mega-events is 
rather contentious given much more acute problems of poverty and inequality 
confronted by much of the population. To understand the event fetish of Chinese 
cities, we need first to have an overview of the urban conditions of late socialist 
China. The most prominent feature is privatisation and commodification (Zhang and 
Ong, 2008, Wu et al., 2007). Ranging from labour, land, housing, socialist welfare to 
state-owned enterprises, the reform championed by the architect of the socialist 
                                                            
3 This is a literal translation of the Chinese version of the Expo slogan.  The official English 
translation is the title of this thesis, ‘Better City, Better Life’.    
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market economy, Deng Xiaoping, has systematically put a price tag on everything 
and manufactured a whole nation of consumer subjects to compete and fight against 
each other in securing resources for their own well-being. Meanwhile, substantial 
public wealth has been transferred to the ruling elites to complete the process of 
primitive accumulation and exacerbate social inequalities created under the socialist 
regime in contemporary Chinese cities. These processes facilitate the production of 
class dominance of the former political elites married to the private entrepreneurs 
over the dispossessed (Harvey, 2005a). It reflects in urban geography and popular 
consciousness. Former socialist cities of production undergo rapid gentrification and 
property-led development to become cities of consumption. This is a product of the 
sweet love triangle between lawyers, the state and developers. Their coalition 
constantly (re)constructs political institutions and regulatory frameworks to lubricate 
the flow of capital and to discipline the new consumer subjects by the ethics of 
private property ownership. 
The rapid changes in Chinese cities are legitimatised by nationalism, 
developmentalism and socialism (Lin, 2006). It is the dynamic and constant 
competition, conflicts and negotiation between them that distinguish urban process in 
Chinese cities and it is also perhaps because of this, observers tend to emphasise the 
Chinese characteristics in describing actually existing neoliberalism in China (Kipnis, 
2007, He and Wu, 2009). The overriding strength of nationalism derives from 
China’s colonial history and the strand under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CPC) paints the party as the only agent capable of leading the 
whole nation to prosperity. Developmental state actively identified with nationalist 
objectives and values. City-building as a nation-building project therefore is widely 
celebrated, as epitome by the slogan of the Shanghai Expo, ‘city makes life better’. 
But the developmentalist pathway is checked by the withering influence of socialism 
in however limited way, either to pacify social unrest or to deal with the destructive 
forces of the market. Displacement as the prelude to development therefore is 
inherently contradictory in ideology in China. It requires the state to negotiate the 
tension between developmentalist goals and socialist values. The structural 
equilibrium between these three ideological discourses effectively decides the fate of 
the displacees.  
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Figure 1.1: Geographical Location of Shanghai  
Source: National Geographic (2010) 
 
Like cities in advanced capitalist economies, mega-events are a tool for speculative 
construction of urban space in Chinese cities. Broudehoux (2007, 2010) argues that 
those events are to legitimatise further large-scale urban transformation and 
centralise the power and wealth in the hands of the dominant class. In nature, the 
event-led development demonstrates China’s full commitment to capitalist economy 
under the authoritarian regime. But such an agenda is concealed through 
identification with the nationalist dream for cutting off the humiliating colonial past 
and re-rising as the centre of the kingdoms. This apparent disequilibrium of 
ideological forces foreshadows the doomed loss of the displacees in event-induced 
displacement.  
To my knowledge, there was no strategic intent in distributing three events exactly in 
three regional centres of China. Shanghai was chosen as the Chinese candidate city 
for hosting an Expo in the early 1980s. The city of Shanghai is the most populated in 
China. The territory is 6,340 square kilometres and inhabited by more than 23 
million inhabitants according to the 6th National Census (2011), of which more than 
one-third are migrants from other cities. In fact, most of the first generation dwellers 
in Shanghai are migrants. The city is socially and spatially hierarchised owing to its 
colonial past, reinforced under state socialism and solidified by the neoliberal 
transition. Four dichotomies may capture the urban social geography of Shanghai, 
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including the hierarchy between xiazhijiao (lower quarter) and shangzhijiao (upper 
quarter), between Pudong and Puxi, between the city proper (Shanghai) and the 
countryside (xiangxia), and between Shanghainese and waidi ren (migrants). The 
hierarchy of the first bears the imprint of colonial land regime, segregating the city 
into relatively well-developed international settlements and deprived ‘informal’ 
settlements under the Chinese government. The second and the third are closely 
associated. The city is cut through by the Huangpu River and the east bank of the 
river (Pudong) was largely vast farmland (xiangxia) until the property-led 
development since the 1990s rapidly transformed the landscape and slowly levelled 
up the west bank of the river (Puxi). This spatial hierarchy is reflected in popular 
consciousness and is reinforced by place identity. As the old saying in Shanghai goes, 
‘one would rather have a bed in Puxi than a flat in Pudong’. Back then, Pudong was 
synonymous with xiangxia. Xiangxia is inferior to urban living and in everyday 
usage amongst the locals; Shanghai is a restricted spatial reference to Puxi. The last 
category is a product of China’s hukou institution, which ties citizenship rights to 
one’s personal institutional identity registered at birth. Migrants are excluded from 
access to citizenship benefits for their lack of local hukou status. Both xiangxia ren 
and waidi ren are pejorative terms in local dialect. The siting of the Expo exploits the 
tropes associated with all four categories. The Expo Park is situated on both banks of 
the river, although it eats up more land in Pudong. In dominant discourse, this is 
known as Shanghai’s xiazhijiao. Owing to the cheap rent there, it is also the foothold 
for many migrants. To clear the land, more than 18,000 households (official account) 
were displaced to resettlement sites in Shanghai’s suburbia. This is of course an 
under-report of the actual scale of displacement. Migrants without legal titles to 
either the land or the properties were unlikely to be counted.   
Thesis Structure and Outline  
This section provides a road map to the thesis ahead. First, let me put forth more 
explicitly the simple overarching questions that guide my inquiry throughout the 
thesis: how were people displaced by the Expo regime, and what are the 
consequences? My answer to these questions dissects the mechanics of power in 
destroying people’s homes and addresses the moral implications for urban politics. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into seven substantial chapters, followed by a 
short conclusion chapter.  
I dismiss the false intellectual rupture between theories, methodology and empirical 
studies. I compromised by writing two separate chapters on theory or methodology. 
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Yet, in my writing of these two chapters, I mix theoretical inspiration and 
methodological guidance in resistance to the rules on writing. Chapter 2 serves as a 
mysterious beginning of this academic journey but many parts were written in 
retrospection. It reviews existing theoretical approaches to event-induced chaiqian. It 
contextualises the thesis in the academic debate and distinguishes the thesis from 
existing studies by its focus on power, domination, violence and suffering. 
Anchoring on Bourdieu’s work on capital, field, habitus, symbolic power and 
symbolic violence, it dialogues with different theoretical strands in understanding the 
operation of power and the mechanism that simultaneously obscures and secures 
domination in modern society. Building on this work, it then expands the notion of 
domicide and engages with Marxist literature on urban process. Chapter 3 defends 
the use of mixed methods for investigating Expo-induced chaiqian in Shanghai. It 
outlines my theoretical, political and ethical commitments in mixing methods 
pragmatically. Much of this chapter is invested in my reporting on the fieldwork 
dynamics in affecting the construction of knowledge for this thesis.  
Chapters 4 to 8 provide an in-depth description and critique of the violent process 
and the injustice people suffered from the Expo-induced displacement. They are 
organised in the typical temporal sequence: before, during and after displacement. I 
wish I had the opportunity to write in real time so that I could document the process 
of displacement without creating this temporal rupture. To compensate for this 
limitation, I stretched the ‘during displacement’ to three individual chapters, each 
focusing on a different facet of displacement. All empirical chapters are guided by an 
independent sub-question in support of the overarching research question. Chapter 4 
challenges the legitimating discourses on the choice for the Expo site. It reconstructs 
the history of the lived place on the Expo site as a process of long-term under-
investment, and examines the ambivalent experiences and attitudes toward a 
wholesale demolition amongst the dwellers, which has been hijacked by the ruling 
elites in legitimating the siting choice and undermining the social solidarity between 
the dispossessed. Chapter 5 is an original contribution, which examines the 
oppressive experiences of displacement as a result of temporal and spatial 
domination in a zone of domicide. It points out the variegated ways of the displacees 
in appropriating the domicide time and space, and highlights the dividing and 
disciplinary effects upon the political agency of the displacees. Building on the 
domicide experiences as documented in chapter 5, chapter 6 questions the moral 
corruption of different agents and organisations in inflicting excessive and 
unnecessary pain on the displacees. Specifically, it looks into the exceptionality 
created by the Expo in speeding up political process and revoking moral and political 
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limits to naturalise violent tactics in evicting people out of their homes. Chapter 7 
slightly turns the analytical angle and examines the interaction between the 
displacees and the displacers in deciding the fate of the displacees. It discusses 
diverse repressive tactics in dividing and atomising the displacees, and forcing them 
to carefully deploy resisting strategies without overly transcending the political 
boundary. An important observation on the breakdown of families as a result of 
manufactured conflicts over compensation is discussed to question further the moral 
limits of displacement and underscores the contradictions of China’s accumulation 
regime. The final chapter reports the economic, social, emotional, physical and 
political impacts of displacement upon the displacees. It shows how planning and 
governing of the resettlement neighbourhoods create an even more alienating and 
oppressive structure and perpetuate the injustice the displacees had already unfairly 
endured.   
The overall argument of this thesis contends that the Shanghai World Expo, through 
the association with normative nationalist discourses, created important conditions to 
revoke political, moral and legal boundaries in the process of legitimatising and 
naturalising the violence against the displacees, and undermining the displacees’ 
capacity to defend their own homes more effectively. The submission of the 
displacees to the dominant power enables the production and reproduction of a 
repressive social and spatial structure in contemporary Shanghai. I hope those 
findings and arguments from this thesis can offer a fresh perspective on the meaning 
of domicide, the importance of academic research on domicide and possible ways 
that we can change the oppressive structure that produces domicide. 
 







This chapter introduces the concepts and theories that have informed the construction 
of the object of this study, the methodology I adopted to grapple with the 
complicated social reality and the interpretation of the experiences of the people I 
worked with. Locating this chapter at this juncture is misleading for at least two 
reasons. First, it creates a false logical rupture and subordinates to the false 
separation of theories, epistemologies, methodologies and empirical case studies that 
structure academic writing (Wacquant, 1992: 26-35, Auyero, 2000: 18). This leads to 
a second problem—the conflation of opus operatum and modus operandi in research 
practices (Bourdieu, 1990b: 52, Beauregard, 2012). It does not map out how the 
conceptual tools I use in later sections come to assist me at different moments in 
problematising ‘legitimate’ approaches, pursuing a certain analytical direction and 
shaping my understanding. Nor does it show how my (re)reading in the course of the 
project and more importantly my fieldwork experiences on mega-events, chaiqian 
and domicide led me to think with/about many theoretical tools in a different light. In 
fact, speaking from my own experiences as a disciplinary and cultural outsider, most 
of my understanding of theories and concepts, especially the ‘Western’ ones, is 
derived from actual doing and wrestling with them in the field, instead of inter-
textual reading. This is not to say I approached my fieldwork with no theories in 
‘How artificial the ordinary oppositions between theory and research, between 
qualitative and quantitative methods, between statistical recording and 
ethnographic observation, between the grasping of structures and the 
construction of individual can be. These alternatives have no function other than 
to provide a justification for the vacuous and resounding abstractions of 
theoreticism and for the falsely rigorous observations of positivism, or, as the 
divisions between economists, anthropologists, historians and sociologists, to 
legitimatise the limits of competency: that is to say that they function in the 
manner of a social censorship, liable to forbid us to grasp a truth which resides 
precisely in the relations between realms of practice thus arbitrarily separated .’ 
Bourdieu and de Saint Martin in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology  
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mind but instead, to caution against the view of the relationship between theory and 
practice as a simple two-way traffic. Instead, as Wacquant interprets Bourdieu’s 
approach to social reality, theory and practice should ‘interpenetrate each other 
entirely’ (1992: 35). Therefore, what is presented in the remainder of this chapter is 
less a product of logical cognitive process of reading, synthesising, critiquing 
existing scholarship and proposing a research agenda. It is also less an appropriate a 
priori theoretical frame that threads neatly separate lines of analysis later. It is more 
an ongoing retrospective reflection upon my engagement with theoretical notions and 
fieldwork experiences in understanding the existence, prevalence, persistence and 
consequence of chaiqian or a more favoured term, domicide, in contemporary 
Chinese cities. Despite my ‘revolting’ impulse, I felt it necessary and practical to 
write a chapter as such. It is necessary in that it contextualises my work and locates 
the common theoretical groundwork to invite intellectual inspiration and reflexivity. 
It is practical because I rarely dwell on theories in later chapters, and this chapter 
could lay down the roots of my thoughts.  
In what follows, I shall first discuss my stance on theories and situate my work in the 
theoretical debates. Based in human geography, I however take ‘human’ more 
seriously than ‘geography’ in defining my project considering the blurred 
disciplinary boundaries. By ‘human’, I pursue my normative inquiry through the lens 
of power, domination, violence and injustice, in the field of both my project and the 
academia in general. This discussion is followed by an introduction of the key 
conceptual tools I borrowed from existing scholarship to develop my thoughts on 
mega-events, chaiqian and domicide in Shanghai. It is organised around the 
mechanisms and processes of urban struggle for controlling time and space. These 
conceptual tools are then used to stretch the notion of domicide in a neoliberalising 
China. Following most critical scholarship (Porteous and Smith, 2001, Slater, 2006, 
2009, Manzo et al., 2008), a similar argument is made to appreciate the full 
dimension of the meaning of home in order to stop domicide.  
Situating the Debate on Mega‐events Induced Domicide  
In An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, an extraordinary pedagogical piece combined 
with Wacquant’s dissection of Bourdieu’s theoretical notions and the transcriptions 
of ‘toe-to-toe’ discussions between Bourdieu and his readers in Chicago and Paris, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant patiently teach a method to think deliberately, responsibly, 
reflexively and politically about the social reality. I take many important lessons 
from this work, but for the purpose of this section, I shall narrow to three interrelated 
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points on research practices. First, the social world should be treated as a whole or a 
system rather than fragmented bits and pieces under the purview of hierarchised 
minute division of academic labour (ibid, 27). Bourdieu invests much of his 
theoretical energy in reconciling (sometimes quite contradictorily) the ontological 
and epistemological binaries (e.g. subject/object, materiality/symbolic representation, 
structure/agency, constructivists/objectivists, etc.) that prevent us from uncovering 
the hidden pattern of social structure and the mechanisms of its (re)production and 
transformation (ibid, 7). In practising his own sociological studies, he transcends the 
dualisms and theorises the social world as a total science of social practice (ibid, 27). 
His approach focuses on both the social actors and the social structure via a genetic 
and relational approach. This is most aptly exemplified by his notion of habitus, 
which is defined as ‘the dialectic of the internalisation of externality and the 
externalisation of internality’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). This conceptualisation eschews 
away ‘the choice between a structuralism without subject and the philosophy of the 
subject’ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 10). To treat practice as a whole, as Bourdieu encourages 
us, is to glue the ‘fragmented’ life artificially produced by the division of academic 
labour and to recover the logics in relation to the actors and the structure.  
Second, it is important to treat theories and methods in an integrated, pragmatic and 
critical way in the process of constructing and solving analytical problems rather 
than the other way around. Theories occupy a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s (1992a: 248) 
work, without which he contends that a researcher becomes ‘little more than an 
amateur, an autodidactic, self-taught, spontaneous sociologist’. But he holds theories 
accountable to social reality, structuring and being structured by the research practice. 
According to Wacquant (1992: 31), theories to Bourdieu are heuristic tool kits to 
wrestle with analytical puzzles. Bourdieu treats his own theorisation effort in the 
same way that is to develop ‘a sociological method consisting essentially in a manner 
of posing problems, in a parsimonious set of conceptual tools and procedures for 
constructing objects and for transferring knowledge gleaned in one area of inquiry 
into another’ (ibid, 5). His attempt is to resuscitate the practical value of social 
sciences, ‘preventing people from being able to utter all kinds of nonsense about the 
social world’ (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1992: 51). This may have been influenced by 
his own political engagement and sense of intellectual responsibility, although 
largely through his writing rather than direct action. Bourdieu’s oeuvre has always 
been concerned with social problems, especially social stratification and political 
struggle. He refuses to label himself as a political scientist but always thinks 
politically (Swartz, 2013: 4). The political and moral dimension of academic research 
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alerts us to material and symbolic forms of domination, inflicting sufferings on 
individual and collective bodies.  
Third, to treat theories and research critically, as Bourdieu alerts us, we need to break 
with common sense concepts in order to avoid subordinating to the doxa of both folk 
discourses and analytical constructs (Bourdieu, 1992a: 248, Wacquant, 2008: 8). 
Bourdieu is sensitive to symbolic practices in producing social stratification and 
imposing symbolic violence. For him, the academic field is not an exception. 
Rigorous research in his eyes must reflect upon both the objects of inquiry (the 
‘legitimate’ and ‘authoritative’ voices, the structure of the academic field) and the 
philosophical positionality of inquirers throughout the knowledge-producing process. 
He wants us to be aware of the symbolic domination and symbolic violence in the 
academic field as well and encourages us to think about the construction of social 
problems, the classification systems and the censorships in academic practice.  
If we take Bourdieu seriously, we should not read Bourdieu’s theories as closed 
thoughts, either. His theoretical notions are for us to think with, to improvise and to 
challenge. To think with him, the first question that must be addressed is the triad 
relationship between mega-events, China and chaiqian. Each operates as a distinctive 
academic field, requires a particular set of knowledge and possesses its own logic. 
My project locates in this overlapping area, and I take this overlap with great caution. 
This may be partly due to my academic training in Event Management and 
Psychology as an undergraduate, my conversion to urban studies thus far, and my 
personal experience losing my home three times in two countries within six months 
in the formative year of this study. My personal background and my fieldwork 
experience slowly led to my distance from existing studies on similar topics. First, 
existing studies on mega-events rarely explore the global event industry in 
structuring how this game is played. With their temporalities and spatialities, modern 
mega-events have established their own organisations, rules, values and politics, 
which structure the event-led development in different localities (Roche, 2000, 
Lenskyj, 2000, Close et al., 2006, Liao and Pitts, 2006, Gold and Gold, 2010). The 
global structure of mega-events industry is at best sidestepped to the background or 
worse conveniently forgotten in analysis. Academic discourses along the line of 
urban restructuring, urban regime theory or urban growth machine theory might have 
some merit in explaining the underlying motivations of city authorities for bidding 
and hosting a mega-event (Cochrane et al., 1996, Burbank et al., 2001, Essex and 
Chalkley, 2004, Shin, 2014), but fail to examine the internal cultural, geopolitical 
and economic logics of the mega-events industry in structuring the articulation of 
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event-led development (including event-induced displacement) in different places 
and times.1 There is a necessity to relink the global and the local and put the local 
articulation back into the global mega-event industry in time and place. Particularly, 
the role of the ‘event circus’, such as the global event producers, the global elites, the 
industry insiders (e.g. IOC, BIE), and the logic of the event industry (e.g. the ecology, 
temporalities and spatialities of mega-events) must be comprehended to avoid 
premature judgement and construction of analytical problems. One example here 
would be the discrepancy in the English translation of the Shanghai Expo slogan (i.e. 
Better city, Better life versus city makes life better). Observers have given too much 
credit to the Chinese state, citing it as more evidence of the Chinese state’s 
ideological pedagogy. Indeed, urbanisation in China is legitimatised by many 
ideological myths. But, if we probe into the production of this slogan, especially the 
role of global event producers in pushing Expo organisers in Shanghai to theorise in 
this direction, we probably would question, like Bourdieu, about the imperialist 
reason for ‘urbanisation’ and ‘city’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999) and the 
translation of these ideas in contributing and legitimising Chinese ideological 
artifice2 (Bourdieu, 1999b).  
Second, I keep a vigilant eye to the economic and legal construction of the chaiqian 
problem, which dominates the analytical, media and popular discourses. Both lines 
of reasoning are constructed with good intention with a shared interest to protect the 
rights of the displaced, but the danger in ready subscription to them is far greater. 
They run the risk of blinding us to see chaiqian as a system, a process, and a 
complete destruction of the displacees’ life world (Hsing, 2010b), and both are 
                                                            
1 To the best of my knowledge, there is only one book that examines the politics and power struggle of 
the Olympic industry and questions the legitimacy of the Olympics in hijacking local political 
priorities (Lenskyj, 2000). Most research on mega-events was conducted after a city was awarded with 
an event and focuses on the politics on local level. Research rarely looks into the rule of game of those 
events and the politics within the mega-event industry itself in structuring urban politics in bidding 
and hosting cities, and in facilitating the flow of knowledge and imperialist reason. This is perhaps 
due to the difficulty in accessing global political, economic and cultural elites, especially those 
diplomats, global corporation managers and personnel at BIE or IOC, and in tracking such complex 
flow of people and knowledge. It may also because most political dealings, especially during bidding 
process, are conducted through diplomatic lobbying visits with restricted access to outside observers. 
Let me use an example here to clarify further my point. In order to bid on hosting an Expo or vote for 
a city to host an Expo, nations have to pay a membership fee to BIE. As long as the membership fee is 
paid, there are no screening criteria for inclusion or exclusion of a nation from becoming a member 
state of BIE. Many bidding cities took advantage of this, and recruited other countries to join BIE and 
vote for them, including Shanghai, through economic or extra-economic means. The legitimacy and 
the implication of such activities for local politics have rarely been explored in existing literature.  
2 Unfortunately, I had to cut out my discussion on the circulation of ideas and the Expo as a Trojan 
horse for global business elites during the bidding process owing to the word count limit. I only 
retained a small portion of the role of global event producers concerning the Expo’s siting choice in 
this thesis (see chapter 6).  
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capable of exercising symbolic domination and perpetuating social injustice. The 
economic reasoning centres on compensation (Wu, 2004, Phan, 2005, Zhang, 2005, 
Chen, 2007, Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Ho, 2013b, Wang et al., 2013),  either 
considering compensation as the root of many social conflicts or pursuing just 
compensation as a solution. It fails to question the social meaning and the form of 
compensation (Zelizer, 1994).  As Hartman (2002: 109) rightly points out, 
‘displacement at heart is a political process, having to do with operant values and 
power in the society’. To compensate, we need to find a common measurement to 
value the loss. Given the power structure in the process of chaiqian, it is at great 
danger to subordinate to the bourgeoisie value system and to the dictatorship of 
money. The problem is that chaiqian or displacement must be seen as an erasure of 
people’s past, a destruction of their present and an engineering of their future. The 
very idea to put a price tag on this process therefore is morally and politically 
problematic. Many forms of suffering and implication are impossible to quantify and 
monetize. Even if we concede to accept compensation for the sake of finding a 
common ground with the perpetrators who want people’s land and homes, we still 
need to question the definition and the supply of compensatory options. Existing 
studies are overly restrictive on this point, narrowing their vision to either in-kind 
compensation or monetary compensation as in official categorisation without 
wrestling with the symbolic domination from reduced choice and without uncovering 
the many ‘accents’, if I may borrow from Bakhtin (1981: 293), in speaking about 
either of them. Words are neither neutral nor empty but are appropriated by people 
with diverse biographical backgrounds in different styles and genres. Compensation 
is one euphemism many displacees I talked to recognised astutely (see chapter 7).  
The economic claim in intellectual and popular discussion is frequently backed up 
implicitly by the legal reasoning premised on the violation of legal rights to 
demolished properties, to legal recourse and to the bodies of the displaced. It is 
rigorously pursued by human rights organisations, such as COHRE (2007, 2008) and 
legal professionals (Wilhelm, 2004, Erie, 2012, Mertha, 2009b, Pils, 2005, 2009a, 
2009b), joined by scholars interested in the legal and institutional construction of 
property rights regime in Chinese society (Zhu, 2002, Deng, 2009, He et al., 2009).  
Central to their concern is the underlying ideological agenda in constructing the ‘rule 
of law’ project in Chinese society whilst in practice the state disrespects the very 
legal project it seeks to construct. A typical narrative will trace the roots of chaiqian 
conflicts to the ambiguities in Chinese land system (Ho, 2001), the weak 
enforcement of legal protection (Shih, 2010a, 2010b), the rampant corruption and 
coercion  in Chinese politics (Qin, 2013, Lin, 2009) and the growing legal and rights 
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consciousness of the masses (Erie, 2012, Shin, 2013: 1067, 1083). As a legal 
problem, solutions are frequently found in legal and institutional channels, either 
through strict enforcement of human rights declaration or a clearer demarcation of 
property rights (He et al., 2009). Or, in a more concerted way, through tackling, 
amongst others, the fiscal arrangement, the inconsistency in Chinese regulatory 
systems, cadre evaluation system, chaiqian regulation and hukou institution (Zhou, 
2013, Yep, 2013).   
As one of Maoist legacies, hukou system is decisive in reproducing social hierarchies 
in Chinese society and a driving force in China’s rapid growth (Wang, 2005, Chan, 
2009, Li et al., 2010). People are born unequal foremost because of institutionally 
prescribed identities, tying one’s life chance with one’s birthplace and family 
membership. Legally, all Chinese citizens must register their hukou with local police 
within a month after their birth providing that the parents meet all requirements 
specified by the one-child policy and obtained all the necessary approvals. Hukou 
first functions as a system in monitoring population mobility. But more importantly, 
it creates and maintains the graduated citizenship through the creation of various 
hukou categories. It first splits the population into agricultural hukou and non-
agricultural hukou holders regardless of actual division of labour and confines each 
group to differentiated access to social welfares. Agricultural hukou holders, most 
farmers and rural dwellers, have always been discriminated against. They are 
deprived of universal coverage of social securities. Within a given locality, 
population are further categorised into permanent hukou holders and temporary 
hukou holders. The former include collective hukou holders who register with their 
institutions and can access territorially-funded social welfares like local permanent 
hukou holders with restrictions, especially in terms of public housing access. 
Temporary hukou holders on the other hand are denied access to public-funded 
welfare within a given city. The importance of hukou in chaiqian is expressed by the 
‘head count’ compensation method, the dividing effect on the solidarity of the 
displacees and the grievances strategising on hukou-induced exclusions.  
I am on the same page with many diagnoses here yet I do not agree with their 
treatment. The prescription on property rights is simply a poison, whilst the others 
are pain relief. Here, the debates on Right to the City offer some pointers for a 
cautious critique of their limitations. As in Lefebvre’s  (1996) vision, the right to 
dwell in the city transcends legal rights. It is a moral right to use and to inhabit the 
city (Marcuse, 2009), and to participate in the decision-making that produces urban 
spaces (Purcell, 2002, 2003). By reducing a moral right to a legal right, in the context 
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of Chinese legal culture where rights are defined as interests in a utilitarian and 
majoritarian way3 (Peerenboom, 1995), it not only narrows the politics and morality 
of chaiqian to a distributive politics about ‘who gets what, how and when’ (Lasswell, 
1950), but also concedes to the domination of the state in weighing what and whose 
rights count in the bureaucratic field. The bureaucratisation of social justice, as 
Young (1990: 75) contends, ‘makes it difficult to see the institutional rules, practices 
and social relations that support domination and oppression, much less to challenge 
them’. The other problem of legal reasoning lies in the privatisation of rights. Legal 
rights, especially on chaiqian, is primarily conceptualised as individual rights and 
encourages possessive individualism. The right to the city is a collective right, as 
Harvey (2008) argues, a democratic control of the production of urban space. The 
risk of subscribing to legal doctrine is to undermine the political solidarity and 
further depoliticise public life (Young, 1990). 
Despite my appreciation for the transformative vision of Right to the City, I kept my 
reservation on using this slogan as a normative frame to understand and envisage 
chaiqian politics in China. My concerns are two-fold. First, we need to be more 
sensitive to the conceptual and linguistic ambuiguities of rights, teasing out what is 
in a right in the Chinese context. For instance, regardless of strikingly differnet 
approaches and perspectives, both Wallerstein and Ren’s (2009) and Shin’s (2013) 
papers in identifying with the dedate on Right to the City in the Western intellectual 
discourses failed to engage with a most obvious yet most critically important issue 
that power (权力) and right (权利) pronounce in the same way in Chinese Mandarin 
and require considerable deliberation to differentiate them when penning down as 
well. Many people also use quan (权), which can be interpreted as as power and/or 
rights. In everyday usage, they are also conflated with interests (权益, quanyi) and 
rites or moral principles (理, li)(Wang, 1980, Li, 2010). An absence of discussion on 
this issue not only missed the opportunity to provide us with a nuanced 
understanding of the political agency of the marginalised in Chinese cities but also 
run great risk of misinterpretation or distortion of political grienvances in lay 
normative discourses. It then leads to further concern over the validity and ethics 
underlying the rallying call for Right to the City to China. Second, it seems to me 
critically important to factor into the political context – both the political opportunity 
structure and microphysics of power - and such ambiguities in structuring and 
                                                            
3 ‘Rights’ is an imported vocabulary in Chinese language and translated as quan li. Quan can be used 
as a noun referring to power or authority, or as a verb referring to weighing or calculating, while li 
means interests, frequently associated with private and individual interests. The legal construct of 
quan li in Chinese invites the power of the state to weigh in on whose rights and what rights count.  
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complicating the power dynamics, the articulation of political claims and the 
repertoire of protesting actions. Authors mentioned above were insensitive to the 
disparities between ‘public transcripts’ and ‘hidden transcripts’ of contentious 
actions in power-laden contexts4 (Scott, 1990).  
My critique on this latter point is also relevant to the debate on the meaning and 
significance of contentious actions from a large segement of marginalised population 
in China. Academic discussion here has been trenched by the debates on rule 
consciousness versus rights consciousness in contentious claim making. On the rule 
consciousness side, stands Perry (2008), who contends that contentious framing is 
entrapped in Confucius ethics and struggles are largely confined to subsistence 
without radically challenging the authority and the power of the state (also Shin, 
2013). On the right consciousness side, we find O’Brian and Li (2006) and Goldman 
(2005, 2007) who sense more progressive potential of grassroots struggles for socio-
economic security and political citizenship in challenging domination of the state and 
growing into a counter-hegemony project. The discrepancy is less a result of their 
different conceptualisation and interpretation of rights in political claims than of their 
different degrees of sensitivity to microphysics of power in shaping the political 
agency of the disenfranchised when putting forward their ‘public transcripts’  on the 
one hand and to the entanglement of power, interests, rights and rites in political 
claim-making on the other (Li, 2010). To understand political dissents in chaiqian 
politics, we need to put it back to the context of a decentralised, fragmented and 
authoritarian Leninist party-state (Nathan, 2003, Mertha, 2009a), especially the 
abusive use of violence in maintaining ‘social harmony’, which disciplines the 
articulation of political dissents from those dispossessed. Political risks associated 
with radical claims affect people’s perception of political opportunities, of achievable 
political outcomes, and of tolerable and effective contentious repertoires (McAdam 
et al., 2001). More progressive claim is not absent in popular consciousness but is 
more frequently and likely to be repressed or restrained by the perceived risks of 
political repression, disciplined by their perceived position in the social space, or 
replaced by more effective contentious actions toward practical interests, as a 
political lesson learnt from their past memories of state violence or from their recent 
experience of revolting against the state. In many cases, progressive political claims, 
such as challenging land ownership structure, petitioning for democracy, or asserting 
greater control of the accumulation process, are intentionally framed through the 
                                                            
4 Scott (1990: 2) uses ‘public’ in reference to ‘action that is openly avowed to the other party in the 
power relationship’ whilst ‘transcript’ refers to ‘a complete record of what was said’, including both 
speechacts and ‘nonspeech acts such as gestures and expressions’.   
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language of socio-economic rights or redistributive politics, borrowing the 
vocabularies and grammar of official, legitimate discourses. Their individual or 
collective political actions may also be organised and confined to bureaucratic 
channels5. They do so however out of their feel of the game to minimise the risks and 
to legitimatise their contentious actions (see Shi, 2007, Hsing, 2010b). Even in 
making their seemingly tame political claims, if we read and listen carefully to their 
public transcripts, we may decipher much more complicated messages in their 
grievances and claims, which draw upon their life biographies, cultural memories 
and lingering socialist value system to construct a mixed sense of entitlement, 
capable of stretching the political system and growing to counter the dominant value 
system in the long run (Abramson, 2011). This is not a complete conversion to 
interpretivism, but a call for critical eye to the confusion and ambiguities in political 
framing laboured by the Chinese language and popular political culture. There is a 
great danger in separating rights, power, rites and interests to understand popular 
grievances and political claims, and arguing one is more politically promising than 
the other. The tamed means does not necessarily correspond to their ultimate ends 
(also see Scott, 1985). It is imperative to take into account the power structure of 
chaiqian field, the political situation of domicide, the history of life struggles and 
home-making practices, and the process of political actions before we fully 
appreciate the significance of their way of understanding the state-society 
relationship and of defending their interests and rights. To this agenda, we will need 
to treat those practices in making, structuring and transforming the life world as a 
system in order to understand the meaning of chaiqian to the displaced. In this vein, 
we will have to take into account not only the regulatory framework on land, housing 
and hukou, but also the demarcation of family boundary, arrangement of familial 
obligation, family inheritance, one-child policy, employment, education, marriage 
practices, social security, social relations, political embeddness, etc. It is important to 
look into how the displaced negotiate those seemingly disparate matters and how 
such negotiations affect their political agency in practice.   
In short, my intent here is not to argue for China exceptionalism or methodological 
empiricism but warns about the risk of the ‘creative destruction through Anglo-
American hegemony’(Aalbers, 2004: 319), and the imperialist or elitist reasoning - 
roots of symbolic domination in the academic field. After all, as McCann (2002) 
                                                            
5 According to the activists I worked with, their street demonstrations or sit-ins were always 
suppressed by police force. In such confrontational situations, the police or the security personnel 
employed by the state agencies were not conservative in physically assaulting them. Even in formal, 
institutionally tolerated and less confrontational petitioning, ‘transgressions’ frequently led to abusive 
physical violence.    
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points out, Lefebvre intentionally leaves his radical vision open and welcomes 
different possibilities. As such, we should be more sensitive to the local political and 
cultural context in structuring the pathways to democratise the production of space, 
which in turn structures and transforms the political life. I appreciate the benefits of 
the rule consciousness versus rights consciousness debate for either pointing out the 
mechanism of durable injustice or suggesting possible routes for more progressive 
actions. My point on the not so neat division of socio-economic rights and political 
rights in popular grievances only states my disagreement with existing debates, 
calling for more attention to the process of political actions. However, I wish to go 
beyond this critique as it does not go far enough to question the conditions that 
produce such grievances in the first place. Put it another way, what puts people in 
this precarious situation in the first place and forces them to fight against all the odds? 
This is not a tautological question whose answer simply repeats the legal and 
economic reasoning I have outlined. At issue in chaiqian politics are the questions: 
who has the right to take away other’s history and identity, and what makes such 
callous decisions possible and so easy? Neither approach as far as I am concerned 
addresses adequately the limits of state power and the conditions that obscure as well 
as secure the illegitimate exercise of state power. The mechanics of power is the 
fundamental theme underlying this present study. It wishes to illuminate the 
mechanisms of power in the process of event-led accumulation that corrupt moral 
and political agencies in the wholesale destruction of people’s homes on the one 
hand, and that work through those uprooted in complying with the destruction of 
their life-world on the other hand.   
The Tool Kits6: Domination, Symbolic Power and Resistance   
In resolving the analytical puzzle in ensuing chapters, I have picked up several 
appealing notions from existing scholarship in different theoretical traditions and 
research paradigms. This is not to concede to eclecticism but to accept the 
fragmented and contested nature of theories and their incapacity of explaining a 
historically and geographically dynamic social reality. In this section, I shall offer an 
overview of the notions as I understand and use them in my own writing.  
Thus far, Bourdieu’s political sociology has been most influential, not because his 
ideas are most compelling but that his conceptual tools are more coherent (politically 
                                                            
6  I treat conceptual notions as tools in assisting the development of my analysis and argument. This 
term is borrowed from Wacquant’s interpretation of Bourdieu’s stance on theories (Wacquant, 1992: 
31).  
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and morally) than Foucauldian scholarship and more structured than the industry of 
resistance studies following James C. Scott. His writing touched upon a wide range 
of topics, covering housing, education, state, law, culture, etc. But as Wacquant 
(2005) points out, the central theme underlying Bourdieu’s work is his exploration of 
asymmetrical power relations in producing and reproducing social injustice. Despite 
the centrality of power in Bourdieu’s work, as Swartz (2013: 33) remarks, Bourdieu 
did not explicitly offer any clear definition, typology and analytical maps of power as 
typically found in theories of power (Clegg, 1989, Lukes, 2005). Perhaps for this 
implicitness, Bourdieu is not as frequently consulted for theoretical inspiration on 
power as his close friend, Foucault is. In comparison, both Swartz (2013: 41) and 
Ortner (2006: 6) agree that Bourdieu and Foucault share their view on the 
pervasiveness and the depth of power. For both Bourdieu and Foucault, power is 
immanent in social relations and affects the individuals corporally and cognitively. 
Both of them see the production of knowledge as a crucial mechanism of power in 
modern society. However, Bourdieu avoids the ‘exercise fallacy’ (Lukes, 2005: 109) 
as in Foucault’s post-structuralist conceptualisation. This important difference leads 
to their divergent normative frames and analytical assessment of power. Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of power is practical, moral and evaluative (Morriss, 2002: 37). 
Unlike Foucault who refuses to see power as something that can be possessed or 
centralised outside the moment of its excise7, Bourdieu assigns a depositional quality 
to power as capacity or ability through his notion of capital in objectified and 
embodied states (Bourdieu, 1986b, Swartz, 2013). This allows us to locate power. 
The associated notion ‘field’, as the social arena of struggles for the distribution and 
definition of legitimate form of capital (Bourdieu, 1992b: 97), acknowledges the 
concentration of power in individuals or institutions, for instance, the state (Bourdieu, 
1994). Also different from Foucault’s normative ambiguities in assessing power8, 
Bourdieu sees his mission, as a sociologist, to uncover and delegitimise the myths 
and the mechanism that conceal and perpetuate the asymmetrical power relations —
roots of structural inequalities and social injustice. His democratic view also stands 
                                                            
7 In the words of Foucault (1977: 194), ‘power exists only when it is put into action’, and ‘something 
called power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated 
or diffused form, does not exist’. He (1978: 93) argues that ‘power is not an institution, and not a 
structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategical situation in a particular society’. For this reason, he eschews away from the view 
of the sovereignty-state and the law as important institutions in the functioning of power in modern 
society. 
8 Refusing to make any clear and coherent normative frame of power and freedom (Taylor, 1984), 
Foucault’s localised power analysis on the productive side of power seeks to unravel the proliferation 
of knowledge and regimes of truths on human life in producing docile subjects (Foucault, 1977, 
1978), whilst fails to illuminate ‘what is wrong with modern power/knowledge regime and why we 
ought to oppose it’ (Fraser, 1989: 29). 
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in contrast to Iris Young (1990) whose five faces of oppression strike a similar chord. 
But, they differ in the most important condition of justice: a priori just distribution of 
various forms and combination of capitals. Bourdieu’s priority to the dynamics of the 
macrostructure (i.e. the distribution of capitals and the power structures), combined 
with his insight on the exercise of power through cognitive structure supplies us with 
more analytical weapons including Foucauldian discourse analysis to challenge 
social inequalities. 
Capital, Field and Habitus 
For this study, the field of struggle and the related notion of symbolic violence are of 
most utility to explicate the most hidden forms of power whose exercise relies less 
on external control than internalised acceptance. But, Bourdieu’s concepts ought to 
be taken as whole as they ‘are designed to be put to work empirically in a systemic 
fashion [emphasis original]’(Bourdieu, 1992b: 97). It does not do justice to take out 
only two of his complicated thoughts. Let me try to outline a skeleton of his thoughts 
here. For Bourdieu, society is full of conflicts and struggles. These conflicts and 
struggles take place in many interconnected fields such as artistic field, literary field, 
judicial field, housing field, economic field and political field. Bourdieu (1992b: 97) 
defines a field 
as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. 
These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the 
determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by 
their present and potential situations (situs) in the structure of the distribution 
of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the 
specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective 
relations to other positions (domination, subordination or homology, etc.).  
For him, each field is an arena where social agents with different capitals compete to 
define the most legitimate form of capital and to acquire such capital in order to 
differentiate their positions in this field. Although Bourdieu retains the Marxist term, 
capital, his concept of field ascribes new meanings to capital, avoiding the economic 
determinism. Bourdieu (1986b) classifies four types of capital: economic capital 
(material goods, money), cultural capital (art works, books, knowledge), social 
capital (social connections) and symbolic capital (legitimated and recognised capital). 
Symbolic capital is the most fascinating yet challenging notion in this typology. Any 
types of capital once recognised as legitimate and valued can be deemed as symbolic 
capital, which is simultaneously an effect of presupposed belief shared by the social 
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agents as well as an outcome of power struggles over the distribution of valued 
resources in the field (Jenkins, 1992: 85). Through certain mechanisms, the labour 
market for instance, different forms of capital can be converted into each other under 
certain conversion rates. The legitimate form of capital, the distribution of capital 
and the conversion rates are all at the centre of power struggles in the field, rendering 
each field a distinctive logic without being dictated by any singular one, economic 
for example. Such struggles structure the agnostic relations between social agents in 
the field—the dominated and the subordinated—depending on the volume and the 
composition of different types of capital possessed by the social agents. As a 
dynamic process, the struggle is constant. Social agents struggle to improve or 
maintain their positions in this field under the constraints of shared view of the rule 
of game. In Bourdieu’s (1998b: 40-41) words:  
a field is a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains 
people who dominate and others who are dominated. Constant, permanent 
relations of inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time 
becomes a space in which the various actors struggle for transformation or 
preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring to the 
competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that 
defines their position in the field and, as a result, their strategies. 
To understand how a social game is played, we need another key and somewhat 
opaque concept in Bourdieu’s theory of social practice—habitus. Habitus mediates 
the social and the individual, engendering a sense of place for the social agents. 
According to Bourdieu (1990b: 53), habitus is  
a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organise practice, and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or 
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.   
In a less obscure way, he (1990b: 54) defines habitus as  
a product of history, produces individual and collective practices - more 
history - in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the 
active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the 
form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 
“correctness” of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than 
all formal rules and explicit norms. 
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The key words here are ‘structured’ and ‘structuring’. It is structured, as habitus is 
the embodiment of individual and collective histories since the social agents’ 
childhood, and constantly structured by ongoing experiences of social practices. It is 
structuring, because the generative quality of this mental structure orients the social 
agents to see, think and act in a practical way instead of calculating all the time 
(Bourdieu, 1990b:62). The durability of habitus gives certain regularity of social 
practices yet it can undergo slow adaptations as social agents enter into new social 
situations or environment. In such cases, however, habitus adapts within the limits of 
initial structure acquired in formative years and maintain certain continuity with 
original structure (Bourdieu, 2002: 31). In relation to the struggle in a field, habitus 
predisposes social actors to act based on their perceived positions, chances and 
consequences and in doing so, those social agents invent shared beliefs on the 
legitimate rule of game in this field, or what Bourdieu calls doxa. Bourdieu (1994: 15) 
defines doxa as ‘a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, where 
it presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view’. Since habitus is rather 
enduring and stable, social agents may occupy quite similar positions across different 
fields. Those different fields, with relative autonomy from each other, consist of the 
society. For Bourdieu, although different fields have their own logic, they are all 
subject to the influence of the dominant field, which he calls the field of power. The 
field of power is the social space where those actors with command of enormous 
capital in different fields compete to define the legitimate form of capital that can 
transcend different fields and allow the legitimate form of capital in each field to be 
exchanged. As Swartz (2013: 65-66) noted, it overlaps with political field, referring 
to the social space where social agents and institutions compete for the control of 
political power. Political field is the social space where the participants in this social 
game compete to construct social problems, to propose public policies and to 
articulate different visions of the social reality (ibid, 68-69). Struggles in the political 
field end in the state, which with monopoly control of power and violence, imposes 
the legitimate values, ideas and views of the social order (ibid, 135-137).  
Roots of Domination 
Society in Bourdieu’s vision is highly differentiated and hierarchised. In each field, 
there are the dominant and the dominated social groups. Bourdieu is frequently 
charged as being pessimistic as he sees this stratified structure once established tends 
to reproduce itself through the mechanism of symbolic violence, or the paradox of 
doxa as he calls it (Bourdieu, 2001: 1). Symbolic violence is the most important 
contribution of Bourdieu’s sociology to the functioning of power in modern society, 
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yet it is also the most controversial one (Elster, 1983, Scott, 1990, Ortner, 2006, 
Burawoy, 2012, Swartz, 2013). Bourdieu shares with Foucault that the exercise of 
power in modern society relies less on raw violence or coercion than on legitimation. 
He calls this symbolic power whose exercise finds expression in imposing 
‘legitimate’ categories, classification, codification, regulation and boundaries. 
Symbolic violence occurs when the arbitrariness of those practices is naturalised or 
misrecognised. It is an invisible but heinous form of violence ‘which is exercised 
upon a social agent with his or her complicity’ (Bourdieu, 1992b: 167). This is to say 
that those victimised by the symbolic violence may not even recognise it. In this 
sense, the victims participated in the covert violence against themselves. But, how 
does this happen? Bourdieu (1977: 164) explains,   
Every established order tends to produce…the naturalisation of its own 
arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most 
important and the best concealed in undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective 
chances and the agents’ aspiration out of which arises the sense of limits, 
commonly the sense of reality.   
For Bourdieu, the struggle in the field is incessant. Once a social order is created, the 
dominant group would strive to maintain their position by concealing the 
asymmetrical social relation, naturalising the arbitrariness, and shaping the desires 
and wants of the dominated in a deep psychological manner. On this point, Bourdieu 
is similar to Lukes (2005) and aims to unveil the third face of power—the most 
insidious but most effective form of power that prevents social conflicts and 
perpetuates the social orders. Whilst Lukes leaves it rather open how this third 
dimension of power might work in practice, Bourdieu  (2001: 23) proposes an 
answer in habitus, the ‘somatisation of social relations of domination’. In Masculine 
Domination, Bourdieu (2001: 38) refers to symbolic power as ‘magic, without any 
physical constraints’. He (2001: 38) elaborates that,  
it finds its conditions of possibility and its economic equivalent…in the 
immerse preliminary labour that is needed to bring about a durable 
transformation of bodies and to reproduce the permanent dispositions that it 
triggers and awakens. This transformative action is all the more powerful 
because it is for the most part exerted invisibly and insidiously through 
insensible familiarization with a symbolically structured physical world and 
early, prolonged experience of interaction informed by the structures of 
domination .  
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Now, recall the definition of habitus, in Bourdieu’s theory of practice, habitus is the 
embodiment of the social structure. It gives the social agents a pre-reflexive practical 
sense of their positions in the social world and orients them to act in a way knowing 
their chances and limits in the social game without conscious thinking (Bourdieu, 
2000: 184). The taken-for-grantedness of the social agents therefore enables the 
production of the established social order and misrecognition of the arbitrariness of 
such order. Once the dominant view is reinforced, naturalised, universalised and 
internalised by the social agents, says Bourdieu (2001: 139), ‘this can lead to a kind 
of systematic self-depreciation, even self-denigration’. Bourdieu’s diagnosis of the 
effect of symbolic violence converges with Goffman’s  (1974) study of stigma and 
inspires numerous critical scholarship on the political production of urban 
marginalisation in advanced capitalist societies (Wacquant, 2007, Garbin and 
Millington, 2012, Slater and Anderson, 2012). Bourdieu’s focus on the disposition in 
habitus also marks a difference from Marxist analysis of ideological mystification (as 
in explaining the workers’ self-exploitation) as Loveman (2005: 1056) and Swartz 
(2013: 100-101) both rightly observed. For Bourdieu, pre-existing cognitive structure 
of the social agents is the precondition for the ideology to work in the first place.  
Bourdieu’s reasoning here is rooted in his deep suspicion of rational choice theory 
(RAT) (Jenkins, 1992: 73) or as Bridge (2001a: 209) charges, his misinterpretation 
of the RAT as only about economic utility maximisation. His explanation of the 
acquiescence of the dominated leaves little room for conscious, rational and reflexive 
actions. Pursuing different lines, both Burawoy and Scott take issue with Bourdieu. 
Following the pathway of Gramsci, Burawoy (2012) in a journal paper and also in a 
co-authored book with von Holdt (2012) acknowledges Bourdieu’s contribution of 
symbolic violence, a missing piece in Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which fails to 
capture the mystification of arbitrary power relations. This is based on his re-
engagement with his early research experience in a factory in Chicago, applying 
Gramsci’s theory to understand labour relations on a factory shop floor (Burawoy, 
1979). He (2012) argues that the workers’ active consent to their own exploitation 
was secured by the internal hierarchical division of labour and the piecemeal 
payment, which gives the workers a false sense of control, satisfaction and freedom. 
Bourdieu takes such subjective experience (also called subjective truth in his 
terminology) as misrecognition failing to recognise the arbitrariness of power and 
thereby perpetuating objective unequal relations (or objective truth in Bourdieu’s 
term). Burawoy differs from Bourdieu in the view on the roots of domination. He 
sees a bigger part of the ideological apparatus and the dual consciousness of the 
dominated in securing the active compliance of the dominated (Burawoy, 2012). 
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Bourdieu’s explanation retreats to the unconsciousness and practical sense of limits 
of the dominated whereas Burawoy sees the acquiescence of the subordinates as a 
more contingent process and involves certain level of rational decision. Although 
Bourdieu steps away from the discussion on false consciousness, his many breaks 
with ‘common sense’ or folk concepts, abundant in his writing, maintains an elitist 
position of social science practitioners and leaves limited room to see the ‘good 
sense’9 of the subordinated. Although it is analytically helpful to take certain distance 
from the research object, it conjures up all the problems of real interest in discussing 
false consciousness (Swartz, 2013: 120-121). For Bourdieu (2000: 189), ‘social 
agents are in any case very difficult to describe in their two-fold truth. Those who are 
caught up in them have little interest in seeing the game objectified’. His focus on 
habitus and misrecognition could not adequately capture the ambivalence or the 
duality of the consciousness of the subordinated. Based on his ethnographic study on 
labour relations in Hungary before the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, Burawoy (1985, 
2012) however observed good sense in the workers who were resistant to prevailing 
socialist ideology and pursued practical transformation of the social order. The 
established myths not only laboured their own dissents but also were vulnerable to 
penetration by the subordinates’ discourses. There, Bourdieu’s theory on habitus as a 
universal psychological mechanism has limited purchase.  
Whilst Burawoy still bears the imprint of Gramsci in making such critique, James 
Scott stretched his critique even further (Scott, 1985, 1990, 2013), in a total break 
with Gramscian’s theorisation of hegemony and in total opposite position to 
Bourdieu. Social agents including the subordinates in his view are much more 
reflexive, knowing at least something of what is going on in the world and the 
sources of their predicament, therefore, both lines of reasoning are untenable to 
explain involuntary submission. In reviewing Scott’s book on Domination and the 
Arts of Resistance, Charles Tilly (1991: 598) comments that, ‘compliance, under 
Scott’s microscope turns out to be sort of constant rebellion’. Whilst Scott 
acknowledges the pervasiveness of power in society, he believes that social actors 
                                                            
9  Gramsci contrasts good sense with common sense. According to Gramsci (1998: 416), common 
sense refers to ‘the philosophy of the non-philosophers’, ‘the conception of the world which is 
uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality 
of the average men [sic] is developed. Common sense is not a single unique conception which, even 
in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the 
social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is’. For Gramsci (1998: 325-326), 
good sense is equivalent to philosophy, a critical inquiry of the social reality; while, ‘common sense is 
a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history 
and a part of the historical process. Philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and 
“common sense”. In this sense it coincides with ‘good’ as opposed to “common” sense’.  
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are more strategic in thinking and acting in power-laden situations (Ortner, 2006). 
For him (1990: 82-83), complete subordination and labouring on one’s own 
domination are only possible under two strict social conditions: a completely 
atomized subordinate group and a shared stable belief in upward mobility from the 
subordinated. Both conditions are nearly impossible for any dominant group to 
achieve given the historical evidence thus far. First, the subordinates are capable of 
penetrating the established beliefs and values through their everyday practices, which 
differ from the prescribed dominant view. Here, he seems to converge with 
Burawoy’s critique of Bourdieu. He argues that prevailing ideology, as any ideology, 
involves certain degree of idealisation of the social reality, which inevitably deviates 
from social reality, thereby offering the raw material for ideological delegitimation 
(Scott, 1985: 336-340). The values, beliefs and cultures promoted by the dominant 
class in maintaining social structure gives the subordinated the discursive resources 
to challenge the ruling class to live up to the promises when open defiance is costly. 
This can be also quite strategic, as Scott (1990: 106) argues, ‘not only is such an 
attack a legitimate critique by definition, but it always threatens to appeal to sincere 
members of the elite in a way that an attack from outside their values could not’.10 
Whilst Bourdieu rejects the ontological binaries in his theorisation, Scott treats the 
separation between action and consciousness more seriously, partly because his 
intellectual career largely deals with the social group with a long tradition of orality 
and of elitist-mediated textual products. He argues against Gramsci and claims that 
radicalism is to be found in the beliefs rather than acts of the subordinated (Scott, 
1985: 322). This leads to his second critique. He is discontent with the conflation of 
pragmatic resignation with inevitability, naturalisation or even legitimation of a 
prevailing order. Bourdieu’s habitus may find some purchase here but Scott’s 
argument is in fact very different. He begs for careful dissection of the sense of 
powerlessness that leads to submission as compared to the naturalisation captured by 
Bourdieu’s (1977: 77) diagnosis, ‘to refuse what is anyway refused and to love the 
inevitable’. As Scott (1990: 103) writes,  
for any particular form of domination one may specify the claims to 
legitimacy it makes, the discursive affirmations it stages for the public 
transcript, the aspects of power relations that it will seek to hide (its dirty 
linen), the acts and gestures that will undermine its claims to legitimacy, the 
critiques that are possible to frame within its frame of reference, and finally, 
                                                            
10 The notion of ‘rightful resistance’ (O'Brien and Li, 2006) follows the same line. Also see Thorton 
(2002a), Ku (2003) and Steinmuller (2011) on resistance through discursive practices in resisting the 
established order.  
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the ideas and actions that will present a repudiation or profanation of the form 
of domination in this entirety.  
For Scott, there is little evidence supporting the misrecognition of the arbitrariness of 
power and injustice. It is also implausible to claim that the subordinated are 
incapable of imagining a different social order (e.g. negate existing order or total 
reverse of the social order)(Scott, 1990: 80-82). Submission to the established order 
may be because of the sense that there is no way out of the social game or due to the 
obstacles in open defiance (Scott, 1985: 323-335). In such circumstances, as Scott 
alerts us, submission might simply be appearances, a public transcript of the 
subordinated in such a power-laden situation, which does not reflect their 
consciousness in hidden transcripts. This point is epically represented by his quote of 
an Ethiopian proverb on the preface of his book on domination (1990), ‘when the 
great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts’.   
I concur with Lukes (2005: 132-134) that Scott’s analysis overly emphasises the 
political awareness of the subordinated and fails to see the influences of more 
durable values and beliefs in shaping the desires and preferences of the subordinates 
and cultivating their sense of place in the social space. However, Lukes does not 
advance his critique further in defending his third dimension of power, which 
converges with Bourdieu’s symbolic violence. On this point, I agree with Swartz 
(2013: 60) that the participation in the political struggle in the first place is also a 
misrecognition of the power relationships. When Scott’s Southeast Asian farmers put 
up everyday form of resistance or strategized their resistance by finding cracks in the 
established order, they already subscribed to the logic of the political field. In making 
this critique, however, I am not defending any theorists I have just mentioned. I agree 
with Burawoy, Scott and Lukes that Bourdieu’s misrecognition through habitus is 
too deep and overly deterministic. But, I do not subscribe completely to their 
approaches either. Empirically, in the Expo-induced displacement as well as in 
existing scholarship (Gaventa, 1980, Havel, 1991, Tilly, 1998, Ying, 2001, Pun, 
2005, Lee, 2007, Qin, 2013), the mechanisms of power in securing the complicity of 
the subordinates as in the tradition of Bourdieusian, Gramscian and Scottian all make 
sense in different situations (see chapters 4, 7 and 8). Is the offer of resettlement 
housing and some bonus, beyond the reach of most families in dire living conditions, 
not a compensatory offering in Gramscian sense? Is such euphoria of private 
property ownership and associated bourgeois values of freedom not a symbolic 
violence in Bourdieusian terminology? Is discrediting the land use and the strategic 
use of hukou by staging fake marriages not a Scottian rebellion? In my analysis, I 
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shall keep an open mind to these different theorists. After all, Charles Tilly (1991: 
594) identified at least six singular mechanisms—numerous combinations at 
different moments—on how voluntary or involuntary compliance can be secured 
through various non-exclusive mechanisms, which is the best warning to keep in 
mind the variegated ways of the exercise of power in modern society.  
1. The premise is incorrect: subordinates are actually rebelling continuously, but 
in covert ways.  
2. Subordinates actually get something in return for their subordination, 
something that is sufficient to make them acquiesce most of the time.  
3. Through the pursuit of other valued ends such as esteem or identity, 
subordinates become implicated in systems that exploit or oppress them (in 
some versions, no. 3 becomes identical to no. 2).  
4. As a result of mystification, repression, or the sheer unavailability of 
alternative ideological frames, subordinates remain unaware of their true 
interests.  
5. Force and inertia hold subordinates in place.  
6. Resistance and rebellion are costly; most subordinates lack of necessary 
means.   
7. All of above. 
If we return to Bourdieu’s field analysis and view the social agents with certain level 
of awareness—in fact, Bourdieu has a thin assumption of social agents as homo 
ludens (Burawoy, 2012: 190) —which is conceivable and highly likely, especially in 
the case of chaiqian where the political game revolves around issues of basic human 
needs, we might have more fruitful insight on the politics and morality of chaiqian. 
Bourdieu’s field is largely a social concept, but as Painter (1997, 2002) convincingly 
suggests, we may add a spatial dimension as well. Chaiqian can be seen as a social 
field intersecting with the cultural, housing and political fields, as well as a spatial 
field confined to the Expo site. Given the state-led nature of the Expo-induced 
displacement, it seems straightforward to conceive the state-led bulldozer team as the 
dominant whereas those displacees on the receiving end as dominated. Those actors 
(photographers, planners, state bureaucrats, business elites, judges, etc.) possess 
different sets of habitus knowledge—rational and irrational, professional and 
mundane, individual and collective—which is evolving as the process of the 
chaiqian unfolds in time and space. They contest the meaning, the process and the 
arrangement of chaiqian, or simply put, the rule of game in this field. The focus on 
reflexive social agents allows me to deal with the issue of responsibility in a much 
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more straightforward way. By responsibility, I am using it as in liability and guilt in 
the narrow and backward-looking judicial model as well as in political and moral 
responsibility in a more broad and forward-looking conceptualisation (Young, 2004). 
Here, I depart from Bourdieu11 (1999d) and Burawoy (2012) who prefer to hold the 
social structure responsible for durable domination, and ally with Lukes (2005: 53-58)  
who insist on holding agents responsible for actions or inactions that affect others in 
a significant, negative way. I concur with his view that  ‘although social agents 
operate within structurally determined limits, they none the less have a certain 
relative autonomy and could have acted differently’ (2005: 57). This charge goes to 
an individual agent as a person or as a member of an organisation or a collective 
including the state12in performing certain roles. In a debate with Clarissa Hayward, 
Lukes (2008: 12, 14) defends his argument and maintains that such perspective 
‘enables us to keep in focus the very question of the difference that agents can make 
to outcomes and to cast a critical eye on attempts by the powerful agents to escape 
their own responsibility by “blaming the system”...this allows us to keep alive the 
critical question of the moral and the political responsibility of powerful for what 
they do and what they fail to do in the past and in the future”. Following Lukes, I 
take issue with both the structure and the social agents for labouring on the suffering 
of those displacees (see chapter 6). I also wish to separate physical violence from 
Bourdieu’s symbolic violence to highlight that the former remains a powerful 
weapon of the ruling elites in securing their interests and maintaining domination. 
Bourdieu (2000: 102-106)  refuses to separate physical violence from symbolic 
violence as he shares the view with Arendt (1970) that physical violence requires 
justification and contains a symbolic dimension. My decision here is not to deny the 
symbolic dimension but to underscore the rampant physical violence against the 
displaced with or without convincing justification. Symbolic violence for me is 
simply a too soft term to capture this. By making this separation, we can also see 
how different forms in a concerted way inflicted enormous pain on the social and 
individual bodies, obscured the alienating power relations and secured their 
submission to the dominant power.   
                                                            
11 Bourdieu’s Spinoza mission as a sociologist is to ‘necessitate conducts, to tear them away from 
arbitrariness by reconstructing the universe of constraints which determines them, without justifying 
them’, rather than ‘a kind of terrorist inquisitor, available for all operations of symbolic policing’ 
(quoted in Wacquant, 1992: 50).  
12 Following Bourdieu (1994) and Auyero (2012), I use ‘state’ as an imagined community, abstract 
structure, bureaucratic institutions and their practices.  
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Domination in Time and Space 
Domination and symbolic power (violence) find expressions in temporal and spatial 
practices. Our engagement with time and space defines our existence in the social 
world. The control of the meaning and practices of time and space therefore is the 
most effective strategy in maintaining an arbitrary social order. Again, Bourdieu is 
amongst many theorists on time and space (Sorokin and Merton, 1937, Lefebvre, 
1991, Harvey, 1985a, 1989a, Ortner, 2006) and the remarkable coherency of his 
thinking is of great utility in shaping my thoughts over time. Both time and space 
occupy a critical place in Bourdieu’s theories as seen in his conceptualisation of 
habitus, his simple example of gift exchange, and more philosophical deliberation on 
Kafka’s trial (1990b, 2000). In his early study of the Kebyle, Bourdieu (1990b: 164) 
writes that,  
the reason why submission to the collective rhythms is so rigorously 
demanded is that the temporal forms or the spatial structure not only structure 
the group’s representation of the world but the group itself, which orders 
itself in accordance with this representation….All the divisions of the group 
are projected at every moment into the spatio-temporal organisation which 
assigns each category its place and time. 
Whilst chaiqian of course is about the annihilation of lived space and a valuation of 
such loss, I wish to join recent intellectual attempts to give time, if not priority 
(Bourdieu, 1990b: 8), then at least the same weight as we give to space or place, in 
discussing displacement and eviction (see Auyero and Swistun, 2009, Harms, 2013, 
Sakizlioğlu, 2014). This however is more than a question of when (as in waiting and 
timing) but a whole array of issues regarding the duration, intensity, sequence, 
structure of times (calendar time, working hours, the time of Expo, etc.). Bourdieu’s 
field analysis - social agents with different volume and combination of various 
capitals occupy different positions in the intersecting fields - can enrich our 
understanding of the social production of domicide and the complex temporal and 
spatial experiences of those on the receiving end.  
Same as Harvey (1989a: 203), Bourdieu (2000: 224) holds that time is a social 
construction and experienced differently. However, he (2000: 225) differs from 
Harvey’s reductionist view on economic capital in mediating the everyday 
experience of time and space and contends that ‘capital in its various forms is a set of 
pre-emptive rights over the future’. Social agents appropriate these capitals in diverse 
ways according to their practical sense of place in the social space; thereby have 
different degree of control of time and their future. The most insidious exercise of 
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power is to engender a sense of lack of future. In a stratified field where the social 
game is played, the dominant group may exercise their power over time in two ways 
to maintain their position: an absolute power that makes a social process beyond 
reasonable predication, and a more subtle form of power that aims at maintaining the 
rule of game as in how the capital is distributed in this field (ibid, 229-230). Since all 
social games are located and evolving in time, the dominated in participating in this 
social game misrecognise the arbitrariness of the power relations and hence partake 
in their own subordination. Such mechanisms lead to the paradox of time as 
explained by his (2000: 227) example on overworking,  
the more economic and cultural capital increases, the greater the chances of 
succeeding in the social games and, consequently, the more the propensity to 
invest time and energy in this also increases, and the harder it becomes to 
contain all the possibilities of material or symbolic production or 
consumption within the limits of a biologically non-extensible time.  
In a quite similar logic, Bourdieu theorises domination in the physical space. He 
(1999a: 124) suggests that ‘social space translates into physical space’, meaning that 
‘there is no space in a hierarchies society that is not itself hierarchised, and that does 
not express hierarchies and social distances’. Bourdieu (1999a: 127) explains this as 
a result of the uneven distribution of various species of capitals among different 
social agents, and hence their variegated capacity in appropriating the physical space. 
Because of the homology of different fields, Bourdieu (1999a: 125) argues that rarest 
capitals and goods may concentrate on certain places. The double inscription of 
social space exists in both the spatial structure and the cognitive structure in a 
mutually reinforcing way. According to Bourdieu (1999a: 126), this makes the 
physical space the arena where symbolic power exercises most intensely and 
misrecognition of the arbitrariness of power relations is most likely to happen (see 
chapter 8).  
Architectural spaces address mute injustices directly to the body and, just as 
surely as court etiquette, obtain from it the reverence and respect born of 
distance, or better yet, from being far away, at a respective distance.  
Because of the durability of the social structure, the physical space is also rather 
stable and cannot be modified ‘except for a work of transplantation, a moving of 
things and an uprooting or deporting people’ (1999a: 124). Bourdieu here shares the 
view of Lefebvre (1991) that social struggles are inscribed in space. Such struggles 
can take individual or collective forms in material or symbolic practices, such as 
voting with feet or politics of the meaning of place.  
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The separation of time and space here is only for analytical clarity. For Bourdieu, 
understanding of social practices cannot be disembedded from specific time-space. 
Following Bourdieu, my analysis of chaiqian practice tries to bring temporalities and 
spatialities of domination and resistance to the fore. Specifically, I shall explore the 
structure of temporalities and the absolute command of space by the bulldozer 
regime in shaping the displacees’ experiences (see chapter 5) and their political 
agency (see chapter 7) in the process of losing their homes, communities and 
workplaces. I will also look into the appropriation of the symbolic meaning of place 
and historical past in (de)legitimating the chaiqian process (see chapter 4) and the 
absolute control of physical space in regulating the future of those displaced (see 
chapter 8).  
Resistance 
The final link in my argument in this thesis, which is quite implicit in Bourdieu’s 
work, is resistance, the moment when reproduction of social space is threatened. 
Here, my understanding is mostly derived from James Scott and existing scholarship 
on grassroots resistance in shaping state-society relations in Contemporary China 
(O'Brien and Li, 2006, Lee, 2007, Hsing, 2010a). If the dominant have variegated 
ways in exercising their power to maintain their positions in the social space, there is 
no reason not to expect the dominated to fight back in diverse, covert and overt ways. 
The predicament for political actions in China is legitimation given the monopoly 
control of symbolic power and force by the party-state, and the strict ban on mass 
protests and demonstrations. Even when protests or petitioning is confined to state-
controlled channels, there are explicit rules on tolerable repertories such as the 
number of petitioners and the acceptable behaviours. Cross-class, cross-issue and 
cross-territory alliance are strictly banned under the national regulation13. With such 
severe constraints, the subordinated have to be strategic in performing their 
resistance. The values, policies and rules from past and present as propagated by the 
elites all become crucial resources to frame their grievances and justify their defiance, 
making the dominant ‘the prisoners of their own rhetoric’ (Thompson, 1975: 263). 
The contradictions within the bureaucratic field, between the daring and caring state 
agencies and agents on different levels, also gives them more opportunities to push 
the political boundaries. This pushes us to examine not only their framing and 
actions in public but also the backstage beliefs. As Bourdieu suggests, struggles in 
the field are constant. The question is how different forms of resistance were 
neutralised and the implications of the defeat for the displaced (see chapters 7 and 8).  
                                                            
13  See Chinese National Regulation on Xinfang (Letters and Visits).  




I use chaiqian, displacement and domicide interchangeably not only in this chapter 
but also throughout the thesis for practical reasons (e.g. to locate a common ground 
for better communication, to avoid inventing many unrecognisable words such as 
chaiqianees). It is crucial here to take a linguistic detour, teasing out their differences 
and warn against the symbolic violence exercised through language and translation. 
This section first conceptualises domicide and second contextualises event-led 
domicide in a neoliberalising China.  
The Chinese word chaiqian has been quite liberally translated as an apolitical term 
for relocation, or a contentious one as in disputed relocation, or as displacement in 
existing literature. Literally, chaiqian entails two moments: chai means destruction 
and demolition, and qian means relocation and resettlement. The closest literal 
translation in English would be displacement and resettlement. Peter Marcuse (1985: 
205), quoting from George and Eunice Grier, defines displacement as a process,  
when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions that 
affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and that 1) are beyond the 
household’s reasonable ability to control or prevent; 2) occur despite the 
household’s having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and 
3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or 
unaffordable.  
Displacement in this definition captures the involuntary nature of chaiqian yet 
remains inadequate to convey the extent of violence as in the Chinese word. 
Resettlement on the other hand is overly value-neutral if not misleading, since the 
anzhifang, or the resettlement housing in English, are purchased by the displacees. 
Although I retain both English words in my analysis, it is more a practical 
compromise to the language game. When I use them as shorthand, I always have in 
mind those violent images of bulldozers destroying people’s homes, of the powerful 
forcing people to leave their homes, and of the painful faces of people in putting 
down their roots in new places.   
The most satisfactory translation for me is the neologism, domicide, coined by 
Douglas Porteneous and Sandra Smith (2001: 12), which is defined as ‘the deliberate 
destruction of home by human agency in pursuit of specified goals, which causes 
suffering to the victims’. I do not use this term to replace displacement and 
resettlement entirely because first it cannot capture the process of qian, inseparable 
from the whole complete packaged process of losing and making homes in a short 
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time-span in the Chinese context; second, it is a new term that largely depends on the 
point of view and may lose purchase in wider discourses. The reason I bring in this 
term resides in its strength of focusing on the social agents and victimhood. The 
agent-centric view and the suffix of domicide are in line with my view of power and 
responsibility. As the authors forcefully argue, domicide are different from 
unplanned disasters because ‘in domicide someone or some group is responsible for 
the suffering; we cannot blame nature, God or even the system’ (Porteous and Smith, 
2001: 19-20). The focus on victimhood here brings the sufferings of those uprooted 
to the centre of our inquiry, which is currently missing in the debates surrounding 
other terms. In using domicide, my intention is to call for greater attention on the 
socio-psychological costs and the moral problematic of chaiqian in the political 
discourses. However, I will not stick to the original definition provided by the 
authors here, which as I will argue is overly restrictive. Before moving to expand the 
notion, let me first offer a better overview of domicide.  
Briefly, domicide refers to the killing of homes (Porteous and Smith, 2001: 12). The 
authors distinguish two types of domicide: extreme domicide as an outcome of war, 
colonial settlement, terrorism and ethnic cleansing, and everyday domicide as a result 
of development projects, such as dams, infrastructures and so on, framed in the name 
of ‘public good’. Whilst the distinction is analytically useful, it does not seem to do 
justice to call the Expo-induced chaiqian as everyday domicide given the sheer scale 
and dazzling intensity of chaiqian and the infusion with the mentalities and logics 
underlying extreme domicide. I do not seek to make such distinction in my thesis. 
This is because not only were the displaced treated like enemies by the state-led 
bulldozer regime but also the spatial restructuring is a revanchist rationalisation of 
the urban land use in contemporary Shanghai (Smith, 1996b), which purifies the 
urban space based on the purchasing power of the users in no less extreme way than 
ethnic segregation.  
Central to the notion of domicide is the meaning of home for human existence. We 
speak about home in many dialects, using it interchangeably with a house, a family, a 
household, a property, or simply any place we feel we belong to. As Somerville 
(1992) summarises, home may simultaneously connote the meaning of shelter 
(materiality), hearth (warmth), heart (belonging and love), paradise (imaginative 
ideals), abode (place), privacy (power and control), and roots (identity). In short, 
home is both a material and symbolic place. The materiality of home connects our 
‘memory and nostalgia for the past, everyday life in the present and future dreams 
and fears’(Blunt and Dowling, 2006: 3). It is also a layered value system whose 
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minimum components as Iris Young (1997) argues, include safety, individuation, 
privacy and preservation. Following Heidegger, Young contends that home is an 
extension of the human body. As human beings, we all need such a place that we can 
claim ownership, not in the sense of the private property ownership, but for 
meaningful use as a sanctuary, a location we can control and a site to construct our 
self-identity. Young (1997: 162) passionately argues that ‘we should be ashamed of a 
world in which safety at home is a privilege, and express outrage at any stated or 
implied suggestion that such a need and liberty is too expensive for any society to 
meet’. For the authors of Domicide, they (2001: ix) share the humanistic 
interpretation of home, and seek to answer ‘how and why the powerful people 
destroy the homes of the less powerful’ . They point out that during domicide the 
multiple meanings and values of home are ruled out by the powerful or at best 
reduced to the singular meaning as an exchangeable material good, deprived of any 
historic and affective qualities. This brings about enormous sufferings for those who 
lost their home. Here, the authors join Marc Fried (1966) and Peter Marris (1961, 
1974) and compare the grieving responses from the loss of homes to the reactions of 
bereavement over the death of a beloved person. They (2001: 63) elaborate that 
domicide may result in:  
the destruction of a place of attachment and refuge; loss of security and 
ownership; restrictions on freedom; partial loss of identity; and a radical de-
centring from place, family, and community. There may be a loss of historical 
connection; a weakening of roots; and partial erasure of the sources of 
memory, dreams, nostalgia, and ideas.  
None of those arguments is less true in the Chinese context. The Chinese word, 家,  
evolves from  and is explicitly spatial and evocative. The structure of this 
character emphasizes the import of roof (宀) in sheltering and defending the habitants 
and conveys the spatial order of activities inside a home 豕 (residence on top and 
economic activities on the bottom). However, the difference might be the pervasive 
control of the state in shaping the formation and dissolution of family through the 
hukou system, which arbitrarily recognises de jure registered members in the same 
booklet as a household unit regardless of actual living arrangement. In chaiqian, this 
is a source of family conflicts and may lead to family estrangement and breakdowns 
(see chapter 7).  
Porteous and Smith’s dissection of the underlying causes and the damages to the 
displaced as a continued process in the book Domicide have pushed me to rethink the 
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chaiqian problem in China. The psychological distress from uprooting rarely 
becomes a legitimate topic in intellectual discussion. Following them, I have put the 
pain, stress, suffering, anxiety, fear and a whole range of emotional distress at the 
very core of my research, trying to offer a counter-narrative of how chaiqian is 
actually lived by the powerless. The immediate problem for me is the restrictive 
notion of suffering. The authors (2001: 194) acknowledge that the ambivalent 
meanings of what has been lost and the post-domicide supportive networks are 
crucial in mediating the experience of domicide over time. The effects of domicide 
can be experienced in quite different ways: some might welcome and benefit from 
displacement; some might be rather indifferent. The question then is should we call 
those people victims even if they do not experience any emotional traumas? For the 
authors of Domicide (2001: 12), the destruction of homes welcomed by the home 
dwellers cannot be termed as domicide. The author of domicide in Shanghai seems 
also agree on this point:  ‘to be sure, not all those affected by demolition and 
relocation are its victims. As pointed out earlier, many residents have moved 
willingly and resettlement has improved their living conditions’ (Qin, 2013: 26). I 
am not denying that a whole range of positive and negative experiences of 
displacement exists. However, I wish to argue that focusing on the subjective 
experiences, especially the positive ones, and failing to reconcile with the objective 
truth of victimisation by the capitalistic accumulation runs the risk of letting go of 
the symbolic violence of place annihilation. It can make us vulnerable to insensitive 
utterances from apathetic and offensive studies on displacement. The danger is 
exemplified by a recent offensive line from Kearns and Mason (2013) who ‘warns’ 
against a priori normative judgement of domicide because ‘residents may like 
change more, or respond to it better, than many commentators expect’ (p.21). 
Therefore, as the authors put, a robust research should be more ‘balanced’ (p.2), 
‘objective and considered’ in assessing the spatial restructuring process in our time 
and avoid creating ‘hegemonic discourse’ (p.21) that obstructs the ‘truth’. The task 
for critical scholarship fighting against displacement is to resolve the tension 
between subjective truth and objective truth so that we can use it more freely and 
powerfully to permanently mute and avoid conceding to those who wish to use 
‘happy movers’ or ‘voluntary movers’ as ‘evidence’ to defend chaiqian and 
displacement as not necessarily a bad thing. To enrich our understanding of the 
objective victimhood, we need to borrow from fruitful thoughts on the urban process 
in Marxist political economy tradition (Harvey, 1978, Smith, 1982, King, 1989a, 
1989b, 1989c, Knox, 1991, Beauregard, 1994, Fainstein, 1994, Christophers, 2011) 
and Bourdieu’s work on domination in physical space that I summarised earlier.   
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The notion of ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey, 2001) and ‘rent gap’ (Smith, 1987) are of great 
use here. Harvey conceptualises the urbanisation process as a constant search for a 
tempo-spatial fix to overcome the inherent crisis-tendency of over-accumulation 
under capitalism. His notion of ‘spatial fix’ (2001: 25) aims at capturing both 
meanings of ‘fix’: the fix of capital in the built environment and the fix to the 
problem of over-accumulation through cyclical investment in building, destroying 
and reconstructing the built landscape. The key link in his theorisation is capital 
switching, referring to the flow of economic capital from the primary circuit 
(industrial production) to the second circuit (the built environment) or to the tertiary 
circuit (science and technology, and social expenditures on the reproduction of 
labour power) at the moment when over-accumulation starts to disrupt the rhythm of 
accumulation in the primary circuit, or more frequently and smoothly with the 
mediation of financial institutions and the state (Harvey, 1978: 107). Such switches 
may also occur between sectors within any circuit or between different geographical 
regions. The problem with the switch of capital to the built environment arises from 
the fixity and durability of the built environment, meaning long turnover time of 
capital investment and frictions for new capital accumulation. Herein lies the 
contradiction:  
in order to overcome spatial barrier and to annihilate space with time, spatial 
structures are created which themselves act as barriers to further 
accumulation…capitalist development has therefore to negotiate a knife-edge 
path between preserving the exchange values of past capital investments in 
the built environment and destroying the values of these investments in order 
to open up fresh room for accumulation (Harvey, 1978: 124).  
This cycle is a rather selective process, subject to the control of the real estate and 
financial complex (Aalbers, 2011). The role of the ground rent is pivotal in this 
process, as brilliantly explained by Neil Smith (1996b). The investment in the built 
environment allows the investors and owners to extract ground rent from the land 
parcel under their control, which is influenced by their improvement on the land and 
the competitive bidding for the land in situ. Unless continuous improvement is made, 
the devaluation cycle of the built structure in a given place starts and slowly reflects 
in the physical conditions of the structure. The surplus capital then flows and fixes 
space elsewhere, triggering further disinvestment and thereby worsening the 
conditions of the built structures. For financial institutions, the ‘sound’ rationale is to 
‘restrict the effects of devalorization, economic decline and asset loss to clearly 
circumscribed neighbourhoods and thereby protect the integrity of mortgage loans in 
other areas’ (Smith, 1996b: 192). The systematic disinvestment causes the rent gap 
Conceptual Tools │45 
 
between capitalised ground rent under present land use and the potential land use 
under highest and best use to emerge. Reinvestment through demolition and 
reconstruction follows to places where this gap is wide enough to generate enough 
economic profits. As Smith (1996b) rightly argues, neither disinvestment nor 
reinvestment is inevitable or natural. It is a deliberate product of conscious investors 
who prioritise the exchange value over the use value of the built environment and 
speculate on the conditions of the real estate market for private agendas. Although 
both authors theorise the process based on historical evidence in capitalist economies, 
Fulong Wu (1999) convincingly extends the thesis of capital switch and the rent gap 
in explaining rapid urban transformation after the rediscovery of the value of land in 
accumulation process in late socialist China. Bourdieu’s work can add further 
complexity to this systematic process of investment, disinvestment and reinvestment 
in two ways. First, for Bourdieu, economic capital is only one peculiar kind of capital, 
although crucial in this process, it is a concerted effort of social agents with other 
species of capital, for instance, cultural and political capital, in many intersecting 
fields that differentiate one place from another, and reinforce the cycle in order to 
make their own ‘profits’. This is most relevant in the Chinese context where land-
centred accumulation is an important political project for the local administrative 
states to take over the power from the work units owing to the legacy of the socialist 
land regime within their jurisdiction (see chapters 4 and 8, and Hsing (2010a)). 
Second, symbolic violence is produced at the very moment when a lived space is 
treated as a commodity that devalues over time. In the case of housing, for instance, 
a house indeed is an economic investment but most crucially, it is a ‘social 
reproduction project’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 21) that produces and maintains a stable 
social group in the lineage of history.    
For whatever reasons, the exploitive land development process has always 
disproportionately distributed the costs to those already disadvantaged by the market 
force, as Engels (1970 [1872]: 19, 70, 72) cogently points out to what happens to the 
working class neighbourhood more than a century ago.  
the expansion of the big modern cities give the land in certain sections...an 
artificial and often enormously increasing value; the buildings erected in 
these areas depress this value, instead of increasing, because they no longer 
correspond to the changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced 
by others…no matter how different the reasons may be, the result is 
everywhere the same; the scandalous lanes disappear to accompaniment of 
lavish self-glorification by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous 
success, but they appear again at once somewhere else and often in the 
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immediate neighbourhood!....as long as the capitalist mode of production 
continues to exist it is folly to hope for an isolated solution of the housing 
question or of any other social question affecting the fate of the workers. 
In short, the underlying causes and values that sustain the land use in contemporary 
cities objectively victimise those on the receiving end of the development 
programmes. Whilst we all need to incorporate the subjective experiences of 
domicide in our research, however, this is not done to examine the variegated 
experiences of displacement in its own right but to unravel the hidden socio-
psychological mechanism that enables the concealment and mystification of a violent 
accumulation process and misrecognises the arbitrariness of power. Autonomy, 
choice, freedom and monetary gains—those are the consolation prizes inducing 
temporary euphoria and concealing the exploitative nature of the accumulation 
practices. An investigation of the objective truth of victimisation is a precondition to 
study the subjective experience of victimhood. Only in doing so, we can have a full 
picture of the political and moral evil. It is for this reason that this thesis takes the 
position that all the displacees I worked with, and also those losing homes to the 
market force, are victims. It is also for this reason that I only perform simply 
descriptive analysis in the hope of painting a general picture instead of pursuing any 
advanced analysis in locating the ‘happy’ movers or the factors that make a ‘happy’ 
mover (see chapter 8).  
The political evil of the Expo-induced domicide as I argue will allow us to peek into 
the neoliberal rule in Chinese cities. In the words of Ong (2006, 2007), this is 
neoliberalism with a small n—the local articulation of the neoliberal technology of 
governance in the production of a confined space. Yet I believe, this small n is 
embedded in Neoliberalism with a big N on other levels and is able to shed light on 
the pattern and the modality of ongoing neoliberalising process in Chinese cities. The 
nature of the rapid transformation in late socialist China, around the time of the 
ascendency of the neoliberalism in the Atlantic region, has been controversial in 
existing literature. Whilst most scholars maintain that China does not square well 
with the prototype of neoliberalism in the Atlantic regions (see Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002b, Harvey, 2005a, Steger and Roy, 2010), they generally agree China 
is experimenting with a hybrid variation and is a member of the big family of 
‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Yan, 2003a, Harvey, 2005a, Liew, 2005, Lee and 
Zhu, 2006, Rofel, 2007, Wu, 2008, He and Wu, 2009, Pow, 2009, Wu, 2010). For 
instance, David Harvey (2005a: 120) points out, what we witnessed in China thus far 
‘is the construction of a particular kind of market economy that increasingly 
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incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralised control’. 
Other scholars in Foucauldian tradition are more critical and refuse to see China 
through the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism as evidenced by the many 
contradictions and discrepancies in various regimes of governance (Nonini, 2008, 
Kipnis, 2007, 2008). The division in existing scholarship as far as I understand is 
helpful in grasping the context specificity of neoliberal practices, but it is 
misinformed and unhelpful as it seems to assume that there is an ideal type of 
neoliberalism—a literal translation of neoliberalism as ideology into political 
practice—which variegated political practices of neoliberal rule in diverse contexts 
elsewhere can be measured against (Peck, 2013, Jessop, 2013, Brenner et al., 2010). 
This is epistemologically problematic as neoliberalism is better understood as a 
process, incomplete and full of contradictions (Peck, 2013). It intersects with other 
processes, forces, and counter-movements in its materialisation and improvisation, 
which makes it difficult to follow the templates of Friedman or Hayek, and even 
more difficult to predicate the course (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a, Hackworth, 
2007, Brenner et al., 2010). This also makes the temporal distinction of ‘roll back’ 
and ‘roll out’ of limited utility as the pathways and modalities are geographically and 
historically contingent. However, this is not to slip into poststructuralist obsession 
with those many small ns, incapable of generalising and seeing the common patterns 
and regularities. It is possible and crucial to see neoliberalisation with small n in the 
Neoliberalisation with a big N on larger scales (Peck, 2013).  
This generic commonality and trend, as Brenner et al (2010: 184) points out, is that 
‘neoliberalisation denotes a politically guided intensification of market rule and 
commoditisation’. Active mobilisation of state power is crucial for this project 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102). Wacquant (2012: 66) shares the focus on the 
state power and maintains that neoliberalism is a statecraft —‘the reengineering and 
redeployment of the state as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the 
subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to realising 
market’. He (2012: 71) holds that this is a process about the ‘articulation of state, 
market and citizenship that harness the first to impose the stamp of the second onto 
the third’. He built his thoughts on Bourdieu’s (1994, 1998a) conceptualisation of the 
state as an arena of political struggles between different agents and institutions from 
various bureaucratic fields fighting over the legitimate classification and regulation 
of society. In line with Bourdieu’s general thoughts, conflicts and struggles are 
constant here, as expressed in vertical struggles between agents on different 
hierarchies and horizontal struggles between the protective left hand and disciplinary 
and punitive right hand of the state. Based on his personal research experience on 
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marginality and penal state in advanced economies, Wacquant (2012: 73, 74) 
contends that ‘neoliberalism entails a rightward tilting of the bureaucratic field and 
spawns a Centaur-state’  and ‘growth and glorification of the penal wing of the state 
are an integral component of the neoliberal Leviathan’. As Peck and Theodore (2012) 
note, both generalisations are helpful attempts to locate the similarities of actually 
existing neoliberalism yet they are not universally applicable in other cultural 
contexts, such as Africa or Asia.  
I agree with Peck and Theodore’s comment. Yet, I think Wacquant’s focus on 
statecraft here offers us a practical heuristic device to dissect the articulation of 
neoliberalism in diverse political landscapes. It is my intention here to use this 
conceptual lens and carve out the logic underlying the process of reengineering of 
state in neoliberalising China, with a case from the Expo-induced domicide. My 
observation in general is in line with Wacquant’s propositions, although the process 
is less straightforward as in Wacquant’s analysis. The reengineering of state is more 
iterative and reflexive, an evidence of the intensive struggle in the bureaucratic field 
and the capacity of the neoliberal doctrine supporters in coping with challenges to its 
ruling. To start, the Chinese state is not monolithic and unified. It is decentralised, 
fragmented and contradictory, along with the ongoing construction of socialist 
market economy (Pei, 2006, Howell, 2006, Lee, 2007, Wu et al., 2007). This is first 
evidenced by the vertical conflicts along the administrative hierarchies, and between 
the high-end politicians and low-flying policy executioners. Second, it is seen in the 
horizontal conflicts between different factions (Fewsmith, 2001, 2013), between the 
left hand and the right hand of the state, between different local states, and between 
predatory and redistributive intention of a given policy programme.   
Vertically, profound changes in the relations between the local state and the central 
state are provoked by the restructuring of power within the bureaucratic field (from 
work units to administrative authorities), the decentralisation of administrative and 
regulatory duties and power, and the establishment of a new tax-sharing system (Fu, 
2002, He, 2007, He and Wu, 2009). Political agents on low-level administrative 
hierarchies now have greater control of resources within their jurisdictions, 
especially the land. This first benefits from the state-led project of constructing a 
land market, which constitutionally settles the controversy over land ownership and 
allows the territorial states to manage, regulate and speculate land use rights under 
their jurisdictions, becoming the de facto owners of land within their territory. This 
applies to the land in both the city and the countryside. Although the constitution 
stipulates that the rural collectives are de jure owners of the land in the countryside,  
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the deliberate ambiguity of ‘rural collectives’ in political and legal systems enables 
the local states to become the de facto owners in speculating land development(Ho, 
2001, Lin, 2009). The construction of the land market caused tensions between 
various state agents. Hsing (2010a: 33-59) astutely depicts the tension between 
territorial states (administrative states) and the functional states (danwei/ military 
organisations) - legacy of the organisation of socialist planned economy - as a turf 
war between the socialist land masters on different administrative hierarchies (ibid: 
34). She notes that local states are gradually winning in this turf war and reclaiming 
territorial power from the functional states by rationalising urban land use and by 
regulating the land/housing market (ibid). The former targets the land use 
inefficiency caused by socialist land accumulation regime and calls for greater 
respect of land as a commodity whose exchange value dictates land use (ibid). The 
latter eliminates the black market for land whose existence threatens the power of the 
territorial states, and in doing so, it consolidates the position of local states to 
monopolise the supply of land and to regulate the entry ticket to the field of land 
development (ibid, also Lin, 2009, Yeh and Wu, 1996). The position of the local 
states is continuously strengthened by administrative and financial decentralisation, 
delegating more responsibilities to the local level to encourage initiatives and 
accommodate local contexts. Whilst the central government may offer overarching, 
broad and ambiguous guidelines, policies or goals, and retains the power in 
approving or vetoing certain local decisions (land use for instance), most decisions 
are now made locally (such as planning, land use change, etc.) (Oi, 1995, Breslin, 
1996, He and Wu, 2009) or translated by local state agents to attune to local contexts 
(e.g. chaiqian regulation). The power of the central government can be further 
circumvented by cunning political craft of the local state agents (see Tsai, 2004). For 
instance, to bypass central state’s control on land appropriation of large parcels, 
some local states may cut a large parcel into smaller pieces to avoid administrative 
approval from the central government (Lin, 2009).  
The decentralisation of the bureaucratic field, the fragmentation of interests and the 
changing central-local relations have been discussed through many conceptual lens, 
such as ‘local state corporatism’(Oi, 1995: 1132), or entrepreneurial states (following 
Harvey’s thesis (1989b)) (Zhu, 2002, Wu, 2003b), or ‘local state capitalism’(Keith et 
al., 2013: 113-139), seeking to capture the activation of state power to engage or 
facilitate capitalistic accumulation. The changing central-local relations in China, 
according to Zheng (2014: 139-159), have evolved into de facto federalism. The 
decentralisation process also creates many tensions, which can be attributed to the 
economic and administrative system. Economically, the tax sharing system, a 
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product of bargaining between the central state and the local states, allows the local 
states to retain a significant portion of land related revenues on the local level, and 
encourages the pursuit of economic interests, personally or bureaucratically (Solinger, 
1992, Wank, 1995, Duckett, 1998, Zhou, 2012). Politically, in post-Mao’s China, 
regime of ‘truth’ is defined by hard facts, concrete images and statistical accounts 
(Liu, 2009). The performance of local state agents is evaluated by an index and 
consists of many quantifiable variables, of which economic growth weighs 
significantly. Such evaluation is goal-oriented and is insensitive to the process of 
achieving them  (Zhang and Lee, 2012). It therefore gives much discretionary power 
for the local state agents to translate such evaluation index in their political practices 
in order to deliver a ‘satisfactory’ answer or to secure their political career. Enticed 
by both the system and personal economic interests, local states agents are prone to 
pursue GDPism and economic growth (Peck and Zhang, 2013). Flagship projects, 
mega-events and urban spatial restructuring, for their high visibility and the 
prospects of large inflow of footloose capital investment thus become popular 
choices amongst the local states. One consequence is the focus on short-term, rapid 
and concrete programmes that are able to demonstrate the achievement of political 
elites within their terms in order to advance their careers (Keith et al., 2013: 125-
126). The other consequence is that, some local states are becoming less financially 
dependent on the central government. This may translate into further tensions in 
scalar politics. The policies and practices of the local state agents may deviate from 
the intent of the central government, triggering or escalating social unrests. 
Corruption  on the local level may also undermine the legitimacy and popular trust of 
the party and the central government. Yet, for the central government, there remains 
lack of effective tools to monitor and discipline local state agents (Chen, 2012a). On 
the other hand, sustaining economic growth and containing social grievances - 
threats to the legitimacy of the central government - are both dependent on the local 
states. This adds additional bargaining chips to the hands of the local states. A further 
consequence of decentralisation, which may complicate the power struggle, is the 
intensive rivalry competition between different localities (Howell, 2006, Shin, 2014). 
This scalar politics begs for a nuanced understanding of ideological cement for the 
Chinese state. Whilst the central party-state may attempt to create a unified, 
harmonious China through constant labour on nationalist and patriotic discourses, the 
local state agents are more inclined to pursue practically economic development and 
personal interests rather than abstract nationalist notions (Howell, 2006: 284).  
Horizontally, the power struggle amongst former president Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) 
and his protégé, the princelings (political elites acquire power through nepotism), and 
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the populists (elites without strong family political background) shapes the course of 
China’s reform. Their power struggles reflect in their political ideologies and policy 
preferences. An example here would be China’s accession to the WTO. It was 
negotiated behind closed doors under the leadership of Jiang and the economic tsar, 
Zhu Rongji, leaving many party elites clueless to the key terms (Nonini, 2008: 166). 
This was a major victory for the liberal reformers. The succession from Jiang Zemin 
to Hu Jintao also witnessed a small shift to social spending and social justice, seeking 
to address glaring inequalities caused by the reform in the 1990s (Chan et al., 2008, 
Zheng, 2014). Under Jiang-Zhu’s leadership, China underwent most intensive 
privatisation and commodification, such as land, housing, education, health care, 
state assets, etc. The shift of political focus is as much a power struggle as a practical 
response to growing social discontent from previous round of economy restructuring. 
Regardless of the intention, the policy programmes put a tiny brake on the ruthless 
pursuit of GDP growth as in the previous decade. However, these programmes have 
been rather ineffective owing to first, the brutal onslaught on socialist welfare in the 
1990s, deepening reform in creating a market economy and second, and the 
obstructions from the beneficiaries of the market reform in the initial round. The 
protective hand of Mao’s paternalist socialist has been severely injured in the reform 
era, stripping most Chinese down to bare life with significant uncertainty and risks. 
In short, social welfare system taking shape in the reform era closely links life 
chances and protective benefits with employment and hukou status, which creates 
and exacerbates old and new social inequalities (Chan et al., 2008, Zheng, 2014). 
The minimal social protection follows the neoliberal means test and workfare model, 
fostering greater dependency between family members; while the invitation to 
market values such as possessive individualism encourages the opposite impulse. 
This contradiction has become a major source of family conflicts (Whyte and Parish, 
1984, Yan, 2003b, Yan, 2009b). The right hand of the state prevails in society, 
bolstering the creation of the market system, which only allows the upper rung of 
society to access and benefit from the nascent market system. This is not to suggest 
neoliberalisation in China features an amputation of the left hand of the state. The 
feminine hand of the state is weak and instrumental.  In response to popular 
grievances, it occasionally reaches out, temporarily restraining the predatory right 
hand and relieving social tension. The tightened control of speculative land 
development, land appropriation approval procedures, financial loans to purchase 
housing in the last a few years and the selective inclusion of migrants in local 
citizenship can all be seen as reflexive attempt to tame predatory accumulation 
practices. However, it does not change the underlying logic that state power is 
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activated to deal with the repercussions of marketization and privatisation and to 
lubricate future capitalistic accumulation.  
The feminine/masculine classification may overly simplify the power struggles on 
horizontal level. The struggle between territorial states and functional states as 
discussed earlier may also be seen in this light. For each local state agency, they are 
subject to dual leadership as a result of the complex grid-like organisation of the 
Chinese bureaucracy (Blecher, 2003, Hsing, 2010a). Functionally, each state agency 
is ruled by ministries and departments along the vertical line. Territorially, each state 
agency is subject to the rule of the municipal or regional government to coordinate 
the functions and interests between different agencies. Some government agencies 
may be prescribed with overlapping responsibilities (e.g. the merger of planning 
agency and land use management agency can be seen an example to rationalise the 
bureaucratic structure). The overlapping of administrative responsibilities, different 
organisational goals, and dual leadership in Chinese bureaucracy structure are prone 
to create conflicts between different agencies. However, it is also conductive to 
create the conditions of floating responsibility, fertile ground for moral corruption 
and political unaccountability (Bauman, 1989).  
The fusion of the Leninist Communist Party and the state further complicates the 
power struggle in the bureaucratic field (Walder, 1995). For Blecher (2003), despite 
the withering power of party ideology, the Communist Party remains dominant in the 
bureaucratic field, profoundly affecting every aspects of Chinese politics. This is 
effectively done through stringent but selective control of party membership (filing 
formal applications, pledging political loyalty, political vetting process, selecting 
loyal or co-opting indispensable political subjects, etc.) and of the opening for 
participating in decision-making process. Although the party advocates democratic 
decision-making, the actual power resides in the hands of a few party members of the 
standing committees of the party, instead of the party congresses or committees and 
the power only flows downward (ibid). Most state agents are Communist Party 
members and their political career largely hinges on the evaluation from the party 
organs (e.g. through the secretive writing of personal dossier)(Lee, 1991). Their 
ranks in the party and their political connections with influential party members play 
decisive role in their political prospects. Moreover, as Pieke (2009) shows, the 
Communist Party is re-inventing itself through various educational programmes 
tailored to government officials and party members to reinforce ideological and 
political commitment to the party. The organisation, structure and politics of the 
Communist Party as a top-down organisation demanding loyalty and commitment in 
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various public and private institutions can become major forces in social mobilisation, 
overcoming administrative differences. But the infusion also creates tension within 
the bureaucratic field in post-Mao era. Deng’s pragmatic philosophy puts technical 
competency and professionalism of state agents ahead of ideological commitment 
and mobilisation of and connectedness with the masses. Experts and talents in 
economics, technology, administration and other subjects are recruited to create a 
professional, efficient and sophisticated modern bureaucracy. Today, a huge number 
of college graduates are recruited into the bureaucratic system each year through 
stringent examination of intellectual merits and political background (Guo, 2005). 
However, party membership and party ranking as screening criteria for selecting and 
promoting bureaucrats undermines such initiatives in creating an efficient and 
technocratic grid of modern bureaucracy. In keeping the fusion of party-state, it 
however also labours tensions between the party boss and technocratic state agents 
(particularly, those in lower ranks) (Howell, 2006). In the context of decentralisation, 
it can also undermine the legitimacy of the central party-state. Corruption of lower 
ranking of bureaucrats reflects and undermines the legitimacy of the party state 
(Howell, 2006).    
The process of state reengineering unfolded in China is fraught with contradictions, 
conflicts and tensions. The underlying neoliberal growth logic - the activation of 
state power to serve the interests of capitalist accumulation - does not show 
significant differences from its western counterparts. The difference might reside in 
the depth and the reach of the party-state in intervening, facilitating or directly 
involvement in capitalist accumulation. However, the discrepancies and conflicts 
between different agencies on different levels, between political ideals and political 
practices, between central plans and local implementation, on the other hand also 
become political opportunities for popular protests (O'Brien and Li, 2006, Shi and 
Cai, 2006). The resisting movement may have challenged the power and the 
legitimacy of the state. Yet, the Chinese state demonstrates strong capacity and 
flexibility in coping with and containing popular grievances and preventing large 
scale collective actions from rising (Lee, 2007).  This must first be attributed to the 
shared goal in maintaining social stability within the ruling elites and the state 
apparatus. Social stability and peaceful order have become central pillars for the 
Communist Party’s legitimacy in ruling over society and finding wide resonation 
with the populace (Shue, 2004). The central state now makes social stability, as 
reflected in the number of petitioning cases or collective actions, a decisive variable 
in evaluating the performances of the local state agents (Yu, 2009, Chen, 2012a). 
This has increased the political stake of the local state agents in pursuing predatory 
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accumulation practices and abusively deploying material violence to protestors. It 
also draws local states agents closer to the central government’s ideological artifice 
of maintaining social stability. Second, this might benefit from co-option of diverse 
social groups in the political establishment, sustaining the hegemony of the party 
state. In response to changing circumstances (e.g. the rise of private entrepreneurs, 
the popularity of college education, easier access to internet, etc.), the Communist 
Party on the one hand has recruited economic and cultural elites and the middle class 
into the Communist Party (Dickson, 2003, 2010). On the other hand, it has 
strengthened the ideological apparatus on grassroots level through setting up party-
organs in private companies and other organisations and reinforcing ideological 
propaganda (Xu, 2008, Zhu, 2010). The monopoly over the media also allows the 
party to define the ‘truth’ and censor agnostic social discontent from mass 
consumption (Brady, 2008). Third and most importantly, it must also be registered in 
the growth of the penal wing of the state. The rule of law project, along with the 
construction of the socialist market system, has been pivotal in selectively removing 
or constructing legal barriers and regulating economic activities of different social 
actors (Peerenboom, 2002, Lee, 2007). For instance, in constructing the housing 
market, cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen strategically grants some wealthy 
migrants conditional access to local citizenship if they purchase commercial 
properties from the local housing market. The well-celebrated Property Law, 
although it offers legitimate weapons for the populace, under-protects the people  in 
cases where the state is the violator of the sacredness of private property rights (Pils, 
2009a). The rise of the legal field however also contains popular protest actions, for 
one, legal right is individualised and for the other, it requires the petitioning social 
agent to play the rule of game in the legal field (i.e. legitimate language, legal 
representation, etc.), exposing them to symbolic violence in the legal field (Bourdieu, 
1986a, Lee, 2007). The weak position of the legal apparatus in the bureaucratic field 
may bend the principle of rule of law to the politics (Blecher, 2003). A most 
indispensable player in the penal wing of the state is the weiwen (maintaining social 
stability) apparatus(Yu, 2009). Spending on weiwen occupies a huge portion of local 
government expenditures.14They flex their muscles and show their teeth over time as 
a benefit of numerous exercises in obstructing legal justice and suppressing popular 
grievances. As contentious actions may reflect in the political career of local state 
                                                            
14 There is no available data on this issue due to the secretive nature of this sector. According to the 
petitioners I worked with, it does not seem cheap at all. During those politically sensitive occasions 
such as People’s Congress, Mao Zedong’s birthday, or June 4th of each year, they will be put under 
close surveillance by the security guards or local officials, incurring additional spending, on condition 
that those who work in the weiwen sector will not embezzle this budget. One petitioner witnessed a 
security guard forging a receipt whose value was ten times higher than the actual expenditure.  
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agents and the complaint system tends to encourage grievances to be resolved locally,  
the local states are held accountable for mediating and resolving complaints against 
them. Their tactics are diverse. Abusive violence violating the bodies of the 
protestors, as pedagogical events, occurs more often than not (Qin, 2013). On other 
occasions, the sophistication of Chinese state bureaucracy supplies the local states 
with a powerful weapon to paralyse protesting actions by kicking the protestors 
between different agencies and teach them to become patients of the state (Auyero, 
2012). On some other occasions, the local states may negotiate with the protestors 
and concede on economic terms. Such concession, as Zhang and Lee (2012) acutely 
point out, symbolises a commodification of citizenship and state power. In righting 
the wrongs and exchanging money for social stability, the local states further 
undermine the legitimacy of the party-state in ruling society. All these tactics in 
undermining, containing and suppressing social grievances are based on cunning 
manipulation of citizenship, denying access to justice, conceding to socio-economic 
benefits, or suspending human rights. But in general, the penal wing of the state is 
less aggressive than in Latin America or the western post-industrial cities (Wacquant, 
2012). Yet, their role is critical for neoliberal rule in Chinese cities.  
Neoliberal growth logic has now been increasingly relying on the construction of a 
state of emergency or political exception (Ong, 2006, Gray and Porter, 2014). The 
Expo-induced chaiqian offers a case to examine further the underlying logics of 
neoliberal rule in Chinese cities. Expo-induced chaiqian as an episode of Shanghai’s 
chaiqian history and crucial component of primitive accumulation, must be seen 
simultaneously as an economic process of land-centred accumulation, a political 
process in producing and consolidating asymmetrical power structure and class 
differences, and an ideological process of promoting individual responsibility, 
freedom and private property ownership and repudiating socialist residue in a 
piecemeal fashion. The rolling-out on all fronts is pervasively controlled by the 
party-state in tandem with constant challenges to its political legitimacy and 
intersects with rapid changes in other spheres of Chinese society. The decision to 
host an Expo may have benefited from a changing political and economic context. 
Shanghai’s strategic importance in regional and national economy was ‘rediscovered’ 
after the rise of Jiang-Zhu leadership in the party and the state from their Shanghai 
base. The siting choice of the Expo in Shanghai’s city centre allows the local state to 
reclaim the land from two major functional states (i.e. the Shanghai No.3 Steel 
Company and the Jiangnan Shipyard) whose occupation of primary land in the city 
centre obstructed the rationalisation and modernisation of urban land use from 
Shanghai governments since the 1990s. The conflicts perhaps would not have been 
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as easily resolved without the endorsement and coordination of the central 
government, through the political construction of the Expo as a project of national 
significance and the importance of the Expo as a concrete display of the achievement 
of the Communist Party. Backed by the central government, the significance of the 
Expo also temporarily suspended or suppressed the tensions between different 
government agencies and between regional rivalries. Given the heavy involvement of 
the central state in the bidding process (waving international debts to other BIE 
member states, green lights to some foreign companies in China, etc.) (see Chen 
2010), the central government, if not fully committed, may have been entrapped into 
its own promises made to the international community. It poured resources into 
Shanghai. Support from the central government also allowed the Shanghai 
government to bypass stringent control in appropriating farmland in the countryside 
for relocating the socialist land masters and for speculative land development. Also 
for such commitment, the Shanghai government was able to mobilise the entire state 
apparatus to pursue a single goal that is to construct an event space in a condensed 
time and in a most efficient way. Examples in this regard may include fast-track 
policies, decision-making or juridical practices in demolishing people’s homes (see 
chapter 6). Mobilisation of social support also benefited from the party organs at the 
grassroots levels through intensive ideological propaganda campaigns and 
dispatching party members in lower ranks to join the domicide crews. In constructing 
the event space, the Expo-induced chaiqian forced the displacees to bend to the 
power struggles within the bureaucratic field, surrender their rights to decent housing 
to the market force and discipline them with both market and statist values, with the 
help from an iron fist that suppressed social discontent and from the caring hand that 
addressed partially the grievances from marginalisation and exclusion. The right 
hand of the state prevailed in this land battle and solidified a socio-spatial structure 
premised on the purchasing power in the market. It further privileged the upper rung 
of Shanghai in accessing the urban space where rarest goods and services are 
concentrated and locked the displacees at the bottom of the socio-spatial hierarchy.  
Let me expand on this observation. The Expo land use continues the experiment of 
the self-praised Land Bank model to extract the utmost rent from the land. This 
project-based semi-public and semi-private institution was designed as a solution to 
the fragmented property regime. It coordinated different district governments and 
work units that have absolute control of the land within this Expo zone and imposed 
exceptional rules that selectively denied or conferred citizenship to individual land 
users. This relied on cunning exploitation of legal landscape and exercise of 
territorial power in a calculative rationality. First, the land bank dwelled on an 
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ambiguously defined Expo project (public/private interest, geographical boundaries 
and explicit construction projects) to bypass legal restrictions on land appropriation. 
Second, it benefited from the emerging market-based housing regime that crushed 
the dreams for a decent home of most ordinary families in Shanghai. This is due to 
the rollback of socialist welfare housing programmes, to the employment-based 
monetary housing benefits (Housing Provident Fund) and to the means-test provision 
of public housing under various names. It solidified the intra-generational and inter-
generational inequities between winners and losers of the socialist housing regimes 
(Wang, 2004, Logan et al., 2010). Those ‘losers’ include the late-comers, the 
excluded and those on the waiting list to the welfare housing provision. Individual 
responsibility now is the buzzword of socialist market economy. Like in other 
spheres of social policy, individuals can only rely on themselves under these new 
urban conditions (Thelle, 2004). Chaiqian has become the only way for most 
families to acquire a better place to live. The ruling elites also mix predatory logic 
with redistributive logic in chaiqian practice by regulating the minimum floor size of 
discounted resettlement housing15 and ensuring it is materialistically better in size 
and quality than the displacees’ previous housing. Through several rounds of trial 
and error, the city-builders in Shanghai developed a model of compensation that 
allowed both floor-size based valuation and hukou-based valuation to solicit 
cooperation from the displaced families by allowing them to choose a higher one as 
the base for monetary compensation. Additional compensation was offered at the 
discretion of chaiqian companies in the form of preferential policies of education and 
health care for displaced families, additional compensation for families in extreme 
material poverty, and bonus for cooperating with the chaiqian deadlines. Third, the 
effectiveness of this compensatory measure rests on the selective use of hukou 
institution. Exclusion and inclusion to neoliberal rule are both at work. It does so by 
excluding non-local hukou holders with no legally recognised foothold in Shanghai 
(migrants from other provinces) and throwing them back to the alienating housing 
regime on the one hand whilst on the other hand accelerating the hukou acquisition 
for some residents and granting them access to hukou associated citizenship benefits, 
which partially relieved their pain from land-centred accumulation. Those residents 
cared for by the left hand of the state are usually victims of social engineering 
programmes under Mao’s dictatorship (the urban youth sent to the frontiers or the 
countryside, the late comers to welfare housing programme, etc.), or of the hukou 
institution (e.g. non-local hukou holders married to local hukou holders, collective 
hukou holders, agricultural hukou holders). The mixture of carrots and sticks in 
                                                            
15 This is a response to increasing political contention amongst the displacees in the early 1990s.  
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compensation are to minimise the social, political and economic costs of chaiqian 
and accumulation.  
The land acquisition for hosting the Expo relied heavily on the penal apparatus of the 
state for maintaining the gray zone with blurred legal and moral boundaries. First and 
foremost, due to the exceptionality of the Expo, the political opportunities for 
protesting actions created by intra- and inter-states are significantly diminished. 
Second, it benefits from the legal construction of property rights regime, which 
overly protects the rights of the state. In practice of chaiqian, it counts on the tacit 
condonation of the justice departments for legitimating the exploitation of the legal 
ambiguities and for injuring the displacees physically and psychologically (Sargeson, 
2013). It also relies on their cooperation to deny the rights of the displaced to seek 
legal justice by clandestine tactics of delays and selective interpretation of law or by 
upfront discrediting the legal merits and rejecting the case altogether. It is also in 
need of the police to suppress popular activism from arising and maintain social 
order and harmony for the accumulation of capital. House arrests, detention facilities 
and black jails awaited the displacees who sought to defend their own legal rights 
(Qin, 2013). It could not be successful without the support from a massive weiwen 
army in surveilling the society, atomising the disgruntled displacees and permanently 
destroying their capacity to fight. The uprising of the penal apparatus is crucial in 
legitimating and securing accumulation in a neoliberalising China (see chapters 5, 6 
and 8).  
Furthermore, the Expo-induced chaiqian exemplifies the triumph of market values 
and the power of the legitimating discourses of developmentalism and nationalism. 
They are the cement of China’s ‘miraculous’ urban revolution in past decades. The 
privatisation and commoditisation of housing promotes the ideology of private 
homeownership. This is underpinned by the rhetoric of greater personal 
responsibility, individual freedom, upward mobility and assets’ liquidity. The market 
force, following the logic of economic capital, takes over the real estate development 
and housing provision for most Chinese families. This is a total betrayal of the 
socialist contract that guarantees minimum housing benefits. It manufactures huge 
numbers of consumer subjects who are now disciplined by the juggle law of the 
housing market. This housing market is a product of collusion between local states 
and real estate developers through guanxi (interpersonal relationship) networks and 
corruption. The conspiracy is sugarcoated by the development discourses calling for 
individual sacrifices for public and national interests. Those discourses are 
particularly important for the Expo-induced chaiqian, which is portrayed as a 
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showcase for China’s rise in the new century, of national significance. 
Consequentially, the burden has been shifted to consumer subjects. The offer of 
resettlement housing at discounted rate in remote suburbia allows for fast-track 
opportunity for victims of long-term disinvestment to become a member of the 
propertied class, to exercise their control from private ownership, and to capitalise on 
the liquidity of their resettlement housing, but constrains their access to inner city 
space. By manufacturing these new homeowners, the regime encourages greater 
dependence on the private property relations, fosters political conservatism and locks 
them into the market value system that prioritises the exchange value of housing 
(Harvey, 1989c, Ronald, 2008). It is those combined forces, values and logic that 
enable chaiqian of largest scale in Shanghai’s history and contributes to the 
formation of the Chinese Leviathan.   
Conclusion  
This chapter first discusses the shift of research focus to domination and its 
reproduction in the production of event space, which parts with existing scholarship 
that is preoccupied with property rights violations and just compensation. Through 
this cursory statement of my discontent with existing literature, this chapter also puts 
forward my epistemological and methodological approach to studying the 
phenomenon of chaiqian or displacement. It calls for a holistic study of place 
annihilation, taking the economic, social, political and affective aspects as a whole to 
understand the meaning and the significance of chaiqian to those on the receiving 
end. This can only be done when we carefully unlock the process of displacement. 
This signifies another break with current research paradigm on displacement, treating 
it as two disparate moments (pre/post-displacement). In taking this approach, this 
chapter suggests the necessity to focus on the involvement of various agents and the 
exercise of power in labouring on the pain for the displaced. Bourdieu’s political 
sociology, especially his work on field, symbolic power, symbolic violence and a 
thin view of social agents are introduced and compared with other scholarship on the 
mechanisms of power in (re)producing a repressive social order. These notions are 
used as conceptual tools in controlling and structuring the analysis in this thesis. A 
first attempt in using Bourdieu’s conceptual tools is made in this chapter to develop 
the notion of domicide further by reconciling the objective truth of exploitative 
capitalist land development and warning against examination of subjective 
experience of victimhood without an assessment of the objective truth. For this 
reason, this thesis completely rejects the rhetoric of ‘happy’ movers. Later chapters 
on the process of production of domicide and reproduction of asymmetrical power 
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relations will also reaffirm this theoretical development. A second attempt is made to 
paint the process of state reengineering in the neoliberal time with the case of the 
Expo-induced domicide, which serves as an overall context as well as a synthesis of 
later chapters.  
 







This chapter details the methods I have chosen to collect, analyse and represent the 
mechanism and impacts of domicide. The design and the choice of those methods are 
informed by existing theories, driven by the analytical puzzles, shaped by my hybrid 
positionalities and complex emotional experiences, and influenced by the power 
relations in practising and producing this research project in the ‘field’. I agree with 
Katz (1994) that ‘field’ as a site of research inquiry is an artificial scholastic 
construction, arbitrarily drawing geographical and temporal boundaries based on our 
research agendas. Subsequently, other artificial boundaries, between fieldwork and 
other stages of research practices, between our everyday life and professional 
pursuits, between our personal political life and our intellectual activism, are all 
blurred (also see Behar, 1996, Routledge, 1996). These crumbling boundaries call for 
greater reflexivity on the mechanics of our constant negotiation of political 
responsibilities, ethical conundrums and power relations in affecting the production 
and dissemination of knowledge. With this agenda in mind, this chapter sets out to 
reflect upon my journey in researching and writing on Expo-induced domicide. By 
doing this, I wish to sensitise and make transparent the power and value laden 
practice of knowledge production.  
‘When I settle into a place, listening and watching, I don’t try to fool myself 
that the stories of individuals are themselves arguments. I just believe that better 
arguments, maybe even better policies, get formulated when we know more 
about ordinary lives’.  
Katherine Boo, Behind the Beautiful Forevers 
‘It is the writer’s duty to hate injustice, to defy the powerful, and to speak for 
the voiceless’.  
Edward Abbey in Resist Much, Obey Little: Some Notes on Edward Abbey 
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For this thesis, I adopted a multiple methods approach. Silverman (2010: 9) advises 
academic novices to ‘take this path only if you seriously want to complicate your 
life’. The first section of this chapter shall justify my choice in complicating my life. 
Bourdieu’s conceptual tools as I introduced in the previous chapter already supplied 
many powerful justifications for integrating methodological techniques. Here I wish 
to draw on the literature on situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988, Bourdieu, 1992a, 
Moss, 1995, Merrifield, 1995, Rose, 1997, Cloke et al., 2000, Sidaway, 2000) and on 
identified methodological issues in researching displacement and domicide to defend 
my choice further. The second part of this chapter will discuss my multiple roles and 
positionalities that are structured and structure my research practice as a student of 
contentious politics in China. Particularly, I shall review the compromises and 
improvisation I had to make in negotiating access, building trust, avoiding political 
censorship, and representing vulnerable others in this project. Those decisions might 
not square well with methodological cookbooks or published codes of ethical 
research practises. I do not think my situated decisions successfully resolved the 
ethical tension or complied with standard practices, yet I think an honest discussion 
of the ethics and politics of such decisions are imperative to unpack the messy black 
box of knowledge production. The issue of language and translation is singled out 
given the cross-cultural nature of this project. Silence on this matter in published 
academic products I believe implies submission to the hegemony of English (Smith, 
1996a, Temple, 1997, Aalbers, 2004, Muller, 2007, Hassink, 2007) and is an 
expression of academic colonialism. There, I wish to discuss my stance on 
translation for this project. Building upon such contextualisation, the remainder of 
this chapter will outline the technicalities of methods I used to acquire and analyse 
the data.   
Methodological Approach 
It now seems popular to integrate a variety of methods in a research project. Yet, the 
underlying rationales for doing this are rarely explored explicitly. An open 
discussion of the motivations in mixing different methods is important to defend the 
rigor of mixed methods research. This is first because each method and approach 
implies a particular way of seeing and understanding the world (Graham, 2005). 
Such cognitive structures are not always in harmony. Differences, inconsistencies 
and even conflicts in epistemology or ontology underpinning various methods are 
frequently cited by paradigm purists and ‘methodological watchdogs’ (Bourdieu, 
1992a: 227) to attack the validity of research project meshing methods and thereby 
mark off and defend their own intellectual territory. A case in point here is the 
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persisting divide between quantitative and qualitative methods, and the slow eviction 
of the former by the latter in research training and practice in human geography 
studies (Philip, 1998, Hamnett, 2003). Secondly, methods are sometimes chosen and 
mixed in an expedient and anarchist way to collect the data without careful 
deliberation of the appropriateness, necessities and purpose (Denscombe, 2008, 
Bryman, 2008). The approach that ‘anything goes’ seems to free us from being ‘the 
prisoner of a particular method or technique’ (Robson, 1993: 291). However, I agree 
with Feilzer (2010) that this is a misinterpretation and abuse of pragmatism, the 
philosophical partner of mixed methods, aiming to rationalise poor research design.  
The use of mixed methods in this project rests upon my theoretical, political and 
ethical commitments. To start, I respect the well-established argument that all 
knowledge is socially constructed. Our research practices are situated in a social 
space structured by webs of uneven power relations. This is best summarised by Katz 
(1994: 69): ‘the fields of power that connect the field researcher and participants, the 
participants to one another, scholars in the field, and research participants and 
audiences as historical subjects who confront various but specifiable conditions of 
oppression, deserve critical scrutiny in the conduct of field research’. The 
complicated power relations condition the production of knowledge at different sites 
and in various research encounters. The upshot is that all knowledge is situated, 
partial and limited, contingent on a range of social relations, forces and processes of 
research practices (Haraway, 1988). However, situated knowledge, as coined by 
Haraway (1988: 584), is not an open invitation to relativism that is ‘a way of being 
nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally’. Rather, it is to accept ‘partial, 
locatable, critical knowledges’ that ‘seek perspective from those points of view, 
which can never be known in advance’ and that ‘promise something quite 
extraordinary, that is, knowledge potent for constructing worlds less organized by 
axes of domination’ (Haraway, 1988: 584, 585). Haraway’s agenda here is to 
politicise intellectual inquiries further and to propose an alternative view of 
knowledge and objectivity that are mediated by the positionalities of the researchers 
and divergent ways of knowing. Both authors point out the complexity of social 
realities and the partiality of knowledge. It then raises a valid concern over the 
capacity of any method to capture a complicated and multifaceted object of research 
completely.  
Qualitative methods (such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, observations and 
ethnographies) indeed have their strengths in attending the subtle interplay of power 
relations, democratising the research process, providing richer accounts of the lived 
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experiences of research participants, and exploring the construction of meanings in a 
fluid and emergent context (Creswell, 2007). Some practitioners of qualitative 
research certainly learn from other forms of knowledges to contextualise the bigger 
picture (Rose, 1997: 318). But, such consultation is usually symbolic and superficial 
with an agenda to supply a panoramic view of the research field (Nightingale, 2003: 
79). It seems to bear the stamps of paradigm war between positivism and 
constructivism in the scientific community and endorse implicitly the incompatibility 
of different paradigms in a single research project (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). As a 
result, it upholds the dualist thinking and forces researchers to choose sides (Creswell 
and Plano Clark, 2007) whilst ignoring the fact that such divisions are historically 
and socially constructed by academic pedagogical labour in the first place (Greene 
and Caracelli, 2003) and ‘perpetuat[ing] an incomplete and disempowering 
caricature of a historically contingent alignment of philosophy, methodology, politics 
and practice’ (Wyly, 2011: 891).  Such dogmatism brings two more dangers that may 
paralyse our sociological imagination. First, as Mason (2006: 13) points out, it can 
lead to conservatism in framing research questions and ‘repeatedly miss whole 
dimensions of social experience’ because of restrained research horizon and the 
shortage of methodological tools. The forced choice may perpetuate an impoverished 
understanding of the social reality. Second, Schutz (1976: 88) teaches us that 
‘methodology is not the preceptor or the tutor of the scientist. It is always his [sic] 
pupil, and there is no great master in his [sic] scientific field who could not teach the 
methodologists how to proceed’. In a similar vein, Bourdieu (1992a: 227) encourages 
students of social sciences to ‘mobilise all the techniques that are relevant and 
practically usable, given the definition of the object and the practical conditions of 
data collection’. Underlying their arguments is a practical treatment of methods as 
analytical tools to assist us in resolving research problems at hand in a most 
appropriate way rather than restraining our options. Yet, the fit between research 
object and the techniques sought must be taken seriously to provide a more robust 
analysis. Staeheli and Lawson (1994: 97) in commenting on feminist fieldwork 
techniques raise their concern over the dominance of qualitative methods and 
reminds the readers that methodological choice should be more reflexive and flexible 
because some questions are better answered by quantitative methods. The key 
message to take from here, as Wacquant (1992: 30) points out, is to be vigilant to the 
construction of research objects and the instruments used for such construction. 
The pitfalls in adhering to methodological fetishism can be addressed by using 
different methods reflexively to produce a narrative that is capable of revealing a 
bigger picture and attending the contexts and the power relations in the politics of 
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knowledge at the same time. Herein rest the primary strengths of mixed methods—
triangulation and complementarity (Jick, 1979, Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003a, 
2003b, Bryman, 2006, Pearce, 2012b). Triangulation refers to the intentional 
utilisation of various methods, analysis and designs associated with diverse 
philosophical traditions to study the same phenomenon in order to neutralise the bias 
inherent in methods, data and the investigators and to improve the validity of 
research findings (Greene et al., 1989, Creswell, 2003). It is particularly helpful and 
promising by letting different forms of data speak with each other. In doing so, it not 
only offers us an opportunity to understand social realities from different vantage 
points of view and to gain a fuller picture of a complex social phenomenon; but also 
invites a critical examination of scientific practices and the mechanics of power in 
constructing and legitimating particular points of view. Whereas consistent findings 
generated by different methods are certainly welcomed as strong support for research 
conclusions yet inconsistencies, contradictions and silences are equally if not more 
valuable to illuminate the creative tensions between different ways of knowing, and 
to engage and problematise the partiality and situatedness of knowledge (Nightingale, 
2003, Greene, 2008). Of course, this requires our awareness of such differences, and 
openly as well as purposely to maintain a dialogue with those differences in our 
analysis and writing (Ley, 1996: 26). By using most suitable techniques to answer a 
given research question and contribute to the overall development of social inquiry, 
mixed methods design also allows the researchers to benefit from the relative 
strengths of different methods, and to enhance and thicken our knowledge of 
multifaceted social phenomenon.  
Chaiqian is one of those complex analytical problems. Chaiqian or domicide as a 
process of place annihilation decides the centrality of the notion of place in my study. 
The indispensable place for all human beings are their homes and bodies (Porteous, 
1976, 1989). Geographers with different interests and training approach the meaning 
of place in divergent ways. Such minute division of academic labour leads to 
premature fragmented conceptualisation of place in geographical literature (Agnew 
and Duncan, 1989). Three fragmented elements of place are identified by Agnew and 
Duncan (1989: 2), including location, locale and sense of place. The first sees the 
place as a container with concrete geographical coordinates on the surface of the 
planet. This typically falls under the preview of geographers whose interests lie in 
the spatial distributions of resources and activities. The latter two are invested by 
humanistic geographers who are more concerned with the material settings, affective 
relations with place, and the construction of place identity. They lament that these 
inseparable aspects of place are rarely treated as a whole or worse, they are 
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frequently seen in competition in defining and controlling place. Relph’s (1976) 
phenomenological study of place reveals one source of such conflicts. Insiders and 
outsiders may experience a place in strikingly different ways over time, and the mass 
culture and consumption in modern times has led to the rapid erosion of authentic 
sense of place, or existential outsideness in his term. Wacquant (2007) also notices 
spatial alienation of this kind in stigmatised neighbourhoods yet he traces the roots to 
the complex politics in the rationalisation of spatial configuration under capitalism. 
Place as a meaningful, humanised and stable location is frequently evoked by critical 
scholarship to counter the destructive effects of capitalistic spatial fixes (Slater, 
2013). The call for emplacement is to reverse the shift from politics of space to 
politics of place.   
This requires us to understand a place in its full dimensions—affective, material and 
symbolic—and explore the interplays of diverse forces and agents in shaping places 
in contemporary cities. Such a task first requires us to wrestle with the logics, forces 
and orders on the macro-level and their interplays with local conditions in 
(re)structuring space. This requires inputs on structural changes, elitists’ perspectives 
and other ‘hard’ data (e.g. land use maps, census data). It also tasks us to take our 
institutional responsibility to facilitate and patiently listen to insiders’ stories about 
their involvement with particular places and their experiences in losing those places. 
This may include the intimate stories of their families or their own in everyday 
situations, their understanding of the meanings of home and community, their 
witness of the evolution of their places over time, their sense of positions in society, 
and their political experience in wrestling with the powerful. Such accounts are of 
vital importance for two reasons. First, it fulfils the sociological imagination in Mills’ 
(1959b: 6) vision: ‘No social study that does not come back to the problems of 
biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its 
intellectual journey’. Only through sensitive and empathetic understanding of 
people’s past can we start to appreciate their responses and experiences of 
displacement. Second, as Peter Marris (1974: x) points out, the intensity, 
development and resolution of loss and grief from place annihilation depends on four 
conditions: the attachment structure developed since early childhood, the 
understanding of the meaning of what has been lost, the capacity in controlling the 
destructive events and the post-event recovering process. Inquiry into those issues 
requires a more integrated research methodology, incorporating techniques such as 
oral history interviews, life history interviews, focus groups, observations, and 
collecting scattered official statistics and historical accounts. Mixed methods seem 
the most suitable approach to weave the fragmented pieces of place together under 
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this single study of place annihilation. Perhaps, it is the best way to avoid 
misrepresenting painful experiences of losing homes because the human species until 
this day lacked the vocabulary and tools to talk about emotional and physical distress, 
pain and suffering as a result of their inexpressibility (Scarry, 1985: 3-19).  
In fact, classic studies on displacement all critically integrate different methods to 
understand its process and impacts (Fried, 1966, Western, 1981, Hart, 1988, Porteous, 
1989). Marc Fried (1966) in his classic text relies on the strength of mixed methods 
in theoretical development and enhanced interpretation. He adopts a sequential 
design (survey followed by interviews) to assess the influence of pre-displacement 
attachment upon the grieving process and experiences. John Western (1981) goes 
further and masterfully shows us how methodological repertoire—including surveys, 
official statistics, historic accounts, literary products, marketing materials, 
photography and personal interviews—can be combined effectively to explore the 
manipulation of space in producing a divided society in South Africa. Those methods 
were used in complementation in his study to document in a most thorough way the 
painful lived experiences during and after displacement. Similarly, Douglas Porteous 
(1989) mixes both quantitative (mapping, statistics) and qualitative techniques 
(government reports, planning documents, interviews, participant observations) in 
developing a geoautobiography (mixing life histories, family histories and place 
histories) of a village where he lived during his formative years from his inpert 
position (articulated insiders with outsider skills) and juxtaposes the analysis of 
different sources of data in reporting on the cause and the impacts of the destruction 
of a meaningful place by powerful development companies. His personal 
involvement and intellectual responsibility also motivated him to decentre the site of 
critical engagement and write critically in plain language along with the bulldozing 
process. Those studies offer us superb and compelling examples of what bell hooks 
(1994: 54) calls ‘ethics of struggle’, seeing ourselves not as professional intellectuals 
but as people with knowledge in a privileged position who work with people with 
such knowledge to fight against domination and suppression in solidarity. Using 
different methods and analysis allows researchers to disseminate the knowledge in a 
more accessible and compelling way.  
The last reason I opt for mixed methods in this study derives from my ambition and 
interest in producing some products that can be of practical use in the battle against 
displacement and eviction. A research tourist whose agenda is to collect juicy stories 
(Cloke et al., 2000) is the last kind of researcher I want to be. This draws me closer 
to pragmatism, which underpins most mixed methods research. Researchers pursuing 
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pragmatic philosophy have stepped out of paradigm wars (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004, Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005, Feilzer, 2010) and take 
seriously the value and utility of research as the guiding principle for research 
designs and methodological choices (Rorty, 1999: xvi-xxxii). Practitioners are called 
to reflect upon own interests, values and commitments, and answer the questions, 
who are we conducting our research for and who do we speak for, before setting out 
to design and perform academic research that tackles concrete social problems. The 
objective is to locate the democratic energies under practical constraints and 
uncertainties, and to push forward democratic actions (Bridge, 2013).   
For a person who constantly loses homeplaces, these questions are quite 
straightforward for me. From the outset, I have no faith in the rhetoric of public 
interests or common good at all. I believe that no one has the right to destroy others’ 
homes against their will and no one has the right to manipulate others’ lives. The 
universal golden rule of ethics should guide all social interactions: do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you. I wish to debunk the myths legitimatised through 
different forms of knowledge saying that chaiqian is a good thing, chaiqian is an 
inevitable price to pay for development, or more viciously, chaiqian is in the interest 
of the poor for them to acquire upward mobility. I hope that my learning and 
engagement with the politics and moralities of chaiqian can be used to relay the 
voices of or speak for the victims and contribute to their struggles, however 
contentiously it might be (contra Spivak, 1988, Staeheli and Lawson, 1994), to 
interrogate and shame the powerful elites collectively and personally, and to 
neutralise the celebratory nonsense surrounding chaiqian in Shanghai and elsewhere. 
I want to produce a counter narrative of the Expo-induced displacement that serves 
as a mnemonic resistance and an intervention. With these agendas in mind, I draw 
the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer different sets of 
questions and juxtapose my analysis generated from various sources to expose the 
interplay of power, knowledge, rationality and morality in inflicting pain on others 
and labouring on social injustice. Qualitative methods are used to democratise the 
research process. They allow me to collaborate closely with those silenced and 
marginalised displacees, hear the stories of their private intimate lives and their 
experiences of chaiqian, and explore their meaning-making process. By publicising 
those private and emotional accounts in this thesis, I wish to provoke discussions on 
the limits of power, and critical thinking on the possibilities and alternatives to 
prevent and end domicide and on democratic politics in general (Bridge, 2009). 
Quantitative data, especially a purposely-designed survey, was acquired to discredit 
the discourses legitimating chaiqian and the officially endorsed social studies that 
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use statistics as evidence. If numbers, counting and significance are the weapons the 
elites used against the displacees, it is my intention to use the same weapon to fight 
back. In coalition, those methods enable me to attend the uncertainties and 
emergencies in the field, and to learn from other knowledges without surrendering all 
my authority in writing up the text.  
Working with Fear and Building Trust  
The rejection of universal objectivity and value-neutrality in social sciences 
encourages greater awareness and recognition of the personal of the researchers in 
the research journey. A necessary step in any social research is to objectify the 
relationships between the researchers and the researched throughout the research 
process. This involves a critical examination of the roles played by the biography, the 
trajectory, and the positions of the researchers in the social space, in the ‘field’ and in 
the academic field, an exercise that Bourdieu (1992a) calls participant objectification. 
The purpose here as England (1994: 82) points out is not to induce ‘a confession to 
salacious indiscretions’ nor perform ‘a narcissistic and egoistic’ dissection, but ‘a 
self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of 
the self as the researcher’. One strategy to do so is to identify the ‘key political 
aspects of the self’ (Cloke et al., 2000: 137). Pre-existing categories  in identity (such 
as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, education, class, religion) here offer us 
convenient frames and many researchers have provided convincing examples on the 
mechanics as to how the position of the researchers on those categories mediate the 
insider/outsider relations, shape power dynamics in research encounters, and 
influence the choice of research methods and interpretation of research events  (Moss, 
1995, England, 1994, Hopkins, 2007, Zhang, 2010). Yet, this identity-based 
‘transparent reflexivity’ (Rose, 1997: 311) remains inadequate to capture other facets 
of the self of the researchers (e.g. emotional involvement, personal experience, 
presentation of self, social skills, personality, embodied knowledge, etc.) (Behar, 
1996, Cloke et al., 2000, Moser, 2008, Nagar and Geiger, 2007) and diverse forces 
and power (e.g. collective memory, structural and institutional constraints, etc.) that 
influence research relations and the overall research process. The reflective exercise I 
take here is to show how the interplay of fear and distrust problematise my hybrid 
identities, force me to improvise research methods, and inhibit or facilitate my access 
and understanding of the lived experience of chaiqian.  
But before I start this exercise, let me first emphasise again the profound impacts of 
how my personal experience of chaiqian affected my subjective positions. A few 
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months before I commenced my PhD research in Edinburgh, the village and the 
home I lived in for most of my life were demolished for a new town project. My 
parents, like our neighbours, built our detached house with their life-long savings and 
loans from relatives under the circumstances of persistent institutional exclusion 
from universal citizenship rights due to our agricultural hukou status. I did not take 
an active part in this process as I was overly stretched to finish my second-degree 
dissertation. The amount of stress and the feeling of passivity and powerlessness 
pushed my emotional and ethical limits. On the day when the demolition team came, 
I stood afar with a neighbour whom I grew up with watching our familiar place fall 
to pieces. We were unable to convey the sadness we felt in words. My parents could 
not bear the thoughts of seeing our home destroyed and stayed in the rented 
apartment that day. For days after the demolition, my mum’s eyes were suffused with 
tears whenever my sister and I shared our sentiments about childhood memories in 
laofangzi (old home). From the beginning of this project, I was puzzled at the human 
costs in exchange for so-called ‘public interest’ development. This however was only 
a start of my serial displacement experience over the past four years. Displacement 
haunts me everywhere and in every moment. Much time in my first year in 
Edinburgh was wasted in securing the lease to an apartment rented from a dishonest 
landlady who concealed critical information that the apartment had already been 
repossessed by the bank. The sheriffs were frequent visitors to my apartment. They 
knocked on my door three times to deliver eviction notices before I finally caved in. 
At the time when I was close to submitting my thesis, the School of GeoSciences 
evicted me, together with other students, from the office where I invested my entire 
PhD life for some cosmetic improvements on the room. Feelings of confusion, 
uncertainty, helplessness, submission and injustice from displacement were lived 
again and again whilst I was working on displacement. I take my personal experience 
of repeatedly losing my places as an asset. In numerous conversations with the 
displacees, it was easier for me to connect with them and empathise with their pain 
and suffering. When asked, I was not shy to share my own feelings as a displacee. In 
a way, this kind of mutual disclosure and discussion of the most personal part of our 
lives creates a communal language in a shared space to grieve and resolve our 
frustration together. It also reduces the psychological distances between us. On many 
occasions during the transcribing, analysing and writing, I felt that the stories I was 
listening and authoring were as much about others as they were about me. The 
imagined boundary between the researched, between me and others, and me as the 
researcher were constantly destabilised and blurred in this project. For this reason, I 
am aware that my understanding and interpretation are inevitably influenced by those 
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dreadful moments of chaiqian as I remembered and personally went through. My 
judgement and writing are coloured by my subjective position as a victim of chaiqian 
and my own feelings toward development, progress and change. However, I take any 
charges against this bias not as criticism or challenge but as recognition and praise 
for my effort in honestly and effectively reporting my own emotions as I heard and 
felt about the wounded lives as a vulnerable researcher, and perhaps more accurately, 
as a normal human being with emotions.  
This kind of close contact and trust with the displacees were developed gradually 
through what Benjamin Read (2010) calls site-intensive methods, a thin version of 
ethnographic immersion that entails close and intensive engagement with a site (or 
several sites) and a group of participants for a relative short period as compared to 
standard ethnographical studies derived from deep immersion in a culture for years. 
From 19th February to 31st July 2012, I lived in a resettlement community in Sanlin  
and continually visited Pujiang Expo Homeland1. Negotiating access and building 
trust was difficult at first partly because the highrise buildings in the resettlement 
sites do not encourage socialisation (see chapter 8) but more importantly due to what 
I call ‘structure of fear’. Mayfair Yang (1994: 14-25), an overseas Chinese 
anthropologist based in the United States, recounted many incidents on the fear of 
oppression from the Chinese state in shaping the research dynamics during her 
fieldwork on the practice of guanxi in China in the early 1980s. It is worth quoting 
the ramifications of her accidental entry to a military residential compound on her 
visit to see her friend as an example of the power of fear in shaping her conducts and 
raising ethical dilemmas. The father-in-law of her friend, for fear of political 
prosecution, made a full report of her visit whilst Yang spent several weeks in 
anxiety and fear, and eventually she decided to burn all her research materials that 
she considered as ‘incriminating evidence’. With the protection of a U.S. passport, 
Yang however internalised the political culture of China at that time. Yang (1994: 22) 
aptly puts, ‘fear was infectious’. She certainly made a good point. Her reported fear 
from an ethnographic episode almost twenty years ago crept into my mind and grew 
exponentially in me because I was about to do fieldwork on an even more 
contentious topic in my own country without any political protection. Having read so 
many articles on brutal state violence against the displacees and grassroots activists, I 
knew far too well the consequences of overly transgressing the political boundary. 
                                                            
1 For financial reasons, I was based in Sanlin during the entire fieldwork. I only spent a few nights in 
Pujiang to observe the differences between daytime and nighttime, between weekdays and weekends, 
and between holidays and normal days, in terms of the use of space and the organisation of the social 
life of the displaced.   
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The paradox is, as Linda Green (1999: 67) reporting from Guatemala perceptively 
points out, ‘one cannot be sure where the [political] line is, nor when one has crossed, 
until it is too late’. The ambiguity perhaps is more acute in China. Like regulations 
on chaiqian, the regulatory framework on conducting social sciences in China are 
notoriously obscure and confusing, and in many cases, it is politics instead of clearly 
written laws or regulations that rule society (Nojonen, 2004). This puts great 
challenges on social scientists to gauge political opportunity structure and manoeuvre 
cautiously in the field in order to avoid legal punishment. As such, my fear of state 
oppression locked me into Bentham’s Panopticon, putting me on a constant alert for 
weiwen force. It also censored my choices of methods, the way I introduced my 
project, framed the questions, and the relationships I developed with many displacees.  
Benefiting from my Chinese passport and my adequate skills in speaking local 
dialect, I was able to blend in with the social milieu and to mingle with people 
without raising too much unwanted attention or suspicions. Unlike western scholars, 
I did not have to seek administrative approval to carry out a social science study or to 
report my whereabouts to the local police station during my stay in Shanghai. In a 
sense, I had greater advantage to stay off the political radar as long as I remained 
cautious and refrained from getting overly involved in any contentious actions. To 
avoid unwanted surveillance, I decided to postpone the arrangements for interviews 
with state agents to later stages of my fieldwork in order not to tip off any insiders of 
the political establishment about my work in Shanghai. I also chose not to seek any 
assistance from local resident committees, a vital organ of the weiwen apparatus, for 
recruitment of research participants. I decided only to seek verbal consent in formal 
research encounters as I was worried that those written consent forms designed to 
avoid legal dramas are exactly the kind of ‘incriminating’ evidence for both the 
participants and me. In preparing for formal research contacts, topics that I believe 
were contentious, such as justice and views about the state, were reserved until I felt 
the right moment. To detect such moments, as Goffman (1989) commented on 
fieldwork, it involves work such as reading the hints and sensing the political 
openings as conveyed in words, tones and facial expressions. The demand put on my 
ability to read and judge subtle shifts foresaw that this was a trial and error process. I 
misread so many situations in the field and ruined many meetings with the displacees. 
On one occasion, I was scolded by a displacee and asked to leave his home 
immediately because I misread his kindness for inviting me in and his quite 
forwarding posture as his openness to discuss state violence. 
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This episode also reflects the biggest problem I had to deal with in building trust with 
the displacees. If fear of the Chinese state could grow in me because I am 
researching a contentious topic, there is no reason to expect that the displacees would 
not feel the same way, if not greater, for sharing with a stranger with foreign 
education background their contentious comments. For most displacees, they had 
learnt important lessons from their past interactions with the Chinese state, and the 
traumatic experience during the Expo-induced displacement was a most recent one. 
My education at a Scottish university increased the risk of confiding in me their 
political dissents and made it more difficult for me to develop trust with them. The 
consequence for the research dynamics is that political boundary was constantly 
negotiated by both the participants and me, rendering the process of research 
encounters unpredictable. In the middle of many conversations, many displacees 
asked me to stop recording the rest of our discussions or more dramatically, some 
displacees withdrew their verbal consent and requested that I cross out all the notes I 
had taken. Occasionally, when asked why reassurance of anonymity was not of any 
use, apart from their fear for political consequences, some displacees considered their 
actions as an attempt to save the mianzi (face) of the nation. As one displacee 
borrowed the Chinese idiom in reply, ‘jiachou buke waiyang’2 (equivalent to ‘do not 
wash the dirty linen in public’ in English). It was quite perplexing for me to 
understand their effort to protect the reputation of the state considering the extent of 
injustice they endured as a result of abusive state power. However, I always 
respected such requests in the field out of my commitment to ethical research 
conducts. Yet, the ethical dilemma remains acute. Although I excluded those 
comments from my analysis and writing, I must confess that those events to some 
extent affected my understanding as to how the displacees perceive their relationship 
with the state and how profound the psychological trauma from state violence is.  
The fear of state surveillance and violence is however only one obstacle to build 
mutual trust with the displacees. In later chapters, I shall provide a more detailed 
account about the acute sense of insecurity from the displacees. Part of that fear 
comes from their vulnerability to crime in the resettlement sites. As a young male, I 
was seen as a primary suspect in the eyes of many senior displacees for burglaries 
and scams. In the first couple of weeks, even people from the building where I lived 
refused to open their door when I tried to socialise and make contact. On one 
occasion in Pujiang, a female displacee in her 70s rejected me with an excuse before 
I fully introduced myself and came back to me a few minutes later with a friend of 
                                                            
2 Interview, D29, 12/03/2012 
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hers and comfortably talked to me about her experience of chaiqian. When I asked 
her about the reason she came back, she told me that she was a little scared without 
the presence of another witness. The distrust of strangers from the displacees 
restricted my methodological choices. I had to seek opportunities to talk with people 
in public spaces, such as community gardens, hallways, parks, community centres, 
etc. This added greater flavour of opportunism and uncertainty to my fieldwork. Any 
typical methodology textbooks emphasise the import of space for research 
encounters, particularly when involving sensitive and private issues (King, 2010). 
Indeed, I concur with such views. I did find that the presence of others tended to 
moderate the displacees from sharing their family stories freely and kept their 
comments on many issues brief. It took me a while to find a solution to this situation. 
My agenda in such contact was limited to build trust. This was done in two ways. 
The first was more practical. I always brought some snacks with me (peanuts, melon 
seeds, energy bars, etc.) and shared with the participants while we spoke. Given the 
age difference between most displacees and me, I always addressed them 
respectfully such as ayi (aunts) and yeye (grandpa). This complies with the cultural 
norm yet I believe it also shortened the distance between the displacees and me in 
those encounters and developed ganqing (emotional connectedness) with them. The 
second was more strategic. On such meetings, I always started with the latest news or 
my ‘interesting’ observations about the community to warm up the conversation. 
Rarely did I ask any questions about their personal experience of chaiqian. I either 
waited for others to leave or arranged a formal follow-up interview at a discrete 
space for another day. Regardless of those procedures, the public nature of most 
encounters undermined my effort. A one-to-one interview started under informed 
verbal consent easily attracted the attention from passers-by and grew into group 
interviews, sometimes up to more than ten people. Initially I was quite frustrated by 
those interruptions for ruining my plan out of my concern that the displacees would 
retreat from sharing their personal thoughts and emotions. They presented me with 
ethical challenges as I did not fully inform them about my project and those 
‘voluntary’ participants might not be aware that the conversation was recorded, 
because I did not wish to make frequent interruption to the flow of conversation. 
Sometimes, I was too occupied and forgot. Because those group interviews were 
unplanned, there was no social or moral contract to sustain the conversation. Those 
voluntary participants frequently came and left, making it difficult for me to seek 
their consent later. Only slowly, I began to see some positives out of those 
disruptions. Those occasions became the greatest opportunities to formally introduce 
myself to the community and inform them about my project. This allowed me to 
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build wider connections with the displacees through frequent contacts and saved me 
considerable time in arranging meetings. On some occasions, an exchange of 
greetings on the road was developed into a half-hour chat about their latest memories 
of their old place. On sunny afternoons, some displacees offered me a seat in their 
‘bike shack saloon’ (see chapter 8). I slowly learnt the craft to use those group 
conversations more effectively. I focused instead on the history of their demolished 
neighbourhoods, which I could benefit from their collaboration in jotting the 
memories. I also used those occasions to verify some high-profile cases and collect 
‘insider’ views. A further benefit is that I was able to meet some ‘voluntary’ 
participants and seek their verbal consent. For those who I was never able to meet 
again before I left, their comments were neither transcribed nor analysed but again I 
must admit the influence of their views on me.  
Owing to those frequent contacts, the displacees seemed to be willing to be more 
open with me when they started to confide in me their family histories, and the 
jiachou (family dirty linen) as one might say, those familial conflicts and ‘strife’ 
during chaiqian (see chapter 7), and their bitter resentment against chaiqian agents. I 
started to question the irrationality of my fear back in Edinburgh. My knowledge 
learnt from the disgruntled displacees on the other hand also helped me to locate the 
political red lines and cope with my fear. I slowly got myself involved in some 
activist work after an epiphany moment when the woman I quoted at the beginning 
of this thesis knelt down behind me as an expression of her gratitude for spending a 
few of hours listening to her traumatic experience of losing her house and family. 
The anticipated political consequences did not follow immediately after my 
involvement in grassroots activism, which led me to believe that the political 
opportunity perhaps was greater than I thought. However, I did not realise that the 
Orwellian Big Brother, the National Security Office, has already gathered 
intelligence against me. On 4 June 2012, a police officer identified himself as an 
officer for national security called my research phone number and requested a ‘chat 
over tea’ about my research project at the local police station. I was extremely 
shocked. Regardless of my reluctance, their threat to drop by my place in Shanghai 
coerced me to agree to meet in a place of my choice on the following morning in 
order to buy some time to plan my exit strategy. I reacted in a more comic way than 
Yang as I quoted earlier. After urgent contacts with my supervisor and two local 
university professors, I encrypted and transferred all digital ‘incriminating’ evidence 
on my laptop to the network server back in Edinburgh with the help from a friend in 
the office, and downloaded many irrelevant government reports, pictures and videos 
to bury the trace. Photocopied documents were hidden at friends’ homes. I also 
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prepared a mock interrogation with my flatmate in Shanghai and planned my 
answers to possible questions. The tea-chat later proved to be less brutal and 
dramatic as I had imagined, yet the officers did convey important political messages 
and delivered the desired outcome. I was instructed to write in the mainstream tone 
(zhu xuanlv) by which they meant a celebratory account with minimum critique of 
surface problems. But how to do this, as they refused to instruct me on the specifics, 
is a political skill that I must master by practice. Second, I became officially a 
contentious researcher on their political radar and they would follow up on my work 
constantly. They did not make any alarming threats yet it affected my later work 
profoundly. My later intervention on grassroots activism was rather tamed and 
strategic, avoiding triggering further alarms or implicating those displacees in the 
surveillance against me. Before I left Shanghai, I was ‘invited’ to report and update 
my work a couple of times. They later requested copies of my fieldwork notes and 
warned me about the legal ramifications for choosing the side of the displacees 
without the story from the state side. For the safety of the participants and myself, I 
provided them a few sample pages with all information that may reveal personal 
identity redacted. And hopefully, my reliance on the government reports and the 
literary products commissioned by the party-state in my critique as presented in this 
thesis could effectively defend my arguments and protect my safety.   
Language and Translation  
Before I start to discuss the technicalities of methods for this project, I wish to make 
a brief comment on the issue of language and translation in doing cross-cultural 
bilingual research. Temple (1997: 607) argues that, ‘if language constructs as well 
describes a society, the figure of the interpreter/translator must come out from behind 
the shadows’. Similarly, Muller (2007: 208) maintains that ‘uncritical translation 
naturalises the translated text in the target language as an objectivity which came into 
being in the course of a seemingly unpolitical act’. For critical bilingual research, 
Fiona Smith (1996a: 165) emphasises the importance of hybridity, which creates 
gaps between self and other, and between ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ language. Srivastava 
(2006) concurs with this view and sensitises us to the influence of constant travelling 
and translation between analytical language and fieldwork language, between official 
language and everyday language on research encounters. As the latter authors 
convincingly demonstrate, the issue of translation is no less acute for researchers 
who speak the local language than researchers who rely on the assistance of 
translators in mediating the construction of meanings. For this study, the analytical 
language is primarily English and the field language was either Chinese Mandarin or 
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Shanghai dialect. The process of data collection and analysis involved simultaneous 
translation of words, concepts and meanings and crossing of cultural borders. I take 
the position of an ‘exile’ and ‘immigrant’ (JanMohamed, 1992) in performing my 
role as a border-crossing researcher/translator. It gives me a new perspective in 
understanding China’s political culture of chaiqian by maintaining physical and 
cultural distance from the ‘West’ without full immersion to either the local culture or 
the Western culture. To do this, I first kept reflexive eyes to theories developed in the 
western context. Also, I followed the suggestion by Srivastava (2006) that all raw 
data collected from the fieldwork were retained in Chinese Mandarin and was not 
translated until formal writing to minimise the linguistic impacts. I constructed the 
survey in Chinese (commented on by Dr Yiping Fang, based in Portland State 
University whose research interest lies in residential satisfaction surveys) and then 
translated the draft into English for comments from my supervisors rather than the 
other way around. In translating the secondary sources and the interview quotes, I 
sought meaning equivalence in most cases with help from native English speakers in 
Geography and Anthropology for particular words or sentences whose translatability 
I believe is in question. In the cases where I believe meanings are lost in translation, I 
retained the Chinese word or sentences and supplied a tentative English translation in 
similar meanings. In some cases, I elaborated on the subtle differences in meanings 
and values as conveyed by the Chinese language in footnotes. Those choices were 
made to avoid premature closure of meanings in translation (Smith, 1996a). Despite 
those efforts, I wish to emphasise the inherent problem in translation as Philip (1960: 
291) points out almost half a century ago, that,  ‘almost any utterance in any 
language carries with it a set of presumptions, feelings and values’, which no 
translation can accurately capture. My translation of those underpinning values, 
feelings and presumptions are quite contingent. The issue was most acute for my 
representation of the sufferings of the displaced as in chapter 5. Compared to English, 
Chinese spoken language lacks the vocabulary to describe emotional experiences let 
alone to nuance their intensity and subtleties. There, I relied on relaying the stories 
from the displacees in chunks and my observations of their emotional state to report 
their victimhood.    
Sources of Data  
In this section, I shall detail out the technicalities of the methods and sources of data 
I used in administering this research. Here, I put them under two broad categories: 
documentary method and site-intensive ethnography.  




Initially I had plans to interview government officials to get their standpoints on 
chaiqian problems and to acquire information on the demographic characteristics of 
the displaced. I also sought to arrange meetings with chaiqian companies regarding 
the technicalities of chaiqian. In making those requests, I chose to use dongqian 
(relocation) rather than chaiqian in order to conform to official representations. 
Although they are often used interchangeably, the former played down the violence 
as conveyed in chaiqian. I fully disclosed my interests in the institutional 
arrangement, the practices of chaiqian regulations and the impacts upon the 
displaced in such contacts. Unsurprisingly, most requests were denied including 
those requests made with the institutional support from Shanghai Normal University 
and the help of my acquaintances who have personal connections with government 
insiders. I once phoned the spokeswoman working at Pudong District Government 
and her response perhaps explains the underlying reason: ‘dongqian is a sensitive 
matter. Even we know or have some information; we cannot disclose it freely to the 
public’. 3 The cancellation of the Expo Bureau in April 20124 made it even more 
difficult to find a coordinating bureaucratic agency to negotiate access. Before I 
exited the field, I was only able to meet with a few planning officers through a 
mutual acquaintance. As a result, I had to rely more heavily on secondary official 
sources, such as government reports, officially endorsed propaganda materials, 
newspaper articles, statistical yearbooks and reports, local chorography and 
chronicles,  and reportage literature. Those materials bear the imprint of the party 
ideology and elitist view of the society. Yet, they proved to be crucial sources of data 
to dissect the mystification of chaiqian and the exercise of symbolic power.  
The most crucial source for this study was the reportage literature, e.g. Pudong Shibo 
Da Dongqian (The Grand Displacement in Pudong) (Shanghai Pudong New District 
Expo-Induced Chaiqian Command Centre et al., 2006) and Fasheng zai Pudong 
Shibo Dadongqian de Baige Gushi (One-Hundred Stories from the Expo-induced 
Displacement in Pudong) (Du, 2006). Such literary products were mostly authored 
by the journalists commissioned by the political establishment. The books I acquired 
were published by local authorities and written in celebratory tones. They provided 
                                                            
3 Telephone Interview, 04/06/2012.  
4 The Expo Bureau was an ad hoc temporary organisation. The business of post-Expo land 
development was transferred to another Janus-faced corporation, the Expo Development Group. This 
is another example of manipulation of time and floating responsibility in the business of domicide. 
The displacees can no longer charge against the Expo Bureau and hold it responsible for their 
suffering. It is also unrealistic to expect the Expo Development Group to right the wrongs committed 
by another organisation.  
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important factual information on the organisation, the policy contexts and the 
bureaucratic infrastructure of the Expo-induced chaiqian, followed by many 
accounts collected from street-level chaiqian agents on their experiences in 
practising chaiqian. The problem with this source of data lies in that they are not a 
product of deliberate social study. Therefore, they do not provide any detailed 
account on research methods. Neither do they offer any references to check the 
validity of sources and accuracy of representation. To overcome the limitations in 
those products, I treated the ‘factual’ information in those texts more seriously than 
those representations on ‘caring’ chaiqian agents and ‘happy’ displacees. I read and 
analysed such accounts along with oral accounts from the displacees. I was fortunate 
to meet a few displacees who had direct experience with the state agents mentioned 
in the book. In these cases, I juxtaposed the displacees’ experience with the 
representation in those texts to present a fuller picture of the mentality and conducts 
of street-level chaiqian agents (see chapter 6). In other cases, my analysis focused on 
the representations themselves and challenged the underlying moral and ethical 
tensions (see chapter 7). This entailed a close reading and deciphering of the hidden 
messages of words and sentences. I argue that if these ‘public transcripts’, published 
to promote and legitimatise the established order, can tell us all about the corrupted 
values of the ruling elites, the systematic problem of Expo-induced displacement is 
self-evident.   
Like many researchers on Chinese media content, information overload was a 
primary challenge (Stockmann, 2010). For this thesis, I chose to narrow my lens to 
three local newspapers (i.e. Xinmin Nightnews, Wenhui News and Jiefang Daily). 
The first targets the mass consumers whilst the latter two are mouthpieces of the 
party-state usually subscribed by state apparatus and disseminated on community 
bulletin boards. But, considering the media censorship in China (Brady, 2008), 
perhaps it is more accurate to see all of them as the ideological claws of the state. 
The reason to choose those newspapers was based on their wide reach to both the 
ordinary citizens and the elites in Shanghai. In selecting articles, I only focused the 
news reports on residential displacement, particularly the representation of displaced 
families and the chaiqian process. Within my capacity, I collected and surveyed 
sixty-two articles from these three sources from the archives in Shanghai Municipal 
Library. Of however limited value, those articles familiarised me with the context of 
the Expo-induced chaiqian.  
Moreover, I also accessed and reviewed several photo albums to get a more vivid 
impression of the Expo site before chaiqian and the chaiqian process. Renmin Shibo 
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(People’s Expo) (People's Expo Editorial Committee, 2011) was explicitly 
commissioned by the local state and others are the products of local photographers 
(Wei, 2010, Lu, 2010, Chen, 2011). Those images offered me the raw material to 
show the exercise of symbolic power in stigmatising the Expo site, particularly the 
priority of aesthetic order over functioning order. Their photographs were also used 
in a few meetings with the displacees as prompts to elicit their memories of the lived 
place on the Expo site. 
Local chronicles provide another important source of data on the political and 
economic historical construction of the Expo site. Here, I focused on the online 
chronicle on Housing Construction. It provides historical narratives of the housing 
conditions and housing development since Shanghai’s opening to colonial settlement. 
The control of history writing is a primary tool for establishing ideological 
hegemony. For this reason, local chronicles are inherently limited by the political 
interests that they are designed to serve. To overcome this, I read them along with 
information from other sources especially from scholastic studies and oral accounts 
from the displaced.  
Site‐Intensive Ethnography  
Primary data was acquired through site-intensive ethnographic methods, including 
participant and non-participant observation, semi-structured in-depth interviews and 
survey methods. The difference as I understand about participant and non-participant 
observation lies in my position in such situations, whether I was personally involved 
in the social activities of others whilst I was conducting the observation (Mason, 
2002, Hume and Mulcock, 2004). I use observation because it allows me to be more 
sensitive and reflective to social relations and social processes. Most observations 
were conducted when I was a pure observer without deeper involvement in the 
activities of the observed. For instance, as chapter 8 will show, I relied on this 
method to observe the organisation of social activities and the use of public space in 
the resettlement sites. In those cases, I did not fully disclose myself as an observer as 
I had presented myself as a researcher on repeated visits to these neighbourhoods. I 
also used this method when I was under-cover in collective petitioning, observing the 
routine tactics of domination in victimising the displacees. On those occasions, the 
displacees were fully aware of my interest and consent to my under-cover 
observation. But the boundary between participant and non-participant was rather 
slippery. In some occasions, the raw anger inside me when I was doing non-
participant observation pushed me to transgress the role as a pure observer and 
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actively involved in grassroots activism. My interactions with the displacees and the 
state agents turned my personal experiences as well as my observations into 
invaluable sources of information on the (re)production of domination.  
The two major methods for this research are semi-structured formal and informal 
interviews and surveys. In terms of their hukou status, all displacees in this study are 
local Shanghaiese who were displaced either for the Expo or for the development of 
the resettlement housing in Sanlin and Pujiang. Migrants who used to rent properties 
on both sites unfortunately could not be recruited for this study. This may lead to two 
limitations. First, migrants in the land war are the most vulnerable due to their lack of 
legal titles to the land or properties (see Shin and Li, 2013). The official count of the 
scale of displacement is very unlikely to include those migrants. The suffering and 
the pain of the migrants from uprooting remain unnoticed. Second, the accounts from 
migrants would have enriched the empirical analysis on the construction of the 
destroyed place, the meaning of homes, the process of displacement, and the 
mechanics of power and resistance. However, this is not an oversight of this project. 
The fieldwork was conducted after the Expo-induced displacement. The opportunity 
to meet the migrants had been long gone. The difficulty to track them down was 
tremendous as there was no available census data. Contacts from displacees who 
used to be landlords or landladies were intentionally sought but did not work out. 
Some changed their phone numbers whilst many, I suspect, as a result of the 
insecurity of job and tenure in Shanghai were forced to move around and made it 
difficult for them to put down roots.  
Following Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), I chose qualitative interviews to understand 
the views on chaiqian from the participants’ standpoints in unfolding conversations. 
Cloke et al. (2004) points out three roles played by the interviewers in those 
encounters, namely actors, directors and choreographers, arguing for the merits of 
openness, reflexivity and flexibility in qualitative inquires. Knowledge therefore is 
coproduced by the linguistic exchange between the researcher and the researched in 
specific time-space. In total, I conducted 121 interviews with the displacees in both 
formal and informal settings such as street corners, food markets, streets, community 
gardens, community centres, hallways and their homes. The length of those 
interviews ranged from 20 minutes to 6 hours. For each interview, I prepared a guide 
with some generic topics and tentative questions as prompts (see appendix I to IV). 
This helped me to stay focused on my interests yet retains the flexibility and 
responsiveness to new themes and topics emerged in the conversation with the 
displacees (Weiss, 1994). The guides focus on pre-displacement life and place 
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history, the experience of chaiqian, and the post-displacement residential experiences. 
Specifically, my inquiry involves (1) the migration history; (2) the housing history 
(tenures, housing improvement, conditions, etc.); (3) the attachment structure; (4) 
experience of chaiqian (level of participation, understanding of chaiqian policies, 
views on justice and public interests, political tactics, etc. ); (5) residential experience 
in the resettlement sites (social networks, housing conditions, place identity, 
resolution of grief, etc.).  
Because of the aforementioned opportunistic and public nature of many research 
encounters, the inclusion of research participants was beyond my control as a 
researcher. My sampling strategy was frequently sabotaged by many ‘voluntary’ 
participants. This is also the reason that some interviews lasted much longer than my 
emotional and physical endurance. Many displacees learnt from their friends and 
neighbours and came to me to vent out their discontents and pain in the hope that I 
would do something or write something about it. I could have declined their requests 
on those situations yet I was worried that it might ruin the relationships with the 
displacees and I felt that what many displacees needed most was to find someone 
who patiently and empathetically would hear out their stories. Therefore, despite my 
declining cognitive effectiveness, I accepted those requests. Later stages of those 
overly long interviews often turned into the monologue of the displacees, narrating 
their life histories and personal experience of chaiqian with minimum prompts and 
engagement from me. Most interviews were recorded with verbal consent from the 
displacees. Due to the time constraints of my fieldwork, only some short ones were 
transcribed in the field and the majority were done after I returned to Edinburgh. I 
relied on my notes and research diaries primarily for generating new interview 
agendas and refining the questions.  
I also conducted a survey on perceptions of the Expo-induced chaiqian and 
residential satisfaction (see appendix V). This was as much a methodological choice 
as a political decision. Methodologically, survey results are used to supplement or 
triangulate the findings from interviews, observations and official sources. Politically, 
given the doubts on interpretive paradigm from the political circle, survey results can 
delegitimise the myths of chaiqian in the favoured statistical language of the elites. 
McDougall and Munro (1994) proposes three approaches to develop a survey 
measurement: selecting from existing scales whose validity and reality has been well 
proved, developing a new survey scale by modifying existing scales and introducing 
new items, or developing a brand new scale whose validity and reliability requires 
testing. The survey used for this study was amended from existing measurements 
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(Fang, 2006, Li and Song, 2009) with the input from interviews, observations and 
other sources at an earlier stage. The initial survey was overly long, including eight 
sections on ten pages. Questions cover personal information, pre-/post-chaiqian 
household composition, experience of chaiqian, residential satisfaction, etc. After a 
pilot study with three displacees conveniently recruited (two male and one female, 
between 30 and 60 years old), a significant portion of the survey had to be cut out in 
order to avoid exhausting the patience of the respondents. The remainder of the 
survey focused more on the experience of displacement and living experiences at the 
resettlement sites. On average, it took 30 to 40 minutes to complete. The recruitment 
of survey participants were driven by practical concerns. In fact, the unavailability of 
the overall demographic characteristics of the displaced made it rather difficult to 
decide an appropriate, statistically representative sample size. Given the time and 
financial constraints, I ensured to collect 300 questionnaires from two resettlement 
sites (i.e. Sanlin Expo Homeland and Pujiang Expo Homeland) in Sanlin and Pujiang 
(see Figures 8.4 and 8.5 for maps) in less than 20 days5. This sample size is relatively 
larger than Fang’s (2006) research on displaced households in Beijing but much 
smaller than Li and Song’s (2009) similar study in Shanghai. As we can see from the 
table below, the sample may have over-represented the middle-aged and senior 
displacees. Three explanations are in order. First, the survey was administered during 
daytime when most young people were at work. The under-development of public 
transport made survey distribution in evenings and nights quite difficult. Second, the 
rejection rate was very high among younger generation. Many of them simply were 
not interested in social studies, seeing such study a useless act. Third, any social 
studies require considerable time and energy from the participants. The lack of 
interest from younger generations is understandable given the long commuting hours 
they had to put up with every day. Yet, I do not see this as a big limitation 
considering that the middle-aged and the senior displaces were most active in 
chaiqian negotiations in their families. Also, existing studies on displacement show 





5 The police intimidated me at one tea talk session and they wanted to see me off at the airport. I had 
to cut short my research plan and make sure I had enough time to take photos of all survey 
questionnaires in case the questionnaires were confiscated at the airport. Thanks to the typhoon in 
Shanghai on the day of my leave, the flight was scheduled to depart several hours earlier. I somehow 
escaped the final meeting with the police.  




Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents  
Characteristics (N=300) Frequency Percentage  Census Data1 
Location 
Sanlin Expo Homeland 153 51% 
NA 
Pujiang Expo Homeland 147 49% 
Gender 
Male 132 44% 51.5% 
Female 168 56% 48.5% 
Age 
20-29 years old 4 1.3% 22.55% 
30-39 years old 6 2.0% 17.59% 
40-49 years old 10 3.3% 15.98 
50-59 years old 90 30.0% 15.32% 
60-69 years old 104 34.7% 7.84% 
70-79 years old 66 22.0% 4.68% 
80 years old and older 20 6.7% 2.28% 
Household 
Head 
Yes  184 61.3% 
NA 




Undergraduate  31 10.3% 22.8% 
Senior High School 77 25.7% 21.8% 
Junior High School  105 35% 38.1% 
Primary School 45 15% 
17.3% 
Illiterate  42 14% 
Occupation 
Government Agencies 7 2.3% 5.27% 
State owned enterprise 
employees 
96 32% NA 
Employed by enterprises of 
non-state nature 
26 8.7% NA 
Self-employed 22 7.3% NA 
Retired 103 14.3% NA 
Farmers  19 6.3% NA 
Unemployed or Laid-off 14 4.7% 0.8% 
Others 13 4.3% NA 
Notes: 1 There is no published statistical data on the displaced population. Hence, the census 
data of the demographic characteristics of the whole city here can only be used as a reference.   
Source: My own survey and the 6th National Census Report (2011).  
To ensure the return of 300 questionnaires, four female college students were hired 
from local universities. The decision to choose females rather than males was a 
strategic use of the gender stereotype amongst the displacees and to save time in 
building trust with the displacees as I did while gaining access for interviews. Each 
surveyor received two-day training from me in assisting with the distribution and 
collection of surveys and each did several pilot studies under my observation to 
ensure that they fully understood the design and the requirement of each question in 
the survey. They were instructed to assist the willing respondents above 18 years old 
in filling the survey out on-site when requested or arrange for collection at a later 
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time.6 In the first scenario, they were told to write down the comments followed up 
by a straightforward answer to a survey question as much as possible. They were also 
instructed to exclude all displacees that personally met me. Convenient sampling was 
adopted to recruit the survey respondents. Surveyors were instructed to make visits to 
displacees’ homes7, approach displacees coming out of their apartment buildings or 
recruit the displacees from public spaces inside the resettlement neighbourhoods. The 
rejection rate of recruiting participants from their homes was significantly higher 
than that of recruiting them from public spaces. Speaking from my own experiences 
in administering the survey, on average, one out of five recruiting attempts failed. 
Many people held strong distrust of social studies, especially survey studies. 
According to many displacees who I personally knew well, quite a few students of 
displacement conducted fieldwork in their neighbourhoods but they never heard back 
from them after they exited from the field. To democratise the research process and 
to fulfil the political commitment of this research, the last section of the survey asked 
the respondents if they want to receive the survey results after the completion of this 
study. A report based on chapter 8 was prepared in lay language in Chinese and 
mailed to those who expressed willingness to receive survey results in September 
2014. In appreciation for the displacees’ assistance, I also purchased some small gifts 
(e.g., soap bars, reusable bags) upon the return of the survey. Over meals and breaks, 
the surveyors and I also discussed the common problems in conducting the survey 
and the general patterns in the displaced views of chaiqian and their residential 
experiences. The collective effort of the surveyors and me made it possible to collect 
300 surveys in one month. All survey data were coded and computerised with the 
SPSS 20.0 software by me after my return to Edinburgh.  
Data analysis  
In terms of the survey data, I chose to use simple descriptive analysis—frequency 
and percentage—throughout the thesis. This is a political decision based on three 
reasons. First, I wished to ensure the accessibility of research findings to people 
without any knowledge of statistics. If an argument can be substantiated by a simple 
numeric counting, I see no point in pursuing further advanced analysis (cross-
category, or regression analysis), which from my point of view, was an act of 
defending the academic territory and obstructing the dissemination of knowledge. 
Second, by using simple descriptive analysis, I hoped that the data could speak for 
                                                            
6 Only 28 questionnaires were filled out by the respondents themselves. Most were filled out with the 
assistance of the surveyors.  
7 Two surveyors turned out to be very successful at making such visits.  
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themselves and thereby, allow me to construct a qualitative narrative without delving 
into the technicalities in producing statistical representations and to weave it into my 
overall critique of the process and consequences of chaiqian. Third, I appreciated the 
value of statistical analysis that may yield results that some groups were more or less 
victimised than others, or that some factors influenced the displacees’ perceptions of 
the impacts more than other factors did. However, I refused to pursue this direction 
of analysis. It departs from the objective of this research, which is to understand the 
prevalence and persistence of domicide. Moreover, it may further undermine the 
solidarity of the displacees, encourage mutual distanciation and prohibit collective 
actions for justice8. In chapter 7, I will show how comparison to other domicide 
victims undermined the potential of collective resistance.  
Most but not all survey questions were analysed and reported in simple numeric 
counting in this final thesis. Practical constraint of word count certainly played a part. 
For instance, the issue of legal practices and trust of legal practitioners was critically 
important but I had to skip it for a discussion of the violence of law, which seemed 
more important (at least to me). This brings to light that research is an ongoing 
process and our perspectives may change and develop. Reflection over the course of 
analysis and writing also led me to rethink the design, relevance and validity of some 
questions. Some questions deemed relevant, sensible and important when this survey 
was designed either no longer fit the theoretical perspective and narrative or deemed 
as rather questionable in terms of the underlying logic. For instance, the benefit of 
hindsight makes me realise the problem in asking the displacees to quantify their 
emotional state (also F4a and F4b of the survey).  
For interview data and my fieldwork notes, I mainly relied on the simple method of 
coding and categorising in order to find the general themes of the experiences of 
displacement and resettlement and to construct my argument (see an example in 
appendix VII). For instance, in chapter 5, I seek to understand the layered 
experiences of living inside the zone of chaiqian. I first read the transcripts on the 
process of chaiqian and coded the oral accounts from the displacees narrowly, such 
as panicking, alienation, crime, etc. The coding was content driven as well as 
theoretically driven, an interaction between my theoretical frame and the displacees’ 
narratives. Later, those codes were categorised to identify the logic and the generic 
themes, such as temporal domination, geographies of fear, destabilising attachment 
structure, etc. In chapter 8, I also relied on this method to identify the general themes 
of displacees’ experiences in the resettlement sites. In some cases, especially in terms 
                                                            
8 My reluctance of conducting more advanced statistical analysis is further explained in chapter 8.  
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of policy documents, I also learnt from discourse analysis to understand the linguistic 
and discursive dimension in defining the ‘truth’ and (re)producing domination 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, Fairclough, 2010). Practically, I focused on the 
discursive strategies and the connections with broader contexts. For instance, in 
chapter 5, my analysis of the eviction notices benefited from this method to 
dissecting the argumentative strategies in facilitating the abusive exercise of state 
violence.  
Conclusion  
This chapter reflected upon the rationales in using a mixed methods approach for this 
project. Derived from my theoretical, ethical and political commitments, a wide 
range of quantitative and qualitative techniques were used in either complementation 
or triangulation to understand the multifaceted problem of chaiqian in contemporary 
Chinese cities. The design seeks to democratise the research practices, and gives 
voice to those silenced and marginalised in the chaiqian process, while at the same 
time debunks the myths surrounding chaiqian. I then moved to carve out the 
fieldwork dynamics in affecting the designs and choices of methods, and also my 
hybrid positionality and roles in doing the fieldwork. Particularly, I discussed the 
ethical and methodological problems due to the opportunistic and public nature of 
many encounters. I also singled out the politics of language and translation in doing 
this cross-cultural project. The remainder of this chapter outlined the technicalities of 
different methods used in collecting and analysing the data in the thesis.  
 








When I was writing up the draft proposal for this project in 2009, the romance drama 
Dwelling Like Snails 2 aired on Shanghai Dragon TV channel and stirred up a 
nationwide controversy on housing, social values and morality.3 Although the 
playwright deliberately invented a fictional place called Jiangzhou, the familiar 
scenes of lilong (alley) housing, the allegorical reference to major political scandals 
in Shanghai (i.e. the arson in evicting a family, the corruption of the former party 
secretary Chen Liangyu and his underlings) and the casual dialogue with 
geographical indications (i.e. the hosting of the Expo, proximity to Jiangsu Province) 
lent credence to the Chinese audience that the show was a satire of the violent and 
                                                            
1 Wo (first tone) can be translated as home. There is a Chinese saying, jinwo yinwo, buru ziji de 
caowo, which can be literally translated as other people’s mansions made of gold or silver are inferior 
to a hut of one’s own. It is similar to the English saying ‘there is no place like home’ that encapsulates 
the emotional experiences of belonging, familiarity, comfort, rootedness and security. The Chinese 
saying, with an emphasis on the materiality of the dwelling space, additionally expresses strong 
sentiment of self-respect and dignity in precarious living conditions. 
2 The publisher translates the title as Dwelling Narrowness. But I favour the literal translation of 
Dwelling like Snails for the visual image the metaphor conjures up to capture the predicament of the 
majority of the Chinese people in this land-centred accumulation regime. The drama series can be 
found on YouTube. See Liang (2010) for a fuller discussion of this drama. 
3 Whilst the critics sharply attacked the show for ‘complotting’ representations of xiaosan (mistresses, 
mostly involved in sexual affairs with political elites. See Hung (2011) for a discussion of the political 
economy of xiaosan) and the objectification of female bodies, and frowned on the frequent vulgar 
language and a few sexual scenes. Yet, for the laypeople, the drama struck a responsive chord in their 
hearts for the perceptive, realistic, and critical representation of the violent and alienating realties of 
the emerging land-centred accumulation strategy in late socialist China.   
The poor rely on chaiqian to turn over their bodies (fanshen).  
A local saying in Shanghai 
 Fanshen: ‘To China’s hundreds of millions of landless and land-poor peasants 
it meant to stand up, to throw off the landlord yoke, to gain land, stock, 
implements, and houses. But it meant much more than this…It meant to enter a 
new world’.   
William Hinton, Fanshen 
Making a Home in Shanghai’s Lower Quarters │ 90  
 
 
alienating realties of the neoliberal order in contemporary Shanghai. The main 
storyline follows a young migrant couple with a college education who struggle to 
secure their own place to live in Shanghai, and in this process, the woman’s younger 
sister who feels obliged to help with the down payment for a shangpinfang (a 
commodity apartment) capitalises on her body and becomes a sexual consort to a 
married politician. Despite such costly efforts in advancing their housing trajectory 
from renter to owner, their life path seems to be tied up with their neighbour on the 
second floor; a destitute local Shanghainese family that is lifted out from the 
crowded, inconvenient, and poorly maintained lilong housing and ends up in the 
same commodity housing estate as a result of chaiqian.  
I revisit the drama series here for two unsettling issues that constitute the theme of 
this chapter. Firstly, the drama reproduced the hegemonic images of the character of 
lilong neighbourhood—an essential part of Shanghai’s xiazhijiao (lower quarters)—
that is featured by the over-crowded living space, inadequate utilities, noxious smells, 
lack of privacy, disorder, tension, and materialistically calculative lifestyle, 
recreating its myth as ‘a living hell for the ordinary’ (Wasserstrom, 2009: 5) dated 
back to Shanghai’s opening to foreign settlement. Similar representations can be 
found in other literary products, including cautiously laboured academic literature. 
There, the ‘notorious’ (He, 2007: 183) lower quarters of Shanghai has been 
recklessly translated as or compared to ghettos (Ho, 2004), or slums/ slum-like/ 
shantytowns (Wu, 2002), or informal settlements (Wu et al., 2010), without teasing 
out the nuances between those terminologies and their historical meanings before a 
‘profit’4 to be hastily made.  
Secondly, I read the young couple’s sense of loss and frustration for not being able to 
escape the fate of neighbouring with the same poor local Shanghainese family after 
all the economic costs and emotional ordeals they went through  as an example of 
‘the lateral denigration and mutual distanciation’ (Wacquant, 2007: 68). As more 
deserving consumer subjects, their sense of entitlement make them think that they are 
categorically different from the less deserving consumers, the poor chaiqian subjects 
in this case, who rest their hope and their fate purely on the last straw of chaiqian 
without making any personal effort. The lack of empathy toward the native poor 
residents reinforces the stigma against them as dependent, speculative, canny, 
money-fetishism and parasite of the public. Such character assassinations of the 
                                                            
4 I use profit in a Bourdieusian sense but retain a greater extent of cynicism than Bourdieu. Bourdieu 
(1998c: 75-91) questions the existence of disinterested social actions. Seeing from a ‘disenchanted 
gaze’ (p.75), he argues that intellectual sites, contrasting to the mystifying thinking, are invested with 
different interests.  
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displacees find a wide purchase amongst the locals. When I introduced my research 
to my friends and ordinary citizens from other parts of the city, the first response I 
received was always a kind warning against my tendency to represent the displacees 
as victims. To them, the displacees must have made a great fortune selling their 
properties to the appropriators, and therefore chaiqian means jiefang (emancipation) 
instead of repression or suffering, in resonance with the hegemonic discourse on 
chaiqian as a life-changing event for the poor, the have-nots, and the marginalised. 
As a popular local saying goes, qiongren fanshen kao dongqian (the poor relies on 
chaiqian to turn over their restrained bodies).These mechanisms—distanciation, 
stigmatisation and misrecognition—effectively isolate the displacees as an 
undeserving social group that those marginalised by the same accumulation strategy 
are unwilling to offer their political support.  
This chapter seeks to offer a counter narrative of the lived place—part of Shanghai’s 
xiazhijiao—demolished for the ‘non-place’ Expo Park (Auge, 1995), and to present a 
portrait of the dwellers displaced by the World Expo. By the end of this chapter, I 
wish to deliver an answer to the following question: how did ‘xiazhijiao’ and 
‘fanshen’ enter into the political discourses to legitimatise the displacement of such a 
huge scale and intensity, and to mould the political consciousness and the agency of 
those residents? To provide a short answer to the central question of this chapter, I 
argue that the infusion of structural and symbolic violence as expressed in the 
evolvement of the waterfront site chained these dwellers to a stigmatised place with 
multiple vulnerabilities (Bourdieu, 1999a) and made them extremely susceptible to 
subordinating to the dominant power in the land-centred accumulation in Shanghai. 
These vulnerabilities have been exploited by the Expo regime in reconfiguring urban 
spaces.  
First emerged in revolutionary China, the discourse of fanshen revived in 
contemporary times is based on a radical change of residential environment, 
particularly home, and on the symbolic value of upward mobility. To expose the 
violent nature of fanshen discourse, we need to understand the elusive and complex 
notion of home. Following Bourdieu (2005: 19-22), I conceptualise home in both 
material and symbolic dimensions in a relational way. Materialistically, home is 
grounded in a place or physical structure. It is structured by and structures social 
relations and power dynamics within and beyond this material space (also Massey, 
1992). Therefore, it can be experienced in diverse, ambivalent and even 
contradictory ways, even for the dwellers in the same space. As Blunt and Varley 
(2004: 3) write, home is simultaneously a ‘space of belonging and alienation, 
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intimacy and violence, desire and fear’. The ambivalent meanings and lived 
experiences of home constitute a main theme in feminist critical study of home (see 
hooks, 1991). Despite so, critiques alerting us to the variegated experiences of home 
implies a subscription to an idealised imagination of home – what home should be – 
as a crucial source of comfort, security, ownership, or belonging, a sanctuary space 
(Young, 1997). This ideal home underpins the efforts of its dwellers to make, 
unmake and remake homes over time, usually as a collective endeavour, investing 
labour, money, time and emotions. As such, it acquires historical and affective 
qualities through the creation and maintenance of a social group in a stable 
relationship who are awarded with satisfaction through investment of different forms 
in the material space. Home therefore is both a biological and social reproduction 
project. Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of home is existential (Allen, 2008). It 
‘expresses or betrays’ the social being of the dwellers in the world, through the 
spatial practices of the dwellers surrounding their homes and the symbolic 
appropriation of various qualities of their homes by outsiders, which may in turn 
shape or affect the experiences of the dwellers about their homes and their being in 
the world. The violence of fanshen discourse lies in that it encourages and 
perpetuates such symbolic appropriation driven by dominant economic logics that 
first, home as an asset or a commodity is devoid of historical and affective qualities 
and its value depreciates over time (Bourdieu, 2005); second, social distinction in the 
housing field is determined by the exchange value; and third, the class boundary in 
this field can only be transcended through supporting chaiqian programmes. Its 
exercise diminishes, corrodes and betrays the dwellers’ sense of social existence.  
To build the argument of this chapter, I shall follow Wacquant’s (2008) 
methodological advice5 on researching advanced urban marginality and examine the 
historical and political construction of this section of Shanghai’s xiaozhijiao, a 
tainted place, from waterfront rural settlements to ‘penghuqu’ or ‘shanty towns’ until 
it was ‘strategically’6 chosen to host the Expo. Particularly, I will pay attention to 
how inside and outside actors interact and contest in constructing the place as ‘shared 
spaces’ (Massey, 1994: 137) under different regimes of accumulation.  This however 
is not an easy task for three reasons. Firstly, the erasure of diverse physical structures 
and the erection of a unified Expo space removed the triggers of place memories that 
is crucial for the development and preservation of more colourful social memory 
                                                            
5 Wacquant never directs his analytical attention to China, but I believe his analytical tools can be 
universally utilised.  
6 In chapter 6, I shall offer a rebuttal of intellectual rationalisation of this siting choice as ‘strategic’. 
Realpolitik and the political ambition to secure the bid at no costs were more decisive in selecting the 
Expo site.  
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(Casey, 2000).  Secondly, as Pan (2005b: 115) comments, the dwellers of the lower 
quarters are the ‘disenfranchised people who had no culture, no traditions, no history’ 
in Shanghai’s modernisation, apart from the hegemonic pejorative narrative 
(re)produced to consolidate the ruling elites’ political legitimacy. Thirdly, the first 
two problems was compounded by the difficulty of organising the displacees from a 
given locality to construct a shared past due to their scattered residence across more 
than thirty different resettlement compounds, which I could not afford to study. What 
is presented in this chapter is foremost based on a collage of oral accounts from the 
displacees I met either individually or collectively and who used to live in the same 
locality; enriched by available literary and artistic products and the official accounts. 
In this sense, it is as much an individualised memory of homes and communities as a 
collective memory of a place destroyed by the Expo and a struggle over the 
representational space (Lefebvre, 1991).  
This reconstructed territorial history will tell us as much about the ongoing process 
of marginalisation of those dwellers through different logics since Shanghai’s 
colonial past as about the characters, the ethos, and the way of life of those dwellers. 
In making their lived place, those dwellers were constantly negotiating their past to 
define their present and imagining what an ideal place ought to be in the future. Such 
spatial practices affected not only their sense of place, but also their experience of 
loss as examined in more depth in the following chapter. More critically, it shaped 
their political consciousness, agency and subjectivities, engendering ambivalent and 
even conflicting attitudes toward chaiqian on individual or collective level. The 
ambivalences and conflicts are intelligible if we bear in mind Harvey’s (2000) 
insight on labourer’s multiple positionalities and subjectivities in the circulation and 
accumulation of capital. In his words, ‘the labourer as a person is a worker, consumer, 
saver, lover, and bearer of culture, and can even be an occasional employer and 
landed proprietor, whereas the labourer as an economic role—the category Marx 
analyses in Capital—is singular’ (p. 102). An understanding of those multiple 
subjectivities, as Harvey points out, can explain the internal ambivalences, conflicts 
and contradictions of the labourer’s political consciousness and agency of ‘resistance, 
desire for reform, rebellion, and revolution’ (p. 102) in contemporary time as Marx 
acutely captured in his time. Following Harvey, my analysis shall attend to the 
multiple subjectivities of the residents victimised by the Expo-induced spatial 
engineering (e.g. parents, socialist workers, the lost generation, landlords, etc.) 
instead of the singular legal/economic category as displacees under the land-centred 
accumulation regime.  




The Expo Park sits on the waterfronts of the Huangpu River between two cross-river 
bridges, i.e. Nanpu Bridge and Lupu Bridge, covering a planned area of 6.68 square 
kilometres in the centre of Shanghai. The land use was rather mixed with obscure 
boundary between industrial production and social reproduction (see Figure 4.1). 
Before the invasion of the Expo, this place was the cradle of China’s modern 
industrial capitalism and the heart of the communist regime’s planned economy. It 
was the base to 272 public or private enterprises and more than 500 home-based 
small businesses, and was the workplace to more than 50,000 workers. Among those 
factories, two corporate giants stood out: the Jiangnan Shipyard Group on the west 
bank and the Shanghai No. 3 Steel company7 on the east bank, occupying more than 
40 per cent of the land together. These factories were neighbours to more than 
18,000 households excluding the renters who disqualified as displacees under the 
published regulations so as to keep the official accounts of the scale of displacement 
relatively small, a typical example of what Hertzfeld (1984) terms politics of 
significance, playing down the actual scale of displacement. Their shelters with 
variegated tenures were largely densely constructed low-rise buildings without any 
impressive facades along narrow alleys.  
Whilst most of the land close to the water was occupied by the industrial plants, 
docklands and warehouses, pushing the residents farther away from the water after 
several rounds of land appropriation, a few neighbourhoods were under siege from 
those industrial plants and the residents literally lived inside the factories, resembling 
a twisted version of the spatial pattern of a socialist danwei compound where life and 
work mixed in a place enclosed by a wall (see Bray, 2005). For this reason, dwellers 
inside these neighbourhoods, when locating the position of their place in the spatial 
hierarchy, frequently referred to their place as Shanghai’s ‘forgotten corners’, 
invisible to the outsiders. Uncle Wang’s experience is most germane here, ‘guests to 
my home always complained to me that I was messing with them. They were right 
outside my neighbourhood but all they could see was a factory. They did not know 
that they had to walk through the factory workshops’.8 Although other 
neighbourhoods seemed to be relatively luckier without the besiegement of those 
industrial factories, underdeveloped ground transport connections isolated their 
neighbourhoods like small islands from the rest of the city as well. The ferryboats 
were the most convenient tool to commute between two parts of the city.  
                                                            
7 It now has become a part of the Baosteel Group after the Expo-induced industrial relocation.  
8 Interview, D85, 01/04/2012.  
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Figure 4.1: Land Use on the Expo Site before Chaiqian  
Source:  Shanghai Expo Affairs Coordination Office and Shanghai Committee of Urban-Rural 
Construction and Transportation (2010) 
 
To outside ‘place-making and place-understanding’ specialists (Arkaraprasertkul, 
2012: 169), the pre-expo site was ‘urban badlands’ as demonstrated by the physical 
land use pattern (Davis, 2006: 202) and seen as a malignant tissue requiring surgical 
removal. In praise of the Italian girl who inspired the Chinese planners to choose the 
Expo site, Gui Xinghua (2008), a poet reputed for his ‘acute sense of political 
responsibility’ (p. 255), dedicated a canto in his politicians-endorsed anthology to 
this plain-looking girl who had no intimate knowledge of China’s history and the 
formation of the ‘backward’ place instead of a ‘strategic’, modernist and 












You collected the data of shikumen9 
You connected the accumulated glory and past 
sorrows 
You mapped out the golden waterfront line 
You wanted to patch up a fissure  
The turning point of the Huangpu River 
Each inch of the land there is gold to glitter  
Your choice was firmly backed up by the warm 
wind from Pudong! 
…. 
You have never been to an operation room 
You did not realise the ‘surgery’ on the city 
Would require how many tailor made scalpels 
 
                                                            





Residential (different categories and 
value) 
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 Despite my distaste for his celebratory tone in rationalising the site choice and 
aestheticising human suffering, I appreciate his honesty in revealing the truth that the 
Expo since its conceptualisation is more about the highest and best use of 
‘depreciated’ land—an unexploited gold mine—than any other rationalistic 
storylines. The rhetoric of highest and best use in judicial and planning discourses, as 
Blomley’s (2004) critical discussion shows, is to maximise the land rent and 
lubricate the never-ending successive development of the land in the grand narrative 
of progress and improvement. Dictated by the logic of the market, the moral 
imperative of highest and best use in capitalistic regime of accumulation subjugates 
the present use as a possible best use to the predicated use under market logic as 
highest therefore best use. It ignores that the present users are as capable developers 
as the corporate developers in improving the built environment where they reside, 
use and work (Blomley, 2004: 82-87). What I also appreciate here is his confession 
in Chicago School pedigree (although perhaps he has never intended to be 
interpreted in this way) that urban planning and the political governance is ‘pseudo-
science’ (Goodman, 1971: 67) pretending to function as divisions of medical science 
but instead is a tool to serve the interests of private developers. Seeing the city as a 
human body that follows the natural process of growth and decline, inescapable from 
getting sick, the metaphor attempts to convince outside observers that radical 
removal of cancerous tissues from the body of the city is the right choice to return a 
functioning, healthy city. Moreover, it leads us to believe that this is the fate, 
unpredictable and non-controllable, an inevitable pain with no one or no force to 
blame but to get it over with.  
The medical metaphor resonates with the hegemonic images, discourses, and feelings 
associated with this place under official classification as xiazhijiao—the armpit of 
Shanghai. Arjun Appadurai (1988) argues that certain ideas and images may become 
hegemonic metonyms for a place as a forceful shorthand capable of capturing both 
the internal complexities and external preoccupations of that place for intellectual 
intercourse. If hierarchy is a recurrent trope for India, xiazhijiao (lower quarter) and 
the synonym penghuqu (simple shack settlement) are the ones activated by the Expo 
regime to define the identity of the pre-expo site. Jiao, literally translating as corner 
in English, encapsulates both the social-spatial dialectics and the evocative feelings 
and thoughts (Pan, 2005b). The dichotomic political construction of xiazhijiao and 
shangzhijiao (upper quarter) shapes the locals’ cognitive map of Shanghai’s 
fragmented urban spaces. Marris (1979) once commented on the relational nature of 
a slum that it ‘is only a slum in the eyes of someone for whom it is an anomaly’. 
Xiazhijiao like a slum is also relationally defined by its urban other shangzhijiao. 
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Situated inside the former concession areas, shangzhijiao as Pan  (2005b: 113) notes 
in popular cognitive map is a symbol of ‘modernity and civilisation’. These areas 
stigmatised as xiazhijiao on the borders of the concession areas and in the urban 
periphery by contrast are known as ‘another of Shanghai’s distinctive world’ (Honig, 
1986: 23) that is  ‘tantamount to hell’ (Honig, 1989: 265).  
I propose to understand xiazhijiao as objectified space of ethnic domination, 
resembling several features of ghetto but are categorically different, not for the 
absence of ethnic segregation as Lu (1995) and Wu (2009) have proposed, but for the 
distinctive trajectory of their formation, and for the different dynamics between 
ethnicity, class and the state in their (re)production in history (Wacquant, 2008). The 
arbitrary classification of the pre-expo site as xiazhijiao firstly perpetuates the 
century-long stigma and discrimination against the inhabitants as well as the place 
they dwell. By activating this classification and collective memory associated with it, 
the Expo regime also effectively appropriated the symbolic capital, negative (the 
derogatory images of penghuqu and xiazhijiao) and positive (fanshen experience), to 
materialise their greedy agenda in legitimating the siting choice and reducing 
grassroots resistance through the chaiqian programme.  
The origin of xiazhijiao can hardly be traced to any book but to folk conversations 
(Pan, 2005b). But, since its birth, it is loaded with pejorative connotations manifested 
not only in the contrasting physical landscapes but also the characters and cultures of 
their dwellers as distinctive from that of the bourgeoisie in the shangzhijiao. Those 
dwellers, mostly first generation migrants, came to Shanghai as refugees of ‘natural’ 
disasters and World War II, or out of their desire for a better life promised by the 
growth of industrial capitalism (Honig, 1992: 45). To survive in a repressive land and 
housing regime in colonial Shanghai, they built settlements initially along the 
riverside outside the concession areas, which gradually developed around major 
industrial plants and further sprawled to the peripheries during war-time (Jiang and 
Zhao, 2006).  
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Tuan (1977) points out that people come to know and experience a place by 
engaging all their senses. Textual representations of those settlements usually 
effectively evoke negative emotions by mobilising all our senses through the 
description of the disordered spatial patterns, extreme poverty and unsanitary 
conditions. A journalist, quoted in Lu (1999: 124), recounted the sensations in 
walking into a shack settlement in 1935, ‘on the little narrow paths there are always 
puddles of muddy water; here men, women, children, pigs, dogs, chickens, and ducks 
move and live. It is difficult to pick one’s way through the dirt’. Walking closer, one 
would be haunted by poisonous smells from filthy industrial and solid waste mixed 
with faeces and by mosquitoes and flies. Hardly surprisingly, these neighbourhoods 
lack of electricity, running water, sanitary facilities, and waste collection (Lu, 1995). 
The shelters, for most practical intent, were built with straw, bamboo and mud to 
satisfy the need for survival. Built on low-lying areas of the city, these occupants’ 
homes on rainy days became bathtubs for their belongings inside—if they had any—
due to flooding. The interior of those shacks evoke further shocking responses: it was 
always overly crowded with five to six sharing a hut on average (Lu, 1999: 126), 
who might not even be related (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1962: 21). 
Their homes were usually without decent furniture, let alone an independent 
bathroom or a kitchen. As the journalist I quoted above observed, ‘some [dwellers] 
have a few pieces of broken-down furniture coated with slimy dust so that one 
cannot tell the material of which it is made, some even without what could be called 
a chair, for the occupants not only sit on the ground but sleep on it as well!’ (Lu, 
1999: 124). Given such miserable conditions, there is little wonder that the dwellers 
were vulnerable to contagious diseases (Schwenning, 1927), a threat to public safety 
that must be surgically removed. 
Roughly, penghuqu was home to more than one million inhabitants in Shanghai, 
close to one-fifth or one-sixth of the total population of Shanghai before the CPC 
took over the city (Lu, 1999). The dwellers were overwhelmingly poor, deprived of 
access to stable industrial employment. According to a survey of 402 dwellers in the 
1930s, half of them were employed as rickshaw pullers and a quarter worked as 
coolies (Zhang, 2008c: 74). This non-representative sample under-estimated the 
precarious conditions of the penghuqu occupants. According to Lu (1999), beggars 
were another large group among penghuqu residents. In early 1930s, around 20,000 
professional beggars in Shanghai all lived in penghuqu and some penghuqu became 
known as beggar villages (Lu, 1999: 136). Quite homogenously, those early dwellers 
were from subei. According to Honig (1992), subei is an obscure and contested 
geographical area with no coherent geographical boundaries, and it is not an 
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objective place but ‘rather represents the belief in the geographical, cultural, 
linguistic and economic homogeneity of a particular area’ (p. 20). In the most literal 
sense, it refers to the Northern part of Jiangsu province, but extends to people 
generally from the northern poverty-stricken provinces such as Anhui and Shandong. 
The ambiguity of subei sets penghuqu apart from zhejiangcun in contemporary 
landscape of Beijing where the residents share a clearly defined place of origin as in 
Zhang’s ethnography (2001). Primarily detonating one’s native place, subei as 
proposed by Honig (1992) is best understood as a marker of ethnicity in the context 
of Shanghai. It was historically and politically constructed to demarcate the social as 
well as spatial hierarchy in Shanghai, separating subei people as a distinctive social 
group from those rich migrants of Canton or Ningbo origins. Subei people, although 
officially categorised as Han ethnicity with no discernible differences in appearances 
from other Chinese social groups in Shanghai, became a derogatory generalised 
social category, akin to Negros or Appalachians, for the underclass defined by 
poverty, tastelessness, filth and crudeness regardless of the origin of place, and 
retained as a most demeaning curse in local dialect until this day, ‘exoticising’ 
(Wacquant, 1997: 347) people who deviate from the mainstream etiquette, culture 
and values of the ethnicity of a higher social status (Honig, 1990: 282). Such 
‘deviances’ were quite expansive, including the behaviours, voices, dialects, dress 
codes and even their choice of food. The stigma attached to subei origin further 





Figure 4.3: Penghu Housing: Gundilong 
(Rolling Earth Dragon)  
Source: Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences (1962), The Transformation of 
Penghuqu 
 




Lacking political and social capital, migrants of subei ethnicity developed strong 
solidarity with fellow ethnic migrants and relied on native-place-based formal and 
informal associations as a source of security (Perry, 1993). Such solidarity perhaps 
can explain the swift mobilisation of the hut dwellers in fighting against the 
republican government and colonial authority when they decided to demolish those 
huts and evict them (Honig, 1992). Their clientelistic relations with organised 
gangsters, under the protection of the police, further allowed them to obtain, however 
partially, social-economic citizenship benefits during colonial time (Perry, 1993). 
Yet, as a consequence of periodic collective violence and the connections with 
gangsters, penghuqu were further defamed as a place of evil and outlaws and the 
inhabitants were subject to blame for their personal defects and pathology, which not 
only perpetuated their own poverty but also engendered social order (Qin, 2010). The 
separation, stigma and discrimination of penghuqu and its inhabitants in a mutually 
reinforcing way established its reputation as no-go area for the shangzhijiao dwellers 
in colonial Shanghai. Associated with poverty, filth and crime, it became a forgotten 
corner of Shanghai (Honig, 1992). Discourses with ideological agendas typically 
portray penghuqu, as rightly summarised by Pan (2005b), through the vicious cycle 
of poverty, outlaws, deviances, and social disorganisation.  
The historical stigma associated with penghuqu and xiazhijiao were activated to 
celebrate the benefits of the Expo-induced chaiqian and legitimatise the siting choice. 
In official accounts, a typical narrative would connect with the collective memory of 
penghuqu as eyesores and follows the same discursive themes, highlighting the 
disordered spatial organisation, the lack of modern conveniences, the poor living 
conditions, and the concentration of poverty and social problems across different 
neighbourhoods. A renowned journalist compared his impression of one 
Figure 4.4: Penghu Housing: Shuishang Gelou (Lofts 
above the water) 
Source: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (1962), 
The Transformation of Penghuqu 
 
Making a Home in Shanghai’s Lower Quarters │ 102  
 
 
neighbourhood within the east side of the Expo site with one described by a French 
sociologist10 about twenty years ago,  
Along the stagnant filthy river stood many small wooden shacks in cheap tilted 
roofing felt, weighed down by some bottles. The windows were broken. Smells of 
decomposed vegetables were everywhere around those shacks. This was the 
description of the miserable living conditions of Shanghainese twenty years ago 
written by a French sociologist. This was hardly any exaggeration. When I arrived in 
Pudong in April 2005, what I saw were rows of run-down houses, with many small 
simple shacks on the back. Five people lived inside this same room, dining, pooping, 
and sleeping, all inside this small room (in The Grand Displacement in Pudong, 
p.78).  
The impressionist description is supplemented by the descriptive statistics of the 
population composition on the Expo site. Instead of a careful dissection of the causes 
of the uneven geographies, the statistics, ‘utterly unfit to probe and scrutinize the life 
of the marginalised population’ (Wacquant, 1997: 346), bluntly highlighted the place 
as a container concentrated with marginalised population, i.e. people with severe 
diseases and disabilities, unemployed and welfare dependants, and former convicted 
felons, activating the false, stigmatised image of penghuqu as a potential source of 
social conflicts, a paradise for the outlaws and a danger for social breakdown.11 The 
status of their tenures also brought into rigid review and the legality of their tenures 
were questioned to remind the public that the disordered physical form of those 
neighbourhoods was the direct consequence of uncivilised crowd poaching state-
owned land with no respect for law and order. Wacquant (2007: 69) rightly points 
out that, ‘Once a place is publicly labelled as a lawless zone or outlaw estate outside 
the common norm, it is easy for the authorities to justify special measures, deviating 
from both law and custom, which can have the effect—if not the intention—of 
stabilising and further marginalising their occupants, subjecting them to the dictates 
of the reregulated labour market, and rendering them invisible or driving them out of 
a coveted space’. Through this statistical exercise, the Expo regime justified the 
ruthless chaiqian programme that disperses the ‘inferior’ and ‘pathological’ subjects 
to suburbia and under-compensates the buildings without legal titles. However, 
without a sincere social programme to alleviate poverty and unemployment and to 
assist people with multiple vulnerabilities, chaiqian programme with gestural 
monetary offers to those marginalised groups simply displaced the problem 
                                                            
10 The author did not provide a reference to the original work. I cannot tell if the description and 
translation was accurate, and whether the comparison is appropriate.  
11 The Grand Displacement in Pudong ( p.77, p.179). For example, according to this book, there were 
4,163 households to be displaced in one neighbourhood, among which 1,700 households had members 
with severe diseases, disabilities, zhiqing, or released prisoners.    
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elsewhere, or worse, it further marginalised those groups because of the hukou-based 
welfare provision and the under-development of the resettlement site in suburbia12.  
A few photo albums were produced by the local artists either out of their personal 
sense of social responsibility or professional interest, or commissioned by the Expo 
regime (Chen, 2011, Lu, 2010, Wei, 2010). I accessed four photo collections during 
my fieldwork, among which, three were produced by a single photographer 
respectively13 and the last one entitled People’s Expo (2011) was a collection of 
photos from various sources. With extraordinary commitment, photographers 
followed the transformation of the Expo site from dense, intimate, and mixed-use 
neighbourhoods to the enclosed consumption space of spectacular postmodernist 
architecture. As Sontag (1990) reminds us, photos are not simply recorded transient 
moments like souvenirs that testify to the existence but an invented history that 
establishes a way of seeing the past and invites sentiments associated with the images, 
the narratives, and the symbolic meanings. Frequently, these photographers chose to 
contrast the past with the present through the choice of colours in their photos. Those 
extravagant pavilions were in original sensory colours while the demolished 
neighbourhoods and the vanished neighbourhood life were predominantly in black 
and white. In doing so, it effectively creates the experience of the passage of time 
and conveys a ‘serious’ attitude toward the past. The colour choice of black-and-
white is a professional aesthetic one, as we would find in journalistic photography or 
documentaries in order to claim neutrality and authority to the represented reality.  
However, the absence of sensory colours filters the ‘noisy’ background of the images 
and forces the audience to concentrate on the objects, the themes and the allegory the 
photographers are attempting to convey. Repeated representations of those 
neighbourhoods uncritically centre on disordered physical space and lack of modern 
conveniences in those neighbourhoods.  
This selective perspective is shaped by the dominant value and discourse on how a 
modern life and modern urban space ought to take form but cannot find in those 
deprived neighbourhoods. As an aesthetical practice, following Bourdieu (1990c, 
2010), the production of photography expresses the class origin, the taste and the 
value of the spectators, and also sheds light on the wider power structure and class 
relations. Considering these photographers to be of middle-class background, it is 
hardly surprising that they perpetuate the fetish with space and advocate the 
dominant value as universal, even though Lu and Wei occasionally lament with 
                                                            
12 Chapter 8 shall discuss the issue in more depth.  
13 Chen Yang is currently employed by the Police Bureau.   
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strong nostalgic sentiments on the destruction of a way of life in a wonderland. Lack 
of vigilance and reflexivity, they failed to resolve the tension between the lived space 
(of users) and conceived space (of technocrats) (Lefebvre, 1991). Their work is 
subjugated to political appropriation and contributes to the legitimatisation of the 
Expo-induced chaiqian.  




Figure 4.6: Urination in Public Space 
Source: Wei (2010) 
Figure 4.7: Dining in the Alley  
Source: Wei (2010) 
Figure 4.5: Night Stool and Running 
Water Tap 
Source:  People’s Expo Editorial 
Committee (2011)




The reason to paint the ‘revolting’ picture of the displacees’ life through diverse 
devices is to activate another piece of the collective memory with significant weight 
that associates the CPC as the saviour to the proletariat. This is embedded in the 
discourse of fanshen manufactured through the governing technology of suku 
(speaking bitterness), sponsored by the CPC to produce acquiescent, loyal and 
grateful class subjects to the nascent socialist state under the dictatorship of the CPC 
(Guo and Sun, 2002, Farquhar and Berry, 2004, Makley, 2005). As the most destitute 
class in Shanghai, penghuqu dwellers were the natural subjects of the party’s fanshen 
project. Their fanshen experience is produced through a simultaneous process of 
arbitrary prescription of political identity and property redistribution. In line with 
political imperative to produce loyal subjects, class emerged as the legitimate and 
most powerful political category in defining personal identity and life chances, whilst 
identity as performed in ethnicity, civic associations or religious gradually lost 
purchase. As the proletariat, penghuqu dwellers acquired a higher social status under 
the communist regime as compared to the former bourgeoisie in shangzhijiao, most 
of them now became primary class enemies. The political experience of fanshen was 
further reinforced by relatively egalitarian redistribution of wealth as in salary and 
houses14 and by the state sponsored redevelopment or improvement of the penghuqu, 
narrowing the gap between the penghu dwellers and former upper class15(Chen, 
2012b). Those fortunate enough to be rehoused in the working class residential 
compounds, purposely designed and built to modern standards, gained further 
euphoria by obtaining upward social mobility and shaking off the stigma. Through 
the ritualistic practice of suku on which occasion examples of moral education were 
                                                            
14 Inequality was never eliminated in Mao’s era. See Howe (1968), Lee (1988), Wang (2004) and Li 
and Wu (2006a, 2006b, 2010).  
15 The rehabilitation of Yaoshuilong is an example here.  
Figure 4.8: Living and Playing with 
Garbage 
Source: Lu (2010) 
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set and source of personal oppression were publically articulated and denounced, 
personal sufferings were transformed into collective sufferings, and the positive 
images of the party-state were transmitted and perpetuated (Sun, 2012a). In Huanle 
Renjian (1971), written in the suku genre, the combined forces of the imperialists, the 
bourgeoisie, and feudalist residues were condemned as the source of oppression for 
the masses in the penghuqu (p. 2). An alleged folk song offered us a germane 










zhaojiabang zhaojiabang, it used to be a smelly water 
creek 
Flies and mosquitoes flew everywhere, hut built above 
the water were like cells, 
The sufferings of the working class were tremendous, 
they were anticipating emancipation all day and night 
Zhaojiabang zhaojiabang, the landscape now has been 
transformed enormously, 
Mercedes on the lane shadowed by tall trees, penghu 
residents now live in new working class compounds, 
Happiness were bestowed by Chairman Mao, the party 
must be remembered for our fanshen.  
 
By those political performances, the CPC successfully achieved its political agenda. 
The political subjects acquired a set of political vocabulary to rationalise their 
suffering. Chen’s (2006b) oral history project interviewed almost a hundred penghu 
families in 2003 and the senior generation in the final report frequently pays tribute 
to the CPC for lifting them out of misery and desperation. The discourse of fanshen 
has been recurrently activated in Shanghai’s later urban development process to 
justify primitive accumulation as seen in the notorious 365 project.16 It allows the 
entrepreneurial state to profit from people’s suffering without losing political 
legitimacy. Conveniently, the cultural stock of fanshen discourses and the political 
technology of suku were once again mobilised to legitimatise the Expo-induced 
chaiqian. In this vein, chaiqian dictated by the logic of the land market was conflated 
with the logic of state welfare, continuously painting the state in a positive light and 
allowing the predatory state to derive legitimacy for participating in welfare 
provision. For this cultural background, chaiqian is normalised as a good thing, a 
long overdue attempt of redistributive justice, and a social intervention to structural 
inequalities.   
                                                            
16 To boost the land development in the early 1990s, Shanghai government announced the 365 plan 
under which 3.65 million square metres of substandard housing in the city centre were scheduled to be 
completely demolished before the turn of the new century.  
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Yokes Chained the Body: The Real Legacy of History 
The analysis above shows the genealogy of xiazhijiao and the production of fanshen 
discourse. Both were skilfully appropriated by the Expo regime through the 
technology of history writing. In this section, I shall refute the causal classification of 
the pre-Expo site as penghuqu and in doing so, I shall unravel the real causes of the 
predicaments of penghu dwellers and the persisting stigma attached to those 
neighbourhoods, rendering them vulnerable to the predatory accumulation regime in 
contemporary time.  
Based on the early distribution patterns of penghu settlement (see Figure 4.2), I think 
the historians of the CPC are correct about the combined force of imperialism and 
industrial capitalism as reflected in land use control, discriminatory labour market 
and capitalistic exploitation in the formation of penghuqu as a concentrated 
settlement of ethnic migrants. I have no intention in refuting this kind of reasoning. 
My analysis shall focus on the governing practices under the dictatorship of the CPC,  
which intentionally or unexpectedly, reinforces the ethnic domination and 
perpetuates social and spatial injustice suffered by the penghu residents. This finding 
concurs with Szelenyi’s (1996: 303) conclusion that socialist cities ‘by restricting 
markets and by regulation regional processes, primarily through central planning, did 
produce and reproduce the asymmetrical allocation of social classes, occupational 
and ethnic groups in space’.  
When the communist regime took over Shanghai, they inherited the neighbourhood 
organisation from the republican government. Despite their intention to address 
Shanghai’s uneven geography, the party consolidated the material contrast between 
shangzhijiao and xiazhijiao through the demarcation of administrative boundaries on 
the grassroots level that was ironically sensitive to established residential patterns 
and housing structure in the past (Lu, 1999). Whilst accepting old patterns might be 
‘quick, comprehensive, efficient and smooth’ to reduce ‘the psychological impact 
often attendant on the imposition of a new system’ and to increase ‘the effectiveness 
of communist rule’(Lu, 1999: 317), the CPC missed the opportunity to transform the 
repressive spatial order fundamentally and allowed the durability of this dichotomy, 
as in materiality and in cognitive memory, in structuring urban space and social 
inequalities (Pan and Liu, 2011). To accumulate political capital rapidly, the CPC 
certainly improved the living conditions of the penghu dwellers through the offer of 
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stable employment in the industrial economy17 and state-sponsored neighbourhood 
improvement in the formative years of the new regime. However, such effort was 
short-lived as a result of the defects in political ideology, economic organisation and 
social policies, particularly, the housing policy. Let me explain each in turn.  
The fate of Shanghai has been tied up with its global connection (Wasserstrom, 
2009). Shanghai quickly fell under Mao’s regime for its ‘shameful’ past associated 
with bourgeoisie values (Zhang, 2000). The national focus on industrial development 
in inland ‘key-point’ cities further marginalised Shanghai’s position in the national 
economy (Wu, 2000). It soon became a major industrial and tax base to finance 
national economic development programmes without receiving corresponding 
financial transfers and investments from the central government18 (Howe, 1968). 
This in turn reflected in the financial strains of the local state in improving and 
upgrading local infrastructures and in investing in the construction of collective 
consumption facilities. As for housing, it was defined as non-productive sector. 
Understandably, investment impulse in building new housing for the working class 
was further restrained.19 The consequence, still felt today, was severe housing 
shortage and structural inequalities (Howe, 1968).  
In order to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism, the CPC 
committed to reducing, if not completely eliminating, exploitation and inequalities 
under its dictatorship. Shortly after it came into power, it launched a violent 
onslaught on private property ownership, during which time properties from 
arbitrarily classified landlord class and the bourgeoisie class (including sublessors20) 
were confiscated or collectivised and redistributed to those poor in need. However, 
the distribution was hardly an equal process but repeated the practice of dynastic 
succession where the new emperor, the CPC leadership, takes over monumental 
residences. Ordinary citizens without political connections were only able to take 
over whatever came along and it was not rare that they were rehoused in poorly 
maintained housing. This strengthened the roots of inequalities under actually 
                                                            
17 According to Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (1962: 65),  a survey of 1,223 Yaoshuilong 
residents revealed that employment rate in 1960 was more than 75 per cent, more than 20 per cent 
increase from the data of 1949.  
18 From 1949 to 1990, Shanghai collected fiscal revenues of 391 billion RMB in total, 84 per cent of 
which was transferred to the central government. In the same period, only 7.38 per cent were 
transferred back to Shanghai for urban development and 1.23 per cent to be used in non-productive 
sector. See Shanghai Finance and Tax Records at 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4445/node57369/index.html 
19 This was only possible for the strict control of population growth through forcible eviction of 
beggars and penalisation of unauthorised migration. The severe housing shortage was temporarily 
relieved through the forcible campaign of sending urban youth to the countryside.   
20 See Zhang (2008c: chapter 3) on sublessors.  
Making a Home in Shanghai’s Lower Quarters │ 109 
 
existing socialism. As part of the CPC’s ‘cradle to grave’ welfare programme, 
housing provisions under the socialist accumulation regime later was organised 
through the danwei system (work units), tied the fate of the workers to the prosperity 
and the power of their employers and fostered great ‘organised dependence’ on their 
line managers and work units  (Walder, 1986, Zhao and Bourassa, 2003). Access to 
public housing was decided by one’s rank, family size, current housing conditions, 
housing history and connections. This created a stratified housing system under 
socialism (Wu, 1996) .      
This new organised consumption however was out of reach to penghu dwellers given 
the shortage of housing on the one hand and their low rank and low skills amongst 
the industrial working class on the other. After all, they were still under a roof even 
though it was made of straws or cheap materials. This is not to say that the penghuqu 
dwellers were betrayed and abandoned by a new regime similar to their sufferings in 
the past. However sporadically, the CPC organised some efforts to renovate the 
penghu dwellings with partial financial support and ad hoc allocation of building 
materials, which were in severe shortage as well (Howe, 1968). Many were luckier 21 
and relocated to working class compounds as a result of chaiqian for infrastructure 
development or the construction of public facilities. Most of the dwellers took on the 
renovation work on their own because they could now afford to do so with a stable 
employment in the state economy sector but perhaps most importantly their huts 
were no longer habitable. This renovation was a never-ending process but attended to 
the changes of their family structure and rising living standard in Shanghai in general. 
Let me offer the housing history of Grandma Wu (in her late seventies) as an 
example. She migrated to Shanghai during wartime and lived in a boat before 
moving to a hut built on the east bank of the Huangpu River. She renovated her 
house twice under the communist regime. The first time was a desperate decision in 
the 1960s. Their roof was blown away in a storm. She and her husband decided to 
build a small room with bricks. With no access to building materials, she scouted all 
over the city and collected discarded bricks and stones, and eventually built with 
their sweat and blood—her husband almost died because of exhaustion—their first 
‘decent’ home. In the early 1980s, she started renovation again, because of her son’s 
                                                            
21 I use ‘lucky’ both deliberately and cautiously. Compared to current chaiqian regulations, they were 
lucky in that the ideological commitment to mass line disallowed the local state agencies from 
appropriating land arbitrarily and compensation was often enough to allow the dwellers to resettle 
elsewhere. Restrictions on public use of appropriated land also set it apart from the current chaiqian 
practices. But, with no available data on the chaiqian experience outside the official accounts, to what 
extent they were lucky is hard to judge.  
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persistent ‘begging’ to improve his marriageability. Once again, this renovation cost 
her family a fortune and they accrued a large debt from their relatives.22   
Wu’s housing history was representative of most families I worked with. 
Unanimously, when commenting on their attempts at making their homes a better 
place to live, they would concisely summarise their experience with a single word, ku 
(bitter), same to what Chen (2006b) found in her oral history project. As we see from 
Wu’s experience, the dominance of pain in their memory was quite understandable. 
Each improvement in their housing was followed by material hardships and 
impoverishment. Their self-help efforts, as Chen (2012b) sharply remind us, must be 
seen as a hidden form of exploitation under the planned economy, in mockery of the 
egalitarian ideal upon which the regime claimed legitimacy. The low wage in 
socialist China was based on a calculation of low rent and living expenses as most 
consumption was organised by the work units. Since those dwellers were unable to 
access the state housing provision, their investment in their own housing with their 
own savings reduced their real wage and further exploited their labour value. 
Exhausting the resources of those dwellers, the hidden exploitation locked these 
dwellers into the lower stratum of the social hierarchy and chained them to the 
penghuqu, followed by continued prejudice and stigma of those residents for being 
poor.  
This however was only the tip of a systematic exploitation and marginalisation of the 
penghu dwellers in the planned economy. The living conditions of the penghu 
dwellers were worsened by the repressive socialist urbanism. Although Chinese 
urbanism did not strictly conform to socialist city ideals, as Lu contends (2006), the 
urban form of Chinese cities by nature is socialist under Mao and was dictated by the 
prevailing accumulation strategy and political ideology of building a city of 
production as seen in the danwei urbanism. The idea was to situate the space of 
reproduction as close as possible to space of production. Influenced by this planning 
ideology, Shanghai in 1953 announced the first master plan with significant input 
from Soviet expertise. Under this master plan, Shanghai was turned into an industrial 
production site, divided into eight industrial districts within each factories were built 
close to residential neighbourhoods. As we can see from the distribution of industrial 
factories between 1959 and 1984 (see Figure 4.9), industrial development rapidly 
expanded in the pre-Expo site, eating up a large parcel of land. The rapid industrial 
growth intensified the competition for space in two ways: by appropriating land for 
industrial development and by attracting more workers to settle close to them. To 
                                                            
22 Interview, D53, 21/03/2012.  
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control the sprawl of penghuqu, for the sake of political legitimacy and also for 
public safety, existing dwellers were encouraged to increase land use efficiency by 
adding additional stories rather than building more spacious ones or additional living 
space on the ground level (Chen, 2012b). This was effectively controlled by the 
nationalisation of land in the city and strict planning licensing. Against this backdrop, 
it is not difficult to understand the unique shapes, forms and styles of the renovated 
penghu dwellings and the mixed land use of the pre-Expo site—both were 
nightmares to modern planners and architects. The pain to existing users was 
conveniently forgotten. The rapid industrial development meant that residing near 
toxic industrial plants became an inevitable feature of their residential experience.  
















esesarch Institute  (2007) 
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The shortage of land and housing supply was aggravated by the return of zhiqing, 
(the urban youth) from inland regions, another stigmatised group. Under the social 
engineering programmes, shangshan xiaxiang (up to the mountains and down to the 
villages), millions of teenagers in Shanghai were forcibly uprooted to join the 
rusticity programme (Bernstein, 1977) .23 Only until later stage of the Cultural 
Revolution and then after Deng Xiaoping finally came into power, the ‘lost 
generation’ was officially allowed to move back, but under very stringent 
regulations24 (Bonnin, 2009). It was easier to reacquire their lost Shanghai hukou 
status yet the hukou-associated benefits under the planned economy were never 
compensated. Returned as adults, married or single,25 they were confronted with the 
challenge to meet their survival needs: shelter, employment, medical care, and 
intimacy. The under-investment in social reproduction during the planned economy, 
coupled with the market reform, paralysed the local states,26 making them incapable 
of providing the essential material support to those zhiqing. Naturally, their natal 
families took the responsibility to assure their survival, but such mutual support came 
at a price. In many cases, it put strains on their family relations not because of 
‘uncivil individualism’ as Yan (2003b: 16) might comment but because zhiqing 
families had already exhausted their resources and were unable to support 
unconditionally more members. Here again started a new round of the vicious cycle 
of incarceration: state abandonment, self-help housing improvement, exhausting 
family savings, impoverishment and imprisonment. Their spatial practices added 
                                                            
23 The arbitrary prescribed class identity and the disciplinary technology of personal performance 
evaluation and documentation were crucial in determining the fate of the urban youth. Many urban 
youth from ‘good’ class or with good ‘performance’ (biaoxian) were exempted from being sent down 
and even obtained a job assignment in the city. For those forced into this uprooting programme, their 
class background also decided the destinations for their assignments, ranging from ranches in the 
border of the country to villages in nearby cities. In the fieldwork, I only encountered zhiqing from the 
poor or bad class background.  
24 Initially only those with severe health issues were allowed to return to their homes. Many zhiqing 
purposely risked their health and hurt themselves in order to be allowed to return. Later after their 
collective actions, regulations on their mobility were relaxed but they still had to prove that their natal 
family was willing to allow them register in the same hukou booklet. See Liu  (2008) for more 
heartbreaking stories of returning home.  
25 According to Bonnin (2009), many Shanghai zhiqing delayed their marriage for fear of permanently 
staying in the countryside once they put their roots there.  
26 According to Shanghai Chronicle, 69,258 families fell into the category ‘families with extreme 
housing poverty’ (including families whose living space was less than 2 square metres per person, 
houseless families migrated to Shanghai from other cities, two couples shared the same room, mixed-
gender teenagers (16 years old) shared the same room, families suffered from work injuries, married 
couples had no place to stay and their original families fell short of living space after supporting the 
newlyweds) at the beginning of 1980. By the end of that year, only 27,335 families in this category 
received in-kind housing benefits. By June 1981, 56,063 more families fell into this category. One 
reason as explained by the local authority was the return of 400,000 zhiqing; many of which joined the 
waiting list for public housing. The provision of housing was far behind the housing demand.  
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more pressure to land supply and changed the form of their neighbourhoods. To 
outsiders, ‘disorder’ or ‘chaotic’ perhaps are descriptions that are more accurate. 
The revolution of neoliberalisation with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005a)  
launched the last yet most destructive attack on those residents. Reflecting upon his 
disilluisonment of revolutionary zeals, James Scott (2013: 2) writes, ‘virtually every 
major successful revolution ended by creating a state more powerful than the one it 
overthrew, a state that in turn was able to extract more resources from the very 
populations whom it was designed to serve’. The neoliberal accumulation regime 
supplied the dwellers with new images, ethics and values on which modern life built 
upon but permanently destroyed their hope to obtain such life through their own 
efforts. The process of dispossession was gradual, steady and sometimes retroactive 
(He and Wu, 2009). The gradualist approach supplied admirers of  the Beijing 
Consensus, like Giovanni Arrighi (2008) with most convincing evidence to coddle 
with the Chinese leaders, as substantiated by the absence of social upheaval in 
traumatised countries that followed the shock therapy. However, what they failed to 
acknowledge is that slow poisoning is always much more painful than a sudden death. 
The instrumental rationality underpinning the transformation of the socialist welfare 
to a market-based system has strategised social policies to contain popular grievances 
(Piven and Cloward, 1971), and lubricated capital accumulation (Zheng, 2014). 
Under the new accumulation regime, penghuqu dwellers were further marginalised 
and their feelings toward the state became even more mixed.  
To begin with, the dismantle of danwei system endangers the security of many 
penghu dwllers and blocks their access to housing benefits or their attempts to escape 
the site permanently. From the 1980s, the shifting labour regime and the 
restructuring of the state economy started to destroy the iron bowls of many workers 
and subjected them to the force of the market (Sykes, 2007). Although workers in 
Shanghai took the hit much later than those in central coastal regions and northern 
China (Peck and Zhang, 2013), job insecurity was widespread. Between 1997 to 
1998, more than 26 per cent of workers at state-owned enterprises lost their 
permanent jobs with a 10 per cent increase in the following year (Peck and Zhang, 
2013). This was followed by a systemic privatisation, from land and state-owned 
enterprises to medical care and education. Mostly employed as industrial workers in 
the state sector, penghu dwellers suffered severe loss from this restructuring. Whilst 
the retired seemed to have escaped from the onslaught from neoliberal reforms, the 
intergenerational transference of resources, disciplined by the lingering Confucius 
Making a Home in Shanghai’s Lower Quarters │ 115 
 
ethics and family-based welfare provision27 (Chen, 2012b), allowed the pain, 
insecurity, anxiety, and depression caused by one reform initiative to transcend 
generational gaps and permeate in the families. These reforms not only have stripped 
them bare but also effectively prevented them from voting with their feet.  
I had a job in a factory but it was too far from home. So I changed my job and 
worked in a shop. The shop was struggling financially and I was laid off. I soon was 
diagnosed with heart problems and depression. So I stayed at home. Not long, my 
husband was laid off, too. He was bought off with 40,000 RMB. We spent that 
money in roughly three years. I am too weak to work, we both were laid off, and our 
son was at high school, how could we feed ourselves?...My generation, born in the 
1960s, suffered the most. We did not receive much education [due to the Cultural 
Revolution]. We have no money. We suffer from the laid-offs. Moreover, we have a 
child to support. We had to stay there (female, on early retirement due to severe 
medical conditions, displaced from Puxi, interview, X41, 16/05/2012).  
Secondly, their recourse to public housing is obstructed by the housing reform. 
Through privatisation and commercialisation, the reform legitimatised, solidified and 
reinforced the structural inequalities among the socialist workers. The privatisation 
of existing housing stocks only benefited workers with higher ranks, wider political 
connections and more financial resources (Wang, 2004, Logan et al., 2010). Many 
tenants of public housing on the pre-Expo site lost out in this reform due to their 
financial predicament and grounded in the poorly maintained public housing. After 
1998, all in-kind housing benefits formally cancelled out from the workers’ 
entitlements, officially signalling the end of in-kind housing benefits. The route to 
have a place to live for late-comers and those on the ‘waiting list’ or formerly 
excluded relies on either the mean-test based affordable housing or from the 
emerging housing market through individual entrepreneurship. 
The construction of this housing market is the biggest political fraud. It came with 
promises yet in the process of its construction, it deviated enormously from its 
original intent. When the economic tsar, Zhu Rongji, promoted the housing reform, 
his neoliberal approach came with a precondition. He was acutely aware that a 
housing market that blindly follows the dictatorship of the market would, if not 
collapse altogether, would soon lose popular support.28 In parallel to a commercial 
housing market where ruthless pursuit of profit maximisation is the golden rule, 
                                                            
27 Chen Yingfang convincingly points out that family rather than individual is the basic unit of welfare 
provision in China, especially in terms of housing. Either under socialist regime or current neoliberal 
regime, the precondition to apply for public housing is to have a family.  
28 See Zhu’s speech on housing reform on 24 January 1997, accessible at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/03/content_2645079.htm, last accessed 25/08/2013.  
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Zhu’s housing programme prioritised a substantial supply of affordable housing 
under strict state regulations. 
What he overlooked was the contradictory roles prescribed to the local states in the 
construction of neoliberal private property regime in China. On the one hand, the 
local states were required to protect a large segment of the society from being 
marginalised and victimised by the emerging housing market. On the other hand, the 
local states become the de facto owner of the land in the city and proxies of owners 
of the land in the countryside, with a strong motive to pursue ruthlessly its own 
interest in land centred accumulation. The incentives are enormous: land use right 
sales and taxes29 (Zhou, 2012), direct involvement in land development30 (Duckett, 
1998), and the political career of the leaders31 (Keith et al., 2013). Because of 
ineffective control of the power of the local states, Zhu’s solution to the housing 
reform brought about disastrous ramifications as seen in the property bubbles in 
China (Haila, 1999). But most importantly, it further exacerbates existing housing 
inequalities. His vision for a large stock of affordable housing has never been taken 
seriously by the local states for obvious reasons of marginal profits, or even financial 
loss in some cases. As ‘the blemished, defective, faulty and deficient consumers’ 
(Bauman, 2005: 34), the penghu dwellers’ low purchasing power foreshadowed their 
exclusion from entering the booming real estate market.  
Rapid land development since the 1990s also intensified urban spatial transformation 
and created enormous pressure on the penghu dwellers. Within the horizon of many 
neighbourhoods on the pre-Expo site, occupiers could see modern apartment 
buildings with shining windows, spacious balconies and colourfully painted outer 
walls. Those new highrises worsened their living conditions by enclosing their 
neighbourhoods, blocking their light and putting growing pressure on the existing 
facilities.32 Those new housing estates also slowly transformed the character of their 
place and created new spatial divisions. To penghu dwellers, those new apartments 
supplied them a referent of what life ought to be and what their life could have been. 
                                                            
29 After the tax sharing system finally implemented in 1994, land use right sales and taxes from the 
real estate industry become the major source of local government revenues. 
30 When the real estate industry started to take off in the 1990s, most development companies were 
either associated with state functionaries or state-owned enterprises  Owing to the close connections 
with the state apparatus, those developers vested with the financial interest of the state developed into 
the dominant companies in the housing sector. Major development companies based in Shanghai are 
connected with the government. 
31 The local politicians are evaluated by performance evaluation system, which emphasises the growth 
of GDP and the image of the city. A large scale of city building naturally becomes the most effective 
tool to pursue economic interests and political advancement at the same time. 
32 For example, the development of Shangnan Huacheng, a commercial housing estate damaged the 
water supply to one neighbourhood.  
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These concrete examples of decent life instilled them a desire to keep up with 
modern standards. As Hoggart (2009 [1957]: 150) writes, ‘they wanted these goods 
and services not out of a greed for possession, a desire to lay their hands on the 
glittering products of a technical society, but because the lack of them made it very 
difficult to live what they called a “decent” life, because without them life was a hard 
and constant fight simply to keep your head above water spiritually as well 
economically’. Whenever their financial condition improved, many dwellers 
substantially improved their living conditions on their own. As my survey shows, 
many families were already equipped with modern conveniences, such as 
independent kitchens (60.3%), toilets (48.3%) and shower facilities (52%) before 
their displacement. Therefore, the causal classification of their neighbourhoods as a 
unified space of xiazhijiao or penghuqu—featured by the lack of modern facilities—
overlooks the internal variation of different places and insults the initiatives of the 
dwellers in improving their own place against the social injustice and material 
hardships they suffered.33 Uncle Wang repeatedly distinguished his neighbourhood 
from other neighbourhoods typically defined as penghuqu,  
Our place is definitely not penghuqu. Only the physical form looks different from 
the modern planned apartment. Our houses were built by ourselves. Self-built, they 
call it penghuqu (male, 50s, displaced from houtan34, 01/04/2012).  
Those self-help improvements, with a practical mind to accommodate their housing 
needs, created more physical structures that violated modern principles of planning 
or aesthetics; thereby, inviting more critiques for damaging Shanghai’s ambitious 
global city project. The stigma of the place and the occupants was reinforced by the 
large inflow of ‘floating population’ (migrants) who seek residence here for the 
cheap rent and closeness to the employment in the informal economy. Through 
abnormalising their language, accent, dress codes, behaviours, akin to the governing 
practices to the first generation of subei people in the colonial Shanghai; these new 
migrants became a unified group as waidiren (non-local), the new victims of ethnic 
domination in contemporary Shanghai 35 (Zhang, 2001). In both official and popular 
discourse, this new generation of migrants are seen as a disruption to the social order 
and a latent threat to social stability and public safety. Their arrival in these 
neighbourhoods on the one hand offered the native residents an additional source of 
                                                            
33 Gilbert (2007) made the same argument about the inflation of the language of slum.  
34 According to Chen Yingfang, the author of the oral history of penghuqu residents, Houtan fits the 
official category of penghuqu (personal communication, 03/2012).  
35 See Zhang’s (2001) discussion of floating population in Beijing.  
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income but on the other hand intensified spatial conflicts, especially in terms of land 
use. 
To outsiders, penghuqu became a durable container for the uncivilised, poor and 
deviant throughout the history of Shanghai. Such technocratic view ignored those 
structural forces that in a consistent way consolidated the position of these deprived 
neighbourhoods in the spatial hierarchy and deprived the residents of upward 
mobility, if not condemned them to race to the bottom. The interactions between the 
penghu residents with the forces of the state and the market in constructing their 
places on the other hand shaped the dwellers’ thoughts, beliefs and characters, giving 
rise to complex experience of their neighbourhoods and ambivalent attitudes toward 
displacement. This is taken up in the following section.  
‘You Living Hell is My Wo’: Serial Displacement, Home‐Making and 
Ambivalence 
In general, the displacees’ attitude toward displacement is best described as 
ambivalent. This is confirmed by the survey result. Amongst 300 respondents, 177 
displacees supported the idea of chaiqian as a solution to improve their housing 
conditions. My interviews with individual displacees returned with richer, 
complicated, mixed and even conflicting attitudes toward displacement that 
transcends the dichotomic choice as in the survey. How to understand such diverse 
impulses toward chaiqian then? To answer this question, we need to have a fuller 
view of their life, particularly, their survival strategies and their ambivalent bonds 
with their places.  
Inspired by Kai Erikson’s  (1976) analysis of the ethos of the Appalachian 
Mountaineers, I here tentatively offer a snapshot of the displacees, the organisation 
of their life-world and their way of life.36 In depicting their lives, I will narrow my 
focus to the most salient tension between the sense of independence and the need for 
dependence.37 I suggest that the displacees’ ambivalence toward chaiqian is a 
product of the displacees’ position in this spectrum between dependency and 
                                                            
36 This is of course a generalised description of the people I worked with, most of whom are more than 
forty-years old. Therefore, it may not necessarily capture the characters of the younger generation who 
are more immersed in the values and ethics of the market. 
37 This is only one of the five dimensions employed in Erikson’s study of mountaineers (the rest are 
the tension between the love of tradition and respect for personal liberty, between self-assertion and 
resignation, between self-centred and group-centred, and between ability and disability), but I believe 
it is universally applicable to any culture and any social group. The reason to focus on this single axis, 
as Erikson acknowledged in his study, lies in that this dimension is so influential that it almost 
subsumes many other contrary tendencies.  
Making a Home in Shanghai’s Lower Quarters │ 119 
 
independency. The independence they understand was manifested in their resilience 
in living through hardships therefore they gained the conservative impulse (Marris, 
1974), wishing to be respected to live the way they prefer and to be free from 
continuous state oppression, especially in appropriating their space. By dependence, 
they withheld the hope for a caring state to live up to its name and promises, 
intervening in making their life better. The diverse, layered, ambivalent attitudes 
toward their place and the state also restrained political agency of the displacees and 
undermined their solidarity.38 
In reviewing their personal trajectories and family histories, one would be surprised 
to find so many clear imprints of displacement on their lives. Here, we need to 
stretch the definition of displacement to accommodate their repeated experiences of 
upheavals. Feldman et al. (2011: 10) insightfully brings to our attention the 
widespread phenomenon of ‘displacement in place’ in capitalistic modernity that 
expands our research horizon from displacement as primarily a geographical concept 
of forcible migration (Marcuse, 1985) to the experience of ‘the declined sense of 
economic and social security as labour’, namely, the loss of one’s place in the society 
while sitting in place. This broader definition allows us to probe into the experience 
of  ‘serial forced displacement’ (Fullilove, 2014: 141) as went through by many 
displacees, which caused greater frustration, distress and insecurity. Those 
experiences encourage greater efforts to re-attach to places and cultivate strong 
dependence, reinforced by their place-making practices. They also evoke mixed 
feelings and beliefs of the state.  
A majority of the displacees I spoke with had personal experiences or family history 
of forcible displacement in their formative years or early adulthood as a result of 
various political campaigns under the Maoist era: loss of homes under socialist 
transformation (1953-1956) and in Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), sent down to 
the countryside (zhiqing), and forced to relocate and support the development of 
inland regions (zhinei) or frontiers (zhibian). Each political campaign was powerful 
enough in destroying the displacees’ attachment structure. But, as many displacees 
commented, most traumatic among these experiences were zhiqing, zhinei and 
zhibian. Lacking political capital, they were forcibly evicted to the most 
impoverished areas and de facto exiled and ‘imprisoned’ there due to strict control of 
population migration under the planned economy. This was not only a loss of place, 
                                                            
38 To make it clear, their understanding of independence was remotely close to the neoliberal ethics of 
possessive individualism, as reflected in the acquisitive impulses, the individualistic calculation and 
maximisation of utilities, and the destruction and replacement of other forms of interpersonal bonds  
by contractual relations (Macpherson, 1962). 
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rupturing their identities, but also a loss of their status as Shanghainese, the 
opportunity to further their study in high school or obtain a university education and 
the privileges associated with Shanghai hukou and the working class. The upheaval 
made life extremely difficult for zhiqing who were forced to leave their homes as 
teenagers. With limited agricultural skills, they however had to compete with skilled 
farmers for subsistence resources in the countryside under the work point system 
(gongfen) that excluded one’s capability from deciding one’s access to collective 
consumption. Malnutrition, injuries and other health problems were commonly found 
amongst this lost generation  (Liu, 2008). The negative experience of the countryside 
spurred their attempts to return to Shanghai as soon as the policy was relaxed. 
However, due to the interruption of their education and their inadequate work skills, 
most of them encountered enormous difficulty in surviving the shifting labour regime 
(Yang, 2003), in addition to the hassles to restore their hukou. Moreover, many of 
them especially those returned from Xinjiang, experienced a prolonged process of 
identity crisis. For these reasons, they treasure enormously the opportunity for stable 
employment in the collective enterprises or the state-owned enterprises. The desire 
for security discourages them from thinking of changing jobs despite the poor 
working conditions and career promises.  
Mrs Zheng is one of the victims of zhiqing programme. She was fortunate in that she 
took over her father’s position in a factory upon her return and worked there until her 
retirement. Her resentment of zhiqing programme was not expressed directly as a 
critique or a negation of the zhiqing experience but primarily articulated through her 
loss of status as the socialist industrial worker and the free welfare under Mao. Her 
bodily pain is registered as her experience of victimisation.   
There is no part of my body does not hurt after I came back from the countryside. 
Injuries are all over my body. There is no part does not hurt. I had a big fall when I 
was in the countryside and hurt my leg. Before the reform, I could still go see a 
doctor for all the pain, from head to the feet, without paying a penny…What do I 
have in the end? The pension could barely cover my medical bills. My leg injury is 
haunting me all the time and I cannot go see a doctor. It is not just one or two 
hundred RMB but SEVERAL hundred RMB per visit to the doctor. Last time, my 
daughter saw me in pain and asked me why I did not see a doctor. I told her that I 
did not want to begrudge spending money on medical bills. My daughter has not 
married yet. How am I going to pay for her dowry? (interview, D86, 01/04/2012) 
To understand her narrative of pain, the notion of ‘somatisation’ from Arthur 
Kleinman and Joan Kleinman (1985: 430) is informative here, by which they use to 
explain ‘the expression of personal and social distress in an idiom of bodily 
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complaints and medical help seeking’. Zheng’s personal experience of alienation, 
uncertainty, loss and suffering from uprooting and returning was translated into not 
only the identifiable residual pain in her leg but also unidentifiable pain all over her 
body. As a socialist worker, her body was appropriated by the state through religion-
like call for personal sacrifice and endurance of pain for the betterment of the large 
social body. Difference between gender, age and skill were blurred under Mao’s 
socialist China and all were thought to have an able, healthy and sturdy body for the 
socialist cause (Uberoi, 1998). But this oppression came with the political promises 
of justice, egalitarianism, empowerment and lifelong livelihood security. Those 
promises established the moral relations between the state and the socialist workers 
and to some extent contained the grievances. Upon her return from the countryside, 
the residue welfare (especially the free medical care) was not only seen as a tool to 
heal her body but also an entitlement and a compensation for her loss, mending the 
tension with the state. However, the recourse to free medical help was soon denied 
and became increasingly out of reach due to the ongoing reform of the state economy 
and the privatisation of health services. Although she escaped from being sacked, the 
loss of working class status and entitlements caused her second experience of 
displacement. This alienation, loss and betrayal as a result of economic upheavals 
once again registered in her body and deepened her memory of social upheavals in 
the past and aggregated her felt pain. Her narrative of pain loaded with nostalgic 
sentiment of the good old days in Maoist China therefore must be seen as a form of 
resistance, contesting the body politic and negating the social reality (Kleinman and 
Kleinman, 1994, Thornton, 2002b) rather than a pure nostalgia, ‘a kind of useless act’ 
without the transgressive power to ‘illuminate or transform the present’ (hooks, 1991: 
147).   
Zheng’s experiences reveal the common traumatic impacts of serial displacement. 
Her experience of being evicted to the countryside in her formative years might have 
reinforced her felt alienation and pain from the displacement in place in the reform 
era. But, her case should not be seen as exceptional. For those who fortunately 
escaped from political campaigns, they had a fair taste of physical displacement 
because of the rampant land-centred accumulation regime in the 1990s. Aunt Zhou 
was a victim of the land centred accumulation regime. Like zhiqing, losing her home 
the first time prompted her to develop stronger attachment to the new place. As she 
recalled, ‘twenty years ago they took away my home. The money they offered was 
like the change you would give to beggars. I could not afford to buy any 
resettlement….In the end, I managed to buy this shack building from a farmer. It did 
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not look good but a place for my family to start all over again. We made great efforts 
in improving it, little by little’.39 
For most displacees, more widely shared experience was the displacement in place as 
industrial workers. The new labour regime relegated the workers to the bottom of 
society and endangered their ontological securities. As I have shown in the last 
section, many were laid off in the reform of the state economy and lost their lifelong 
secure employment and welfare. The loss of working class pride, status and privilege 
is widely shared amongst the displacees. Many of them sought employment in the 
informal economy whilst others lost their jobs permanently due to their age, 
education, low skills or health issues. The experience of displacement in place also 
sensitises them to the problems, the scandals and the pitfalls of the new accumulation 
regime as it evolves. Corruption, inequality, decaying morality, and many other 
social ills spread under the new regime in a mutually reinforcing way aggravating 
their sense of injustice and sparking their disappointment in the ruling regime. 
Against this background of repeated displacement and a declining faith in the ruling 
regime, the displacees seek protection more inwardly, from their families, kinships 
and communities. They treasure their homes, which have been slowly improved and 
upgraded through several rounds of collective attempts. They have every reason to, 
because the way they did so were dishearteningly improvising yet ingenuous as we 
can see from the housing history of Jiang’s family. Jiang (in his 60s), the father of 
two sons, purchased a small 20-square-metre room with a tiny balcony on the second 
floor of a self-built housing unit from a local farmer on the east side of the Expo Park. 
To accommodate his family of eight after his sons both got married; he modified the 
eave and converted it into a small loft inside his home, doubling the living space. 
Later, he modified the structure of the balcony, enclosing it as an extension and used 
it as an independent kitchen.40 He certainly was not distinctive in ‘squeezing’ space 
inside their home. Most displacees made structural modifications to accommodate 
their housing needs or built numerous additions to their existing houses. As 
unforgiving and substandard as their homes appear to outsiders, ‘this is my wo’ as 
the displacees frequently commented. Few of them were shy to hide their pride in 
building up a decent home over the years.  
When I got married and moved in with his family. Looking up, there was only the 
tilt roof. Looking down, only earth. What could you possibly do with it? I have to 
rely on myself. I always think like this. When you were in bad situations, you need 
to find a way to get by. You have to think and work, earn money with your bare 
                                                            
39 Interview, D13, 03/2012.  
40 Interview, D80, 28/03/2012.  
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hands. No one dares to criticise you [your morals] if you work hard enough.” 
(Interview, D2, 08/03/2012) 
The above account highlights the symbolic meaning of the physical structure of a 
home. To most displacees, their sense of independence derives from building up a 
dwelling space that holds their family under a roof against the backdrop of 
systematic oppressions and material deprivations. The materiality of their homes 
witnessed their journey of striking roots, making the place a site of their sanctuaries, 
or reassociating with the place where they belong. Those buildings are evidence of 
their independent and tenacious characters. By keeping their family sheltered, their 
home-making practices also demonstrate their moral and social standings. As the 
most crucial component of their family wealth,41 the demolished homes were a 
symbol of family legacy to be carefully preserved. The preservation, maintenance 
and accumulation of family assets through building decent homes established their 
moral positions in the lineage of their families and kinships running through their 
ancestors to the generations yet to come. Whilst not every member in the family line 
could contribute to the (re)production and the accumulation of familial wealth, 
glorifying the family name; it is the responsibility of each member to at least protect 
the family wealth and absolutely avoid frittering away family legacies. The loss of 
family property tends to induce guilt and devastating loss of standing in the family, 
especially to the senior generations. Commenting on the Expo-induced displacement, 
the third time of losing his family property under the CPC, Mr. Wang was furious but 
also regretted not being able to preserve his family legacy: ‘my grandpa had a small 
shop. The party took it away and called us a bourgeoisie family…We claimed our 
allegiance to the party but it took our home again in the 1990s. This is our third time 
my family has been robbed by the Communist Party…I got nothing to pass down to 
my son now. He can expect nothing from us now’.42  
There is a practical value of intergenerational wealth transfer. It stabilises family 
relations and reinforces mutual support and dependency between family members. 
This however is only a small part of a network that the displacees relied on in their 
                                                            
41 It is quite interesting that both public housing tenants and private homeowners claim their absolute 
ownership of their properties. The public tenants frequently justify their claim based on their sense of 
entitlement as socialist workers. The regulatory practices de facto acknowledged them as the owners. 
Unless there are any disruptive events, such as chaiqian, their families can live in the property for as 
long as they like. Even in the event of chaiqian, they may receive a compensation package or be 
sheltered in public housing elsewhere. Private homeowners on the other hand rejected upfront the 
arbitrary separation of land use right from ownership as in the Land Act for the land underneath their 
properties. They strongly hold that the land was passed down from their ancestors and the party 
simply robbed them of it with its coercive power. 
42 Interview, D113, 18/06/2012.  
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everyday life. Similar to what Fried (1966) or Herbert Gans (1962) found in the 
context of the US, or to the literary representations of penghu residents (Wang, 2000, 
Cai, 2004), the significance of dense interpersonal relations in these neighbourhoods 
distinguish them from the middle-class neighbourhoods in Shanghai’s highrises. In 
addition to their common ethnic origin and relatively low residential mobility over 
the years, the spatial patterns of their neighbourhoods certainly helped with the 
cultivation of those relations by encouraging greater tolerance of differences, 
empathetic understanding, and reciprocal relations. Because of the shortage of land 
supply, innovative solutions to accommodate family housing needs as I have 
described above frequently involve poaching on public space or posing minor 
troubles to their neighbours. These ‘amoral’ practices (Banfield, 1958), with an 
immediate interest toward one’s own family; however, rarely cause drastic conflicts. 
There seemed to be a consensus between the residents, distinguishing understandable 
and tolerable spatial practices. According to displacees, the moral principles were 
simple and clear: no obvious threat to public safety and a severe shortage of housing 
in that family.  
Precisely because of these ‘amoral’ practices and crowded living conditions, much of 
their everyday life took place on the narrow alleys shared with their neighbours next 
door (see Figures 4.5 and 4.7), such as cooking, dining, and laundry. Visiting their 
next-door neighbour’s home or chatting by their doors was the most common leisure 
activity for the majority of the displacees. The domestication of the public space 
encourages face-to-face interactions in their everyday life. Mundane topics such as 
meal plans and domestic trifles were as much frequently exchanged in 
neighbourhood life as topics in the nature of gossip, rumours and moral judgement, 
such as divorce, impiety and criminal offense. Those frequent small talks as in the 
eyes of Wang Anyi (2003a), a reputed writer on Shanghai, are as intimate as our skin. 
The sounds overheard from the alleys, the busy life seen from the doorsteps and 
windows, and the smells of food from the alley are the power of penghu housing and 
make them an appealing and comfortable place to live. The intensive social contacts 
also encourage the development of supportive networks and altruistic behaviours. 
They looked out for each other, shared each other’s joy and sorrow, and made 
themselves and their family a small tissue of their community as a big family. When 
I brought up the issue of community life, a woman could not stop telling me how 
grateful she was to her former neighbours.  
My old neighbours are great. If I was sick at home, they would come to check on me 
from time to time and even cook for me. There was this grandma next to our home. 
She was really nice to my family. She would look after my son whenever I 
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needed…sometimes when I was working late on my shift, I did not even have to ask, 
she would pick up my son from the kindergarten. She would say, “don’t worry. No 
rush from work. I will take care of him”. She was really kind (D18, female, 03/2012).  
Accounts of this kind are not only common in my fieldwork transcripts but also quite 
popular in literary products lamenting the ‘community lost’ in a globalising Shanghai 
(Cockain, 2012). In Fuping (Wang, 2000), we find a disabled child receiving warm 
support in his everyday life from all the neighbours, whereas in Diceng (Cai, 
2004),we read of the money-lending practices amongst the housewives to help each 
other make ends meet. If those residents were different from the mainstream 
Shanghai society, it is their value of such intimate, supportive, and warm 
relationships—the spirit of gemeinschaft—that ‘deviate’ from the norms in a modern 
city populated with unrelated strangers. Through those everyday contracts, they also 
learned to negotiate, to compromise, to understand, and to resolve conflicts in their 
everyday life: cooking schedules were arranged; water tap were shared; public 
bathrooms were cleaned in rotation.   
To modern standards, it seems that the crowded and dense space brings the issue of 
privacy. However, the displacees, like the West Enders in Gans’ Urban Village 
(1962: 21) ‘knew so much about each other that there is no need for prying’. 
Through everyday contacts over the years, they came to know not only each other’s 
family but also their frequent visitors such as their relatives, their friends and their 
co-workers.43 Nevertheless, they were never nosy about private matters behind the 
doors. But, they were also never willing to walk away from intervening in domestic 
conflicts in other’s homes. They have a strong tendency to become a part of each 
other’s life when they in need but they also tend to maintain a reasonable boundary 
toward their own families. This group experiences gave them a sense of belonging 
and security. Because of the relative stability of their group, social control was strong 
in the demolished neighbourhoods. The public gaze, organic and bottom-up, 
maintains social order and censors social morality when the state retreated from 
intervening private spheres.  
On my way to food market, if I bought a lot on that day, neighbours would ask what 
the occasion was. I would tell them that my brother-in-law and my sister-in-law 
were visiting their parents on that day. They would then know, the son and daughter 
of my parents-in-law were performing their filial obligations and caring about their 
aging parents. Otherwise, they would remind them to visit their parents more often 
next time (Interview, X41, 16/05/2013).   
                                                            
43 One displacee referred to the senior woman living next door as one of his family because she knew 
every member of his family. She also attended the funeral of his grandfather.  
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The sense of community and the mutual support and trust compensated their loss 
from the ongoing reform. Direct compensation was also generated from their 
economic activities in the neighbourhoods. Many displacees had small businesses 
(grocery store, hardware store, food store) or offered petty services (such as hair-
cutting, bicycle repair, etc.) in their neighbourhoods in order to supplement their 
family income. Many of those business owners were those laid-off industrial workers. 
In some neighbourhoods, many families also rented out the empty rooms or 
purposely built simple shacks for the newly arrived migrants in the city with the 
same hope as the first generation of their families in colonial Shanghai.44 
Furthermore, the displacees were also compensated by the closeness to their 
workplace, reducing their cost of commuting. A majority of the displacees from 
Pudong were employed by the Shanghai No. 3 Steel Company. It is not uncommon 
that two or three generations from the same family worked there before the company 
went bankrupt in the reform era. The collective consumption facilities (inter alia, 
library, gym, basketball court, cinema, hot water supply) of this steel factory were 
accessible to every member of their families but were also extendable to neighbours 
of the factory, similar to Shell’s community relations project in Flammable (Auyero 
and Swistun, 2009) but mixed with logic of socialist welfare. However minimally, 
those semi-public factory facilities and services, free of charge or with nominal fees, 
developed a reciprocal patron-client relationship between the displacees and the 
factory. The steel company therefore also gained the reputation as san laoban among 
the displacees (Boss Three, in English), for its ‘generosity’ for the community 
welfare.45  
Psychological, social and economic bonds as such tied the displacees closely to their 
place and nurtured their minds to escape from ruthless state intervention and 
appropriation of their space. Many of them held a grudge against the state for selling 
their land in the 1990s without their knowledge.46 They also resented the planning 
control that regulates their own land, forbidding them from renovating or rebuilding 
their homes. A majority of the displacees also rejected the idea of chaiqian as they 
see their improved houses could accommodate their housing satisfactorily. Even if 
                                                            
44 I do not have comprehensive statistical data of all neighbourhoods on this point. But according to 
the statistics from Shanggang Xincun Street Office, one neighbourhood in Pudong, more than 2000 
households out of 4,163 displaced households were relying on the rent to survive. Data from other 
neighbourhoods is unavailable. But according to the recollections of the displacees, it was a common 
livelihood strategy.  
45 Interview, D101, 18/04/2012.  
46 A few neighbourhoods in Pudong were de facto chengzhongcun whose land was appropriated yet 
the residents were not displaced.  
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their house was not ideal yet, they had the plan to upgrade it when they could afford 
as they had been doing it in the past.  
I don’t want displacement at all. Our son already moved out after he got married. 
The only downside of my old home was the small size. But, I don't care how small 
the room is. It was close to hospitals, close to my son, close to my friends, and close 
to my old work place. For us, a couple of two, it was enough (male, displaced from 
Puxi, interview X43, 21/05/2012).  
My old house was enough for me. I had a separate room to sleep, separate room to 
eat and to cook. I had everything [like modern apartments]. I was happy….The place 
was so much better. We had many seniors living there. Their common leisure was 
sitting outside, chatting, playing cards, etc. No strangers would walk in. You leave 
your door wide open and no thief could walk in without being identified 
immediately (male, displaced from Pudong, interview D48, 19/03/2012).  
However, there is also a ‘shadow side’ in their attachment to the place (Chawla, 1992: 
66), fostering the negative bonds with their place. The consequences of systematic 
exploitation in the past became increasingly distressing to many residents. First of all, 
due to the under-investment in their neighbourhoods, they were confronted with 
many practical problems in their everyday life. For example, as a combined result of 
the low-lying geographical conditions, inadequate infrastructure and constant 
damage of existing facilities from industrial and new housing development, many 
neighbourhoods were under the threat of flood and fire. One neighbourhood (houtan) 
was not connected with running water supply until the 1990s. These negative 
experiences affect the way they see their neighbourhoods and foster their acceptance 
of the dominant idea of a hierarchical place. When asked to describe their 
neighbourhoods, some residents internalised the stigma and referred to their place as 
penghuqu.47 In their clarifications, they activated the images and activities—old and 
new—associated with penghuqu such as emptying nightstools, small and dark rooms, 
organic spatial patterns. Some displacees saw the concentration of new migrants, 
who are ‘uncivilised’ and ‘low quality’, with ‘different habits and customs’ from 
Shanghainese,48 as the problem, stigmatising their neighbourhoods as penghuqu. 
These are text-book examples of lateral denigration, mutual distanciation and 
corrosion of sense of self, product of territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007, 
Wacquant et al., 2014). In a much simpler way, some displacees emphasised ‘the 
lack’ in their original community as compared to the modern planned communities 
they currently lived in, the lack of enough living space, the lack of green space, the 
                                                            
47 This may have implications for the health and well-being of the dwellers in stigmatised areas. Yet, 
for this project, I did not have sufficient data to make such claim. See Pearce (2012a).  
48 Interview, D13, D21, D80, 03/2012.  
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lack of beautiful looks, etc. Whilst some of the lack is acquirable through their 
efforts, most of the lack they listed is beyond their present capacity. But, even if they 
could do so, we cannot ignore that each attempt means digging another hole in their 
life.    
Another big problem for them was the industrial pollution from so many factories 
concentrated in their neighbourhoods. Different from the toxic experience in 
Flammable (Auyero and Swistun, 2009), where contradictory views on the existence 
and nature of contamination created ‘toxic uncertainty’ , the displacees were 
unanimous about their environmental suffering and neither did they have any 
confusion about the dominators, because of the visibility of pollutants. 
Smoke never stops coming out from the chimneystacks of the steel factories. If you 
dry your clothes outside or air your quilt on a sunny day, a few minutes later, dirt, or 
something filthy would be all over them. It also drops on your clothes, your hair, and 
flies in from your window to your room (Interview, D11, 09/03/2012).  
Like residents in Flammable, they seldom pursued any political actions in the past. 
Their dependence on those factories for employment and communal welfare is for 
sure one explanation. Two more additional explanations can be expected here: their 
acute sense of their powerlessness and their rationality of subsistence ethics. Many 
polluters are owned by national state and national functional agencies and are beyond 
the control of the municipal government. The two big companies, the Jiangnan 
Shipyard Group and the Shanghai No. 3 Steel company occupied such a massive 
land parcel that it is unthinkable to relocate them elsewhere. Hoggart (2009 [1957]: 
63-64) rightly points out, that,  ‘when people feel that they cannot do much about the 
main elements in their situation, feel it not necessarily with despair or 
disappointment or resentment but simply as a fact of life, they adopt attitudes toward 
that situation which allow them to have a liveable life under its shadow, a life 
without a constant and pressing sense of the larger situation’.  Indeed, for many 
displacees, pollution was tolerated for their more urgent need to survive. To quote 
Bauman’s (1989: 130) comment on willing subordination in a totally different 
context, ‘they could not choose between good and bad situations, but they could at 
least choose greater and lesser evil’. More than one interviewee constantly reminded 
me that,  
for the poor who are struggling to have their basic living needs met, a better physical 
environment is a luxury to pursue in life. Unless you die instantly from the pollution, 
chronic contamination is a part of your fate (Interview, D111, 06/2012).  
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The negative bonds with their place, confronted by their incapacity to change or 
escape, foster their hope for external forces to invest in their neighbourhoods and to 
improve their living conditions. For those zhiqing and the socialist workers, they 
believe it is the right thing and about the right time for the state to take this role, as a 
remedy to the sufferings they have unjustly endured. Their view was also shared by 
those who were formerly excluded from the socialist welfare system, such as those 
danwei dormitory lodgers and private homeowners. Their dependency on external 
force to improve their living conditions coincides with the state agenda of gentrifying 
their neighbourhoods through the gestural offer of a modern apartment that provides 
that all their current residence lacks on one condition, that these residents gave up 
their place. Of course, the exploitative logic is well packaged in the euphemism of 
better life, or progress, to avoid undermining the legitimacy. Like political elites 
elsewhere, the elites in Shanghai manipulated the poor people’s hope. What those 
displacees truly wanted was not a new apartment, or progress, but improvement in 
their living conditions, access to ‘the lack’, which has been denied in the name of 
their weak purchasing power. According to my survey, among 177 residents who 
hoped for housing improvement from the Expo site, 121 residents (68.3%) were 
willing to share the cost and they were joined by another 27 residents if their share 
was below 30 per cent. The elimination of the option to stay, dried out the territorial 
resources that might have bonded the residents to organise and protest. In accepting 
the proposal of wholesale demolition with an offer of modern apartments from the 
bulldozer regimes, the displacees not only submitted to the doxic rules of the 
neoliberal housing regime but also legitimatised the appropriation of their properties 
and foregone injustice that they have endured from the socialist regime in the past. 
Conclusion  
This chapter sets the scene for the Expo-induced displacement by offering a close 
look at the displacees’ lived experiences in their homes and their vulnerabilities to 
chaiqian. I have attempted to carve out multiple meanings and experiences of home, 
and capture symbolic violence exercised through the reductionist view of home as a 
material good and a financial asset whose exchange value triumphs its use value. To 
most displacees, home is first of all a necessity for their survival and their only 
foothold in the city. In striking their roots in Shanghai over the years, their 
investment in homes in the form of labour, money, emotion and time, witnessed their 
livelihood struggle and constitutes an important part of their sense of self. Rooted in 
the demolished place, they also built their social networks united by a strong sense of 
community and mutual support, an important source of their social capital. Moreover, 
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spatial practices of constantly making and remaking a durable and decent place to 
live through collective effort over generations contributed to the maintenance of 
family lineage and kinship networks and testified to the moral standing of the 
dwellers in the family line. For sure, home is not experienced in the same way to all. 
Similar to feminist arguments, lived experiences of home are ambivalent. Housing 
distress, toxic habitat and pejorative representations affected some displacees’ 
experiences to great extent. Their perceptions of their positions in the society and 
their economic incapacity incarcerated them here, despite their yearning for positive 
change, a decent home. Home in ideal imagination is a source of comfort, security 
and satisfaction, at least decency. This is the motivation underlying many displacees’ 
constant investment in their homes, improving their living conditions, whenever they 
were able to. However, the displacees’ understanding of home was defenceless in the 
housing field in contemporary Shanghai. Not only the exchange value of their 
properties is significantly suppressed and undermined by economic and spatial 
activities under different regimes of accumulation, but also the symbolic value of 
their houses was completely removed from the Expo-induced spatial reconfiguration. 
The displaced were dispossessed of their land, their homes, their communities, their 
past, and their livelihood. It is only with this background in mind that we can 
understand the meaning of loss to the displacees in this land war. Domicide is more 
than the loss of a material space to live. It means an extraction of material and 
symbolic capitals, an alienation of dweller’s identities, and a disruption to or even a 
dissolution of a stable biological and social reproduction project. The displacees 
were forced to enter into the housing field and accept or entertain the logic that the 
exchange value of the resettlement properties defines and upgrades their positions in 
society. Yet for most displacees, a new home remains primarily a crucial space for 
them to live and to survive.  
Symbolic violence also finds expression through the activation of the hierarchical 
notion of xiazhijiao and penghuqu in defining the identity of the pre-Expo site and 
evoking revolting images and imagination about the place and the occupants. Those 
representations failed to capture the layered structural forces in shaping the formation 
of those neighbourhoods and turned deaf ears to the lived experiences of those 
occupants who through constant struggles made this place their sanctuaries. For these 
failures, such products not only recreated the same myth about those ‘deviating’ 
neighbourhoods but also justified their annihilation by the state, and even 
consolidated the state’s legitimacy through the discourse of fanshen.  
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The symbolic violence exercised through such representations is challenged by my 
attempt of reconstructing the history of xiazhijiao and penghuqu under different 
regimes of accumulation. As Wacquant (2008: 1-2) argues, ‘urban marginality is not 
everywhere woven of the same cloth, and, all things considered, there is nothing 
surprising in that. The generic mechanisms that produce it, like the specific forms it 
assumes, become fully intelligible once one takes caution to embed them in the 
historical matrix of class, state and space characteristic of each society in a given 
epoch’. By looking at the interplay between state, class, ethnicity and space under 
different regimes of accumulation, the historical exercise I take in this chapter treats 
the formation and fixation of those neighbourhoods and the concentration of poor 
residents as a result of an ongoing and consistent process of exploitation, exclusion 
and symbolic violence, locking up the marginalised in a stigmatised place. Both in 
the past and in the present, neighbourhoods in xiazhijiao have served as an attractive 
shelter for the poor, the marginalised and the migrants in succession. The 
annihilation of penghuqu and their siblings in xiazhijiao therefore can be seen as part 
of ‘the systematic plan to expel the low-income and unwanted population from the 
face of the earth’ (Harvey, 2010: 245), or at least from the horizon of the rich in 
Shanghai.  
The attitudes of the dispossessed toward such expulsion programmes however are 
not as straightforward as Harvey would imagine. In this chapter, I have also tried to 
tease out the mixed feelings of the displacees toward the state due to repeated 
displacement, which encouraged them to attach firmly to the home and the 
community they lived in on the one hand and fostered their sense of injustice and 
delusional hope for a caring state to take due responsibility for their well-being on 
the other. Their ambivalence is further reinforced by their mixed residential 
experience and restrained by their inability to change or to escape. The mixed 
positive and negative feelings put a limit on their agency. The reliance on external 
forces, primarily the state, to improve their living conditions surrendered their power 
to control the repressive production of space in the neoliberal era, which is examined 
in chapters 5 to 7. This finding must be read as evidence against a recent offensive 
argument made by Kearns and Mason (2013) claiming that when people choose to 
move, then the process does not count as displacement. The hypocrisy in their 
middle-class point of view is that for victims of displacement, the choice of a decent 











This chapter endeavours to direct the analytical language from property rights and 
just compensation to the oppression and sufferings the displacees endured in losing 
their homes and communities. The first rationale of doing this is, as I believe, that 
much of the lasting traumatic effects of domicide as I uncovered from the life of the 
displacees in the resettlement sites, which I will pick up in chapter 8, cannot be fully 
understood without an adequate account of the social process and conditions that 
bred them. The pain of losing frequently exceed, perpetuate and aggravate the pain of 
loss. Along with the loss of their homes, many displacees also lost their dignity as a 
human being. Secondly, it serves as a response to the appeal from Libby Porter (2009) 
who urges us to hear out the lived experiences of displacement and eviction patiently 
and compassionately. Her plain yet powerful question asks, ‘what the daily grind of 
being displaced actually looks and feels like’ (p. 397). To address this question, I will 
rely heavily on the testimonies from the displacees in order to reconstruct the process 
of domicide and glimpse into its traumatic impacts upon their bodies and mind, both 
have been suppressed under the media boosterism. The nature of this question 
determines that my language in this chapter is mostly descriptive. The brutal and 
violent realities of displacement and eviction must be told in flesh and blood as the 
We have no words to speak about our oppression, our distress, our bitterness, and our 
revolt against the exhaustion, the stupidity, the monotony, the lack of meaning of our 
work and of our life, against the contempt in which our work is held; against the 
despotic hierarchy of the factory; against a society in which we remain the underdogs 
and in which goods and enjoyments that are considered normal by other classes are 
denied to us and parceled out to us only reluctantly, as though we were asking for a 
privilege. We have no words to say what it is and how it feels to be workers, to be 
held in suspicion, to be ordered around by people who have more and who pretend to 
know more and who compel us to work according to rules they set and for purposes 
that are theirs, not ours. And we have no words to say all this because the ruling class 
has monopolized not only the power of decision-making and of material wealth; they 
have also monopolized culture and language.  
André Gorz, in Justice and the Politics of Difference 
Wounded Life in the Domicide Zone │ 134  
 
 
attempt to overly ‘estheticize or theorise those lived realities out of existences as felt 
pain and passions’ is to ‘lose the raw anger against injustices and exploitation that 
powers much of the striving for social change’ (Harvey, 1996: 37).   
To foreshadow some results of this chapter, the experience of domicide is 
comparable to that of a war victim, filled with sentiments of insecurity, 
powerlessness, fear, terror, and despair. Despite the nuances in their feelings, the 
grief syndrome is prevalent (Fried, 1966, Porteous, 1989, Porteous and Smith, 2001, 
Fullilove, 2005, Vine, 2010), widely endured by the displacees across the lines of age, 
gender and class. I argue that this war-like experience is attributable to the bulldozer 
regime’s domination of time and space, and the systematic violence against the 
displacees inside the domicide zone, which repressively aggregated their pain from 
existing forms of domination in their quotidian everyday life, such as repressive 
spatial order, capitalistic domination in the workplace, patriarchy at home, etc. The 
displacees appropriated this domicide time and space in heterogeneous ways, which 
in turn shaped the course and intensity of their feelings and influenced their political 
agency. Their variegated experience of domicide unfortunately created discordance 
in their political views and actions, and undermined their solidarity to act upon their 
grievances and fight for their homes and communities collectively. This last point 
shall add our understanding to the political inactions of the displacee as I have 
analysed in the previous chapter and individualised resistance as discussed in 
existing literature (Hsing, 2010a).  
‘Where is the sunshine? It felt like you are at a war!’ 
The Expo-induced displacement is unanimously represented as a harmonious, 
civilised, ordered, and most importantly joyful and caring process in local 
newspapers and formal publications. According to official reports, ‘only’ 80 
households out of 18,000 registered households were evicted by force (Cui, 2007). 
Harassment, intimidation and violence against the displacees were under zero 
tolerance policy. The practice of the Expo-induced displacement turned over the 
darkest history of chaiqian in Shanghai and even established as best practices widely 
promoted in other parts of Shanghai (Ye and Cen, 2005). The impression one may 
have after reading those prose and documents affirms the platitudes that 
displacement is not always against the will of the displacees; it is not a bad thing and 
it may even be in the best interest of the displacees after all. Here are two 
representative articles I selected from 62 non-exhaustive news clips from three local 
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newspapers (Xinmin Evening News, Wenhui News and Jiefang Daily) from 2005 to 
2006 when displacement was most intensely carried out.  
Waves of laughter were overheard from Bailianjing of Zhoujiadu Street Office, 
Nancun of Shanggang Street office, and Nanmatou of Nanmatou Street Office in 
Pudong: as the first group of the Expo-induced displacees, they signed the 
resettlement agreement with smiles, left their old home with smiles, and welcome 
the Expo with smiles. They moved homes happily...Zhang Xuebing [the Governor of 
Pudong] and Du Jiahao [Member of Standing Committee of Shanghai Municipal 
Government] presented them a fan engraved with ‘better city, better life’, flowers 
and cakes, wish them happier life after Sunshine Displacement (yangguang 
dongqian) (Wenhui News, 11/04/2005).  
Entitled as ‘Six hundred jinqi (red banners) testify the support of the Displacees’, the 
other article relates to a story of Mr Xie, who held out and was determined to be a 
nail household. However, six days before he finally agreed on a resettlement deal, he 
presented a red banner poetically written with ‘caring like relatives, edifying like 
teachers’ to the chaiqian agents, and expressed gratitude and admiration to the 
chaiqian agents, ‘you have talked to me for more than twenty times. Even if you 
decide to evict me, I am determined to present you this banner.’ Self-claimed as a 
‘nail’, he finally came around because his heart was ‘melted’ by the sincerity of the 
chaiqian agents. To quote, ‘They treat me as a friend, as a family member, which 
make me feel warm’ (Jiefang Daily, 05/12/2005).  
And, a few photos copied from an album entitled ‘People’s Expo’ to give a more 
vivid impression of the Expo-induced displacement.  
  
Figure 5.1: Expo-Induced Chaiqian Propaganda 
Source: People’s Expo Editorial Committee (2011) 
Featuring the smiling faces of the displacees, the friendly and considerate chaiqian 
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along with many other evocative words and images, those celebratory accounts 
‘convincingly’ substantiate the dominant representation of the Expo-induced 
displacement as a process of yangguang dongqian, in which the displacees were 
bathed in the sunlight from the radiating sun, i.e. the bulldozer regime. The 
metaphoric reference to sunshine is rooted in the Chinese cosmology of solar 
worship (Smith, 1957) and politicised into the worship of an emperor as a 
personified god (Gao, 2002) ruling over the cosmos under Mandates of Heaven 
(tianming). From the death of feudal emperors arises the organisational emperor, the 
Communist Party (Zheng, 2010). The old wine of emperor worship was poured into a 
new bottle. This is most evidently seen in the cult of Mao. In a religiously fanatic 
way, Mao was mythologised as the sun, the great saviour of the Chinese people, 
lifting them out of wars, poverty and oppression, represented in the song The East in 
Red or The Never Setting Sun Rising over the Prairie (Bauer, 1976). The sunshine 
metaphor therefore maintains an ideological continuity. By this rhetoric, the 
bulldozer regime attempted to appeal to the symbolic meanings of the sunlight in 
expelling the darkness, to conjure up subjective feelings of warmth, security, trust, 
vibrancy and effervescences. Moreover, the goal was to reinforce the image of the 
communist party-state, head of the bulldozer regime, as the compassionate, caring 
and loving saviour to the displacees inside the zone of domicide who were trapped in 
a hazardous habitat and financially incapable of improving their housing conditions 
under the emerging housing and land regime.  
Elitist in origin and propaganda in nature, those media products are stamped with the 
interest of the global ‘event-media-capital’ complex (Lenskyj, 2000, Horne, 2007),  
producing and maintaining the facade of ‘better city, better life’. As the famous line 
in 1984 by George Orwell (2013: 40) reminds us well, ‘those who control the present 
control the past and those who control the past control the future’. Bearing this 
insight on the politics of truth, I set out to identify the distances, between lived 
experiences of displacement and media representations, and between policy on paper 
and policy in practice (Wacquant, 2008). One of my questions to the displaced was, 
‘how do you feel about the yangguang dongqian?’ Rather than elicit a 
straightforward reply, the response I frequently got was raised eyebrows and a 
rhetorical question asked in anger and contempt, where was the sunshine? Uncle 
Chen, a state-owned enterprise worker in his late fifties, once humoured me when we 
talked in a community garden in Pujiang, ‘well, some people did see the sunshine. 
Those people always cause a headache to the Communist Party. The sunshine was so 
strong that burnt those people’s back’. Like a political scientist, he then insightfully 
commented on the legitimacy of the party-state based on his wisdom as a savvy 
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worker, ‘the Communist Party is never going to be afraid of those who are 
determined to use force. If you are too poor to feed yourself, they will be sacred and 
have to give you a bowl of rice. But if you pick up a knife to fight, they have guns, 
missiles, and atom bombs’. What he seemed to imply are two messages. Firstly, the 
domicide experience is ambivalent, stratified, or even bifurcated; at least the housing 
needs of some residents were taken very good care of by the bulldozer regime. 
Secondly, livelihood security and benevolence are at the moral centre of state-society 
relations (Shue, 2004, Wright, 2010, Perry, 2008) and constitute the role expectations 
in political situations. Militant resistance without the justification of violating these 
moral orders is an open invitation to state oppression through its monopolistic 
control of physical violence, and vice versa.  
The first message was supported by my survey on self-reported satisfaction of the 
displacement and resettlement. One question asked the respondents to indicate their 
emotional state at the time of domicide with a five point scale and the mean score 
returned at 3.05, approximate to the tipping point to a positive attitude (mean 
score=3.5). However, after reading more than one thousand pages of transcripts and 
my fieldwork notes, neither his two messages nor the survey result can hold. It 
strikes me that the utterances from the displacees I worked with are overwhelmingly 
negative, reflective in their tones, in the choice of words, metaphors, chengyu (set 
phrases), and in their facial expressions and emotional state I observed. Their 
suffering comprises not only reflections on the loss of places and the collapse of 
attachment structure, but simultaneously and more importantly interweaves with the 
loss of dignity and the collapse of the moral universe in defending their sanctuary 
space (Franco, 1985), which offered them support, trust and intimacy and immuned 
them from state oppression and violence. Those accounts are filled with pain, 
depression, fatalism, indignation, disappointment and frustration.  
The sharp discrepancy is likely to be caused by my negligence and lack of 
reflectivity in the survey design. I committed an even worse mistake than Erikson 
(1976). My question asking the respondents to encapsulate a wide range of emotions 
and quantify them with a number must have sounded so absurd and unintelligible to 
them. My inquiry to the process of displacement at interviews and chit chats may 
have pushed them, including the ‘happy movers’ to ponder and reflect upon their 
experiences of bargaining, waiting, packing, leaving, accepting and adjusting, to 
great details. In doing these mnemonic exercises, the suppressed or marginalised 
memories might have flashed back to their focus, or as Halbwachs (1992) argues, 
those memories are reconstructed for the purpose of rationalising a coherent 
Wounded Life in the Domicide Zone │ 138  
 
 
experience of suffering in the present, which is overwhelmingly negative. In this 
sense, those memories are retrospective and political in nature. But, even there are 
mistakes, distortions or exaggerations in their accounts, we cannot simply depreciate 
values. Here, I find Janet Walker’s (2003) notion, ‘paradox of trauma’ very 
instructive, and argue that flawed or even false memories are part of the experience 
of trauma, are symptoms of grieving, and are the wounds that remind us of the 
human sacrifices made for the ‘best ever’ Expo.  To many displacees, especially the 
seniors, the Expo-induced displacement was lived like a war, in which they were not 
simply refugees and victims of atrocity, but ‘soldiers’ from the opposing side to the 
state. It is a result of different forms of oppression laboured by the bulldozer regime 
and their accomplices. The warlike experience features in the profound sensations of 
disorder and chaos and in the feelings of powerlessness, anxiety, insecurity, fear, 
alienation and despair, which temporarily suppressed the sentiments from the 
destabilised attachment structure.  
Not long after they started chaiqian, they cut off the water and electricity supplies to 
our village. In evenings, it was so dark. You felt like you were living in a dark forest. 
It was so dark that you cannot see your hand in front of your face (shenshou bujian 
wuzhi). [YZ: they cut off your electricity and water?] Unbelievable, right? Cutting 
off electricity already made your life as hell. You must know, the water from the 
river now is not drinkable any more. Thirty years ago, you could still fetch some 
water from the river and use alum to settle the turbid water. You could see your 
shadow reflected in the water. But now, tons of alum would not have the same effect. 
Cutting off your water was in fact cutting off your food supply. You cannot eat raw 
rice. It was not at war, like in the Battle of Sangkumaryung Ridge. You cannot live 
without water and food [like in the war] (Mr Qian, male, late 60s, displaced from 
Sanlin, Interview, D29, 12/ 03/2012).  
 The minute the dongqian team moved in, they told us that this place must be razed 
in three months. It was like a war. It happened so fast. They promised three months 
but in less than a month almost all families had been displaced. They told us that the 
sooner you move out the sooner you see the benefits of displacement (zao zou zao 
deyi). Is it moving? It was fleeing. Just like refugees. (Mrs Sun, female, late 50s, 
displaced from Pudong, research notes, 14/05/2012 ).  
At that time, it makes you feel like at war. You know anti-Japanese war, right? It 
was like that. Everywhere was in hubbubs. Every family was busy packing. All sorts 
of bags, appliances, and furniture, filled with every one’s homes. Jingling and 
banging, [My family rode with the trucks] all the way to the countryside with all 
those boxes and bags. It felt like you were fleeing from a calamity (Mr Zhao, male, 
late 70s, displaced from Puxi, survey interview, 21/07/2012).  
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These alternative narratives of warlike experience not only problematise the politics 
of history writing but also subvert the moral order underpinning the domination of 
the predatory accumulation regime. Its emergence as a referential frame is 
understandable, however. In addition to the performative power of excessive media 
products on anti-Japanese war in China (Wang, 2012), many displacees witnessed, 
suffered and even served in the wars for China’s independence. The cultural 
knowledge and lived experience of the chaos and upheavals of wars therefore 
provide displacees with the frame and the vocabulary to make sense of the traumatic 
events. Moreover, I also suspect that it is influenced by the inflation of warfare 
metaphors in political discourses and the prevalence of ‘warfare strategies’ employed 
by the displacers (see the next chapter).  
‘Negotiating’ Domicide: The Cost of Speed  
The warlike experience is firstly a result of the rigorous pursuit of speed at all costs, 
so compressing and depressing that it exposed the displacees to even more 
aggressive exploitation and domination, intensifying their anxieties and securities in 
the rapidly neoliberalising economy. The duration of domicide time is subordinated 
to the time of the master planning and construction of the Expo pavilions. Unlike 
displacement caused by infrastructure or gentrification projects, the Expo project is 
too big to fail. Instead of a flexible deadline contingent on the progress of 
displacement, the Expo strictly enforced a fixed deadline for knocking down all 
existing building structures, beyond which not only significant financial costs would 
be incurred but also the reputation of Shanghai as the host city and a global-city-to-
be would be in jeopardy. The duration of domicide varied in locations, ranging from 
one month at least to a year at most, with an average of three months before a 
neighbourhood of roughly one thousand households were completely bulldozed. 
However, for any cooperative family, the displacement process rarely took more than 
a couple of weeks. In this regard, a figure widely cited and touted as a miracle in the 
local media is indicative of the breathtaking pace of displacement. Allegedly, on a 
single day, around one thousand households signed the resettlement agreements1. 
For sure, in those celebratory accounts, lip service was paid to the great sacrifice 
made by the displacees and to the enormous pressure professionally handled by the 
chaiqian agents. However, what they have understated is the stress endured by the 
displacees in this process. A major source of their stress comes from the hegemonic 
and compressed domicide time within the zone of displacement. Here, the bodily 
                                                            
1 Jiefang Daily, 26/02/2006.  
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time, the calendar time, the industrial time, the family time and so on, structured the 
quotidian life of the displacees became irrelevant and were displaced by the clock 
time of the bulldozer regime. War of displacement did not simply disrupt the 
organisation and structure of the displacees’ everyday life, but exploited, colonised 
and dictated the life-world of the displacees, forcing them to make a ‘rational’ choice. 
According to the regulation, the public nature of the Expo-induced displacement 
entitled the labourer to two days of paid leave. Unsurprisingly, however, none of the 
displacees was aware of the existence of this regulation. Even after I informed many 
of them, their immediate response, unanimously, was to ridicule my question, rather 
than blame the exploitative nature of displacement regime. The overwhelming worry 
over employment and livelihood would have discouraged them from defending their 
legal rights should they had known it at that point. The chaiqian agents on the other 
hand take displacement as a profession, and were instructed to work against the clock. 
Therefore, negotiation meetings were squeezed into any possible free time of the 
displacees, putting the displacees into multiple exploitations. The destabilised work-
life balance posed a challenge to the displacees for the demand of patience, 
endurance and strength. It is a valid conjecture that a good resettlement deal would 
eventually compensate the lost time and emotional suffering, but for most displacees, 
this process was so irritating, painful and helpless that they felt forced to surrender, 
as illustrated by the following testimonies.  
Uncle Fang, now a retiree, told me his experience of ‘double exploitation’,  
At the time of displacement, it was the toughest time of our factory [a collective 
factory]. Restructuring of the ownership was on the way. Massive lay-offs also set in 
motion. Do you dare to take any time off to deal with them [chaiqian agents]? What 
if your factory put you on leave permanently? (Interview, D101, 18/04/2012) 
Aunt Chen (in her fifties), eldest among her siblings and a full-time caretaker of her 
father, bitterly condemned the bulldozer regime for taking advantage of their family 
emergency at the time of displacement while her father (paralysed) groaned in bed 
repeatedly during the interview, 
Before the announcement of displacement, my father was just diagnosed with 
bladder cancer. He had cancer before. In 2000, one kidney was surgically removed. 
He was then in hospital for a major surgery for a second time. We worried sick for 
him and we spent all our time at the hospital with him… People say good things 
come in pairs. So does bad luck. Earlier that year, my mother just had a major 
surgery for the bowel cancer. Do you think we had any extra time back then? We did 
not have any energy or mood (xinqing) to deal with the hassles of displacement. We 
asked our youngest brother to deal with the chaiqian company. But he was occupied 
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by our father’s surgery, too. He is the youngest of our family. Every family problem 
before was always first shouldered by his three elder sisters. He does not have the 
social experience (shehui jingyan) in dealing with this kind of thing 
[displacement].But we did not have a choice but to ask him. We did not have a 
choice, really….Can you hear that? Every time I talk about chaiqian, he [her father] 
cries. Every time, I am honest with you. It was more imperative to save the life of 
our father. We were scared by the recurrence of his cancer (Interview, D52, 
21/03/2012).  
What if the displacees say no to this domicide time? What happened to the woman I 
quoted in the beginning of this thesis is indicative of the horrendous consequences of 
prioritising job and everyday livelihood over chaiqian. Her family of three were 
excluded from negotiations for resettlement deals for a three storied self-built house 
owned by them and her brother’s family. She never had the chance to speak with 
chaiqian agents. This led to her suicide attempt on the day of eviction.  
In 2002, both of us were bought out by the factory due to the Expo-induced 
relocation. [The severance payment was] Only 30,000 RMB.2 We had to survive, 
right? With a huge mortgage, we bought a coach, cut a deal with a transport 
company and started the long-haul coach business. We have to work day and night, 
and literally, my husband and I had to live on the coach, otherwise we would end up 
in debt of thousands of RMB. Do you think we could stand such loss? When the 
displacement company came in 2005, we could not bear the costs of giving up the 
business. They [the chaiqian company] did not even bother to reach us to offer a 
resettlement deal. They only talked to my brothers living on the second floor. When 
we came back very late from work, we cannot find anyone from the chaiqian 
company to talk about the resettlement either. Without any words from them, they 
destroyed our home (Interview, D106, 04/2012).   
It must be reminded that the decision of moving homes is far more complicated. It 
concerns more than technical calculation of property values, monetary compensation, 
division of family properties, locations of the resettlement  apartments, commuting 
plans, but also negotiations of living arrangements, familial intergenerational moral 
obligations, and development of alternative livelihood strategies (Chen, 2009). Those 
decisions however were expected to be heroically made within a couple of weeks, 
creating enormous pressure on the displacees. Intrusive and repeated visits were 
made by chaiqian agents to disseminate information, persuade and talk the 
displacees into cooperation irrespective of the timing. It was rare to reach any 
agreement on an initial meeting. Stressful meetings of this kind often took several 
rounds, as some displacees commented; it was ‘a seesaw battle’. Disagreements, 
frequent and inevitable, in many cases escalated to arguments, quarrels or even 
                                                            
2  Roughly £ 3000.  
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physical fights. If the peaceful and happy negotiations were real rather than staged as 
represented in the images,3 those occasions were ‘deviants’ whereas tensions and 
conflicts of various intensity were the norm. After all, three books were dedicated to 
the witty and resourceful bulldozer regime in resolving conflicts and preventing 
major social unrest because of the Expo. Those disruptive and dreadful encounters 
added to the psychological and physical strain.  
Aunt Ma, a retired worker-cum-farmer, recalled her depression and deteriorated 
health condition after a few failed settlement meetings with tears,  
After the initial meetings, the chaiqian agents called me and asked to drop by for a 
visit. They said that I was too unreasonable (nangao). Like I told you before, I am 
out of condition. I cannot take any shock or surprise. [I have a]Heart problem. When 
the chaiqian agents were in my house, I felt scared suddenly. I was not lucid. My 
newly born granddaughter was crying all the time. And, I could not even hear her 
cry. My mind was like miles away. After that visit, I could not think. I could not 
work. I could not take care of my granddaughter. I did not remember to cook for the 
family, either. I felt apathy. I stayed at home dumbly and idly (shasha daidai). I 
could not sleep at night. I was incapable of looking after my own granddaughter. I 
bought a few books on infant care and even made a dietary plan for her. But I 
seemed distracted. When she was crying, I felt like I could not hear anything. My 
mind was far-gone. I did not know why she was crying. I did not remember to feed 
her. I could not focus on anything (Interview, D2, 08/03/2012).  
Noticeably, this is a well-articulated account of the psychological state during 
displacement, diagnostic of the traumatic power of those intensive, recurrent, and 
distressing meetings where loss was negotiated and bargained. Her narrative did not 
offer much clue on the context that provoked her depression and numbness, but the 
character assassination nangao commented on by the chaiqian agents based on 
previous meetings hints that the process must not have been easy for her family. As 
judged from her reactions, the label nangao is less to stigmatise than to terrorise. A 
snapshot of an episode at a negotiation meeting offered by Grandma Wu (in her 
eighties), head of her family, shall enrich our understanding of the production of 
anxiety and fear of those encounters.     
Once, this Mr. Gao from the chaiqian company was at my home to offer a 
resettlement deal. There were some disagreements within our family. It [family 
conflict] was quite natural. Big family always has some conflicts between family 
                                                            
3 I accidentally met one old woman from Pudong who was asked to pose for a photograph by the Party 
Secretary of her Residents Committee during the displacement to show her gratitude to the bulldozer 
regime. She was deeply regretting being coerced into taking this staged photo, which now undermines 
her claim to fair compensation after she discovered her family was significantly under compensated 
according to the regulation.   
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members. They want our house but eventually they will give us resettlement housing. 
This Gao however meddled in our disagreement and tried to exploit this crack in our 
family (cha yijiao). We did not want to speak with him. We were then arguing and 
having a row. Suddenly, Gao pounded the table, giving off a very loud sound. I 
asked him, “Mr (shifu) Gao, are you here to negotiate or intimidate me today? If you 
are here to intimidate me, fine, I am an ordinary woman and could not bear your 
threat. If you are here to negotiate, then we sit down and talk”. Can you believe it? 
He thumped our dining table! My son was furious, and asked him, “How dare you 
act so maliciously?” I could not be bothered talking to him. I told him, “pound as 
you wish. The table is mine. If you pound again, I will leave. I do not feel like 
continuing our negotiation. The house is mine. How come you are so menacing 
when you are after my house?” (Interview, D60, 22/03/2012).  
Her account incisively ridicules any romanticisation of the negotiation meetings, as 
represented in the propaganda. Following Bourdieu (1991), I suggest that negotiation 
is a euphemism, concealing the hierarchical power relations of such encounters. 
Taken place in the homes of the displacees, a negotiation meeting however is a 
public encounter, infused with state power and authority but embedded in intimate 
relations of the displacees. Here, we may borrow Goffman’s (1990) instructive 
notion, ‘performance’, to understand the exercise of power and the cause of her 
indignation. Like most displacees, she sensed no opportunity to stay put, and was 
expecting at least a dialogue, or a bargaining as in the marketplace, if not as in the 
ideal model of communicative action in the public sphere (Habermas, 1984). Her 
compromised script for the public performance however did not concede her moral 
authority as the head of her big family. Representing the state in appropriating the 
property, the chaiqian agent placed himself in a higher moral and political position. 
His actions declared the coercive power of the state. To this senior displacee 
however, let alone the morally corrupting exploitation of family disputes, his 
intervention in a family affair and subsequent act of pounding the table reversed the 
host-guest relations in this private sphere, thereby violating her moral standing as a 
family head and as a host. Despite her assertion of resistance out of anger, her family 
eventually reached a resettlement agreement at a later negotiation meeting. They 
moved out before the deadline out of fear and helplessness. It is hard to tell to what 
extent this episode may have influenced their final decision. But the story of Mr 
Wang, a retired bus driver shows that determined disobedience to authority would 
only escalate the situation, making the disobedient more vulnerable to stress, shame 
and terror. Subservience and resignation seems a practical choice to extricate from 
the emotional suffering and for harmony and equilibrium, as suggested by the 
comment ‘if I cannot fight against you, I can avoid you (gaobuguo ni, duode qi ni)’ 
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(17/03/2012).  Listening to this comment with swearing words, one may easily relate 
to his deep sense of pain, injustice, and outrage.  
The chaiqian team came to my home every night. The mother fuckers (tama de) 
came to talk a lot of nonsense. I lost my temper in the end. Those mother fuckers 
came in around eight or nine o’clock every night. It was so fucking tiring. After one 
meeting, I told them not to come to my home any more. I warned them, “if you dare 
to come tomorrow like this late, be alert, I am going to kick you out with a rod”. 
After this incident, they were afraid to come to my home. They came to my 
neighbours’ [homes] but they avoided coming to mine. But they would not put this 
whole thing to a halt. Once they thought I was nangao, they sent the police, the 
street office officials, the Resident Committee and the chaiqian team to scare me, do 
my thought work (sixiang gongzuo), and called on a xietiaohui (a coordination 
meeting) in the end. My family was the first victim of this meeting…I was on a sick 
leave from the bus company at that point. I was just discharged by the hospital after 
my heart surgery. It was so fucking exhausting and draining. I was afraid that I was 
going to die of those meetings. My sister also came to talk to me. She was worried 
that I might have another heart attack. It is not worth it, is it? Just suck it up and 
move (Interview, D85, 01/ 04/2012).  
His deposition unravels an important tactic of the chaiqian regime—the battlefield is 
changeable, subjected to the strategic calculation of the chaiqian regime. Once the 
negotiation meetings failed in the private arena, the chaiqian regime would mobilise 
the bureaucratic resources and organise coordination meetings in the public arena, 
retreating to the formal coercive power of the state. On those meetings, the 
displacees were exposed to the gaze of state agents from different departments on 
different levels. The asymmetrical power relations and the ritualistic settings brought 
alive the memory of pidou dahui (the struggle meetings) during the Cultural 
Revolution. Although physical violence akin to that of the struggle meetings rarely 
occurred, the ‘thought work’ imposed substantial symbolic violence, aggregated the 
pressures and engineered consent (Anagnost, 1997).  
My analysis of the experience of being in the zone of domicide thus far disembeds 
the displacees from their family relations. If we peek into the domestic settings of the 
displacees, one may further nuance the domicide experiences as a result of existing 
power structure and domestic disputes within the displacees’ families. In chapter 7, I 
shall zoom into those domestic arrangements and the collapse of family as a 
collective unit in resisting the bulldozer regime. Here, I wish to focus on their 
implications—the feelings of despair, helplessness, depression and alienation.  
Bourdieu’s critical analysis on temporal power can inform our understanding of 
those extreme feelings. Although hu (household) was the legally defined unit of 
displacement, and all members of the household were legally constructed as 
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collective owners of the demolished properties and as named displacees, negotiation 
meetings rarely involved all members of a given household to voice their different 
concerns and to work out a satisfactory resettlement plan for all members. Voluntary 
resignation by the displacees from those meetings was common, but this was more 
likely caused by the lack of legal vocabulary, by distrust of own calculation inability, 
and by the intent to avoid intensifying latent familial conflicts rather than disinterest. 
In many cases however, the chaiqian agents purposely exploited existing family 
conflicts and power structure and excluded some family members from the decision-
making for greater efficiency and effectiveness. The exclusion of those displacees on 
the one hand denies the right of those family members as the owners of the 
demolished properties and on the other hand renders their future unpredictable and 
dependant. Without any power to participate or influence the resettlement plan, their 
fate was placed in the hands of other family members whose ideal role was to liaison 
with the chaiqian agents and represent the interests of the rest, or at the mercy of the 
chaiqian agents who were expected to act compassionately and caringly to serve the 
interests of the displacees rather than the bulldozers. The division and co-optation of 
family members bred the exercise of absolute power over other members, increasing 
the latter’s vulnerability to ‘most brutal forms of manipulation of their fears and 
expectations’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 230). For the excluded, the domicide time, following 
Bourdieu (2000), is ‘an alienated time’ featuring a helpless ‘wait[ing] for everything 
to come from others, from the holders of power over the game and over the objective 
and subjective prospect of gain that it can offer’ (p. 237).  But for the displaced 
families as a whole, this is the moment of family estrangement, or in extreme cases, 
family break-down. Furiously blamed by many displacees, chaiqian not only killed 
their homes but killed their family, ‘jiapo renwang’ (family broken, members dead) 
as in their original words.  
I met Mr Gao (almost eighty years old) in a community garden in Pujiang. He 
isolated himself from the crowd and sat quietly in the corner. Living together with 
his son’s nuclear family, he describes his relations to his son’s family as worse than a 
lodger to a landlord. Emotionally distant to his son’s family long before the 
displacement, he had envisioned an independent, peaceful and relaxing life after 
displacement through rearrangement of living space, away from frequent abusive 
arguments and quarrels with his daughter-in-law. As the named owner of a private 
apartment in a lilong, he however was excluded from all negotiation meetings, for his 
‘cognitive inability’ (gaobu qingshuang) to understand the complexity of chaiqian. 
The exclusion forced him to accept whatever came his way.  
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I have never seen the chaiqian regulation. I don't know the amount of money we 
received from the chaiqian company. I didn’t know the living arrangement. I didn't 
know when to move. I didn’t even sign the resettlement agreement. When my son 
told me to pack and move, I followed his orders and jumped on the truck (Interview, 
X32, 10/05/2012).  
His exclusion was a result of the ‘making-out’ between chaiqian agents and his son 
during chaiqian. But the exclusion can also be engineered by the chaiqian agents. 
Drifting apart from his two sons, an old man in his sixties remarked on his exclusion 
with great anger and frustration:   
That night, the chaiqian agents went to my home and discussed with me and my two 
sons concerning the resettlement plan. It lasted until half nine or ten. We were all 
tired and my eldest son had to work early the following day. So we all agreed to 
convene the meeting again the following day. Later that night, my two sons walked 
past the chaiqian office. They were pulled into the office for another meeting 
without me. Around 11 o’clock, my younger son came back and woke me up. He 
asked me to come down to the office to sign the agreement. They had signed the 
agreement. I went ballistic and scolded him, “how dare you sign an agreement so 
casually?” Weren’t the dongqian agents profiteering from my pain (kaiyou)? They 
took advantage of me. If Chairman Mao were alive, those agents would have 
definitely been executed by shooting. Are you serving the interest of the people or 
the country? Our family was set up (kengle) by the chaiqian agents (Interview, D54, 
21/03/2012).  
The Use of Fear  
Living inside the zone of domicide is living inside chaos, suffused with violence and 
fear. The sensations of chaos was generated by the daily intensive flow of people, 
machinery and traffic in and out of the zone of domicide on a large scale, 
demolishing the lived space of the displacees and tearing apart the social fabric of the 
targeted communities. This was a state orchestrated effort to produce a ‘landscape of 
fear’ (Tuan, 1979), that of crime, of collateral damage, of property loss, of bodily 
harm, of emotional survival, and most importantly, a far greater fear of state power. 
Displacement and eviction frequently mixed the tactics of exhortation and 
intimidation (Zhang, 2001) whilst violence, physical or symbolic, was one of the 
chosen domination repertoires rather than a last resort. Although not all displacees 
were direct victims of physical violence, most of them personally witnessed the 
violent attacks and forcible evictions of their neighbours (see Table 5.1). Trauma 
may be personal but fear is infectious.   
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Table 5.1: Personal Experience of Illegal Chaiqian Tactics 
Incident   (N=300) Direct Experience Direct Witness 








Damaging roads, water and electricity 













Source: My own survey, 2012  
Indeed, fear is inherent, omnipresent and saturated in everyday life (Virilio and 
Richard, 2012) given the uncertainty (Giddens, 1990) and the risks (Beck, 1992b) we 
have to bear. Such quotidian experience of fear was intensified by and enmeshed 
with the ‘situational fear’ inside the zone of domicide. Those fears were diverse, 
explosive, inflating, conflating and mutually reinforcing, growing into such an acute 
and powerful state that it reached beyond the capacity of most displacees to control 
and to maintain a normal living. Such intense fear is one of the defining features of 
life during chaiqian, and shapes the choices of the displacees. In most cases, fear 
became so unbearable that the only way out of it was to compromise and move 
outside the zone as soon as possible.  
The eviction of the migrants marked the political production of fear. The migrant 
workers as ‘others’ inside the domicide zone became the first group of victims due to 
their lack of entitlement to citizenship and property (Shin and Li, 2013, Shin, 2013). 
The elimination of the migrant workers was only a necessary preparation before 
setting in motion the organised crime,4 further transforming the social geographies of 
the targeted communities. As the main users of the ‘illegally’ constructed houses and 
employees of rural enterprises, eviction was carried out cunningly through the 
destruction of ‘illegal’ buildings and suspension of unregistered or regulation-
violating workshops. The eviction of migrants paralysed the social and economic 
organisation of the local communities and thereby demonstrated the inevitability of 
place annihilation. Like a rehearsal, it also proved the determination and solidarity of 
the bulldozers to destroy the space in a most effective and efficient way.  
                                                            
4 To call many chaiqian tactics a crime is not exaggerating as testimonies I am about to present will 
show.  
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 The declaration of chaiqian zone did not simply demarcate a no-go area but invited 
in a wide range of social actors to profiteer from the injuries of the displacees. Quite 
paradoxically, it was a site of decline and death but it was also the place of thriving 
economic opportunities. Not long after the migrants moved out, the crew of the 
bulldozer regime intruded, including the staffs from the chaiqian companies, 
government officials, construction workers, lawyers and if necessary mafias, most of 
which were outsiders to the local communities. Scavengers and second-hand goods 
recyclers soon followed and flooded in, collecting waste materials or looking for 
good bargains. Migrant workers and relocation companies were hired to help the 
displaced families to pack and move out. As soon as one family moved out, 
construction workers soon arrived, damaging the buildings to prevent squatting. The 
flow of large numbers of strangers compounded by the exit of the displaced families 
destabilized the social relations, and thereby undermined the sense of security inside 
the domicide zone that was based on familiarity, close community ties and trust 
between the neighbours (Zhang et al., 2009).   
The dying landscape became a source of fear to the displacees. Strangers were 
perceived as threats to personal safety in the neighbourhoods. Not only did they 
outnumber the local residents, but their suspicious background amplified the 
anxieties and insecurities. Mr Zhu (in his forties) from Sanlin remarks on his fear,  
I work in Songjiang. It was far from Sanlin. So, sometimes I had to stay in the 
dormitory of the factory overnight. My wife had to stay at home alone. I was among 
the first few families that left the village at an early stage. They had already 
destroyed many buildings. All ruins. People with different backgrounds were 
everywhere, day and night. Black (gangsters) and white (lawful) —all sorts of 
people. She was scared at night. Indeed, no people would feel differently. I was also 
worried about her, a woman at home alone. You don’t have a choice (Interview, D27, 
11/03/2011).  
 
Landscape speaks. It conveys semiotic messages (Herbert and Brown, 2006), but the 
message is not sent to the displacees alone. It extends to thieves and burglars. More 
than one displacee reported their personal experience of being robbed during 
chaiqian. Most crimes took place at night, but daytime robberies were not 
uncommon, making it difficult to predict and calculate the risks. Although the lost 
properties might not be of significant value (e.g. cell phones, petty cash, electronics), 
the direct experience of break-ins was traumatising. The fear of future crimes 
factored into many displacees’ decisions to move out.  
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One woman in her seventies recalled her scare after a personal experience of a break-
in,  
My husband was in hospital, so I was home alone. One night, a burglar broke into 
my home. I was in another room and heard some noise. But I did not realise it was a 
housebreaker. On the following morning, I found my home was trashed. All valuable 
belongings were gone. I was scared to death and agreed to move out (Interview, 
D102, 18/04/2012).  
Unlike the middle-class who may influence the public discourse of security and erect 
walls to protect themselves in exclusionary spaces against unwanted dangerous 
others (Low, 2003, Pow and Kong, 2007), the displacees were living inside of a zone 
of abandonment. Increased risks to crimes and the actual rise of crime rates did not 
translate into a public agenda and increased police force, as investment in a dying 
place is a waste of public money. Crimes reported to the police were either deferred 
or ignored, as tracing burglars in a time of chaos was barely possible. And, 
sometimes, the lost properties were so trivial in value that the displacees decided not 
to go through the bureaucracy at all. On other accounts, suspecting and witnessing 
the police in collusion with some crimes, many displacees did not have any faith in 
the police to serve justice. Hence, the neoliberal subjectivisation of personal 
responsibility was effectively at work. The displacees were forced to remain vigilant, 
policing the flow of people and detecting potential criminal activities themselves. 
Such personal investment instead of reducing anxieties only intensified the fear of 
crimes, leading into bodily symptoms—over-alertness, nightmares, sleep deprivation, 
etc. For seniors, the ordeal was particularly painful to go through.  
A woman in her sixties acutely recounts her dreadful experience of insomnia during 
chaiqian, mixed with a dry sense of humour,  
They [the thief] have some professional ethics (zhiye daode). They did not want your 
whole wallet, only after cash. No bank cards, no ID cards. Wallets were thrown on 
the ground. Also, your clothes were scattered all over your place. You would 
definitely feel scared. You could not sleep at night without worrying about being 
robbed. A little noise would wake you up. Insomnia, night after night. Too bitter (ku 
a), too bitter (Interview, D36, 15/03/2012).  
No matter how hard the displacees tried to reduce their risks to crime through their 
own territorial actions, it was impossible to remain vigilant constantly for their other 
commitments (work, study, personal life, etc.). Any negligence would increase their 
vulnerability to robberies. Repeated suffering from burglaries and the absence of 
effective control from the police, pointed to a straightforward way out—accept the 
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deal and move out. This is a fine example of displacement by pressure in Marcuse’s 
(1985) typology. Remarked by Aunt Cheng (in her fifties) on her frustration about 
the repeated break-ins,  
They [the local government] evicted the renters from my home. If they [the renters] 
did not move, chengguan [street order control officers] came and evicted them out. 
They pull down their rolling shutters and did not allow them to do business. Those 
rolling shutters were mine and several were stolen in the end. After the renters were 
gone, there were only three of us in my big house. How was it possible to watch over 
such a big yard? You had to sleep at night. You had to work during the day. Lots of 
stuff was stolen. My family did not want to move. So they sent in the scavengers. 
You cannot tell [who were thieves and who were scavengers]. Sometimes, they were 
just thieves. Would you be scared in the same situation? [Sigh], there was nothing 
you could do. Just sign and leave. It is more important to save life first (Interview, 
D117, 01/04/2012).  
The sense of insecurity and fear was further intensified by the inconveniences, 
nuisances and danger of living in a construction site. Once a family agreed to move 
out, the piece-meal destruction was soon carried out, regardless of the harm to the 
families nearby. Detached self-built housing were immediately destroyed while 
windows, doors, non-bearing walls of tenement buildings were immediately removed, 
giving off enormous dust clouds and noise, and leaving behind piles of building 
waste. Environmental hazards aside, the sitting displacees had to suffer the danger 
associated with the destruction. But to the bulldozer regime, risk of this kind were 
calculated as less important and less probable than that of holding out and squatting, 
which might slow down the process of demolition. By making appropriated 
properties no longer habitable for the early movers, it made it impossible for them to 
compare their resettlement packages with later movers. Also, it reduced the potential 
efforts to evict the squatters. But, like any statistical calculation, probabilities can 
never be confused with certainties (Douglas, 1992, Scott, 2012). When life-threating 
accidents caused by the destruction did happen, the victims become tragic yet 
unfortunate collateral damage. Their life was expendable to the cause of the Expo.  
We have not yet all moved out before they started to destroy our community. I 
almost died in one accident. I was home watching TV in bed on that afternoon.  
They were destroying my neighbour’s house, which was right behind mine. Around 
two o’clock, a concrete board slashed into my home. They were pulling off the 
structure of my neighbour’s house and one concrete board just flew inside mine, 
cutting through the wall. I was knocked to the ground, bumped my head badly. I was 
so scared and my blood pressure went up to 220. I was just outside from hospital 
after the first stage of chemo treatment. I could not stay in hospital. My family had 
to work and all belongings were at home. At that time, our communities were full of 
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waidiren (outsiders). You had to be alert in case they came to steal your stuff. My 
neighbours came to check on me immediately and took me to hospital. The doctor 
was worried as well. My blood pressure was too high. He admitted me to the 
hospital immediately, asked the nurse to put me on saline and forbid anyone talking 
to me, in case my blood vessels might explode and lead to a stroke and brain damage 
(Mrs Chen,  interview, D103, 20/04/2012).  
  
Figure 5.2: Producing a Living Hell 
Source: Courtesy of a displacee (photo taken in 2007), 2012 
 
Fear is always politicised to the advantage of the powerful (Hollway and Jefferson, 
1997, Shirlow and Pain, 2003). It is socially produced to irritate and to intimidate the 
displacees, turning their peaceful life into a state of despair, with incalculable risks 
and unforeseeable dangers. In most cases, it was the scavengers, the migrant workers, 
the thieves and burglars, the construction workers, and other unidentified outsiders 
that took the blame for increased sense of insecurities. However, they were only the 
scapegoats anchoring the displacees’ angst from the inability to lose their homes and 
communities in a dignified way, and covering up the dirty hands of the bulldozer 
regime. Speculative land development is an organised crime. This must be 
understood metaphorically as well as literally. During the Expo, the bulldozer regime 
was not hesitant to use illegal violence against the displacees by appropriating and 
exploiting the displacees’ fear. Their tactics were appallingly discreet, in order not to 
backfire and undermine their legitimacy. Sometimes, this entailed an indifference or 
connivance to reported crimes or on other occasions, the bulldozer regime created 
ripe conditions for crimes, or simply encouraged and instructed criminals to commit 
crimes with pardon and immunity. This is illustrative by the following testimony 
from Aunt Zhou (in her mid-forties) from a naturally emerged group interview. Her 
nuclear family were amongst the few families who insisted on fair compensation. 
One day, she received a kind warning from a sympathetic migrant worker before her 
home was robbed by this migrant worker and his working partners.  
Workers were destroying the roof of a 
displaced family’s home while they were 
still living inside at the time  
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He has conscience. He warned me, “Ayi, please do not feel scared tonight. We feel 
sorry for your sufferings. But, I will have to come to break your door tonight. The 
chaiqian company asked me to break your doors”. Even warned by him, my husband 
and I were still scared that night.  “Bang” —a huge noise, our door was knocked 
down. Scavengers came in and took away all our belongings. My husband was so 
pissed off. [YZ: why didn’t you call the police?] Don't be so childlike. They had 
everything planned already. You really think the police had no idea of their scheme? 
My husband was furious. He stamped his feet in anger through the night. Nothing 
you could do to stop it (Interview, D13, 03/2012).  
The extent of fear would be unimaginable if her family had not received a warning 
beforehand from the kind migrant worker. Such dramatic performance was rare, 
usually reserved at a later stage after most families had left, meaning fewer eyes 
watching over neighbourhood safety and over the conducts of the bulldozer regime. 
The normal tactic favoured by the bulldozer was the untraceable but irritating 
harassment or intimidation. For many displacees, it was their everyday life of being 
roused by the sudden heavy knocking on their doors or windows at nights. Some 
displacees also reported being visited by burglars with ‘professional ethics’ who stole 
nothing but messed up everything in their homes. No one hurt, nothing stolen, 
nothing damaged—frequent nuisances of this kind made it useless to seek help from 
the police, regardless if they could be trusted at all. Staged crimes perfectly mixed 
with real crimes, with the most desirable outcomes to the bulldozer regime. It fuelled 
the fears of the displacees, confused the displacees about their vulnerabilities to real 
crimes, and made it extremely difficult and eventually impossible to calculate and 
contain their fear rationally. Many displacees chose to leave to contain such 
unbearable state of fear. As commented by Herzfeld (2009: 263), such intimidation 
was ‘the most unobtrusive kind of violence—the violence of the creeping corrosion 
of solidarity’.  
The Spectacle of Violence and Terror  
For most displacees, what they feared most was qiangqian (forcible evictions) 
frequently staged as spectacles of violence and terror. To onlookers, qiangqian is 
confined to the final coordinated violent scene of evicting the ‘nail households’ from 
their premises (see Qin, 2013, Erie, 2012, Mertha, 2009b) and such violence is 
intimidating enough to convince the rest to give up fighting. However, to expose the 
sheer extent of violence, I wish to point out that qiangqian is better understood as a 
sequence of events. Hannah Arendt (1970) made a cogent point that violence unlike 
power requires justification for its use. Those nails had to go through the 
bureaucratic formalities of xingzheng caijue (administrative arbitration), qiangzhi 
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chaiqian tingzhenghui (public hearing on forcible eviction), and qiangzhi zhixing 
tongzhi (forcible eviction notice), to justify the terror, before they were forcibly 
evicted from their homes. Whilst each bureaucratic procedure served the interest to 
maintain a respectable appearance of rule of law, it was an abuse of the coercive 
power of the state, a reinforcement of the slander against the evictees, an escalation 
of violence, an accumulation of bodily pain and the feelings of powerlessness and 
despair, paralysing the psyche of the evictees.  
By the time the evictees received the formal eviction notice, the ‘truth’ about them 
being selfish, stubborn, unreasonable, greedy, and uncivil had already been 
manufactured through ritualistic arbitration meeting and public hearings. Those 
meetings rarely left any traceable verbatim evidence if the displacees were not savvy 
enough to make a recording. However, the eviction notices (Figures 5.3 and 5.4) 
provided us the opportunity to investigate the production of truth, and the 
justification of violence. I gathered two types of eviction notices from the displacees. 
A formal eviction notice was sent out to each displaced family stamped by the 
district government, accompanied by a few informal eviction notices by the leading 
agency of the bulldozer regime with a similar stamp during the days before forcible 
evictions. The genres of writing in those two types of eviction notices were strikingly 
different, with different performative power. Whilst the state issued formal eviction 
orders written impersonally, citing legal vocabulary to justify the eviction decision 
and warning the displacees about the forthcoming forcible eviction if they refused to 
evacuate from their premises, the informal eviction notice from the bulldozer regime 
mixed intimidation with exhortation in addition to the violence of law. But, the 
absence of the subject for the action xiwang (wish) in both notices challenges the 
formal/informal distinction with an enigma—who was/were instructing the evictees? 
The hidden message requires political imagination to decipher. One of the decoded 
messages lead to my conviction that corporate power and state organs coddle with 
and find each other as a spokesperson to voice their greedy desires for speedy 
accumulation. With the institutional support from the government, the bulldozer 
regime showed no mercy to abuse their power. As we can see from the second 
example below, their threat to the displacees was elaborate, explicit and tyrannical, 
without any euphemism and concealment.  
Statistics were used as objective factual evidence, as we can see from two notices 
below, to demonstrate the genuine support from the early movers and to persuade the 
displacees to give up their pointless and selfish fight. What is questionable here is not 
the truthfulness of the statistical figure but ‘the truthfulness of the truth’ (Liu, 2009: 
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42) or how support was defined and quantified, and how statistical reasoning came to 
define and legitimatise reality. To the first question, the syntax of the statistical 
statement plays a great part in encouraging confusion and misunderstanding. The 
generalised conclusion of overwhelming support from a great majority of the 
displacees (jue daduoshu) follows immediately after the statistical quantification of 
families that accepted the resettlement deals in the previous clause. This discursive 
tactic casually establishes causality between the rate of acceptance and the rate of 
support, thereby, vindicating an ambiguous misinterpretation through a precise big 
number. Even if the validity of this line of reasoning is accepted, it must be noted 
that the quantification excludes the diverse situations under which the displacees 
made the decision to accept the resettlement offer from moral sentiments and 
judgement. An acceptance, even under duress, here was counted as a genuine and 
legit vote as a heartfelt consent. To the second question, Theodore Porter (1995: X) 
offers a trenchant explanation that statistical representation of the reality is one of the 
political solutions to a political problem. Similar to its historical precedents, this 
statistical truth-making is repressive (Rose, 1990). The ‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’ 
detonated by a statistical figure adds a flavour of ‘scientific rationality’. The 
scientifically calculated number 98 per cent powerfully vouches for the validity and 
credibility of the resettlement programme. The obedience of the majority self-
evidently legitimatizes authoritarian killing of the displacees’ homes. By activating 
the discourse of fairness, premised on the consistency of a tyrannical resettlement 
programme rather than the universal value of justice, it constructs the forcible 
evictions as less an order from an authoritarian state but as a result of the tyranny of 
the majority (Tocqueville, 2003). The emphasis on the extreme small number of the 
defiant minority further implies that the source of the problem lies not in the 
resettlement programme but in the displacees. This typical strategy of blaming the 
victims lends further legitimacy to stigmatise and attack the moral characters of the 
evictees, as in the nine imperative sentences with an exclamation mark at the end in 
the last paragraph.  
The dates of forcible eviction rarely informed the displacees. Those stated in the 
eviction notices were open and suggestive. It means that the evictees were unable to 
prepare for the confrontation with state violence and for the destruction of their 
homes. Kafkaesque accounts of the lived experience of forcible eviction occur 
repeatedly in my fieldwork notes—life was dictated by the naked power of the 
bulldozer regime, deprived of any certainty. One plausible explanation for the delay 
is that a forcible eviction is a concerted performance and requires time to coordinate 
the efforts from different bureaucracies. However, the testimonies from a few 
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evictees convinced me that the decision of the exact timing of eviction was 
meticulously calculated to acquire the land from atomised displacees at minimal 
costs, economically and politically. Each eviction was planned at a time of an 
impasse when only a few families were holding out. Their immediate neighbours had 
already moved out, meaning the loss of most possible support from these bystanders 
(Smith, 1998). Its suddenness and randomness make it difficult to prepare and to 




Figure 5.3: A Formal Eviction Notice from Pudong District Government 




[Title of Government Authority] 
Notice of Forcible Eviction  
[Reference Number] 
[Addressee] 
[Indicate the date and substance of the 
Arbitration Decision] 
Given your family did not evacuate from the site 
within the deadline, the Construction Bureau of 
Pudong District Government applied for a 
forcible eviction. After our review, the 
construction bureau had made an arbitration 
decision on [date] and ordered your family to 
evacuate from site on a deadline. According to 
article 25 of Shanghai Chaiqian Bylaw, we shall 
order relevant authorities to evict you out after 
fifteen days upon your receipt of this notice. 
For the benefits of the scheduled construction, 
[we] wish your household to comply with 
eviction notice and move out for the benefits of 
scheduled construction.  
[closing] 
[Seal] 










Figure 5.4: An Informal Eviction Notice from Huangpu Chaiqian Zhihuibu  
Source: Courtesy of a displacee (information related to personal identity redacted and all translation is 
mine), 2013 
 
Each eviction is a spectacle of terror. As Charles Tilly (2003: 237) points out  
‘terror is a strategy rather than a creed’.  The spectacle of eviction delivers at least 
two outcomes. One immediate end is to remove the eyesores from the road to profits. 
The other is to turn the eviction of a private family into a public, exemplary and 
pedagogical event. An eviction is a violent political ritual, like a public execution 
[To the Residents] 
[Addressee] 
[Indicate the arbitration decision and the Eviction Notice 
from the government] 
Only  days left before forcible eviction of your 
household! 
More than 98% of families had signed on the deal and 
moved out—this hard fact proved the trust and the 
support from a great majority of the displacees for the 
Expo-induced displacement, and that our consistent 
chaiqian policy bears examination. For timely 
demolishment and clear the site on time, for scheduled 
construction of the Expo site to be carried out on time, 
for the authority and credibility of the party and the 
government, for our commitment and promises to early 
movers of a consistent policy, we shall stick to our 
chaiqian policy with greater confidence and 
determination and will not compromise and give in. We 
are determined to destroy the site as planned. 
[We] wish your household to, stop being unrepentant! 
Stop speculating and wishing to get a better deal! Stop 
greedily asking for more money! Do not lose out the last 
opportunity! Adjust your attitude! Think carefully! 
Weigh your loss and benefits! Treasure your legitimate 
interests! Agree on a resettlement package as soon as 
possible! 
[closing] 
[Seal of the head agency in charge of displacement] 
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analysed by Foucault (1977: 58), with an aim ‘to make an example, not only by 
making people aware that slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by 
arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the 
guilty person’. It communicates an intimidating message to a specific group of 
onlookers, socially and psychologically distanced to the evictees but also face 
displacement from neighbouring communities, that centralised violence from the 
state is at the disposal of the bulldozer regime and the consequence will be the same 
if not worse than those evicted. 
Fan was one of the evictees I secretly consulted for this project. I met Fan and her 
ex-husband Wang on a humid summer afternoon at a discreet location in Pudong for 
fear of implicating each other in the censorship5. They had already divorced before 
the property demolished for the Expo for the greater benefits of their single child. 
Fan and her teenage boy were evicted on a cold morning in winter without any 
warning, four months later after the receipt of the formal eviction order. Speaking of 
her experience of eviction, she could not stop sarcastically admiring the militarised 
political artifice of the bulldozer regime. ‘They are the elites of our society, you 
know? They have a whole strategic plan to evict you, to control you, and to challenge 
your moral bottom line (daode dixian). They are the elites of the most vicious kind’.  
To her, the prolonged delay was to paralyse the social support she managed to secure. 
As it was approaching the Chinese New Year, she had relaxed her guard against the 
unpredictable forcible eviction. Her own moral sensitivity fed on her hope for a 
peaceful new year under her own roof. The blitz-like eviction on that cold rainy 
morning robbed her of any opportunity to mobilise political resources. ‘There was no 
sign of it coming. They are apt at blitz (turan xiji)’. She giggled and continued, 
‘They did not simply come to destroy your home without knowing whether you were 
at home. So before they brought up the whole action, they first sent up a janitor from 
our compound to check on us first and pretended to ask for water. It was around eight 
o’clock in the morning. My son just had all term-end examinations from school and 
we decided to indulge ourselves with a long lie in bed. I decided to ignore his 
knocking. But, he kept knocking and asking a few times and I was determined to 
ignore him. A few minutes later, I heard the rambles from the bulldozer machine 
driving closer and the thunder from hundreds of people walking downstairs. Until 
then I realised the eviction was happening’. Her intuitive action was to check the 
situation outside from her window. The appearance of the organised eviction came to 
                                                            
5 To protect the safety and avoid my use of her story here becoming an ‘incriminating’ evidence 
against her, I do not want to disclose the date of interview here. Same concern applies to the cases of 
Chen and He below.  
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her as a great shock. ‘There were hundreds of people, like a flood’. However, it was 
not a disorganised crowd. The eviction team proved to be highly professional and 
was marching forward toward her home in clear formation as recalled by Fan based 
on her judgement of the dress style. The frontline was secured by low-rank officers 
in riot gear, followed by police in their uniforms, protecting the government officials 
and supporting professionals from public institutions (i.e. doctors, firemen, 
chengguan [street order maintaining officers], etc.), with a defensive wall of officers 
in uniforms setting up parameters of violence zone. Outside parameters stood 
hundreds of spectators and onlookers, who were strictly instructed not to film or take 
any photos but to watch the spectacle only.  
This militarised organisation was described by Fan as ‘Japanese troops sweeping a 
village’, graphically resembling the representation of anti-Japanese war in dramas. 
Fan bitterly smiled, ‘we both were honoured model workers in socialist past, and 
now we were the state enemies’. Wang cut in and added outrageously, ‘It (the Party-
state) always say the Japanese were cruel, as a matter of fact, it was much crueller 
than the Japanese. It does not even treat you as a human being’.  Indeed, the eviction 
relied on pure physical violence without any moral or legal limits, even though there 
was no apparent drastic resistance as confrontational as in the eviction of Pan Rong, 
a female fighter who threw homemade petrol bombs at the bulldozers.6 Before her 
son and she were able to put on decent clothes and prepare for a last fight, three 
doors made of steel were broken by force. Her son in his underwear was dragged out 
barefoot immediately by officers in riot gear. After a short time of pointless fighting, 
Fan was pulled downstairs. Her son tried to make a phone call asking for help but 
unsurprisingly mobile phone signal was jammed. Their family possessions were 
packed and towed away without a notary statement. At the time of the interview, the 
whereabouts of their family possessions remains a mystery to the couple. All they 
saved on that day was her son’s school bag.  
Evictees in such context were treated as the homo sacer whose bare life ceases to 
have any value and is vulnerable to murder without any punishment (Agamben, 
1998). Humanity and conscience vanish into thin air. Unsurprisingly, even pardons 
frequently granted to seniors and minors in criminal charges became inapplicable 
(also see Hart, 1988). Every member of the evicted family was found guilty of 
jeopardising public interest and thus punishable by the state sanctioned violence. On 
the eviction day of Mr Chen’s family, Chen was arrested from his workplace by 
armed policemen because of an alleged anonymous tip suspecting him of possessing 
                                                            
6 See http://www.infzm.com/content/38292.  
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dangerous arms. Before this official arrest in public scene, he had already been 
illegally detained and assaulted for more than a week at the conference room of his 
workplace. ‘Beating was not a big deal to them. On the first day, they just slapped 
my face for no reason. A co-worker called the police for me, and the police got back 
at me, telling me, “you want to complain about me? Let us go and take it to the 
municipal police bureau”’. On that day, he simply gave up resistance at all. After a 
ritualistic body search, he was immediately escorted to a rental apartment under 
house arrest. Meanwhile, his wife and his nearly four-year-old son were expelled 
from their ‘small but cosy’ apartment. His son was taken away from his wife who 
was forced out with both arms restrained by two strong-armed men in uniforms. 
Rootless in Shanghai, the couple never let their son out of their sight since he was 
born. Separation anxiety trigged by the disappearance of his mother was amplified by 
witnessing the violence to his mother and by being detained in an unfamiliar place 
with strangers. Chen’s wife was brought to the rental apartment later that afternoon, 
with blood on her feet cut by glasses on the ground when she was dragged. A 
neighbour to their current residence remarked on her experience of witnessing the 
eviction of this family, ‘a decade ago when I was displaced from the city, they [the 
chaiqian agents] were like thugs. A decade later, how come they still acted like 
thugs?’ 
A surveillance team was sent to monitor them closely, both inside and outside the 
apartment, restraining their freedom. Their son, however, was not brought back to 
them until early next morning, and was under house arrest of a similar kind. That day 
was the longest in their life, losing their only sanctuary space in Shanghai and 
separated from their only child at the same time. ‘As a father, I felt heartache for not 
being able to protect my son’, said Chen, ‘When I learnt that he was taken away by 
the chaiqian agents after I have seen my wife alone, I was scared to death’. Guilt and 
self-blame experienced as heartache torment the couple constantly for the traumatic 
effects of eviction to their son’s psyche. Whilst psychoanalytical vocabularies are out 
of their stock, the discernible changes in their son’s behaviours send out an alarming 
warning. ‘For a long time after the eviction, he had troubles in sleeping. We let him 
sleep in our bed, but every night he had nightmares. He would suddenly wake up 
alert and fearful’. Nightmares speak of the darkest terror. When I was working with 
this couple, I was tempted to involve their son and retrieve further details of those 
nightmares, not to decipher the meanings of those imaginary experiences, but simply 
to have a shallow taste of the pain he suffered after the expulsion. In doing so, 
however, I was worried that it would only have brought him greater harm than have 
helped him to heal the wounds. My research impulse was therefore suppressed. The 
Wounded Life in the Domicide Zone │ 160  
 
 
absence of any accounts of those nightmares however does not make it less valid to 
connect them with the crisis he was going through. As Foucault (1986: 47) writes, ‘in 
dreams he [sic] encounters what he is and what he will be, what he has done and 
what is going to, discovering there the knot that ties his freedom to the necessity of 
the world’. What Foucault seems to suggest is that dreams interweave our temporal 
experiences of past, present and future, and give rise to agency in future, in the sense 
of both yearnings for emancipatory alternatives (see Pun, 2005) and actions to resist 
and change. In this light, his response after exposure to those dreams voices his 
suffering.  
His heightened alertness after exposure to those nightmares can be read as an 
intuitive response to defend his ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1990: 92), the 
security of being in the present, which was understandably in a dire crisis after a 
recent sudden collapse of the meaningful life-world. External danger and political 
violence similar to what he personally experienced became so ubiquitous and 
powerful beyond the control of his adult parents. Fear and insecurity were 
accumulated and intensified by those frequent dreams. Trust in full-time protection 
from his parents was shattered and had to be secured on sight provocatively to be real, 
leading to his ‘irrational’ attachment behaviour. Chen’s wife continues, ‘when he 
was awake, he simply followed me everywhere at any time, even when I had to use 
the bathroom. He could not stay alone without seeing me for a second. He became 
distant to his father. He only needed me, no one else’. Indeed, attachment to a mother 
figure is common in childhood across cultures (Bowlby, 1971) but rejection of a 
father figure and regression to infantile attachment behaviours at his age can only be 
explained as a self defence mechanism to demonstrate and resolve frustration, 
confusion and pain this child was suffering.  
Without a chance to heal, immediate surveillance, the presence of violent specialists, 
and living homelessly until this day are not helping this boy recover from the 
psychological trauma. When I first met him, it was in their bare concrete apartment 
on a burning summer afternoon. Their apartment was the only one in a row of houses 
without an air conditioner. My T-shirt was uncomfortably wet and sticky as I was 
sweating during the whole interview despite an old pedestal fan facing toward me. 
Chen’s wife kept the door and windows open to cool down the room. His son 
however quickly retreated to a tiny room with doors and windows securely locked. 
Chen’s wife told me that this was typical, ‘Even when we both are at home, he locks 
the door and windows, too. You see the tiny window in our bathroom? We always 
keep it open to circulate the fresh air. Every time he uses the bathroom, no matter for 
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what purposes, doors and windows are always locked’. Wound of the mind never 
stops bleeding. A closed space is like a bandage patching up this open wound, 
offering him maximum security. ‘What if bad guys break-in again’? He once asked 
his mother. The frustration and fear as conveyed this big ‘if’ do not wither away but 
escalate through the years. On my second visit, I was talking with his mother in the 
living room and the topic of the police violence emerged from our conversation. 
Having overheard our talk, he shouted from the bedroom, ‘One day I will kill all of 
them with a bomb’.   
Killing the oppressors might be an aggressive but immediate solution to right the 
wrongs, but the public gaze during the eviction makes humiliation perpetuating. The 
onlookers were not innocent witnesses of state violence. Following Foucault (1977),  
to observe and to witness is to guarantee the punishment and to take part in it. Their 
presence in silence made them if not accessories but one source of shame and anger, 
especially to females. Bodily struggles always violated their bodies, and the gaze of 
the public aggregates their feelings of humiliation. Mrs He, in her eighties, could 
barely talk without weeping when talking about her experience of eviction. The time 
of eviction was never explicitly informed in her case, either. It was on a summer 
morning. Other family members were out at work. Her daughter was shopping for 
fresh food at a morning food market. She was alone at home when eviction took 
place. Doors had been reinforced in case of a sudden eviction but turned out to be 
futile. She was carried out from the second floor and ‘tossed to the ground as trash’. 
Her daughter soon came back to defend their home and physically altercated with the 
eviction force. ‘She tried to get inside our house and protect our home. They of 
course did not let her. It was in late summer. She was only wearing a shirt on top. So 
many strong men were beating her, a single woman. Her shirt was soon torn off in 
the bodily conflicts. In the end, there was only a bra covering her top, exposed to the 
crowds afar. What kind of government is capable of doing such things? How could 
she live as a decent woman anymore?’   
Leaving, Crying and Loss 
It became quite understandable that only 80 families were counted as evictees. To 
most displacees, they were simply tied of the anxiety and fear. Leaving became their 
way out of the battles. Once an agreement of resettlement plan was made, the 
displaced families must pack their belongings and move out within a few days. Time, 
as condensed as it has already became in constructing the Expo, became too 
invaluable and scarce during displacement to spare finding proper closure with 
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familiar places and people that constituted the ‘structure of meanings’ (Marris, 1974: 
4) developed over a long span of the displacees’ life trajectories. The pace of the 
displacement was so intense that it created a crisis in the experience of time and 
space, robbing many displacees of the opportunity to dig deep, to make sense of what 
is happening and what chaiqian really entails, to gain insight of the chaiqian 
business, and making them numb. Therefore, mourning was more common at later 
stages, bursting out at moments when departing homes with the home-moving trucks 
knowing that this is a one-way journey, or witnessing their homes falling into pieces 
within hours or a couple of days, or until they have resettled in the transitory housing 
and realised what was lost in this chaotic moving process. In response to my question 
regarding their feelings when moving out, few of them could articulate their intense 
feelings other than the memory of the simplest and intuitive reaction of crying. Tears 
may have evaporated, but the communicative act of weeping tells us all about their 
frustration, loss, and sorrow.  
I was really sad. I was very reluctant to leave and burst into tears….I invested my 
whole life in building the home (female, 70s, Interview, D79, 28/03/2012).  
My daughter cried all the time in the first few months we moved out. She was at 
junior high school and had to go back to the neighbourhood on her way to school.  
She was born there and grew up there. You would get used to that place if you lived 
there long enough too (female, late 40s, Interview, D39, 15/03/2012).  
 I didn’t like them to demolish my home. I cannot remember how many times I cried 
at that time. Sometimes I even woke up suddenly because of crying at night. I am 
not lying….It only took two months before everything was bulldozed to the ground 
(female, 60s, research notes, 16/03/2012).  
We cried when our house was demolished. I felt so sad. My partner was sick. I had a 
big open balcony. I worked and saved for my whole life (shebude chi, shebude yong), 
and invested all my life in this house. We have running water on our balcony 
connected with water pipes. In a row of houses, mine was the best (female, late 70s, 
interview, D53, 21/03/2012).  
Those seemingly simple, monotonous, and repetitive narratives of crying over the 
loss of homes also convey strong sentiments for the loss of belonging, continuity and 
connections. Home in the material form is an extended self  (Beck, 1992a) and this 
home-related identity is produced and reproduced through home-making practices 
(Blunt and Dowling, 2006). This is particularly pivotal to understand the feelings of 
the self-built housing owners whose dwellings in most cases were constantly 
renovated to materialise an imagined family life that is at least materially decent. 
However substandard in the eyes of the technocrats, those dwellings remind the 
Wounded Life in the Domicide Zone │ 163 
 
displacees of the life journey they travelled to become who they were and constitute 
a key site of livelihood struggles. Created with enormous investment in the form of 
emotions, labour and money, those houses engender the Lockean possessive impulse. 
The final form of their houses prior to displacement was the result of efforts of 
renovation and redevelopment over generations, attentive to the changed housing 
needs of family members. Such practices are conducive to the development of stable 
attachment and sense of rootedness. Chaiqian therefore not only annihilated their 
lived place but also destroyed part of the displacees’ sense of self.  
Although the process of uprooting is not as sudden as in ‘natural’ disasters—caution 
must be taken to maintain such distinction as warned by Kai Erikson (1994) and Neil 
Smith (2006), the precise moments of home annihilation to many displacees remain a 
painful shock. This experience of cutting off one’s roots in a familiar place argues 
Mindy Fullilove (2005) is commensurable with corporeal trauma. Numbness only 
lasts for seconds if it is a sharp, clear cut. As the displacees settled down, the muggy 
and entangled sentiments of attachment and loss slowly became crystallised. The cut 
appeared so deep that words or scales are incapable of describing their pain, and so 
clear that no scar tissue was left to remind them of the existence of their roots. Like a 
phantom limb however, the lost past constantly flashes back in the present and 
exacerbates the pain of transition (Greene et al., 2011). The relationship to the 
destroyed life space is not severed, detached or resolved, but transformed, eternalised 
and engraved in the psyche of many displacees. To many people, especially the 
seniors, death is the final outcry of their bodies protesting for the loss of familiarity 
and continuity. At a point in my fieldwork, I simply lost count how many senior 
displacees regretted the loss of their old neighbours and friends who slowly died of 
sorrow and depression after displacement. Less life-threatening, depression prevails. 
The metaphoric remark on the ‘emptied heart’ from a retiree allows us to have a taste 
of the tip of the grief from uprooting.  
I felt deeply sorry and regret for moving out. After I moved to a new home [guodu 
fang, rented house before moving into the resettlement housing], I went back there 
many times. All [had] gone. It was empty. I stood there with feelings that I could 
hardly describe-my heart was empty (xinli kongkong de). [It was] all empty. There 
was no way back. No way back. I should have taken some pictures [of my old home]. 
Now, it is all in my memory. All [is] in memory. No way back. No way back (male, 
50s, interview, X11, 02/ 05/2012).  
 




Figure 5.5: Grieving for Lost Places 
Source: Wei (2010) 
 
For thousands of displaced residents hired by the factories at the Expo site, especially 
the younger generation of workers-cum-displacees, they had to cope with even more 
formidable crises in their livelihood and work-related identity due to closures or 
relocation of the factories at the Expo site. Although older workers, especially those 
close to legal retirement age, had the option to retire early, the middle aged and the 
younger generation were particularly vulnerable to the threat of unemployment and 
associated psychological malaises. ‘Caring’ factories might be conservative in firing 
any workers but if tactfully, they could join forces with the ‘daring’ factories like the 
steel factory, strategising the relocation as an opportunity to dump the redundant 
labour force. Those workers, former owners of the state-owned enterprises, followed 
the downfall trend since the reform (Lee, 1999) and had no influence in the 
management to control their fate. In the case of the steel company, the workers’ 
union and the party organ were in collusion with the management, blocking the 
channels of communication and resistance. Through fenliu,7 maiduan,8 xiebao,9 
bingtui or bingxiu,10 and other similar measures, more than one thousand workers 
lost their jobs at the factory through hidden mechanisms.11 Families with members 
hired by those factories therefore were confronted with the challenge of a wholesale 
disintegration of their life. The loss of homes was compounded by the feelings of 
livelihood insecurities, eroded status and privileges as socialist workers.   
                                                            
7 Job reassignment from original post to newly created posts or other post within the working units or 
to the reemployment centre to be re-hired. See Lee  (2000).  
8 Workers who are laid off with a one-off payment based on the length of employment and other 
settlement fees. See Hurst and O’Brien (2002) and Gallaher (2009).  
9 Temporarily unemployed during which the workers labour contract with original work units are 
maintained and the latter shall keep contributing to the social security fees according to the temporary 
unemployment agreement until the workers’ retirement. See Gallaher (2009).  
10 The former refers to workers who retire early due to lost labour power or severe health issues and 
the latter refers to sick leave. 
11 Data here is based on personal communication with many former workers of various companies at 
the Expo site in different interviews from March to June, 2012.    
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A male worker in his forties worked for the steel factory remarked with great anger 
and defeatedness on his tough choice of breaking his own ‘iron bowl’:  
Do you know how big our factory used to be? Such a big factory disappeared from 
the scene. My father worked in the factory, too. So did my mother. The factory was 
not just a factory. It was a home…They cannot forcefully lay you off. But 
commuting two to three hours, every working day is exhausting enough to make you 
reconsider your job options. Getting up at five in the morning and returning from 
work at nine or ten at night. It is beyond your reasonable physical strength. What did 
the state do? You [the steel factory] are a state-owned factory. You [the steel factory] 
are not a private business. They [the state and the factory] don't care if you have to 
commute long hours. They did not compensate your loss commuting. In their 
defence, they offered free shuttle bus. But, the place is in shenshan laolin (remote 
suburbia without households). There were no vehicles apart from the shuttle bus. 
And the shuttle bus only runs during the commuting hours. If there is a family 
emergency, what can you do then? My son was five years old then. My wife and I 
were both fulltime workers. One of us had to make the sacrifice. So, I decided to quit. 
You don’t have a choice, do you? (Interview, D51, 19/03/2012).  
Conclusion  
Writing up this chapter has been particularly painful, not only because those negative 
emotions were so depressing it forced me to take a break constantly but also because 
of my fear that my command of English vocabulary does not do justice to the 
displacees’ pain and anger when they confided in me their personal stories. Their 
pain and suffering are private, experiential and incommunicable. They are so intense, 
complex and layered that the attempt to dissect and name them accurately is prone to 
wrong judgement. Frequently, I also find myself lost in their testimonies—the open 
wounds on their body and mind were inflicted in such an appalling way that the 
damage is beyond my political view and the stock of my academic knowledge. How 
could I possibly decide whose suffocated life story merits some space to breathe in 
this chapter? How could I possibly extract an episode from a sequence of repressive 
events of displacement embedded in a system of oppression simply to narrow down 
their desperate feelings? How could I possibly to retell their frustration caused by 
those staged theft and break-ins?  How could I possibly communicate the extent of 
pain caused by forcible eviction?  
Herbert Gans (1962: 220) lamented over four decades ago, ‘American redevelopment 
planning so far has proceeded on the assumption that relocation is secondary to 
redevelopment, Thus, great pain are taken with planning for clearance and the reuse 
of the site, but plans for the present occupants of the site are treated as by-products of 
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the redevelopment proposal’. To him, at the heart of the injuries of the displacees 
was the treatment as ‘by-products’, not out of the callous intention of the powerful 
elites, but because of the discrepancies between technocratic and popular views of 
places, which allowed the reproduction of a repressive social and spatial order and 
caused great pain to those evicted. Whilst the emerging elites in China are keen on 
importing planning expertise and urban development practices to catch up with 
western civilisation (Olds, 2001, Keeton, 2011) —a best practise area of urban 
redevelopment was created during the Expo, they have surely imported the whole 
package. Combined with the authoritarian political culture, the displacees, as this 
chapter shows, were not simply treated as ‘by-products’ but as wrong people in 
wrong places, as the dispensable, or worse, as subhuman, or as enemies. 
By telling those private depressing stories in this chapter, I tried to bring those 
vocabularies of pain, bitterness, terror, and grief to the focus of our discussion on 
chaiqian. I wish to urge the planners, the politicians, the lawyers and the academics 
to suspend our disagreements and quibbles on the property rights and principles of 
justice loaded with our academic jargon, and dwell on our moral truisms to 
understand the pain of the displacees and the real costs of the Expo, a showcase of 
‘progress in humanity’.12 Such moral truism, as Kai Nielsen (1991:25) convincingly 
argues, relies less on ‘a fancy moral theory’ than on ‘a rather rudimentary moral 
sensibility or what Engels once called a sense of human decency’. For this human 
decency, what we need is to reject upfront the naturalisation of inflicting pain upon 
others unnecessarily (Nielsen, 1991), and despise the policy programmes that treat 
humans as nonhumans or subhumans (Margalit, 1996), or simply, as David Smith 
(1994) echoing Porteous (1989) suggested, put ourselves in the displacees’ place and 
ask, how would we feel if we were asked to give up our own homes and communities, 
and how would we feel if we were treated as by-products, guinea pigs or enemies of 
the public, suffering from state tyranny? Whilst those personal stories are certainly 
unsettling and unjust, the social context making them possible in the first place warns 
us about the pathological systematic nature (Young, 1990). This is the topic I turn to 
examine in the next chapter.  
 
                                                            
12 This is one of the core values upheld by the International Bureau of Exposition.   





‘Men at their birth are naturally good. Their natures are much the same; their 
habits become widely different’. 
Chinese Three-Character Classic  
‘…we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too 
obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other 
original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and 
humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. 
The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not 
altogether without it’. 
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments   
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have attempted to unravel the infusion of diverse forms of 
oppression and violence that have inflicted great pain on the displacees and forced 
them bitterly to give up their homes and communities. Either through cunningly 
discreet and well hidden tactics of staged theft or environment hazards, or by virtue 
of naked intimidation, mental torture, barbarian eviction or abusive detainment in its 
purest form, the bulldozer regime spared no effort in acquiring absolute domination 
of time and space on the Expos site, which repeatedly undermined legal justice and 
challenged the common sense morality. If the Confucius doctrine or Adam Smith is 
correct about human condition, it would be much easier to blame those chaiqian 
agents as sociopaths, or at least pathologically aggressive, taking pleasures from 
causing or watching other people’s suffering. However, as the case of the staged theft 
shows, it is untenable to jump to such conclusions. The pertinent yet perplexing 
question to ask is how were those uncompassionate, cruel and apparently illegal acts 
committed by cognitively and morally competent social actors possibly conceived, 
legitimatised and naturalised in a civilised society? The complex causal chains of the 
displacees’ sufferings are the focus of this chapter.  
By addressing this question, this chapter will not shy away from assigning blame and 
responsibilities. However, I should lay bare upfront my ‘disloyalty’ to the displacees’ 
grievances and my discontent with the legalistic discourses and practices. In breaking 
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with the displacees, I have Nancy Fraser’s (1989) suggestion in mind, which cautions 
me to keep a vigilant eye to the aims and the interests of the displacees with whom I 
identify with. To many displacees, defining the state as a criminal is theoretically 
difficult1 (Green and Ward, 2004) and limited in practical value. Even if they hold 
grievances against the state, it is those corrupted and transgressing chaiqian agents , 
‘keys to a dimension of citizenship’(Lipsky, 1980: 4), that must be held accountable 
for their suffering. This is not a new discursive strategy. For them, displacement is 
concrete and real in the sense that it is caused and executed by real people rather than 
mythical corporate bodies or impersonal bureaucracies (Blomley, 2004: 98), or as an 
‘end product of a large and abstract process’ (Piven and Cloward, 1977: 20). I have 
no doubt on this point. However, in narrowing to such individualistic charges, I 
believe it runs the risk of entrapping and subordinating to the legal game (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1991); and of misrecognising the magnitude and the social causes of the 
injustices the displacees endured. I consider it crucial at this juncture not to ‘relay’ 
the stories of the displacees as substantially as I did in the previous chapter but to 
speak of their consciousness more closely under the theoretical gaze in order to 
examine the social nature of their suffering critically (Spivak, 1988).  
My disagreement with the legalistic practices lies firstly in the sanitisation of the 
legal vocabularies that narrowly focus on the observable, nameable and quantifiable 
bodily damages (Das, 1995); secondly in the separation of persona from person 
(Emmet, 1967) and thirdly in the obsession in proving intentionality and causality 
(Arendt, 1994, 2003), before arriving at a ‘rational’ and ‘safe’ judgement and decide 
the form and extent of punishment appropriate to the atrocity. This line of reasoning, 
following Bourdieu (1991), is restrictive and insulting, exercising a new round of 
symbolic violence. If not excluding the possibility of lodging a petition completely, it 
would easily lead either to a doomed failure due to the difficulty to prove causality, 
or slip into a situationist argument blaming the authoritarian situations or 
bureaucratic rationality that suppressed or displaced the moral agency of the social 
agents. However, based on the evidence I gathered, many chaiqian agents showed 
great inclination to Machiavellian power games, deceptions, corruptions, cruelty, 
violence and other law-violating actions to get their jobs done. In many cases, they 
proved considerable initiative and creativity in exercising their discretionary power 
to force the displacees out of their homes, with meticulous calculation of the 
consequences of their actions. Those reflective actions under such asymmetrical 
power relations during the displacement cast reasonable doubts on their mores and 
                                                            
1 Under the Sovereignty-state model, it remains quite challenging to define the state as a criminal.  
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conscience. Therefore, I will not reduce to the argument claiming that evil is bred in 
the absence of choice and agency (Milgram, 1974, Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).  
In the argument developed below, I see those chaiqian agents not as cogs in the 
assemblage of the bulldozer regime, but as Bourdieusian (1990b) reflexive agents 
with various beliefs, values, mentalities, knowledge and interests that socialised and 
contributed to the structuring of the Expo-induced domicide culture, one of whose 
defining features is exceptionality. By exceptionality, I use it in a much broader way 
that refers not only to the failures of protecting the rights of the displacees as in the 
concept of ‘state of exception’(Agamben, 2005, Ong, 2006, Gregory, 2006), but also 
to the exceptional fast-track policy practices (Swyngedouw, 1996, Baptista, 2013), 
within or beyond the established regulatory frameworks. Although originated from 
discursive glorification of the Expo, the exceptionality of the Expo, is constantly 
activated, laboured and legitimatised through societal efforts, leading to the 
devaluation and dehumanisation of the people on the Expo site. It is this 
exceptionality and moral corruption, facilitated by the floating responsibility and 
structural incentives within the bulldozer regime that encouraged the chaiqian agents 
to take initiative in flexibly assembled bulldozer machinery, which caused the 
naturalisation of massive suffering of the displacees.  
Voices of Hope: Lies and Rationality  
I begin by examining the discursive practices that rationalises and legitimatises the 
Expo. Shin (2012) argues that the Shanghai Expo, together with the Beijing Olympic 
Games and the Guangzhou Asian games, was staged by the Chinese ruling elites to 
facilitate capital accumulation and to entertain their aspiration for building a unified 
nation. Whilst he sensitizes us to the instrumental value of the mega-events during 
their preparation, I wish to push backwards the temporal focus and chart out the way 
the Expo was legitimatised over the course of its production, from the 
conceptualisation of hosting an Expo, to actively bidding and preparing for it. This 
extended temporal focus and reversed analytical angle shall address an under-
explored issue: the inherently contested nature of mega-events and their weak 
legitimacy (Hiller, 2000, Gotham, 2011). This is particularly pertinent to the Expo 
because it displaced not only a large number of local residents but also a few 
powerful ‘socialist land maters’ (state/military-owned enterprises) (Hsing, 2010a:34), 
who are not simply beyond the control of the Shanghai government but in rigorous 
competition against it for territorial power. It will also reveal a much more complex 
picture of power and rationality behind the bidding and hosting of the Expo. My 
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analysis shall show that the Expo, as one of those spatial fixes, was a product of 
processes unfolded with diverse, contingent and practical logics, manipulated by the 
ruling elites to accommodate the power dynamics within the global event industry 
and rapidly changing global and local conditions. The Expo was constantly 
rationalised, legitimatised and glorified in realpolitik at different stages through 
different normative discourses, to neutralise the resisting movements, especially from 
the people whose home were destroyed by it2.  
In the lifespan of the Expo, the growth machine drew upon an array of discourses to 
construct the Expo as a project of national significance. Voices of hope, filled with 
sentiments of urgency and unrealistic imagination of the benefits of the Expo were 
predominant in the bidding stage. ‘Voices of decline’  as in Beauregard’s (2003) 
term, were systematically manufactured and activated by the politicians and the 
planners at a later stage to justify the changes of the site choice. I categorise those 
normative discourses into higher order ones such as nationalism/patriotism, 
modernisation and developmentalism, and lower order ones of urbanisation, 
distributive justice, new urbanism and sustainability, to build up societal dedication 
to the Expo.3 It must be noted that these discourses are not mutually exclusive. 
Neither does the higher/lower distinction correspond to the spatial scales. The 
difference lies in the values they appeal to and the normative power they have. Those 
lower ones frequently, through partial identification with higher ones, derive 
legitimacy from higher ones. Similarly, higher ones also constantly adapt their 
narratives to accommodate the changes in lower ones. I maintain that it were those 
higher ones that were decisive, not only in legitimatising the means of eviction but 
also in paralysing the political agencies of the displacees. Since my primary interest 
lies in the implication of those discourses to the displacees, I will narrow my 
temporal focus to the discursive construction of the Expo before the displacement.  
But let me first introduce the political context when the Expo was brought to the 
political agenda. The initial conceptualisation of the Expo was the convergence 
between China’s modernisation project in post-Mao’s era and the imperialist mission 
of the Expo as a global cultural institution to advocate a European-centric notion of 
progress, modernity and world order (Roche, 2000). The embryo of the Expo came 
into shape at a time when Maoist ideology and China’s modern history suffered a 
selective and instrumental negation, in which progress is no longer defined by class 
                                                            
2 Flyvbjerg(1998) made a similar argument along this line.  
3 I am inspired by David Harvey’s analysis of the discourses surrounding the construction of highways 
in Baltimore. See Harvey (1992).  
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struggles nor egalitarianism but by the hard measurable facts (Vogel, 2011, Kluver, 
1996). The initial idea of hosting an Expo in the 1980s was nurtured precisely by the 
revised perspectives of history. Dynon (2011) is right in that the Expo was less to 
brand Shanghai as a normative model for Chinese cities than for branding the party 
for its continuous domination in the Chinese society. However, we cannot understate 
the changing geopolitics in the 1970s and the non-material forms of globalisation 
(Olds, 2001). Wang Daohan, the first mayor of Shanghai in the reform era, 
developed his interest in hosting an Expo from his impression of the Osaka Expo and 
his conversation with Japanese Expo producer, Taichi Sakaiya, who was dedicated to 
co-organise an Expo on China’s soil. Of great interest to Wang were the hard facts of 
development brought by the Expo to Japan’s economy: annual GDP growth at 11.6 
per cent, 0.15 billion USD profits from tourist revenues, iconic architectures, 
infrastructural legacies, and FDI investment from high technology companies (Wu 
and Shi, 2009). However, constrained by the substantially inadequate physical 
infrastructural base of Shanghai, discouraged by national strategic focus on Southern 
China, compounded by economic crises and the student movement in the 1980s, and 
frustrated by the withdraw of financial commitment from the Japanese government, 
Shanghai gave up this plan. But the historical detour firmly established Shanghai’s 
position in possible intra-regional competition for hosting an Expo and bolstered an 
entrepreneurial way of thinking about urban space (Chen, 2010).  
When the idea of hosting an Expo was brought to the table again in the early 1990s 
and translated into a formal bid at the turn of the new century, the practice of 
entrepreneurial urbanism had been established as a new orthodoxy for urban 
governance in Shanghai (Wu, 2003a, 2003b), and enthusiastically pursued by 
Wang’s successors, the Shanghai Gangs (Jiang Zemin, Huangju and Chen Liangyu) 
and the economic tsar, Zhu Rongji. By that time, neoliberal urbanism had made its 
mark on Shanghai’s urban landscape (Olds, 1997, Chen, 2007, He, 2007, He and Wu, 
2005, 2007, Qin, 2013). In this process, Chinese intelligentsia also underwent rapid 
stratification, with a group of them firmly identified with the state-market-intellectual 
complex (Wang, 2009). They are the suppliers of intellectual resources for 
ideological control to contain social grievances and to neutralise critiques and 
resisting actions. In doing this, they produced, endorsed and legitimatised a plethora 
of discourses including (sub)urbanisation, distributive justice, new urbanism, 
historical preservation, and sustainability. Those discursive resources were already at 
their disposal to rationalise Shanghai’s bid. On this regard, let me summarise a few 
salient ones based on a collection of 33 newspaper articles from the mouthpieces of 
the party (Jiefang Daily, Wenhui News, Renmin Daily and Guangming Daily) and 
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the impact assessment section of Shanghai’s bidding report (2002) before Shanghai 
secured the bid.4  
(1) Economic growth5: The Expo would boost Shanghai’s economic 
development, especially the infrastructure and property market. A figure is 
indicative here, ‘the land value surrounding the Expo site would be increased 
by 300%’.6  
(2) Human qualities: the Expo would be a ‘civilizing’ process to improve the 
quality (suzhi) of Shanghai citizens and the Chinese in general.7 But more 
specifically, it would ‘rationalise’ and ‘optimise’ the quality and structure of 
the people near the Expo site given the overall planning of the Expo site.8   
(3) Ecological sustainability: the relocation of industrial plants and factories and 
subsequent greening efforts would transform the toxic environment and 
improve urban biological diversity.9    
(4) Aesthetical landscape: the industrial landscape and the disordered living 
space were out of place in a globalising Shanghai.10 Iconic exhibition halls 
and renovated industrial plants would become Shanghai’s new landmarks for 
leisure consumption.11   
(5) Distributive justice: the siting choice of the Expo in one of the shanty town 
areas and the offering of resettlement housing in planned communities in the 
suburbs to those displaced residents who were incapable of improving their 
living conditions on their own would improve their quality of life.12  
To critique textual knowledge, it seems crucial to deconstruct the texts and analyse 
the reasoning behind them. My short summary here does not do any justice to those 
                                                            
4 The temporal distinction between discourses during the bidding stage and the preparation stage is 
important because they were delivering different political outcomes. This point can be made clearer 
through the notion of public transcript. In the bidding stage, those discourses were to rationalise the 
imagination of the Expo and justify the decision to bid for it. It was an announcement of their public 
transcript, something they wish to deliver. In the preparation stage, they had to grow into the mask in 
order not to undermine their own project. Those discourses had to construct a coherent narrative that 
not only reaffirms the legitimacy of the decision to bid for the Expo but also rationalises the gap 
between reality and imagination of the Expo, even if some of those discourses followed the same line 
of reasoning and furnished similar vocabularies as those in the bidding stage.  
5 Apart from the arguments for economic boosterism and human capital, the rest of the arguments 
were drastically shifted when the choices of the Expo site was changed from the suburbs to the city 
centre, with the influence from international planning expertise and BIE. See Chen (2010). 
6 Shanghai Expo Bidding Report (2002), Vol. 2, p. 212.  
7 Renmin Daily, 27/02/2012. 
8 Shanghai Expo Bidding Report (2002), Vol. 2, p. 212. 
9 Zheng Shiling, fellow of Chinese Academy of Science, Wenhui News, 11/11/2002.  
10 Wenhui News, 16/03/2002. 
11 Shanghai Expo Bidding Report (2002), Vol. 2, p. 212.  
12 Ibid.  
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well-articulated lower order discourses, testified by political elites and hundreds of 
academics, based on their meticulous studies of previous expos in advanced 
economies, sophisticated ‘scientific’ modelling and calculation, and consultation 
with international expertise. I gave up my interest in this direction after a telephone 
interview with the leading investigator in charge of the ex-ante environment impact 
study for the Expo,13 which convinced me that further effort is not worthwhile. How 
such texts were produced seems analytically more interesting and valuable than the 
linguistic dimension of those discourses. Realpolitik, dominated by the ruling elites, 
prevailed in the production of such knowledge, or lies to be precise.   
Fieldwork Entry, 31/05/2012 
 
I read the bidding report today. The figure of popular support in the environment impact 
assessment section was quite surprising. According to the report, 90 per cent of the 
displacees supported the Expo-induced displacement. But my interviews with the displacees 
so far seem to suggest the opposite. Is it part of the politics of memory? Is it because the life 
after displacement was not as they were promised? Should I use the same questionnaire? I 
called the leading investigator in charge of the environmental impact assessment after quite 
some efforts to locate her. Again, so difficult to speak to those insiders. I asked her if it is 
possible for her to share the original questionnaire and full survey report so I can use as a 
base line. However, she told me that they did not actually conduct a survey and the figure for 
popular support was their estimation based on similar scale of infrastructure development in 
Shanghai in the 1990s. I was surprised as the report states that her institute conducted a 
survey with the displacees. She laughed on the other side of the phone, and told me that in 
their report to the government for drafting the bidding report, they ‘explicitly emphasized the 
fact that we did not have enough time to carry out the survey with those people who would 
be displaced’. I told her that the report did not warn the readers and misrepresented the 
studies. She agreed and told me the context in producing this report, ‘time was too short back 
then. We were only given ten days to finish this environmental impact assessment. We did 
not have time’.   
 
My initial response to her comment was shock and anger. Political decision-making 
was replaced by callous lies as if those on the receiving end of political decisions 
should take whatever comes along their way. Chen (2012a: 292) was convinced that 
the CPC can no longer rely on lies to rule but my finding shows that the deception 
never loses purchase power in political undertakings. Lies, as Hannah Arendt (1972: 
4) once wrote, ‘have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings’.  
From Sun Tzu to Machiavelli, political lies are widely advised as a favoured tactic to 
secure power. My initial interpretation of such scandalous deception by the Shanghai 
government was framed through this line, using James Scott’s (1990) conceptual lens 
                                                            
13 It also briefly assessed the social impacts of the Expo.  
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of ‘public transcript’ and seeing it as another product of the elites to maintain a 
respectful facade. The benefit of hindsight in writing leads me to question my 
indifference to the audience consuming those arguments. The prematurity of my 
thought lies in that the deception at the bidding stage was not primarily aimed at 
Shanghai citizens or any layperson, although they might have justified the bid and 
mobilised public support, they were first and foremost produced to entertain the 
BIE’s rational vision of modernity and progress in order to win the bid. As Arendt 
(1972: 6) trenchantly points out, ‘[a] liar has the great advantage of knowing 
beforehand what the audience wishes or expects to hear’. The Expo regime, well 
informed by Expo producers from Germany, Canada and Japan, knew astutely that 
they had to deliver some reasonable, rational and well-articulated arguments for an 
‘impartial’, ‘objective’, and ‘disinterested’ 14 vote for Shanghai from Shanghai’s 
allies whose ‘friendship’ was secured through several rounds of lobbying before the 
vote on December 3 2002, even when it entailed vote-for-money or vote-for-
political-concessions15 ransom from the BIE member states (Chen, 2010). The 
truthfulness of  the calculation or reasoning was less important than masterful 
political manoeuvre of geopolitics in bidding for mega-events (Lenskyj, 2000), or 
than successful marketing campaigns relying on evocative images, sounds and 
words16 to sell the city (Horne, 2007). My point is not to suggest that rationality lost 
purchase to emotionality, rendering the Expo an irrational business. Quite the 
contrary, the Expo business adheres faithfully to rationality of power. This point is 
nicely put by Flyvbjerg (1998: 228), ‘the freedom to interpret and use “rationality” 
and “rationalisation” for the purpose of power is a crucial element in enabling power 
to define reality and hence, an essential feature of the rationality of power’.  
To sell the Expo to the Chinese citizens, legitimatising efforts were penetrated by 
nationalist sentiments. Shanghai’s bidding decision was put forward at a time when 
nationalist sentiments were paramount in China. The rise of nationalist sentiments 
was a result of not only the boosted confidence from the booming economy but also 
the party’s rigorous efforts to manufacture legitimacy through nationalist discourse 
after the demise of popular faith in communist/socialist ideology (Saich, 2004, 
                                                            
14 Those are the professional codes for member states of BIE. See BIE (1972). 
15 The CEO of Carrefour initiated a French business elites club supporting Shanghai’s bid at a time 
when the Carrefour was stuck in a scandalous case in China for violating the foreign investment law 
yet maintained their ambitious plan of  a 16 billion USD investment in Shanghai to outcompete its 
competitors (Walmart). This is based on my own investigative work with evidence from various 
sources, which unfortunately had to be cut from this thesis.  
16 The marketing campaigns of the Expo regime were greatly appreciated as a major strength of 
Shanghai by the BIE investigators. Comments on this point in their conclusion were much more 
extensive than on any other aspects. See Chen (2010: 192).  
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Farquhar and Berry, 2004, Fewsmith, 2008), further reinforced by the ongoing 
bidding campaigns for the summer Olympics, and fuelled by a series of geopolitical 
events—the resumption of the Sovereignty control of Hong Kong and Macau, the 
bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by United States troops, the successful 
hosting of the APEC conference in Shanghai, and the accession to WTO. The world 
Expo, as an imperialist cultural institution whose invention was imbued with 
nationalist ideology (Roche, 2000), offered another site for the articulation of state 
censored nationalist sentiments to consolidate the legitimacy of the CPC. In return, 
those nationalist sentiments rationalised and legitimatised Shanghai’s bid for the 
Expo.  
The overwhelming normative power of nationalist discourses do not simply come 
from constructing an imagined community, but most importantly from unifying 
different social groups and cementing the Chinese society for the anti-imperialist 
revolutions and modernisation undertakings for more than a century (Zhao, 2000). 
The articulation of nationalist discourses is embedded in China’s modern historical 
narrative of ‘the century of humiliation’ (Gries, 2004: 43), dating back to Qing’s 
court’s defeat in the Opium War (1840-1842) and subsequent opening-up of 
Shanghai, among four other cities, for international trade under the humiliating 
Nanjing Treaty. This defeat was an insulting moment that unsettled the China-centric 
world view of the Chinese people and propelled the political elites, intellectuals and 
the mass to explore the pathways of modernisation and to restore China’s wealth and 
power (Schell and Delury, 2013). Irrespective of political differences on the roads to 
modern, powerful China, as Zhao (1998: 290) commented, nationalism ‘engulfed all 
that stood in its path’ and ‘permeated them all’, with a common objective, to shake 
off the humiliating and backward past and restore China’s glory. The CPC dwells on 
this nationalist dream as well. Despite the fact that the Party now breaks all moral 
contracts with the masses, the yearning for modernisation remains a powerful tool to 
maintain its political legitimacy.  
The temporal proximity between China’s humiliating century and the invention of 
the World Expo, and Shanghai’s significant position in this history, offered the elites 
ample room to unearth historical evidence to construct a coherent historical narrative 
of China’s engagement with the Expo. For Wu Jianmin (2009), former Chinese 
Ambassador and a liaison for Shanghai’s bid, China’s participation in the Expo is a 
summary of China’s century of humiliation. Although Chinese pavilions and 
exhibitions won a few medals from previous Expo organisers, the display of ancient 
relics, in stark contrast to advanced technologies in the West, only highlighted the 
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‘backwardness’ of the nation. Adding to this injury was the insulting Orientalist 
representation of the barbarian China by the colonisers through the display of 
embroidered shoes (symbol of patriarchal domination of female body), instruments 
of torture, and models of Chinese people addicted to opium, gambling and violence.  
In addition to China’s encounters with the Expo, political fictions with sketchy 
fantasies of hosting an Expo from more than a century ago also provided cultural 
resources for authoring China’s association with the Expo, and emphasising the 
meaning of the Expo to the Chinese. In The Future of New China (Liang, 
2010[1902]), The New China (Lu, 2010 [1910]) and The New Dream of the Red 
Chambers (Wu, 2010[1905]), all three authors unanimously situated the Expo in 
Shanghai and saw the Expo as a symbol of the revival of the Chinese nation. Liang 
Qichao (2010[1902]), one of the most prominent political activists in republican 
China, in his imagination of new China dreamt of the Expo as an occasion when the 
British Kings and Queens, the statesmen from Russia and Hungary, and the leaders 
from other imperialist nations would all pay tribute to China, while Shanghai as the 
host city would be a site for disseminating Chinese wisdom. What his utopia entailed 
is not an aggressive imperialist vision of China’s future but the intense sentiments of 
an injured national identity and the yearning for national honour. This point is 
echoed by Lu Shie (2010 [1910]) in whose novel the Expo was more than a 
showcase of China’s power, of greater importance were the disappearance of 
colonial governance in Shanghai, and the polite White foreigners who were no longer 
‘pushing their way by shoving around the Chinese civilians’ but eagerly studying 
Chinese culture in Shanghai. In all three novels, the Expo is constructed as a 
spectacle with a simple message that was well summarised by Wu 
Yanren(2010[1905]: 283), ‘China eventually has this moment! (Zhongguo ye you 
jintian!)’.  
It is not far-fetched to suggest that Shanghai’s hosting of the Expo, to those authors 
and many nationalists, is a symbol of China standing up psychologically, of equal 
importance to Mao’s proud claim of China’s political independence in Tiananmen in 
1949. The symbolic value of the Expo, to avenge the humiliation and to recover 
mianzi,17 transcends the possible and actual economic opportunities. It is no surprise 
that the Chinese national leaders promised a ‘most successful, most wonderful, most 
memorable Expo’ through full-scale institutional support (diplomatic, financial, 
regulatory, etc.) for Shanghai to the Expo community during the bidding process. 
                                                            
17 Mianzi is the social aspect of face in Chinese culture, referring to one’s moral standing in a society, 
as compared to lian, which usually refers to one’s moral decency. See Zhai (2011) and Gries (2004).  
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Born in this political context, Shanghai’s bid for the Expo was represented as a 
project of nation-building, or more accurately, as a showcase testifying the party’s 
achievement of modernising the nation, particularly, the correctness of Deng’s 
architecture of socialist market economy. Repeatedly emphasised was the symbolic 
meaning of China as a developing country in fighting in a game exclusive to 
powerful nations in advanced economies. China’s entry to this game is convincing 
evidence of the party’s accomplishment in materialising the nation’s century-long 
dream. In a front-page news article entitled, ‘Yearnings from billions of Chinese’, the 
paper quoted the speech from Shanghai’s leadership,  
Hosting the Expo is an important indicator of national power. After two 
decade’s reform, the national power has been improved. Bidding for an Expo 
is a symbol of our improved international status and national power. It will 
provoke patriotic enthusiasm of billions of Chinese and push forward the 
historical progress of the revitalisation of the Chinese nation (Wenhui News, 
11/03/2002).  
Due to the priority of political lobbying at the bidding stage, a full scale 
legitimatisation of the event to domestic audience only became a major political 
agenda after Shanghai secured the bid at the end of 2002. The urgency of political 
legitimatisation at this stage lies in that the choices of alternative development 
strategies have been effectively eliminated after the success in bidding. As the ‘sweet 
lemons’ discussed by John Elster (1983) informs us, the city’s as well as the nation’s 
priority for the coming decade now must be dedicated to the event in order to grow 
into the mask the elites presented to the international community and the Chinese 
audience, even though the Expo tasted much sourer than it expected, and even 
though there were more urgent political agendas. The preparation of this event 
became an exception to routine political governance. In response to my question 
regarding regional or intra-agency conflicts, the director from the municipal planning 
bureau laughed at my way of thinking, and told me that,  
We had this slogan back then: “All available resources must be poured to this 
event”. Hence, there was no conflict at all. This was the instruction from the 
leaders from central government. Resources, not only from Shanghai but 
from every corner of the country, were mobilised to prioritise Expo-related 
projects. Several subway lines in the city were given priority to accommodate 
the needs of 70 million visitors to the Expo site (25/07/2012).  
To further legitimatise the event and exceptional measures in the coming years, in 
early 2003, the municipal government organised another round of city-wide debates 
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within the whole state apparatus on the meaning of the Expo to Shanghai,18 with the 
input of scientific discourses similar to those in bidding stage but were furnished 
with meticulous detail, endorsed and dominated by a group of leading urban 
economists, sociologists and political scientists in Shanghai. Sentimental discourses 
appealing to passion sidestepped to the background but were never muted, whereas 
discourses appealing to science and reason took control again to rationalise the Expo 
project. In the final report from this debate (2002), unanimously, those authors took 
the greatness of the Shanghai Expo as a given, all they did was to find or 
manufacture19 facts that fit in this narrative through selective use of positive figures 
and sophisticated modelling, and to justify the incompatible facts through their 
scenario-based proposals.  
Through such discursive exercise, the state-led Expo regime avoided the deliberation 
of the necessity and legitimacy of the Expo, which is rather contentious when a large 
segment of the society has been marginalised by the reform in the 1990s. By 
projecting the consequences of hosting an expo, imbued with the power of scientific 
and nationalist discourses, the regime mobilised popular support for hosting the 
event. If scientific discourses were easier to resist, the nationalist discourses make 
critiques politically risky. This must be attributed to the mystification of the CPC as 
the embodiment of the nation, the only saviour and the guardian to the century-long 
quest for wealth and power (Zhao, 1998) in the state-controlled nationalist discourse. 
Articulated through the vocabulary of aiguozhuyi (patriotism), the nationalist 
discourse authored by the party’s historians in post-Tiananmen era made it difficult 
to attack the party-state without being accused of being unpatriotic.  
For the displacees, such discursive construction created formidable challenges to 
lodge their complaints or to organise effective protests. The displacees were not only 
effectively excluded from the legitimate scientific language to speak about the Expo, 
but were also deprived of the political opportunity by the nationalistic discourses. 
The defining feature of the state-led nationalism, as Charles Tilly (1994: 133) points 
                                                            
18 The mouthpiece of the party Jiefang Daily and Wenhui News published a series of editorial 
commentaries on this debate. See Jiefang Daily, 13/03/2003, 17/03/2003, 18/03/2003, 19/03/2003, 
and Wenhui News, 20/03/2003, 01/04/2003, 04/04/2003, 27/04/2003, 11/04/2003, 15/04/2003.  
19 For instance, in one report on the impacts of the Expo on quality of life, a Tongji University based 
research team led by Zhu Dajian (2002), a key policy consultant to Shanghai Municipal Government 
and keen promoter of creative city in Shanghai, predicted the Expo would contribute to Shanghai’s 
annual GDP growth at an average rate of 2 per cent, as compared to the scenario of not hosting the  
Expo. In their calculations, population growth, currency rate (Chinese RMB to USD), and annual 
growth of fixed asset investment were controlled at current growth rate, and predictions of tourist 
revenues and inward investments were held as independent of political and economic contexts. Those 
assumptions have already limited the predicting power of their models but authors still boldly claim 
their predictions as convincing evidence of the importance of the Expo to Shanghai’s economy.   
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out, is the moral appeal mandating that ‘citizens identify themselves with that nation 
and subordinate other interests to those of the state’. As a result, political openings 
from tensions and contradictions between a sympathetic central government and a 
predatory local authority (see O'Brien and Li, 2006, Cai, 2010), if not closed 
completely, were left with tiny fissures. In defending their right to stay, they would 
be under the moral pressure of acting against the interest of the national state, 
meaning the possibility of losing sympathy from the rest of society. Moreover, the 
memory of their personal violent encounters with the party-state and witness of 
political violence against the students in 1989 powerfully warned them what the 
authoritarian regime is capable of in confrontational situations. As a result, 
consciously remembered and eternalised fear about the state was conjured up to 
censor the political subjectivity and paralyse the political agency of the displacees. 
This is a persistent theme in the responses of political inactions from the displacees. 
The following testimony from a man whose grandfather was classified as a capitalist 
in the 1950s and family property was confiscated during the Cultural Revolution, is 
representative.  
The Communist Party is good at putting big hats on people (dai maozi, arbitrary 
classifying woes and friends). If you do not move, they will give you a big hat, 
accusing you of ruining the national image and jeopardising the Expo project. Do 
you think an ordinary citizen like me can bear such accusation? No one dares. You 
do not want to go in that direction. Fighting against the national state (gen guojia 
dou), do you want to live or not? (Interview,  D81, 31/03/2012).  
Devaluation and Dehumanisation of the Displacees 
By appealing to both reason and passion, the discursive practices effectively 
legitimatised the exceptional import of the Expo. At best, such ideological 
legitimatisation can only extend to the preparation of the Expo as a disruptive 
emergent political situation or an abnormal state of urban governance, requiring ad 
hoc measures and additional resources for successful delivery of a best ever Expo to 
the international community. This structural condition may encourage the ‘moral 
inversion’ (Adams and Balfour, 1998: 4) in the event of displacement, under which 
condition the problematic of the displacement were split and excluded, or even worse, 
redefined as a good thing that not only necessitates the greater good but also in the 
best interests of the displacees. But, it is contentious to make a logical jump from this 
point to the conjecture that this condition directly led to the transgression of social 
norms and legal boundaries and permitted the violent, in symbolic or physical form, 
treatment of the displacees, although the causality cannot be denied here. After all, 
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from persuasion to force, the bulldozer regime had a wide range of political options 
to arrive at the goal of removing people from the Expo site. They could have chosen 
a much more humane and compassionate way to relocate the displacees from the 
Expo site. But instead, in addition to exploiting the displacees’ traumatic memory of 
encounters with state power, they consciously chose the most vicious ones from their 
arsenal: deception, intimidation, abuse and violence.   
What truly ‘emancipated’ the minds of the chaiqian agents and made those 
horrendous actions permissible and eventually routinized as a normal practice during 
chaiqian must also be registered in the discursive construction of the displacees as 
expendable and undesirable biological beings, members of the polity but were 
excluded from legal protection. This is a collective enterprise of the urban planners 
and legislators, embedded in their view of modernity in post-Mao’s China but 
boosted by the exceptionality of the Expo and condoned by the Expo community. 
Such demeaning view of the displacees manufactured a psychological and social 
distance between the agents of the bulldozer regime and the displacees, allowing the 
former to relax their moral guard and eschew their political responsibility to the latter 
as equal fellow citizens. As Bauman (1989: 184) argues in his dissection of the 
causes of that Holocaust, ‘Responsibility is silenced once proximity is eroded; it may 
eventually be replaced with resentment once the fellow human subject is transformed 
into an Other’. Although racist resentment of the Other is absent from the Expo 
induced domicide, the legal and policy practices followed the same logic and 
successfully accomplished the same outcome: the redefinition of moral and legal 
boundaries, and the immunity of the chaiqian agents from transgressing established 
regulatory frameworks, both justified by the exceptional situation of the Expo. 
Inarguably, the judicial and political culture of China offers a most fertile soil to 
nurture such pathological mentality and aggressive actions. However, by limiting our 
critique to structural ills in Chinese society, I am afraid it will let go a most important 
source of oppression, thereby giving away the possibility to transcend the peculiarity 
of Shanghai Expo. The suffering of the displacees in Shanghai must be attributed to 
the politically unaccountable BIE—puppet of politicians and global corporate 
elites—a keen promoter of neoliberal urbanism and violator of human rights. Their 
corrupted organisational ethics and the bureaucratic rationality turned those events 
into a major contributor of political violence in our time.   
The Expo, as ‘an arm of state foreign policy and diplomacy’ (Roche, 2000: 53) in a 
cultural guise, is merely another site for geopolitical games in contemporary world. 
This game is exclusively played by the politicians, in coddling with the global 
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business elites. Their right to vote is frequently used as a piece of symbolic capital to 
leverage for greater economic and political exchanges from the bidding countries, in 
the forms of  bribery, gifts, ‘investment’, bail-out of business investment; all 
accepted norms justified through moral relativism in the bidding process (see Chen, 
2010). As such, the Expo is only a chess piece in a bigger political game, with trivial 
use value in itself for the voting states. Their involvement in the production of the 
Expo is only to conceal the political dealings behind the scenes where their real 
interest rests. On this point, BIE is not shameful to admit. In their official guide for 
organising an Expo (Bureau International des Expositions, N.A.), they explicitly 
stated that the voting decision is influenced by ‘international relations between the 
candidate country and the voting BIE member state’ in addition to feasibility and 
viability, and the proposed theme of the proposed Expo, with no room for human 
rights protection. But, this is not the real problem. The greater concern for me is 
BIE’s apathetic view of human rights protection as a worthless value to pursue, 
irrelevant to their imperialist organisational agenda(Chen, 2010)20. However, this is 
understandable. When the anonymous voting system effectively diffused their 
responsibility, ensuring no voter could be traced back to take the blame for awarding 
the global event to a shameful record of human rights violations, there is no need to 
shoulder such responsibility and take it seriously. Extending C. Wright Mills’ (1956: 
344) critique on the moral bankruptcy of the powerful elites in America to those BIE 
voters, ‘as an individual, they are morally defenceless. But as a group, they are 
politically indifferent’.   
If indifference is enough to question their mores, their insensitivity, or perversion to 
be more accurate, is more than sufficient to testify to their sins. According to the 
memoir of Chen Zhixing (2010: 197) (deputy director of Shanghai Expo Bidding 
committee), the voters in reviewing Shanghai’s candidacy for the Expo considered 
the residents on the Expo site not as humans with housing rights and human rights to 
be protected but as threats whose resistance would put the implementation of the 
Expo in difficulty. It was the Dutch Ambassador in the end who vindicated the 
credibility of the Chinese government in terms of the financial capacity of 
resettlement, based on his observation from working as a diplomat in Beijing (Chen, 
2010). What concerns me here is not the ambassador’s selective use of evidence or 
his bourgeoisie perspective, but the capacity of him as well as those voters inside the 
Expo community to make a decision affecting people, to whom they do not have to 
be accountable. Their presence at the BIE assembly is entrusted by their sovereign 
                                                            
20 According to Chen’s recollection, the executive committee of BIE repeatedly excluded discussion 
on human rights as an organisational objective to pursue and a criteria for the Expo bid evaluation.   
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states foremost to serve the interest of their own nations. It is unrealistic to expect 
them to give up their national interest in exchange for the well-beings of people in 
another country in this zero-sum game. Even if it is their intention to defend human 
rights, the temporal distance between their decision and the political consequences, 
blinded by their trust of ‘responsible’ Chinese colleagues, can easily paralyse their 
sociological imagination, entertaining their impulse for denial.  
One group of those ‘responsible’ colleagues I am putting on the defendant seat are 
the planners. Robert Goodman (1971), a practising radical planner, bemoaned that 
the conformity of the planners to the repressive social structure and the dominant 
ideologies had created an ever more repressive social structure, making the life of the 
poor even more miserable. Quite conservatively, he conceded that the plans might 
have been conceived with good intentions and some consequences were unintended. 
However, he insisted that this is inadequate to exonerate the responsibility of the 
planners because ‘any individual ought to be responsible for his [sic] acts and 
participating in immoral acts is simply immoral’ (p. 96). Whilst I agree that planners 
are inexcusable for becoming the dupes and accomplices of the repressive regime, I 
am less convinced by his concession to the platitudes of side effects or unforeseeable 
consequences. This line of argument is indefensible when direct displacement is part 
of the plans. Annihilating people’s homes is always a conscious, calculative and 
strategic decision. Like any spatial practices, it is bounded with moral reasoning 
(Smith, 2000). It requires the planners to deliberate morally on not only the 
utilisation of people’s spaces but also on the treatment of the current users as fellow 
citizens in a polity. Whilst the planners might appeal to technical language to justify 
their decision on spatial designs, they are bounded on the latter issue by the universal 
‘golden rule’ of human existence that ‘treating others as you want to be treated 
yourself’ (Smith, 2000: 48). Therefore, to examine the benignity of the planners’ 
hearts, we need to place how they treated those people directly affected by their plans 
at the centre of our inquiry. 
Let me first introduce the context of the siting decision before I examine the 
conscience of the urban planners in Shanghai. The siting choice of the Expo was an 
arranged marriage of Chinese politicians and the BIE technocrats matched by 
international planning expertise. It differs from the state-led production of 
transnational urbanism in contemporary Shanghai (Olds, 1997, Ren, 2011, Chen, 
2007) in that the power structure of the Expo community and the rule of the bidding 
game were decisive in shaping the agency of the entrepreneurial state. It is true that 
Chinese urban planners frequently bend their principles for political wills, but their 
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possession of professional knowledge allows them to occupy a privileged position in 
the bureaucratic field. On the one hand, they are the key producers of professional 
planning knowledge for political decision-making. On the other hand, they are the 
problem-fixers to rationalise and materialise the ambitions of politicians. The initial 
proposals of the three Expo sites in Shanghai’s suburbia respected the critical and 
professional inputs from the urban planners. Those choices were ‘rational’ decisions 
based on their algorithm in their land use model and maintained continuity with their 
planning rationality to modernise the city at minimum costs since the 1990s. 
Displacement was only a variable in this algorithm, and the displacees as human 
beings were reduced to a number, whose fate was dictated by a simple mathematical 
calculation. The inspiration to locate the Expo on Shanghai’s waterfront in the city 
centre came from a planning exercise for the Expo by a group of students from a 
Paris-based planning studio during their summer camp in Shanghai.21 One team of 
students dismissed the assigned locations by the Chinese planners and chose the 
waterfront to develop their planning. This bold choice was appreciated by the 
Chinese planners for their creativity; however, it was the popularity of this proposal 
within the BIE based in Paris, entertained by the Chinese politicians in the mentality 
to secure the bid at no costs, that forced the Chinese planners to reconsider their 
siting choices and evaluate the possibility to host an Expo on the waterfront. In less 
than four months, rationales for this new site choice were neatly reasoned by the 
Chinese planners and presented in the final bidding report. Similar to what Flyvberg 
(1998) noted in the Aalborg project, what we see here is that rationalisation is 
produced whenever powerful elites need one. In a bird’s eye view of the city, 
planning decisions that affect the lives of millions of people on the planned site was 
so casually and hastily switched from option A to option B in realpolitik as if people 
fell under those plans were packable and transportable things.   
The view of the displacees was no less humiliating in rationalistic discourses than in 
the realpolitik. Let me quote in full-length one rationale presented by the Shanghai 
Bidding committee to the BIE. Zheng Shiling (professor in planning and a member 
of Chinese Academy of Sciences) and his colleagues from Tongji University, a 
prestigious university in China for the architecture and planning departments, 
reviewed the report.    
Population density in the planning area for the Exposition will be reduced to 1/20 of 
the current level. Mobile population will increase. The residents in this area will 
become younger and better educated. More foreign residents will move in. All these 
                                                            
21 Sanlian Weekly, 2007, vol. 12. 
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changes will be in line with the population plan and policy of Shanghai to optimize 
the population structure and improve the population quality (Shanghai Expo Bidding 
Report, p. 212).  
In a more elaborate narrative, the research team on Expo planning headed by 
Professor Zheng and funded by the Shanghai municipal government further justified 
the choice of the site,  
Inner city is densely populated, resulting in environment degradation and hindering 
the rationalisation of urban land use structure. Population settlement in the suburbia 
on the other hand is too dispersed and city building investment did not generate 
adequate return. As a result, the countryside is weak to attract people, and more 
people are poured to the inner city….The Expo can contribute to the adjustment of 
urban structure, controlling the population scale in the inner city and exporting inner 
city population to the suburbia….According to the principle of population 
replacement, 400,000 highly qualified and entrepreneurial talents will be 
imported to the inner city; meanwhile, 1.5 million people will be exported to the 
suburbia, resettled along the metro lines from the city centre to the suburbia. 
Eventually, the number of people living in the inner city will be limited to 8 to 
8.5 million (my emphasis) (Tongji University Research Group for Expo 2010, 2006: 
73-74).  
The eventual choice of the Expo site adheres to the logic of ‘rent gap’ (Smith, 1987). 
The primary objective is to release for profit a large parcel of waterfront land in the 
city centre whose exchange value was depreciated by the industrial use and self-built 
housing. But, in rhetoric, the agenda is concealed under environmental sustainability 
(e.g. heavy pollution) and public health. The cause of the problem following this 
logic lies neither in under-investment nor uneven development but in people’s 
residential choice. In this line of reasoning, intervention must be found in effective 
control of the population flow and manipulating the space, similar to apartheid 
(Western, 1981, Hart, 1988), classifying the political subjects and disperse different 
categories of people to the right social space. This Chicago School view coincides 
with and reinforces the discourse of suzhi (loosely translated as human qualities or 
human capital) that originated from the social engineering of birth control in the 
post-Mao’s China but identified with nationalist teleology to rejuvenate the nation. 
Under Deng’s modernisation project, according to Yan (2003a) and Anagnost (2004), 
suzhi discourse has been activated as a value-coding mechanism to facilitate the 
rapid capital accumulation. One key discursive tactic is to devalue the bodies of the 
subaltern class (e.g. peasants, manual labour) and to legitimatise their inferiority to 
other groups in the social hierarchy, so that exploitation of their labour in the market 
can be mystified as improvement of their personal capacities in both quantity and 
quality, and naturalised as morally legitimate and just (Kipnis, 2007, Tomba, 2009). 
Organised Crime on Trial │ 185 
 
In most illiberal form, social inequalities are justified and perpetuated in political 
discourse in a most explicit way.  
 ‘Younger’, ‘better educated’, ‘foreigners’, ‘highly qualified’, and ‘entrepreneurial 
talents’, those are precisely the false categories to code, compare and order human 
bodies under the dictatorship of the logic of the market, echoing the agenda of the 
Expo to civilise the local citizens. But, different from the ‘civilising’ project in 
Glasgow as observed by Gray and Mooney (2011), disciplining the destitute is too-
consuming for Chinese planners. Their once-for-all quick fix, learning from their 
ruthless allies in reforming the SOEs sector (Solinger, 2009), is to map out the 
undesirables and to import the superior groups who are more conducive to the 
accumulation of capital. Cautiously worded, what both quotes above imply is that the 
predicament of the current users manifests their own low quality and unfitness for the 
jungle of the market. They are inferior to the group with higher quality who can 
generate more economic benefits, therefore they no longer deserve the location 
where they currently live and are obliged to give away their land for the other group. 
Otherwise, their continued existence on the Expo site was unhealthy for the growth 
of the economy. In this sense, the Expo was conceptualised with a sinister intention 
as a filter for a Darwinist society, contributing to the ladder of spatial citizenship. 
Dangerously, this view of space and society resembles Nazi’s vicious view of race 
and space to justify genocide. Richard Darré, the Nazi minister of Agriculture, 
laboured on the garden view of population policy that,  
he [sic] who leaves the plants in a garden to themselves will soon find to his surprise 
that the garden is overgrown by weeds and that even the basic character of the plants 
has changed. If therefore the garden is to remain the breeding ground for the plants, 
if, in other words, it is to lift itself above the harsh rule of natural forces, then the 
forming will of a gardener is necessary, a gardener who, by providing suitable 
conditions for growing, or by keeping harmful influences away, or by both together, 
carefully tends what needs tending, and ruthlessly eliminates the weeds which would 
deprive the better plants of nutrition, air, light and sun (cited in Bauman, 1989: 113).  
It should not be too surprising to note that farmers, at the bottom of human quality 
hierarchy, who gave up their spacious houses, their farmland and their livelihood to 
resettle the urbanites in a relatively superior position in this ladder, were never 
mentioned in the Expo plan. Appropriation of their land was taken for granted, in no 
need of professional labour to justify it. Gestural gifts (cakes, fans, and medals) 
awarded to the displacees from the Expo site never reached their doorsteps. To the 
planners and the politicians, the farmers simply did not exist in their accounts of 
direct last resident displacement. Understandably, they were seldom credited for their 
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enormous sacrifices to the Expo. A male worker used to live on the resettlement site 
commented on the exclusionary practices with fatalist sentiments internalising the 
unjust social order against them,  
They [the urbanites] are the birth children of the state; we [rural households] were 
adopted. Adopted children cannot be compared to the birth children. There is 
nothing you can do about it (Interview, D27, 11/03/2012).    
The planners, like the personnel in the penal apparatus in Wacquant’s analysis, are 
performing the same role of ‘imposing categories, upholding material and symbolic 
divisions, and molding relations and behaviours through the selective penetration of 
social and physical space’ (Wacquant, 2009: 304). In a twisted neoliberal logic,22 the 
devalued bodies of the displacees only entitle them to places appropriate to their 
positions in the social hierarchy. As such, they are incapable of and unqualified to 
desire for a better place. The director from the Municipal Planning Bureau replied to 
my persistent questions on the failure to use the resettlement sites to exemplify 
Shanghai’s solution to ‘better city, better life’ that,    
Of great concern to us back then was how to relocate people in a most effective way. 
We certainly thought about planning of the resettlement sites, but there was no point 
spending too much on it. The prime agenda was to move these residents out as soon 
as possible so that the site can be prepared for hosting the Expo. Besides, the 
displacees are practical. Their priority lies in the size and the function of their living 
space. They are not yet at the stage of caring about designs, overall plans, 
aesthetics, etc. (25/07/2012).  
The second group I am after is the legislators. Their efforts encoded immoral values 
as a rule of law for the zone of chaiqian. It is also their efforts that systematically 
obstructed and denied the displacees’ rights to stay put, to constitutional protection, 
and fair compensation for their loss. As the last defence of the moral and legal order, 
the judicial system muted, collapsed and conspired to the collective orgy of the 
Expo-induced domicide. For the space limits, I shall summarise a few key 
compromises in the regulatory framework to the force of market and the 
                                                            
22 I agree with Kipnis (2007) on the point that the articulation of suzhi discourse is different from the 
blame-the-victim rhetoric in that structural cause is not denied but morally justified.   
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exceptionality of the Expo based on the regulations relevant to the Expo induced 
displacement to expose the symbolic violence of law.23   
To regulate chaiqian practices on the Expo site, an ad hoc short and vague 
Regulation on the Expo induced Residential Displacement (hereafter ERD) overrides 
legal orders on different levels. It not only abandoned the displacees on the Expo site 
and deprived them of the minimal legal protection under pre-existing regulatory 
framework, but also explicitly coerced the displacees to surrender personal rights and 
interests to the nation by simultaneously appealing to the moral disciplines of the 
displacees and legal violence. As an overarching legal document, ERD only defines 
the obligations of the displacees and offers no concrete advice of their rights and the 
procedures to seek legal remedies. Article 3 mandates that all individuals as well as 
impersonal units yingdang (must and should, interchangeable) submit to the needs of 
the construction work for the Expo, and evacuate themselves in line with the 
progress of the Expo project and the deadline specified in the Demolition Permit.  
The directive word yingdang must be taken seriously here. Ross and Ross (2000) 
highlight the categorical difference in English in terms of legal obligations connoted 
by the directives of ‘must’ (bixu) and ‘should’ (yingdang): the former carries strong 
technical obligations whose non-performance implies punishment whereas the latter 
implies weak deontic obligations whose adherence is a matter of moral duty. But the 
Chinese legal language has been ambiguous in the usage of strong and weak 
obligations. As Cao (2004) argues, in Chinese language they are identical, carries 
same weight in defining legal obligations of the political subjects. However, Cao also 
nuances that yingdang might ‘signify a kind of indirect command latent with moral 
connotation’ yet its substitution of bixu in legal language implies no lesser legal force 
(p.66). The choice of yingdang in the legal document therefore can be interpreted as 
a deliberate attempt to moderate the authoritative tone without weakening the 
coercive power of this regulation. More importantly, this choice is politically astute 
as it appeals more to moral censorship and peer pressure on accepted social norms 
than to the authority of the state or the violence of law alone. In so doing, it can 
                                                            
23 Law is a very elusive and elastic concept in China. As Keller (1994) points out, there is a great 
confusion on what counts as law in China. This is exemplified by the variegated wording of legal 
orders in China, such as falv, fagui, guiding, tiaoli, xize, etc. Policies from various levels of 
government may have same power as laws. To inform my analysis, with the inspiration from Santos 
(1987), I categorised them into core (Constitution, Land Law, etc.) and periphery laws (Housing 
Policies, Planning Act, Chaiqian Regulations, etc.) to analyse the interlegality of the Chinese legal 
system on displacement. A further distinction between regulatory law (e.g. koujing-detailed 
regulations) and facilitative law (e.g. Shanghai Bylaw on Chaiqian 2001) borrowed from Blandy and 
Wang (2013) is also applied to inform my understanding of the exceptionality of the Expo in the legal 
system.   
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exonerate the responsibility of the state from direct confrontation with the displacees 
in the event of disputes. From this view, it is not difficult to understand the rationale 
behind the careful wording of the negations for compensations as affairs between 
‘relevant parties’ (dangshiren) rather than with the states in the second part of article 
3.  
In the event of negotiation failures, ERD advises the displacer to follow the legal 
procedure specified under the section on shizheng dongqian (displacement caused by 
public infrastructure) of Shanghai Bylaw on Chaiqian 2001 (hereafter Bylaw), rather 
than cite directly the violent term of ‘evicting out first, settle disputes later’ (xian 
chaiqian tengdi, hou chuli jiufen), a legal lexicon invented by the Shanghai 
municipal government for displacement under its jurisdiction. This is a pre-emptive 
clause to allow the displacers to take over and demolish people’s homes whilst 
compensation for people’s loss is in dispute and court litigation is still in process, 
meaning that even if the displacees can afford legal costs and find the juridical 
system on their side, they would have already lost their homes for months or years 
(see Shih, 2010a, 2010b).  
The Bylaw attempts to hide the dirty hands of the local state behind the displacers, 
being it developers in commercial development projects or agencies appending to the 
state apparatus in public infrastructure development. But in either situation, the 
Bylaw is to maximise the gains of the displacers rather than protect the interest of the 
displacees. It allows the displacers to decide most crucial parameters for chaiqian in 
the Displacement and Resettlement Plan (DRP) submitted for getting a Demolition 
Permit. Upon approval by the housing authority of the local state, the DRP becomes 
the most fine-grained regulation governing chaiqian practices, of equal power to a 
law. In this sense, the Bylaw is akin to the Black Act that not only facilitates and 
condones injustice, but also naturalises, legalises and perpetuates injustice. The legal 
apparatus is not simply an accessory but an authority in the killing of people’s 
homes.24 More cunningly, the Bylaw is formulated with a calculative eye to prevent 
latent pre-emptive actions that may halt the developers’ project. Since the DRP is 
only required to be publically announced after its approval, the displacees, if without 
any connections with insiders, would  have lost all opportunity to influence how the 
game of chaiqian might be played, if not prevent the displacement altogether. The 
political opportunity is confined to accept the DRP, and push the boundary of the 
                                                            
24 The distinction between law in text and law in practice is important. Law is an important source of 
power to the displacers but in the practices of chaiqian, law is only selectively enforced. In most 
cases, the displacers appeal to pure violence and moral pressure.  
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DRP through constant bargaining, making the exploitation and injustice tolerable and 
subordinating to the established order.  
The 2001 Bylaw, in line with cancellation of all in-kind housing benefits in 1998, 
established the monopoly status of money in chaiqian compensation and cancelled 
the parallel in-kind resettlement practised for decades in the city. This can be seen as 
another victory of neoliberalism in China’s ‘rule of law’ project. Indeed, it might not 
be worthwhile to single out the triumph of money here, whose destructive power in 
transforming social relations into calculative monetary exchange has been critiqued 
by great minds from Marx and Engels (2008 [1848]), to Simmel (2004), and to 
Sandel (2012). In Communist Manifesto, we find the notion of ‘cash nexus’, sharply 
criticising that money is more than alienating labourers but reducing human relations 
into nothing but ‘naked self-interest’ and, ‘callous cash payments’ (p. 37). 
Relationships between humans turn into relations between things. Following Marx, 
Simmel in his masterpiece on money argues, ‘money is free from quality and 
exclusively determined by quantity’ (p. 281). The reduction of quality to quantity 
subordinates social relations to instrumental, precise, and arithmetical calculations. 
As a result, social questions run the risk of being transformed into mathematical 
questions. Their perceptive remarks remain relevant in our time, in which everything 
seemingly can be put a price tag on—our emotions, our legal rights, and even our 
future yet to come. Those monetary exchanges propel Michael Sandel to question the 
moral limits of market. I have no intention of substantially repeating their poignant 
ideas rather than extending those ideas to analyse the implication of the Bylaw 
briefly here. The view of housing as a tradable, quantifiable and monetisable 
commodity devoid of moral, emotional and social values in the legislature is an 
antithesis to housing as a ‘biological and social reproduction project’ (Bourdieu, 
2005: 21). The money compensation, computerised by an ‘impersonal’ and 
‘objective’ algorithm of the size, location, and the residual value of the physical 
properties, conceals the exploitative relations. In so doing, moralities and politics of 
chaiqian is effectively replaced by trivial technicalities of compensation, revolving 
around issues of who gets what and how much.   
Such technical issues bring about two dehumanising effects that I believe are 
contributing to the systematic failure of the legal system and making the displacees 
more susceptible to manipulation and exploitation by the displacers. Firstly, the 
Bylaw may primarily serve to dissolve and transfer property rights, but in so doing, it 
inevitably destroys the material base for the displaced families as a stable social 
group and forces them to negotiate the dissolution and reformation of their families 
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in order to make another collective investment to shelter themselves. However, the 
divisibility of money encourages individual members, in many cases under the 
manipulation of the displacers, to pursue their personal interests, which frequently 
leads to family conflicts or breakdowns (see chapter 7). Secondly, the DRPs for the 
Expo attach a price tag on each family member in ‘housing difficulty’ (zhufang 
kunnan)25 to increase their overall compensation in order to purchase a resettlement 
house. To qualify, the displacees must also go through demeaning marriage test, 
pregnancy test, and hukou test, as if losing legitimate properties is similar to entering 
into the state benefit payroll system. If eligible, they may receive a cash payment 
decided not by their actual housing needs but by the location of their current house 
and by the phase of the displacement programmes. What it seems to suggest is that 
the value of things and locations transcends the value of the displacees as owners and 
more importantly as humans. The headcount with an increased compensation, as the 
state’s feminine left hand (Bourdieu, 1998a: 2), was welcomed by many families in 
precarious situations. Through selective inclusion, the double standard of 
compensation drives a wedge between the displacees in the same locale and destroys 
prior social ties that might unite the displacees to protest against the displacers.  
Floating Responsibility and Profiteering from Domicide  
The previous two sections revealed the production and legitimatisation of immoral 
values under the exceptionality of the Expo, which suppressed, dehumanised and 
abandoned the displacees. This section, I shall further examine how individual 
conscience was compromised due to the functional and social division of labour. It 
creates several important conditions for immoral actions: floating responsibility, 
bureaucratic rationality and structural incentives. This adds to Harvey’s (2005b) 
notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ by questioning the social processes and 
moral conditions that make it possible. In the first section, I purposely avoided the 
implication of nationalist discourses on the state apparatus. As a symbol of the 
nation’s dream for wealth and power, acquired irrefutable political legitimacy to 
mobilise the whole state apparatus to clear any hindrance in its way. The bulldozer 
regime was a state-led temporarily assembled ad hoc giant bureaucratic machine 
with a clearly defined goal to demolish people’s homes with least input and within an 
unnegotiable deadline. It was the ‘hegemonic bloc’ in Gramsci’s term (1988), 
comprised of government agencies, party organs, legitimate or illegitimate violent 
specialists, legal apparatus, and grassroots organisations, each with distinctive 
                                                            
25 In Pudong, housing difficulty is defined as per capita living space in less than 10 square metres. In 
Puxi, the line is set at 7 square metres per person.  
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interests, organisational culture and operational principles. It is analytically difficult 
to map out meticulously and accurately the organisational structure of this bulldozer 
regime for the involvement of diverse agents from different government positions, at 
several stages, on different levels and to various extent in this process. Nonetheless, 
the bulldozer regime was able to establish a clear hierarchical chain of command 
based on pre-existing governance structure, dead (i.e. danwei) or alive (see Figure 
6.1).  
I classify the organisations involved in the Expo induced domicide into three tiers 
based on the primary roles of those organisations. The first tier is what I call ‘loaded 
firefighters’, consisting of the state council, Shanghai municipal government and the 
Expo, including their subordinate administrative organs. In this organised crime, 
their role is to supply the cash, stamp on the chaiqian regulations, and contain social 
grievances through their functional agencies. Although Expo-induced domicide is a 
party-state project, affairs related to land and displacement were centralised under 
the ad hoc Janus-faced organisation, the Expo Land Bank, which could engage in 
land speculation as a private land developer on the one hand and was entrusted with 
the enlightened responsibility to protect the interest of the society on the other. Its 
jurisdiction is confined to the land within the Expo site, which previously was under 
the management of three district governments respectively. As a legal body, the 
Expo Land Bank represents the local states as the de jure displacer in appropriating 
the land from the existing users and signing the resettlement agreements, thereby 
covering up the dirty hands of the states. Given the scale and complexity of 
residential displacement, the land bank is extremely short-staffed to carry out the 
displacement on its own. The solution was technical and rational: a wholesale 
valuation of the costs of displacement was purchased from professional valuators and 
cash from the central and municipal government was showered to the district 
governments and state-owned enterprises, who command greater territorial power 
and larger pool of administrative resources at their disposal, in exchange for their 
services to negotiate with the displacees. As the nominal supervisors overseeing the 
process, the central government and the municipal government were less interested 
in protecting the interests of the displacees than to put out ‘fires’ caused by the 
displacees in different places, resolving the most alarming disputes on condition that 
those disputes were lodged within the political boundary and the consequences did 
not shadow the project of the Expo.  
The second tier includes the district governments, their subordinate street offices, and 
the SOEs on the Expo site, in territorial struggle with the municipal states, which I 
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call ‘military strategists’. In monetary agreement with the Expo Land Bank, each 
district government set up a militarised command centre, or zhihuibu in Chinese. 
Zhihuibu is frequently used in military settings or political emergent situations. In 
displacement, zhihuibu were responsible for designing the regulations, coordinating 
internal and external agencies, mobilising resources and formulating strategies, 
overseeing the implementation. They were headed by either governors or deputy 
governors of each district as a temporal arrangement or a ‘loan’ of their political 
titles. Similarly, heads or deputy heads from different government offices were also 
borrowed to staff these centres as an additional political task to their routine jobs. In 
so doing, the command centres could easily mobilise fragmented bureaucratic 
resources within their own organisations and reduce inter-agency conflicts. As the de 
facto displacers, the district authorities decided the koujing, drawing legal resources 
from existing regulatory frameworks with two exceptions, which were under their 
discretion under the Shanghai Bylaw 2001, i.e. minimum floor size of resettlement 
housing and minimum monetary compensation per square metre. Similar to a 
political campaign, displacement as a political task was further downloaded to the 
street-offices and township governments. On each level, smaller command centres of 
similar political arrangement were established to coordinate and manage the 
destruction of people’s homes within their territories.   
The third tier is the messy ground where Expo-induced displacement was minutely 
planned and routinely carried out in a gigantic scale. This is a ‘gray zone’ in Javier 
Auyero’s (2007) term where normative boundary between legal/illegal, 
legitimate/illegitimate, permissible/impermissible, and state/gangsters crumbles and 
obfuscates. Violence in different forms were visualised in the everyday life of the 
displacees through their interactions with the chaiqian agents, from which they learnt 
the harsh reality of being in the neoliberal regime of accumulation and were 
disciplined and coerced to subordination. On this level, domicide was meticulously 
broken down into small tasks carried out by a group of professional chaiqian agents, 
grassroots state appendices and gladiators from various professions inside or outside 
the political establishments, under regular instructions from their superiors to 
rationalise the organisation and improve the efficiency (see Figure 6.2). Those are 
the street-level bureaucrats in Lipsky’s  (1980) terms who practise and make policy 
through their daily interactions with the displacees. I call them ‘domicide operatives’.  
 
 



























Figure 6.1: The Organisational Structure of the Bulldozer Regime 
Source: my own  
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During Expo-induced chaiqian, each planned demolition area was mapped out as a 
jidi (bastion), and a dongqian (displacement) office with multiple functions was set 
up as the main office for everyday administration, as the mediation centre in the 
event of conflicts, and the walk-in centre for information and contact during the 
displacement process. The major labour force at this level was the chaiqian 
companies, the contracted displacers, selected by the district governments. As 
professional home destroyers but outsiders to the bastion, they relied on a pool of 
flexibly recruited mediators from both masculine and feminine hands of the state 
apparatus (Bourdieu, 1998a) to negotiate their access and perform their routine home 
destruction business. These mediators, each possessing a particular set of skills or 
knowledge may include neighbourhood police force, cadres on placement, social 
workers, neighbourhood party-organs, co-opted authoritative figures, residents 
committees, lawyers, teachers, etc. The recruitment was contingent throughout the 
displacement process. Whenever necessary, either for a particular case or for as 
permanent supplement to the company’s workforce, new members from existing 
bureaucracies may be transferred and assigned to local offices. The balance of 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the team of domicide operatives enabled the bulldozer 
regime to exploit the established social networks by the grassroots bureaucrats and 
people’s trust in expert knowledge—lawyers in particular on the one hand, and to 
preserve a group of detached personnel to enforce policies and regulations on the 
other. Apart from the routine task force on the third tier, special task forces staffed by 
government officers and young cadres under party career observation programme, 
mostly from the district governments, were organised to deal with ‘tough’ 
households, who were refusing to cave to the chaiqian companies. The simple 
rationale was to ensure that destruction was carried out according to the schedule and 
























Figure 6.2: An Anatomy of the Domicide Operatives 
Source: my own 
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the agenda of the clients of their services—the local governments. This business 
arrangement allows the state to split morally contentious and politically threatening 
task outside the realm of politics, and reap the benefits of business professionalism. 
In doing so, it transformed straightforward political antagonism between the 
displacees against authoritarian state in the political sphere to civil conflicts between 
the displacees against business malpractices in the market sphere. Acting as an 
impartial mediator or hypocritical defenders of the interests of the displacees (e.g. 
making concessions on behalf of the chaiqian companies), the state agents through 
their interventions could even reinforce the legitimacy of the state in appropriating 
people’s lifelong investment in land and private property. Moreover, such labour 
arrangements also produced great confusion for many displacees to pin down the 
displacers and frame their grievances against the real authors of their sufferings. The 
political logic behind the conflation of coercive power of state and capital became 
crystal clear to me after a confrontational conversation with Tu Jianliang, the duty 
officer in charge of unresolved Expo-induced chaiqian conflicts in Pudong District 
Government, when I was an under-cover petitioner with a group of aunts I worked 
with (see chapter 8).    
June 2012 
 
Tu: Displacement is a private business between chaiqian companies with the displacees. The 
government has nothing to do with it.  
YZ: Are you trying to put the blame on the chaiqian companies? 
Tu (impatiently): It is not the responsibility of the government. They were the people who 
negotiated with the residents and signed the agreement with them.  
YZ: What was the responsibility of the state then? 
Tu: Our responsibility was to explain the policy [to the displacees] and supervise the 
conducts of the chaiqian companies. We did not sign the agreement.  
YZ: Why were government officials from street offices, from district government, from 
residents’ committees all involved in the negotiation with the displacees? 
Tu: You need to focus who were the displacers on paper here. They [government officials] 
did involve in the chaiqian process. But still, it is not the responsibility of the government.   
YZ: What if the displacees now were unhappy about the terms in the resettlement plan 
because of deceptions or fraud because of the involvement of those agents at the time of 
signing the agreement?  
Tu: Again, who were the displacers here? You need to get this right. Who signed the 
resettlement agreement [with the displacees?] The chaiqian companies. Have problems? Sue 
them. We can mediate but it was not our responsibility.  
 
This conversation is extracted from a two-hour recording I made secretly. To 
contextualise this encounter, we were petitioning against an environmental hazard 
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right next to a resettlement site. Tu was impatient from the very beginning, as he 
believed that we were in the wrong place, even after we informed him that our visit 
was instructed by his colleague earlier that morning. His response here might be 
interpreted as an exercise of state power in mundane governance to discipline 
petitioners like me to become ‘patients of the state’, to borrow Auyero’s term (2012), 
by kicking them around, forcing them to lodge one complaint after another and 
travelling from one agency to another. But, there is more to this inquiry of who to 
blame than could be revealed. It is an example of floating responsibility, one of the 
conditions that permit immoral actions, produced by the division of labour. Writing 
on the role of modern bureaucracy in the Holocaust, Bauman (1989) alerts us that 
moral regions of the bureaucratic actors are vulnerable to short-sightedness when 
their actions toward the final end are mediated by functional and hierarchical 
division of labour. In this situation, personal morality is either replaced by 
bureaucratic rationality, requiring the agents to address a problem in their position in 
a most efficient way, or diffused by the floating responsibility in the bureaucracy, 
that no one claims responsibility for the disastrous outcome of their collective 
enterprise. Floating responsibility, as Bauman (1989: 163) warns, is ‘the very 
condition of immoral or illegitimate acts taking place with obedient or even willing 
participation of people normally incapable of breaking the rules of conventional 
morality’.  
It is inarguable that chaiqian companies were the legal contracted bodies, a major 
labour force for displacement, who signed resettlement agreements with the 
displacees. However, their negotiation was constrained by the koujing formulated by 
legislators in a bird’s eye view of the displacees. Their working progress was also 
reviewed weekly by the heads at the command centres. In reaching the final 
agreement their actions were also facilitated and mediated by a group of state agents 
and professionals under the political order. Chaiqian companies therefore are only 
brokers and scapegoats of the state. Zhu Aijuan, the deputy party secretary of the 
chaiqian division of Pudong Real Estate Group, frankly appreciated the contribution 
from those mediators to the achievement of her chaiqian company,  
Ten words from a chaiqian company staff are less decisive than a word from the 
cadre at residents’ committees. Without the participation from cadres and party 
members from the street offices and residents committees, I doubt the displacement 
would be implemented so smoothly (The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p. 16).  
Zhu was honest about the absence of institutionalised power of her company. The 
efficiency of the company would be seriously impaired without the state agents who 
Organised Crime on Trial │ 198 
 
 
embody the power of the state. In the war against the displacees, each of the latter 
were a warrior of the state, hand in hand with the chaiqian companies, and 
performed a distinctive function in their capacity in the collective destruction of 
homes. Heads of different government agencies were stationed in the command 
centres organising daily meetings to formulate tactics to overcome the setbacks in the 
everyday bargaining with the displacees. Lawyers were on-site as ‘volunteers’ not to 
teach legal language to fight against the state but to promote the unfair treaty of 
chaiqian koujing. The task forces were spontaneously organised by the state ready to 
target and conquer the most stubborn families reported by the chaiqian companies. 
As a last resort, the eviction apparatus were prepared to demolish people’s homes 
before legal procedures were exhausted. The complaint system absorbed and 
recycled the grievances within the bulldozer regime,26 obstructing the formal channel 
to address grievances. The justice system was more than ready to embrace ‘misrule 
of law’ (Holston, 2008: 66), selectively applying or suspending the law to give 
leeway to the bulldozers.  
As the mediators between the chaiqian companies and the displacees, these state 
agents were there to convince the displacees to give up their homes using different 
tactics. But they were exempted from any accountability charges despite the fact that 
their actions were crucial and in some cases were decisive in closing the land deals. 
Traces of the involvement of themselves or their agencies were effectively removed 
as the final written resettlement plan was between the displacees with the Land Bank 
and the contracted displacement company. Such arrangement resulted in a mixture of 
business morality (ends justify means) and bureaucratic morality (procedural 
rationality) (Bauman, 1994). Displacement of a family became a collective enterprise 
that no one claimed ownership and responsibility.  
In this land war, chaiqian companies were most prone to moral and political 
corruption due to their labour structure. Most chaiqian companies only recruited a 
few managers with sound knowledge on housing policies, chaiqian regulation and 
financial management to perform key administrative tasks such as finance, auditing 
and documentation to comply with local regulation and to reduce their overhead 
costs. The majority of the frontline employees who were responsible for on-site 
negotiation with the displacees were activated from registered practitioners, 
borrowed from other companies, or temporarily recruited from the labour market 
with no knowledge in this field. They were free to quit at any time. After a once-for-
                                                            
26 Complaints lodged at independent petitioning offices were returned to agencies that provoked the 
complaints in the first place.  
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all short vocational training course that lasted five days, they were sent off to 
negotiate with the displacees on behalf of the company and the state. A majority of 
them lacked adequate knowledge in the field, had only minimum commitment to the 
profession and very weak loyalty to the company. Apart from those frontline 
negotiators, organised gangsters were also in clandestine relations with the chaiqian 
companies to intimidate families to move out. The internal division of labour further 
diffused their moral responsibility toward domicide victims. Moreover, these 
chaiqian agents are overly protected under current regulations. They will only be 
disbarred if their misconducts are proven to have ‘consequences’ (as in 1994 
Regulation) or they fail twice in internal performance evaluation conducted by the 
housing authorities (as in 2002 Regulation). The former creates burden for the 
displacees to prove a clear causality of events, and effectively excludes legitimate 
claims against the chaiqian company employees on the ground of harassment. The 
latter, echoing ‘three strike law’ in Chinese dialect, shi bu guo san, essentially issues 
each practitioner impunity card for the first violation and allows one to continue 
practicing in a lucrative, non-transparent and under-regulated business. 
Chaiqian companies hired all sorts of “talents”. What kind of talents? They are all 
bastards. Some have nimble tongues. Some are daredevils. Some are thugs. They are 
all assembled in chaiqian companies. Like a hospital, there are surgeons, physicians, 
cardiovascular surgeons, genitourinary doctors, all sorts of people. Otherwise, it 
would difficult for them to do their job. Chaiqian companies are the mob boss 
(Uncle Wang, displaced from Puxi, Interview, X15, 02/05/2012).   
The chaiqian company knocked down my home before I agreed on the resettlement. 
They did it on purpose. They wanted to get an upward hand. All my family 
belongings were still inside. I called the police. The police told me that the chaiqian 
company were a group of thugs and they cannot do anything about it. They were the 
untouchables (Ms. Lu, displaced from Puxi,  Interview, X38, 15/05/2012).  
 
Whilst immunity from personal responsibility is an important condition for immoral 
actions, it is inadequate to address the misuse of the system for personal agenda or 
the convergence between personal interest and organisational goal, which motivates 
the social actors to transgress social norms. Here, I find Bourdieu’s generalisation of 
Weber’s argument very instructive—‘one obeys the rule when the interest in obeying 
it predominates over the interest in disobeying it’ (2005: 129). In addition to the 
immunity from personal responsibility, the bulldozer regime was created with strong 
political, economic and symbolic incentives to encourage the chaiqian agents to 
transgress social norms and participate in immoral acts.  
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To this analytical agenda, we need to look into the exercise of power within the 
apparatus of the party-state. It was implemented in a fashion similar to the socialist 
campaigns with rigorous participation from the state agents. As insiders of the 
political establishment, they are susceptible to the party’s values and ethics, which 
demand absolute loyalty and obedience to authority, through numerous ideological 
indoctrination programmes. Their performance is disciplined by the bio-power 
technology of the CPC, subject to the personal evaluation system (Bakken, 2000, Lee, 
1991). To the state agents involved in the collective destruction of homes, especially 
those cadres who were sent to the jidi to ‘develop their political skills in the 
university of chaiqian without walls’,27 it was not another piece of routine job but a 
critical moment to testify their loyalty to the party, to demonstrate their political 
skills and to prove their qualification for a higher position. The higher their positions, 
the higher stake they have in this collective home destruction business. 
In Pudong, for instance, thirty-eight cadres were sent to grassroots organisations 
during the displacement to facilitate the process, and six middle-aged cadres from 
different positions were called for duty in a special task force called the ‘sharp-knife 
squad’ (jiandaoban) , with the mission to ‘punch the knife in the key positions in the 
battlefield and solve the problem as soon as possible’.28 Tu Jianliang, whom I 
confronted while doing fieldwork happened to be a member of this squad. His 
personal reflection of working for the squad in his journal entry was quoted in The 
Grand Displacement in Pudong. 
Journal Entry of Tu Jianliang 
In the critical moment of the Campaign to Educate Party Members to Preserve Their 
Vanguard Nature, the Expo Coordination office established a working group of cadres sent 
down on job placement to target the most difficult cases. I was fortunate to be a member of 
this squad. For a month, we have been working hard and exploring the most efficient method 
for our task. We consciously connect the theory of party-member’s vanguard nature with our 
chaiqian practices, and tempered ourselves in the practice, developed our political skills. We 
received a most vivid and inspiring lecture on this subject through our practice in the 
grassroots (p. 208-209).  
 
Given my personal encounter with Tu, it is difficult to convince me that this journal 
entry, loaded with bureaucratic worldview and official ideology, could testify to his 
ideological submission. His denial of the responsibility of the state was as a matter of 
                                                            
27 The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p. 8. 
28 The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p. 203. 
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fact, a denial of his personal responsibility and his profiteering from destroying 
people’s homes. He was amongst a group of cadres promoted to higher positions 
after the displacement. For political bureaucrats like him, interest in their political 
career is a powerful motivation to participate in the violence against the displacees. 
In a political system where public offices are appointed without traceable 
justification, it is analytically presumptuous to establish causal links between 
political performance in the displacement and later career advancement in the 
political ladder. But the rise of more than a few politicians, such as Zhang Xuebing,29 
Cao Yazhong,30 and Tao Ye31 reveals a convincing pattern.32 
In addition to the political incentives, the state agents also seemed to have become 
immersed into a military culture and mentality in performing their tasks. Military 
terminology like ‘sharp knife squad’ is more than abundant in the official 
representation of the displacement process. For instance, in the Grand Displacement 
in Pudong, several leaders of the bulldozer team are represented as junshi (military 
advisors, p. 31-51) and the subordinates were represented as bing (soldiers, p. 46). 
The political order of displacing the residents was represented as a task of junling 
(military order, p. 97). Special task force in the name of gongjian zu (Difficulty-
Conquering Unit, p209) were strategically established to negotiate with ‘stubborn’ 
families. In addition, several high-level leaders of the domicide team were 
demobilised military officers.33 The inflation raises a morally disturbing question as 
to whom the state is at war with? To this question, perhaps no political elites dare to 
offer any answer. What concerns me behind the inflation of military language is the 
colonisation and normalisation of a military logic in the civil sphere. This military 
mentality centres on determination to execute orders and obsession with state-
sanctioned violent means to destroy without moral concerns.  
                                                            
29 From 2004 to 2008, he was the governor of Pudong New District. Since 2008, he became the 
assistant to the Mayor and Director of the Public Security Bureau. In 2011, he was promoted to the 
position of Deputy Mayor of Shanghai.   
30 He was the Deputy Commander of Expo-Induced Displacement Command Centre (Pudong Section) 
and now has been promoted to the Chief of the Environment Protection Bureau of Pudong District 
Government.   
31 Former Deputy Director of Letters and Visits Office of the Committee of Agriculture and Industry, 
key negotiator for tough ‘nail households’ and promoted to Office Assistant of Pudong Expo Area 
Management Office in 2012.  
32 Also see The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p.156-157 and p. 281-294. Most cadres were either 
promoted to a higher government position or received very positive feedback from their superiors.  
33 Han Nailing, director of Chaiqian office in Pudong and deputy director and deputy party secretary 
of the Expo Affairs Coordination Office at the district government, used to be a colonel. Ke Xun, 
Director of Inspection Office of the Expo Affairs Coordination office, used to be a staff officer and a 
colonel. Hu Xingyi, party secretary of Sanlin Town used to the director of Political Department of 
Senior Colonels and Army.    
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Militant Annihilation of Homes in Sanlin in 90 Days 
“Is there anyone incapable of doing the job?” At one meeting, Hu Xingyi33 sternly asked his 
subordinates…Since he promised to live up to the military order that he made to the 
leadership of the district authorities, he had to pressure his subordinates and set a hard goal 
for them: by the end of the first fifteen days, 30 per cent of the families must be displaced. In 
the second fifteen days, 70 per cent must be displaced. In the third fifteen days, more than 90 
per cent of the families must be displaced. By the end of 30 December 2004, more than 95 
per cent of properties must have been evaluated and more than 95 per cent of families must 
be displaced. Hu told four leaders of chaiqian teams, “this is our objective. If anyone think 
this is impossible or is unwilling to do this, raise your concern as soon as possible. I shall 
replace you with someone else who is competent and willing immediately” (in The Grand 
Displacement of Pudong, p. 98).  
  
With such strong incentives and determination, the bureaucrats were more than 
capable of practising the political crafts and military tactics in a most ruthless and 
vicious way to target the displacees whom the party promised to serve. The 
testimony from Mr Chen reveals how Tao Ye betrayed his trust, manipulated his 
family’s hope and undermined his solidarity with his neighbours.  
I was on my internship at a new factory that day. One guy from the factory told me 
that Tao Ye wanted to have a conversation with me. I went with him to the 
conference room. Before it started, Tao instructed me that the conversation must be 
kept strictly confidential. He promised to find my family resettlement housing and 
also a job for my wife. I trusted him. So I kept the conversation from my co-workers. 
I was not savvy enough to ask for a written record. When I met him again, he denied 
all the offers (Interview, D110, 06/2012).  
Another deposition from Mrs Yang shows the ruthlessness and cunning military craft 
of Wang Guodong, former deputy director of Megaprojects office in Pudong District 
Government,  
One day, Wang Guodong, with his colleague Ye Guoliang, manager of the chaiqian 
company came to my home. I did not know they were actually the advance soldiers, 
the scouts, investigating how prepared my family was. They were leaders of the 
chaiqian team. So, I was quite polite to them. I made them both a cup of tea. They 
asked me what I really want. I asked them to give me an offer. They were only 
willing to offer 20,000 RMB, even less than we previously bargained. I told them, 
“you are not really here to negotiate”. Wang stormed out and Ye stayed in my home 
and forced my husband to the bedroom. Before we came to our senses, the eviction 
team came and destroyed our doors like thugs. We both were pulled out. Wang was 
out to call reinforcement. Can you believe this? He could have informed us that 
eviction was coming that day. But he just left and called eviction team up (Interview, 
D97, 16/03/2012).  
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It is also this underlying political logic the integrity of law was comprised, 
devastating the last institutionalised defence of the displacees. In normalising the 
fast-track eviction procedure, Judge Lu, a party cadre from Pudong People’s Court 
and also assigned for a job placement in chaiqian offices during the Expo, 
commented that,  
The court defends social justice. Between efficiency and justice, the court prioritises 
justice…But the government prioritises efficiency. This is because the government 
and the court have different duties and therefore they prioritise different values. This 
is a natural difference…It is perfectly normal for the government to sacrifice justice 
for efficiency. No fish can survive the cleanest water (shui zhi qing ze yu). It is 
impractical to speed up work when strictly abiding by the law. Only when the land is 
cleared can the Expo pavilions be built. No need to worry about the sacrifice of 
justice.34 
For scholars on the Chinese legal system, her confession perhaps is not too surprising. 
The absence of autonomy of judiciary system from local administrative agencies and 
the party politics are widely documented (Potter, 2004, Alford, 1999, Yu, 1989) and 
have been nicely captured by Lubman’s (1999) term, ‘bird in a cage’. This 
schizophrenic statement is indicative of the systematic failure of the judicial system 
during the domicide. The very law created by the ruling elites to regulate the exercise 
of power and define the limits of social actions, becomes revocable and negotiable 
on the Expo site, as if the Expo site was an isolated political space independent from 
the rest of the nation. The state of anomie as observed by Durkheim (1984) in social 
crisis or transitional times seems to be able to be instigated by the elites to deploy in 
a confined space for particular political agendas. By arguing this however, she also 
loudly ridiculed the meaning of the justice system and violated the ethics of her own 
profession. If we look into what is unsaid in this collusive communicative act 
(Thornton, 2002a: 668), the corrupted conscience becomes more straightforward and 
appalling. The old Chinese saying, shui zhi qing ze wu yu, if translated more properly 
for this context, means that illegalities and immoralities are necessary conditions for 
the survival of the Expo project. This saying in Chinese is followed by ren zhi cha ze 
wu tu, which means that if one is overly observant and critical one may lose one’s 
friends. What she confesses is an answer to St. Augustine’s question on the nature of 
state as enlarged robber band. The Chinese state is indeed a robber baron functioning 
under the guise of a justice system that is in league with the perpetrating states. This 
is precisely what Auyero (2007) observed in the gray zone in Argentina that political 
                                                            
34 Lu, Reflections on Expo-induced Displacement, available from 
http://www.pdfy.gov.cn/css/pdpub/upload/200509200918176484.doc last accessed 21/08/2012.  
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agents actively participate in collective violence. In this context, the life of the 
displacees are not worthy of protecting.  
Apart from the political interest, the domicide operatives were also easily seduced by 
the monetary benefits from the chaiqian business. Mediated by cash, the 
compensation method conveniently offered the operatives the opportunity to retain or 
extort money from the displacees without noticed from their supervisors. Such illegal 
activity was easily covered up by the legitimate means, through the so-called 
buchong xieyi (supplement agreement) as an appendix to the standard resettlement 
agreement. In addition to this money, the financial arrangement also encouraged the 
chaiqian companies to perform their job in a most efficient way. In Pudong, each 
resettlement agreement brought by the chaiqian companies was paid 5000 RMB. 
Although they were assigned to work on certain caseloads, these companies were 
forced to compete against each other due to the centralised control of the resettlement 
housing stock and the routine progress review. Since all companies were given same 
access to the housing stock, those who were able to work more ‘efficiently’ could 
tempt the displacees with better resettlement housing and secure a resettlement 
agreement. Their progress was also periodically reviewed. Those companies who 
failed to meet the quota had to pass their caseloads to other companies35.  
For the managers of the chaiqian companies, their interests in this business were far 
greater. This is due to the ambiguous nature of their companies and their associations 
with the bureaucratic field. The hybrid ownership structure, the development 
trajectory and the party organs inside the chaiqian companies convincingly testifies 
that the state itself is the perpetrator.36 For this project, I only investigated five 
companies due to the accessibility of their business records. These chaiqian 
companies are subsidiaries of three giant shanghai-based property corporations that 
were either fully owned or controlled by the local states (i.e. Pudong Properties, 
Shanghai Pudong Development (Group) Co. Ltd., and Shanghai Nanfang Group). 
Their specialisation in chaiqian business can be seen as a corporate strategy to 
diversify the investment, reduce internal transaction costs and diminish the business 
risks for their parent companies (Chandler, 1977). Under the mask of modern 
corporations, those de-statised property development corporations; however, all have 
                                                            
35 The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p. 13.  
36  They were Lujiazui Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd, Shanghai Lianyang Dongchaiqaian Co., Ltd., 
Pudong Chengshi Jianshe Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd, Pudong Fangdichan Dongchaiqian Co., 
Ltd, Shanghai Shinan Fangwu Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd and Shanghai Qili Dongchaiqian 
Shiye Co., Ltd. The first three were contracted by the Pudong District government whilst the 
latter two were with the Huangpu District government. 
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a built-in Leninist party organ inherited from the command economy. The 
incorporation of party organs in the corporate governance structure entangles the 
morality of the state, the party and the shareholding companies, which are not always 
in congruence. To some extent, it resembles the nomeklatura system widely practised 
in the planned economy (You, 1998). Therefore, the Expo-induced displacement was 
more than a business opportunity, as both their economic and political careers were 
at stake.  
In the context of limited interest in domicide, psychological mechanism of splitting, 
attributing the immoral actions to a split self, is also an alibi for the perpetrators 
(Adams and Balfour, 1998). However, as Stanley Cohen (2001) argues, splitting in 
Freudian sense is unconvincing and overly dramatic because it is very unlikely that 
the perpetrators are unaware of their own actions. The perpetrators are able to have a 
cohesive self and they are capable of exercising moral judgement. For him, role 
instantiation, compartmentalisation and segmentation are more compelling 
mechanisms to explain the psychology of the perpetrators. In those situations, 
morality of our (in)actions performed under social masks is separated from personal 
morality. This is the discursive tactic used by the migrant workers to tip off the 
family before they destroyed the door to that family’s home in a midnight raid, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter. Similar tactics were also used by a residents’ 
committee worker to rationalise his ambivalent feelings in soliciting compliance 
from a ‘stubborn’ family in his neighbourhood.  
There was this family. They had a pretty tough life. They could barely make their 
ends meet. We all know this family well. But we had to intervene and mediate. Why? 
This was passed down from the superiors as tasks. It came as part of the job. I did 
not want to get involved in this business at all. They were really poor. It was their 
last chance to get something for themselves. I did not have a choice (27/05/2012).  
Again, as I have been insisting, neither making an immoral action less painful, nor 
giving up the sympathy and compassion for others to get the job done is an excuse to 
exonerate their responsibilities for engaging in immoral actions. ‘I am just doing the 
job’ should not prevent us from thinking as a person with skills and knowledge, 
rather than as professionals detached from our self as person. Whyte (2002) 
convincingly argues that we have more in our life to pursue outside our 
organisational life. The thing we sell to the organisation is and should only be our 
labour instead of our conscience.  




In this chapter, I attempted to tease out the causes of massive sufferings of the 
displacees as documented in the previous chapter. I challenged the view that 
accredits a coherent logic to the production of the Expo and ignores the realpolitik in 
rationalising and legitimatising the Expo. My approach situated the Expo in the 
global and local contexts and examined how the discursive practices of bidding and 
preparing were embedded in wider discourses and influenced by different logics. The 
casual change of the Expo site and subsequent production of political lies and 
knowledge is representative of the ruling elites’ pathological view of the local 
citizens as expendable and manipulatable subjects, devoid of any rights and 
opportunity to live and imagine an alternative life. The construction of the Expo as a 
nation-building project powerfully legitimatised the exceptionality of the Expo and 
transformed the Expo site as a site for flexible accumulation (Weber, 2002, Zukin, 
1991) as well as a political space for ‘distinct governing regimes within the broader 
landscape of normalized rule’ where ‘organised hypocrisy’  dictates the operational 
ethics of governance (Ong, 2006: 103,113) .  
However, this is not limited to the authoritarian China. Researchers on mega-events  
(Hall, 1992, Essex and Chalkley, 1998, COHRE, 2008, Gold and Gold, 2010) 
repeatedly observe that political desire to secure the event as a spatial fix to urban 
social and economic ‘crisis’ fuelled by over-positive prediction of the impacts of 
these events more often than not transcends the concern for meaningful participation 
of the citizens in the bidding stage, let alone those citizens who will be directly 
affected. Neither should we limit the irrationalities to mega-event industry alone. 
What they truly reveal is the prevailing political rationality of our time that spatial 
fixes are constantly searched and secured through systematic deprivation of 
ontological security for a vast segment of our society (Feldman et al., 2011).  
Defamation, devaluation, dehumanisation, and abandonment of the powerless 
citizens are the most common strategies to secure and perpetuate the power of the 
elites for their dominance in our contemporary world (Wacquant, 2008)  
The strategies of the Chinese elites in late socialist China are not drastically different 
but they certainly have more cards to play than their counterparts in western 
democracies do. Most crucially, they inherited a Leninist party-state and a repressive 
social structure from the communist past, which allows them to creatively destruct as 
well as reconstruct the system to the advantage of the political elites and their 
intellectual and market allies, through either re-writing history, ideological onslaught 
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and societal ideological campaigns, or justifying and reproducing inequalities. What 
they seemed to have effectively accomplished in preparing the land for the Expo was 
the organisation of a war of all against an individual family. With diffused 
responsibility, coupled with (personal and social) moral corruption and legal failures, 
the chaiqian agents in this home-killing machine offered another cogent example of 
the destructive potentials of mankind and the violent nature of capitalist 
accumulation, a recurrent theme of capitalist modernity. For the displacees, the land 
war against their homes, a threat to their existence, is a crisis moment calling for a 
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‘It is the interaction of the perpetrators and victims that is “fate”’. 




The testimonies from the displacees thus far have attempted to tease out the layered 
emotional experience of domicide: indignation, shock, frustration, fear, contempt and 
grief. This is a cluster of ‘attack mode’ emotions (Jasper, 1997: 107), which in theory 
can be appropriated and transformed to spur political actions when framed as a result 
of external forces or social actors. Yet, throughout my fieldwork, I was confronted 
with the analytical puzzle: the widespread popular grievances and the prevalent 
political docility. The displacees were aware of their pain and the authors of their 
sufferings; however, political inactions were more frequent than political actions.  
When the displacees did put up a fight, their actions against the predatory 
accumulation regime were less likely to be open, organised, militant collective 
defiance than individualised and bodily resistances. Those collective actions I was 
able to resuscitate from the accounts from official and unofficial sources were by and 
large transient, localised and tame, resembling what Lee (2007) calls ‘cellular 
activism’ in her description of labour protests in China. Isolated and confined to a 
locality, none of those actions escalated into a cross-class and networked protest 
movement. Those individualised resistances on the other hand employ a spectrum of 
stratagems, performed with different appearances. In most cases, the last fight of the 
displacees might be described as elementary form of resistance in Guha’s empirical 
frame (1999), or placed under James Scott’s term ‘everyday resistance' (1985), in the 
forms of ‘a war of words’ (p. 281) through discrediting the state agents, gossiping the 
political scandals, dismissing terminology of ‘compensation’ or ‘sunshine’ policy, or 
voicing their grievances in cyberspace, and of ‘informal, often covert’ opposing 
actions ‘concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains’ (p. 33), such as delaying 
valuation, avoiding negotiation, holding out, squatting on appropriated properties, 
bribing and co-opting the chaiqian agents. On other accounts, some displacees in a 
more dramatic way used their bodies to protest and to increase the compensation, by 
speeding up marriages, ‘faking’ marriages/divorces/pregnancies, updating hukou 
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registrations, etc. In most extreme cases, rational and calculative actions yielded to 
overwhelming feelings of desperation and anger, triggering resistance against violent 
property appropriation through suicide or homicide, often violent. If the whole point 
of resistance was for a better life in the future, one is left immediately with a 
conundrum. What is the point of giving up their own lives and leaving behind a 
traumatised family?  
As a matter of fact, family break-down and dysfunction is one of the many risks the 
displacees had to bear when they entered into negotiation meetings with the chaiqian 
companies, and is the most traumatic yet most likely, common outcome if they 
hesitated, or decided to take any actions and failed to prove their conformity in time.1 
Displacement not only severed the displacees’ roots to their sanctuary space but also 
destabilised their family relations and sowed the seeds for family conflicts. Those 
conflicts may unfold in different trajectories and revolve around diverse issues. 
Family where ‘ordinary laws of the economy are suspended, a place of trusting and 
giving;…where interest, in the narrow sense of the pursuit of equivalence in 
exchanges, is suspended’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 20), seemed to cease to function as a 
basic social unit to protect members from a predatory accumulation regime, or even 
worse, turn into the accessories of the brutal bulldozer machine. Instead of fighting 
against the displacers collectively as a family, many stories I collected from the field 
seem to show the exact opposite; a Hobbesian war of all against all within a given 
displaced family. 
The brief preview of the political agency of the dispossessed poses several 
theoretical challenges to existing scholarship. Moore (1978: 79) argues that ‘effective 
action against the social causes of suffering must be collective. Individual actions are 
not to be dismissed, and are certainly better than no effort at all unless they occur at 
the expense of other victims, as unfortunately is often the case. But individual 
solutions that help only minority by definition do not change the situation’. My 
sketch of the landscape of resistance therefore firstly doubts the promise of 
community as a political agent to counter the force of the market and the power of 
the state (Logan and Molotch, 1987, Davis, 1991). Subsequently, it questions the 
likelihood and the efficacy of a cross-class alliance loosely connected by a shared 
social/territorial identity to assert a collective right to the city under the current 
accumulation regime in China (Shin, 2013), when the basic unit of society, bonded 
by blood, kinship and loyalty, was so easy to collapse. The outcome of 
                                                            
1 On this point, the alienated time experienced by many displacees and the stories of the homeless 
evictees are telling evidence in chapter 4.  
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individualistic resistance on the other hand challenges the genuineness of ideological 
tenet underpinning the accumulation strategy in contemporary China, which tries to 
recover the value and the ethics of family to buttress the shock of neoliberal reforms 
to the political subjects (Whyte and Parish, 1984, Whyte, 1997, Forrest and Izuhara, 
2012). Furthermore, those bodily resistance questions the distinction between moral 
rights and legal rights (Dworkin, 1977), the boundary between resistance, 
disobedience and crime (Scott, 1985), and the rationalistic assumption of resisting 
activities (Popkin, 1979).  
These challenges bring to the fore the analytical focus of this chapter: the conditions, 
processes, mechanisms, efficacies and implications of this wide range of resisting 
activities. The central question I wish to answer in this chapter is, why the displacees 
chose less effective, or morally and legally contentious actions, to defend their 
homes, and at what costs? My answer to this question will be guided through a body 
of literature on political opportunity structure (Marx and Engels, 2008 [1848], Piven 
and Cloward, 1977, Tarrow, 1994, McAdam et al., 2001, Meyer and Minkoff, 2004, 
Meyer, 2004) that reconciles the objective openings in general political structural 
conditions and on particular issues, with the subjective perceptions of such openings 
and contentious repertories (Tilly, 1993, Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, Scott, 1990, Auyero, 
2004). This places the learnt contentious tactics for making political claims at the 
centre of my analysis. By addressing this question, this chapter shall offer a close-up 
view of the power struggle between the displacees and the bulldozer regime, and 
within the displaced families or a given displaced family. The latter focus shall add 
further political complexities to existing literature on displacement that stops the 
analysis on the scale of community (Shin and Li, 2013, Weinstein and Ren, 2009), 
and avoids romanticising resistance, as warned by Ortner (1995: 179), which 
overlooks the fact that ‘individual acts of resistance, as well as large-scale resistance 
movements, are often themselves conflicted, internally contradictory, and affectively 
ambivalent’. It will do so by taking into account the displacees’ embeddness in their 
social and political relationships, and analysing how different positional embeddness 
influenced the dynamics within the displacees and shaped their political agency 
(Granovetter, 1985, Bourdieu, 1990b, Michelson, 2007).  
The argument of this chapter can be summarised as follows:  The displacees’ 
submission to the dominant legitimate language in discussing chaiqian and their 
failure in asserting their voice to the dominant discourses lead to their loss in this 
land battle before it began. The fragmentation and compartmentalisation of the 
displacees, as a result of institutional legacies and the displacers’ domination over 
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time, space and money, reinforced by ad hoc repression, pre-emptively created 
formidable obstacles for open and collective actions of different scales, reduced 
available political options of the displacees, and forced them to resign to 
individualised and bodily resistances. The negotiation within an individual family 
further exploited the institutional and social embeddness of each member of 
individual family, in addition to the tension created by monetisation of compensation 
and routinised immoral tactics. The coercion, co-optation and cooperation of 
atomised family members created internal strife within individual displaced families 
and shaped their agency to resist. As a result of such broken ties and internal 
conflicts on different scales, the displacees reduced the political and economic costs 
for the displacers and in a way aggravated and perpetuated their own sufferings.  
‘We Want a Reasonable Compensation’ 
To make sense of the political actions the displacees chose, we need first to 
understand what the displacees expect and understand displacement and the changes 
brought by displacement in the first place. This is shaped by a particular set of ideas 
about rights, entitlements, justice, ethics and morality. It must be admitted that 
violation of this universe does not necessarily or always motivate individuals to join 
collective actions to address their grievances. But, as I believe, the question merits 
our attention, as firstly it is a starting point that shapes the political agency of the 
displacees in terms of their subjectivities, claims and tactics; and secondly it offers a 
close up view of the discrepancies between the technocrats and the displacees in the 
construction of the meaning of displacement.  
In the dominant technocratic view, displacement is a pure economic transaction and 
the displacees are rational and calculative homo economicus, with the agenda to 
maximise their interest. Such technocratic view is most reflective in the over-
simplistic explanatory economic model below developed by Cui (2007), a planning 
officer at the local government, based on his personal working experience as a 
chaiqian agent. Given his personal career trajectory, he of course paid tribute to the 
generosity of the compensation offered by the Expo regime in his doctorate thesis 
and believes that the high compensation standard was decisive in winning the 
support from more than 97 per cent of the displaced families.  
 




Figure 7.1: Economic Modelling of Displacees' Gaming Behaviours 
Source: Cui (2007: 279) and my translation and clarification 
 
For now, I shall refrain from repeating my critique of this model for 
decontextualising the displacees’ decisions from the power relations and their moral 
universe. Here, I wish to focus on the ontological flaw and the manipulative logic of 
this economic rationale. First, this model presumes the existence of a land market 
that is beyond the control of the state, and purely dictated by the law of supply and 
demand. From Polanyi (2001[1944]) to Bourdieu (2005), social theorists have 
convincingly argued that market is a social construction. The practice of land 
management and development in China is not an exception. In the debate between 
Annie Haila (2007) and Zhu Jieming (2009), Haila compellingly dissects the 
conceptual ambiguities and ontological fallacy in the inflation of the vocabulary of 
land or real estate market in China whilst empirical evidence suggests otherwise. A 
perfect empirical example here would be the Janus-faced shareholding land 
development companies who steal public wealth with the support from the state 
through the abusive use of eminent domain and the iron fists. Secondly, the so-called 
market-based valuation only calculates the residual value of the appropriated 
properties without taking into consideration land use rights, let alone the rent gap 
created by the land speculation. Unsurprisingly, this valuation is enormously below 
the desired offers of the displacees. The perversity of this statecraft lies in the fact 
that the discounted valuation set up a baseline for the worst-case scenario and 
reduces the expectations of most displacees about what they could possibly get. 
When a gestural bump from the valuation is made, it creates the impression that the 
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offer from a caring state is in the best interests of the displacees, as compared to an 
‘objective’ and ‘fair’ offer from the ruthless private developers under the principle of 
the market. In this way, it not only saves the state from ideological attacks but also 
consolidates its legitimacy.  
As Cui confesses, no concessions from the side of the displacers can ever meet the 
expectations of the displacees under any circumstances, as it is unrealistic and 
against the principle of the market. His view is shared by a director at the municipal 
planning bureau. But for him, the impossibility resides in the displacees’ confusion 
of temporal experiences and conflates different claims surrounding the issue of 
chaiqian. For him, the difficulty of chaiqian and the intensive conflicts it involves is 
a result of the displacees’ unreasonable need to ‘want a fundamental change in their 
life at one go without putting in more of their own efforts’2. As he believes, it is 
unfair for the displacers in charge of present displacement to resolve the grievances 
from unemployment, severe diseases, extreme poverty, and historical sufferings 
(zhiqing, confiscation of properties in the 1950s and during the Cultural Revolution) 
because those past sufferings were caused by various policy regimes, irrelevant to 
chaiqian, and should not be conflated with the land appropriation. It is also 
unreasonable to expect the displacers to take care of the displacees’ excessive needs 
for future well-being of all members, let alone generations not yet to come. In his 
logic, temporal boundaries are as important as spatial boundaries and must be clearly 
demarcated. The arbitrary control of temporal discontinuity or ruptures is the 
cornerstone of ‘reason’ in chaiqian. Chaiqian is a problem of here and now, bearing 
no weight on history or the future. This view reveals the hypocrisy of the 
accumulation regime that tends to ignore that one source of their social power is their 
domination over time. While it is the past structural injustices suffered by the 
displacees that lay the foundation for their powerlessness in the present land game, 
those injuries can only be taken advantage of rather than framed as legitimate claims 
to be pursued through the avenue of chaiqian. Whilst for the displacers, the future 
needs of the displacees are unreasonable to be put on the table for negotiation.  
For the displacees on the receiving end, the success of the Expo bid has already 
decided their fate. In chapter 5, I have discussed the normative power of nationalism 
underwrites the Expo project, which makes subordination of personal interest to 
national interest a mandatory order. Most displacees were aware that the annihilation 
of their homes is inevitable and it is only a matter of when, how and where to. The 
big question as to why they had to leave was not at all practical even to contemplate. 
                                                            
2 Interview, 25/07/2012. 
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One should not be too surprised then to find that the displacees share little 
intellectual radical excitement for the right to the city, neither in terms of  Lefebvre’s 
(1996) call for the right as urban inhabitants who appreciate the use value of the city 
as ‘oeuvre’ that nurtures the collective life and who can assert a ‘right to freedom, to 
individualisation in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit….to participation and 
appropriation’ (p.173-174), nor of Harvey’s (2008) conceptualisation as a right to 
‘greater democratic control over the production and utilisation of the surplus’  in 
order to collectively  ‘reshape the process of urbanisation’ (p. 23), nor of Peter 
Marcuse’s (2009) suggestion as a collective right claimed on a ‘higher moral plane 
that demands a better system in which the potential benefits of an urban life can be 
fully and entirely realised’ (p. 34).   
But, this is not to say that the displacees had no impulse to pursue that direction. 
Compensation and resettlement as two Bourdieusian euphemisms (1991) are well 
known to the displacees: the so-called resettlement housing has to be purchased with 
the money received from the state as compensation under asymmetrical power 
relations and unequal terms. The adoption of those terms is to conceal the 
exploitative nature of chaiqian and maintain the respectful appearance of the state as 
a law-abiding and decent market player. The heinous predatory logic is nicely put by 
Mr Li as the logic of gangsters.    
I had in my hand the land certificate issued by the party state, which clearly states 
that I can sell the land to whomever I want. At the time of displacement, the state 
denied my right and I do not have such right. This certificate was issued by the 
Communist Party in 1950 not by the Republican Party. How could you deny all my 
rights stated in the certificate. This is robbery. If I go to the shop, I told you that I 
want this pen or that pen. But you do not want to sell it to me. Can I just take it any 
way? What is the difference between this robbery (of pen) and that robbery (of land)? 
Is it not the logic of gangsters? (Interview, D58, 21/03/2012). 
The tension between the impulse and the action, in Durkheim’s (1984: 293) words, 
comes from ‘the working classes do not really desire the status assigned to them and 
too often accept it only under constraints and force, not having any means of gaining 
other status’.  The displacees, despite their differences in class identities, are in the 
same position in this land battle as the working class in industrial production was, 
powerless to halt or stop the inevitable coming of the wheels of the bulldozer 
machine. The sense of inevitability, writes Moore (1978: 490), ‘rules out any serious 
struggle, or at least any serious struggle with a prospect of victory’ and ‘implies a 
conception of the universe ruled at least in part by blind forces of fates ultimately not 
responsive to human will and actions’. Immersed in such defeatist feelings, the 
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displacees were tamed to become pragmatic players in this field of displacement, 
following the rule of game set by the bulldozer regime and adopting the legitimate 
language in discussing their fate. As Burawoy (2012: 193-194) explains,  ‘the very 
act of playing the game simultaneously produced consent to its rules. You can’t be 
serious about playing a game…if at the same time you question its rules and goals’. 
This is another example of symbolic violence the displacees reproduced themselves 
by ‘unwittingly contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting, in advance, 
the limits imposed on them’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 169).  
For the majority of the displacees, their claim was to bargain for a higher exchange 
value of their existing properties so that they can at least move on with their life in an 
estate that they were kicked into. This future-needs-oriented claim, as Perry (2008) 
might comment, in nature is a tame one for subsistence rather than for political 
citizenship. Compensation constitutes the central subject of their claims, as it is 
crucial to increase their consumer power in buying decent resettlement housing that 
meets their needs. But, they knew well no matter how much compensation they 
squeezed out of the displacers, it would not significantly improve their economic 
conditions nor advance their positions in the housing ladder, as the dominant view 
claims. To many of them, home ownership in the planned gated neighbourhoods was 
not an appealing ideology at all, since they see themselves as owners of their existing 
houses and apartments any way and more importantly, they rarely see their houses 
from the view of the market. Most of them share the perspective of the working class 
in the UK (Allen, 2008:7), houses are dwelling space rather than easily tradable 
properties subject to the dictating power of the inflow and outflow of capital. Their 
seemingly ‘obsessive’ demand for greater compensation is less out of a desire for a 
decent life than of a need to prevent their life from getting worse. A senior woman 
told me, ‘only water flows downward and people have to go upward’.3 This is the 
moral economy of the peasants in Southeast Asia as examined by James Scott (1976), 
but also applicable to understand the displacees’ life-world. Chaiqian brings little 
promise other than bigger apartments with modern convenience on condition that 
they can make great efforts in adapting to a new life in a strange place. Their fight is 
to ensure that such efforts would be kept at minimum, and foremost, would not 
exhaust their available resources and impoverish their life in the resettlement sites.  
Of primary concern to the displacees was to ensure that compensation would enable 
the basic needs of each family member be properly satisfied. Those needs include 
education, health care, employment, transport connections, nursing, etc. Considering 
                                                            
3 Interview, X33, 12/05/2012. 
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the under-developed resettlement site and the enormous costs of making all 
relocation arrangements, the displacees had to prioritise diverse needs, to resolve the 
conflicts between members, to make inevitable sacrifices, and to practise their life 
wisdom again as they did to satisfy their needs under socialism, to keep this 
transition as painless as they could. Because of such complexity, the decisions hardly 
came as a result of peaceful, straightforward and easy process. The moral compass of 
the displacees was caught up in the tension of competing discourses of an ideal 
family (Hansen et al., 2010) and practical constraints of displacement. They were 
confronted with the tension between greater autonomy promised by the divisibility of 
monetary compensation, and the greater dependence on familial reciprocity in 
making collective investment in resettlement housing, nursing, education, etc. They 
had to negotiate familial responsibilities and obligations, and balance the interests 
between family members.  
In arriving at such a decision within displaced families, familial reciprocity 
disciplines the displacees’ needs and expectations of a reasonable compensation. 
Depending on the family structure of the displaced families, they had to negotiate 
inter-generational and intra-generational responsibilities amongst their members. In 
many families, this inevitably involved the negotiation of money transactions, thanks 
to the monetary compensation that entitles each member to a fair cut. It increased the 
chance that economic rationality and materialistic calculations evade, corrupt and 
damage intimate relations. Of course, this is not to deny, as Zelizer (1994) points out, 
that people constantly negotiate the meaning of money and make economic 
transactions in all social relationships, but to suggest that the frequency and intensity 
of conflicts and compromises incurred in such decision-making shape family 
dynamics and lead to family estrangement (Yan, 2003b, Davis, 2010, Li and Huang, 
2012). In the case of Mr Huang,4 his father had to borrow a substantial amount of 
money from relatives on his mother’s side and pay off his uncles, aunts and 
grandparents on his father’s side so that the absolute ownership to the two bedroom 
resettlement apartment could be transferred to him to increase his chance of success 
for courtship and marriage. The monetary transaction puts severe strains on his 
family relations. He was regretting the loss of emotionality in his family and hinted 
that family dramas of this kind could have been avoided had the compensation been 
reasonably higher in the first place.   
Although the displaced families have diverse needs, almost unanimously, they would 
prioritise the interest of the younger generation of their families. Education and 
                                                            
4 Observation, March to July, 2012 . 
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marriage was at the top of their concerns. The first perhaps does not need any further 
elaboration. No parents want their single child, the only hope of their families to 
obtain the ‘first world’ conditions and the only reliable supporters for their old age 
(Fong, 2004), to lose out in the competition for elitist careers due to disruption in 
their schooling in their formative years or the lack of opportunity to access high 
quality educational establishments that are all centrally located in the city. The issue 
of marriage is more pertinent and urgent to families with a grown-up single child, 
especially when this single child is a male. The transition to a market-based economy 
provoked the shifts in the meaning of housing and the social values related to its 
consumption. The emerging market-based housing supply and the soaring price for a 
reasonable-sized apartment have created enormous pressure for the younger 
generation to have a place for their future nuclear families. The ethnography of 
heterosexual families in Kunming in Zhang’s (2010) work offers us an intriguing 
example of how individual self-worth and marriageability are largely hinged upon 
the possession of material properties, and particularly the ownership of housing. 
Same conclusion is made by Sun (2012b), who conducted an ethnographic study of 
the marriage market in public parks in Shanghai (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3), that men’s 
ownership of private housing independent of parental generation is a condition of 
entry to this matchmaking market. During her study, she even read some 
advertisements explicitly stating that ‘no talk without an apartment’ (p. 113).  
The growing anxiety amongst Chinese parents and urban youth seem to suggest that 
the tension between housing and romance, as Pellow (1993) once wittily commented 
as ‘no place to live, no place to love’ in the early reform era, is not solved by the 
introduction of the market mechanism to the housing sector and the political 
initiatives to improve the housing conditions. Instead, it has been aggravated by the 
dominance of the market and its associated values in every sphere in Chinese society, 
squeezing out affective feelings of any social relationships and producing a growing 
anxiety for the youth to leave their natal families and develop intimate relations with 
others. Societal obsession in private property ownership effectively creates a 
repressive structure for the urban youth today that with no own place to live; they 
have no chance to love. Bargaining for higher compensation based on the needs of 
the youth and of the generations yet to come is reasonable and justified for many 
displacees (especially the peasants and the self-built housing dwellers) as the land 
ownership to their homestead allows the flexibility to accommodate the changes in 
family structure. In addition, such change is more than a practical adaption of family 
housing structures but a ritual of inter-generational wealth transfer to maintain the 
continuity of family lineage and enhance the mutual dependence between family 
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members by patrilocal living arrangement. Such flexibility has been deprived by the 
supply and the ownership structure of the resettlement housing. Changes in family 
structures thereafter can only be solved by collective investment in the commercial 
housing market. This is a sudden shift in their consumption pattern of housing and a 
makeover of their moral universe in imagining and organising their families. Aunt 
Cheng who petitioned for under-compensation for four years at the time of fieldwork 
explained why every penny of the compensation meant so much to her present family 
and the generations yet to come.  
To be honest, I can give up. But, what about my son? Where is he going to live when 
he grows up? What about his child? What about his grandson? He will have nothing 
to pass down (Interview, D117, 22/04/2012). 
   
Figure 7.2: Marriage Market Advertisement in Shanghai  
Figure 7.3: Parents in the Marriage Market in Shanghai  
Source: my own, 2012 
 
The moral universe of the displacees shapes their understanding of the changes 
brought by displacement and their expectations of a reasonable compensation. 
Chaiqian, to many of them, is an opportunity to improve their living conditions but 
foremost is a challenge. Whilst every displacee yearns for a happy family, 
unhappiness caused by unpleasant discussion or unavoidable sacrifices, is another 
cruel and inevitable piece of reality that they had to bear. However, conflict 
avoidance as a golden principle for harmonious relationships still have some 
purchase in contemporary Chinese society, and make crafty maintenance of social 
relations a better option (Yang, 1994). Increased compensation, which allows them 
to cope with these diverse needs and interests brought by chaiqian, therefore, is a 
viable and reasonable solution to avoid such dreadful experiences, against the 
backdrop of a neoliberalising economy. Despite their modest expectations, the 
displacees seldom defend such interests in an egocentric, aggressive and Hobbesian 
way. Here, I concur with the view of Madsen (1984) that people are practical 
philosophers who are ‘not interested in knowing what good persons are like but in 
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acting as good persons do’ and ‘reconcile their real life situations with their moral 
ideals’ (p. 4). Their persistence on higher compensation is not to capitalise on 
chaiqian or undermine the public good, but to adhere to daoli (reason) and liangxin 
(conscience). This is the cultural logic of the reasonable compensation. In negotiating 
with the Expo regime, many displacees did not adhere to the law or the market, but 
to moral principles, even if it meant compromises in their economic interests. Aunt 
Cheng, a female displacee in her 50s, told me at a follow-up interview after our 
collective visit to the court to address her grievance,  
It is important that one’s behaviour should not make oneself feel ashamed. The state 
wants our land to develop, laobaixing (the mass) support such decision. I am not 
asking you [the state] to compensate me ten or twenty new apartments. That is not 
reasonable. I understand. We must follow our conscience. Right? I supported you 
[the state] but what you have done to me in return (Interview, D117, 22/04/2012). 
To her, the land grab is more a social exchange rather than monetary transaction 
between the state and her family. As we can see, neither right nor wrong is explicitly 
used in her narrative, but the reference to conscience engenders a clear claim of 
morality premised on self-discipline and reciprocity rather than the universal notions 
of justice. Disciplined by such moral codes, her loss of homes and communities is to 
be compensated reasonably rather than justly. Being reasonable is to follow her 
conscience moulded by the socialist morality that demands personal sacrifices for 
greater good. From her perspective, this same moral principle not only disciplines 
her, but should also be applied to judge the state. As Cohen (1927) argues, ‘a 
property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the owner 
and other individuals in reference to things’ (p. 9). The personification of the state 
therefore enables her to assign popular relational ethics to evaluate good and bad 
practices of property exportation, justice and injustice of the outcomes.   
Cheng was not the only one to let conscience decide the reasonable level of 
compensation offers. Ms Fan offered a similar account to explain her consistent 
claim to be resettled on site yet was rejected by the bulldozer regime.   
I first proposed [to the chaiqian company] that I would accept a small one-bedroom 
apartment close to my old one in Pudong. I do not care how small it is. Just a nearby 
one. My son’s school was in this area…. I was not asking them to compensate me an 
apartment of hundreds of square metres. I told them, you could just compensate me a 
similar-sized apartment as my old one, or even a smaller one. However difficult 
living condition I might end up, I would not accuse you [the chaiqian company/the 
state] of anything. They always accusing me of making excessive and unreasonable 
demands. But this was my only demand back then (Interview D112, 06/2012). 
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For Fan, her proposal for a similar or even smaller sized apartment was a big 
comprise of market principles. She did not cite the regulation of on-site resettlement 
to support her claim either. It was a reasonable demand, as she did not request a 
policy-based resettlement plan that would at least double her living space. Her 
insistence on on-site resettlement was not to speculate on the increase of property 
value but to ensure her son could continue studying at the same school. Therefore, 
her concession of economic interest to the state is a circumscribed trade-off between 
economic gains and her moral obligation to her son. It is an unjust but necessary 
concession that she was willing to make. However, to the chaiqian agents, such 
claim was translated as greedy and vicious intention to speculate on the real estate 
market. The irreconcilable gulf between the dominant market, legalistic view and the 
popular moral views of chaiqian and compensation becomes a source of conflicts 
and sows the seeds of resistance, which I am exploring in the following sections.    
Divide and Conquer: Failed Open, Collective and Institutionalised Resistance  
In this section, I shall first explore the reasons of the rarity and failures of collective 
actions, following the analytical frame of Scott (1985: 241-248) on everyday 
resistance in Sedak, especially his insight on the internal divisions of the 
subordinated groups and routine repression. Organised defiance is certainly not an 
alien experience to the Chinese citizens. Commenting on Tarrow’s (1994) 
generalised description of authoritarian states’ repressive tendency toward grassroots 
movements, Perry (2002: xxiv) points out that China perhaps can be seen as an 
exception. Unlike authoritarian states elsewhere, the Communist Party’s ideological 
commitment to the mass line, rooted in Chinese political culture in justified rebellion, 
encourages contentious actions and even occasionally sponsors mass campaigns for 
their instrumental value to consolidate the legitimacy of the ruling factions of the 
political elites. Historical experience of political struggles, according to Perry’s  
(2003: 266) remark on the lasting impact of the Cultural Revolution, ‘imbue ordinary 
citizens with a greater awareness of the possibilities and practices of mass protest’. 
Despite the political risks and frequent oppression, spontaneous or reactionary 
collective claim making was never absent from the political landscape in China and 
has been intensified by the ongoing reform in the post-Tiananmen China (see Cai, 
2010). The widespread organised bottom-up resistances, regardless of the diverse 
nature of their claims and outcomes, even lead Goldman (2005) to celebrate the 
potential for democratisation in China’s soil. Therefore, to argue that the rarity of 
collective actions is a result of the lack of political experience is unfounded from a 
historical perspective.  
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Neither is it empirically true in the present study. During my fieldwork, I was only 
able to access a few displacees who joined collective actions in their neighbourhoods. 
Those localised collective actions however were extremely short-lived, as compared 
to a nine-year collective action in another district in Shanghai (Shi, 2008). As Brunn 
(2013: 259) points out, the power of collective actions resides in ‘connecting, 
focusing and agitating of a given mass of people’. The rarity of such actions and their 
failures to achieve the desired outcomes as I shall examine in this section should be 
registered with the systematic deprivation of political resources and opportunities for 
mobilisation through the revolutionary tactic, divide and conquer, masterfully 
employed by the communist party for its long-lasting dictatorship (Perry, 2007). The 
displacees were confronted with major obstacles to join forces with displacees inside 
and outside the immediate boundary of their neighbourhood, not to mention to 
further ‘jump scales’ (Smith, 1992: 60) and mobilise sympathetic citizens, 
intellectuals and activists on their side.  
The division between the displacees is firstly created by the institutional settings 
enabling the ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in China which, as Harvey (2005a: 181) 
conceptualises, is a process of constructing ‘the bundle of rights necessary for capital 
accumulation’ to dictate human lives. Amongst the bundle of rights, property rights, 
as a recent legal construction in China, is perhaps a most important one to sustain 
land-centred accumulation in Chinese cities. I have no intention here to wrestle with 
the definition of property (rights) in various disciplinary traditions5 (Brown, 2007, 
Hann, 1998), or to debate with non-reflexive academic praxis that using this notion 
to prescribe pills to solve the problems arises from China’s grand project of 
neoliberalisation6 (He et al., 2009, Zhu, 2002). For my analysis here, I follow 
Verdery’s (2003: 14-20) relational view of property that ‘specifies what things have 
                                                            
5 This is for sure not an easy task. Property rights may be seen as people’s relationship to things, or 
interpersonal relationship to things (Cohen, 1927). The most popular definition is economistic and 
legalistic, focusing on a disaggregated bundle of abstract rights, including rights to use, rights to 
derive profits, and rights to transfer or alienate (Demsetz, 1967). Anthropological and sociological 
traditions tend to follow the substantivist school pioneered by Polanyi (2001[1944]), anchoring their 
theorisation on social and cultural relations. This approach embeds the material objects to a web of 
social relations and attempts to understand how social actors negotiate the relationship to things. In so 
doing, it avoids methodological individualism. Along this line, politics and morality becomes inherent 
and inevitable issues for discussion (Hann, 1998).  
6 For example, Pils (2009a) is doubtful of the legislating efforts in defining clearer boundaries of 
property rights. Despite the advancement—better to have a law than not, she believes that the law is 
symbolic. The legal construction overly interferes in civil issues whereas inadequately keep the power 
of the state in check in the process of appropriating private properties. In this sense, the law is merely 
another tool to serve the prevailing logic of capital. Haila (2007) argues that such uncritical embracing 
of the vocabularies of capitalistic economics is in fact constructing the market as the new emperor in 
China.  
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what values and who counts as a person’ (p. 18) and positions the things in a web of 
social relations imbued with power, subject to constant contestation and negotiation. 
One of the functions of property rights is to create boundaries, ‘concerning what 
belongs to whom and who belongs to or has affinities with some larger entity’ (p. 18).  
As I have been repeatedly arguing against the ontological presumption of temporal 
discontinuities in analysing China’s neoliberalising process (see He and Wu, 2009), 
the institutional legacies inherited from China’s communist past as I would argue, 
have been as much creatively destroyed as creatively reconstructed (Lee and Selden, 
2007) in order to reduce the cost of capital accumulation and ‘construct class 
dominance’ (Harvey, 2007: 41). The departure from socialist redistribution to a 
market-based organisation of social reproduction in China results in ambiguous 
property regimes with mixed logics. The deliberately ambiguous property rights 
arrangement (Ho, 2001) therefore augments the displacees, complicates their internal 
structure, and makes it difficult to construct a shared identity as victims of the Expo. 
They were compartmented by jurisdictional boundaries, cut through by the rural-
urban divide and further split by the ownership structure of their properties. The site 
of the Expo and two major resettlement-housing sites occupy the land under the 
jurisdiction of four district governments. As a result of decentralised governance in 
Shanghai, land-related governance is by and large controlled by the district 
governments, a critical institutional arrangement for ‘local state capitalism’ (Keith et 
al., 2013: 125-133)7. As the de facto displacers, the district governments have the 
power to formulate the most fine-grained regulations on chaiqian within the general 
legal frame. Similar in format, however, those regulations vary significantly in the 
overall process of displacement, the formulas of compensation, the openings in 
participation and the contact agencies for appeals and grievances. Such technical 
difference in legal framework, although not entirely intentional, reinforced the 
geographical boundaries and created practical difficulties for the displacees to arrive 
at a common vision on the target of their defiance.  
Even within the single district of Pudong, where more than 10,000 households lost 
their homes to the Expo, the caste-like hierarchical structure caused by the rural-
urban divide (Whyte and Parish, 1984), and the complexity of land and housing 
ownership resulted from the predatory land-centred accumulation in the previous 
decades, created tremendous obstacles for political mobilisation and a cross-class 
                                                            
7 Both the state council and the municipal government regularly controls and monitors the land use 
given the concern for food security (Lin, 2009). But there are many tricks the local governments may 
play to bypass the regulations such as cutting a large parcel of land into smaller pieces, to facilitate 
‘local state capitalism’ (Keith et al., 2013: 112-139).  
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alliance. Owing to the dual land ownership, the collective ownership of the land in 
the countryside as compared to the state ownership of land in the city creates an 
institutional cleavage between the urban and rural hukou holders. As per regulation, 
land appropriation of two types of land must follow different procedures and offer 
additional compensation packages to the farmers, including compensation for the 
loss of their agricultural products, labour force resettlement, and collective 
infrastructures, etc. The collective ownership of the land allows the farmers to frame 
their grievances in a much more powerful way as compared to urbanites, including 
those urban self-built housing dwellers, who cannot ground their collective interest in 
the land of their communities. At best, they could make a claim of ownership to their 
zhaijidi 8 (building plots) or in most cases, to their houses only.  
In addition to the gulf wedged by the land ownership, the displacees were further 
divided by the property rights arrangement of their housing. The housing stock on 
the Expo site is a mixture of self-built owner-occupied houses, commercial housing, 
public rental homes, danwei9 (work unit) housing and shared ownership apartments, 
and chengzhongun9  properties, houses without legal titles, amongst other types. 
Contestation of property ownership of each type of housing in this short list had to 
employ different rhetoric, resort to different policies and target different authorities.10 
Such diverse institutional settings created further obstacles for the disgruntled to 
formulate their tactics. The accounts selected below show the missed opportunity for 
mass protests because of the failure to reconcile their differences caused by 
                                                            
8  This is another example of conflicts caused by deliberate institutional ambiguity. State ownership of 
urban land was arbitrarily imposed in the 1980s in revising the Land Law, taking advantage of violent 
appropriation of private properties during the Cultural Revolution (Wilhelm, 2004). Many displacees 
contest the legitimacy of state ownership of the land underneath their properties and refuse to accept 
the legalistic separation of land use right from land ownership, as a shift in policy regimes (the quote 
from Mr Li in this chapter can be seen as an example). It is against the local traditions. This may be 
seen as an example of the violence of law, disproving traditions that hurdle the free circulation of 
capital, as argued by Springer (2013) based on his study in Cambodia. Protests in similar rhetoric 
were employed by public/danwei housing tenants who acquired their properties during the communist 
era and claim absolute ownership to their properties although the law specifies clear limitations on the 
tenants’ rights to such properties.  
9 Self-built housing on formerly collective-owned land was left intact to reduce the cost of 
resettlement during the land appropriation and ownership conversion before selling the land use right 
to developers.   
10 For instance, renters of danwei housing need to manoeuvre and craft their relations with both the 
displacers and their danwei in order to get a fair compensation. Their status as socialist workers offers 
them the moral resource to frame unfair treatment as a further betrayal of socialist contract. Such 
cultural resource however is not at the disposal of the self-built housing owners. It was rather 
straightforward for them to contest on the land ownership and the under-compensation for their loss of 
land use right. For chengzhongcun property owners, they were further deprived of the opportunity to 
contest the land ownership and had to seek sympathy from their former collectives. Illegal housing 
dwellers had to defend the legality of their buildings as a survival strategy in material poverty. 
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institutional settings and to construct their actions with a shared vision for secure 
livelihood.   
To put it bluntly, we had been abandoned for a long time before the displacement. 
We thought we were governed by our brigade. But the brigade told us that we are no 
longer part of it. Our land had long been appropriated. People on the sixth 
production group were luckier. Their land had not been entirely appropriated. They 
were still part of the collective. We from the fifth production group were unfortunate. 
We had no land left. Each production group was in a different situation. Our brigade 
had six production groups. No group was in the same boat (female, chengzhongcun 
property owner, interview D76, 28/03/2012). 
We farmers had such spacious houses. Those Shanghainese lived in crowded 
conditions. Ten people might live under the same roof. They of course wanted 
chaiqian. It is a good thing for them. For us, poor farmers, we did not want chaiqian 
at all. It impoverishes us. No one wanted to be displaced (female, farmer, interview 
D10, 09/03/2012). 
Those people from Zhoujiadu were different from us. They own their properties. 
They built their houses. Many of them lived there for generations. Ours was built by 
our danwei. Our danwei distributed to our parents’ generation. So now, we were the 
de facto owners (female, SOE danwei housing dweller, Interview D111 06/2012). 
On that side of the road was the apartment buildings. On this side was our penghuqu 
(shanty housing area). They treated us completely differently. Their properties were 
valued at 8000 RMB per square metre while ours were only several hundred RMB. 
Location-wise, we were only separated by a road…Some of theirs were commercial 
housing and some were privatised during the housing reform. They could sell but we 
could not. Our housing [ownership] was different. Plus, we knew no body in that 
part  (female, self-built owner-occupier housing, Interview D13, 03/2012). 
Following Bourdieu (1999c), one might comment that the displacees in these 
fragmented groups are so immersed in their own social spaces and microcosms, 
constructing ‘us’ and ‘them’ along so many different lines as we have seen from the 
quotes above, that they failed to see things outside their particular positions, and 
misrecognised the commonality in their ‘positional suffering’, which  could have 
engulfed their differences if the view of the macrocosm was taken into consideration. 
The pluralistic views of political possibilities, a combined effect of the displacees’ 
diverse positions in the social hierarchies and the organisation of the demolition;  
however, are more than dividing the displacees, destroying their social bonds and 
preventing political coalition. Worse, they restricted political imagination, turning 
the ‘privileged’ compensation standard applied to one group or in one locality as the 
ultimate goal of protesting actions for those in inferior positions in other places. 
Ironically, those claims frequently dwelled on a sense of distributive justice. This 
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popular view is remotely comparable to Rawlsian (1971) liberal philosophical 
theorisation of justice as a social contract established by individuals under a veil of 
ignorance in fair conditions. Neither basic liberties nor equal opportunities are the 
principles of justice (Rawls, 2001: 42-43) that the displacees were pursuing. Their 
view, hardly self-consciously though,  is rooted in the Confucius ethics that sustains 
hierarchical social order in the social space and posits justice not as measured against 
universal value but as relative perception derived from comparison to others in the 
same social and spatial category (Zhang, 2008a). As Ying (2001: 34) noted, the 
repressive power of such moral cultures lies in that it restricts, undermines and tames 
political actions. Distributive justice for them is sought not by overthrowing the 
oppressive structure or the powerful growth machine in truly privileged position 
through collective efforts, but to make an unjust situation less unjust, or as unjust as 
those in better positions, competing to become less miserable victims. This said, it is 
perhaps highly unfair to dismiss the value of such actions altogether. For one, those 
practical actions are for sure better than resignation, despite how ineffective they are 
to bring real change. For another, arbitrary privilege is born to be fought against in 
any social circumstances; even such fight might disturbingly let off the real culprit 
and enable the reproduction of domination. This is nicely put by Primo Levi (1986: 
27), ‘it is the duty of righteous men [sic] to make war on all undeserved privilege, 
but one must not forget that this is a war without end. Where there exists power 
exercised few or by only one against the many, privilege is born and proliferates, 
even against the will of the power itself; but on the other hand it is normal for power 
to tolerate  and encourage it’.  
Tolerance and encouragement, however, are perhaps too passive and ineffective to 
eliminate the chance of political uprising. New divisions must be constantly making 
cooperation between the displacees a pipe dream. Potential alliances were prevented 
by the piecemeal process of land appropriation and demolition. The Expo site within 
the jurisdiction of each district was further divided into small and controllable 
neighbourhoods according to the time management of the domicide business. This 
might be attributed to the limited capacity of the bulldozer regime to operate the 
domicide business on such a gigantic scale at the same time. However, by creating 
those spatial boundaries and controlling the timing of domicide, it also contained 
possible resistance in a given locality. This was only possible with the cooperation 
from the displacees whose high level of uncertainty of displacement (timing, 
possibility, etc.) turned them into bystanders to the victims of other localities. The 
non-transparent planning process certainly fuelled their uncertainties. For many 
displacees, displacement had been a haunting ghost and speculations had circulated 
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in some neighbourhoods before they were finally displaced by the Expo. Each false 
alarm desensitised the displacees’ reactions and aggregated their sense of uncertainty. 
Despite the Expo having been successfully secured in 2002, most displacees were 
suspicious that they would be displaced given the sheer scale and the land politics 
entailed by the project.  
We knew Shanghai was successful in the bid but we had no idea it involved chaiqian. 
Besides, there were many versions of the Expo site at that time and no one was 
affirmative about the location. What I thought back then was, Shanghai No. 3 Steel 
Company was way too big to be relocated. No one could possibly have the financial 
capacity to relocate such a huge company. We thought, Shanghai Expo might, like 
Aichi Expo, find a place in a remote suburban area and dismantle all pavilions 
afterwards (Mrs Fan, interview, D112, 06/2012). 
The only reliable source of information on displacement to most displacees was the 
final chaiqian announcement distributed by the bulldozer regime (see table 7.1). The 
control of timing is of course centralised in the hand of the bulldozer regime. It 
speculated on the displacees’ rationality to take control of uncertainty by getting on 
with their mundane everyday life before the final arrival of chaiqian notice rather 
than let uncertainty dictate their life to take precautions when nothing has been set in 
motion. The rationality of the dominated becomes one of the most powerful weapons 
of the dominators (Bauman, 1989).   
Co-optation and manipulation offered the bulldozer regime more effective 
ammunition to destroy the solidarity between the displacees and more powerfully, to 
coerce one displacee against another. In chapter 6, I have discussed the effect of the 
head-count method of compensation in undermining the solidarity between the 
displacees in a given locality. The baseline of compensation in this method was 
determined by the number of entitled people in a given family rather than the value 
of the appropriated property. Resettlement offered to those displacees, who would 
otherwise become homeless under the property-based compensation method, was 
coloured in a way to address long-term social injustice and exercise the power of the 
state in redistributing wealth. These people became the prime target of co-optation. 
Moreover, additional subsidies were offered to displacees with disabilities or severe 
health problems, or suffering from unemployment. Such almsgiving paid off a large 
number of displacees in material deprivation and secured their subordination. This 
has not yet taken into account the additional offers in the supplementary clauses in 
the resettlement agreement to solicit the consent from a few families who were 
purposefully selected to unsettle the social fabric of a given neighbourhood and 
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sometimes were used later as real-life examples for manufactured realities of 
chaiqian in official propaganda.  
Table 7.1: Knowledge of Displacement and Actions before Displacement  
Knowledge of Chaiqian and Actions before Chaiqian  (n=300) Frequency  Percentage  
Timing of knowledge of 
chaiqian 
During the Bidding Process 67 22.3% 
When chaiqian finally started 233 77.7% 
Source of knowledge of 
chaiqian (Multiple Choice) 
TV, internet, and other media 40 13.3% 
Neighbourhood meetings 51 17.0% 
Final chaiqian announcement 
distributed  
260 86.8% 
Efforts made to study the 
regulatory frameworks 
Yes  64 21.3% 
No 236 78.7% 
Efforts made to improve 
housing conditions to 
increase compensation 
Yes 35 11.7% 
No 265 88.3% 
Source: my own survey, 2012 
But, co-optation remains expensive. It is absolutely free to manipulate the displacees’ 
desires, preferences and interests through the logic of the market, making them 
believe that the real enemies undermining their real interests were among themselves. 
All they needed was a compelling pitch or performance to create anxiety and 
encourage competition for a decent resettlement apartment that is in short supply and 
convince them to make a ‘rational’ choice. It must be noted that neither scarcity of 
economic resources is a given condition nor choice can be freely made according to 
one’s will. On the former, Sahlins (1998) reminds us that scarcity was created rather 
than a natural a priori condition, due to a particular cultural system in valuating 
resources and organising the way to satisfy human wants. On the latter, Bourdieu 
(2005: 22) persuasively argues that ‘though it is not incorrect to say that production 
produces consumption, supply, by the very fact that it tends to eliminate some or all 
of other possible ways of satisfying housing need….contributes to imposing a 
particular way of satisfying this need, while apparently respects the rights of the 
sovereign consumer’. Yet, scarcity was real for the displacees because the supply of 
resettlement housing was centralised in the hands of the bulldozer regime. For most 
displacees, the meagre compensation only allowed them to purchase apartments in 
suburbia. While the quantity of the supply there was sufficient, the quality of housing 
(size, layout, floor-level, building facilities, communal designs, etc.) was always in a 
false state of scarcity. This effectively forced the displaced families with diverse 
housing needs and preferences to compete against each other in the jungle of the 
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resettlement housing market. On this issue, Engels (1993 [1887]) lamented more than 
a century ago,  
Competition is the completest expression of the battle of all against all which rules 
modern civil society. This battle, a battle for life, for existence, for everything, in 
case of need a battle of life and death, is fought not between different classes of 
society only, but also between the individual member of these classes. Each is in the 
way of the other, and each seeks to crowd out all who are in his way, and to put 
himself in their place….But this competition of the workers among themselves is the 
worse side of the present state of things in its effect upon the worker, the sharpest 
weapon against the proletariat in the hands of the bourgeoisie (p. 87-88). 
By constructing a resettlement housing market and forcing the displacees to compete, 
the bulldozer regime could rest their craws in most of the time rather than 
excessively rely on the coercive power of the state. All they had to do was supply the 
information on the housing stock in terms of its availability and conditions, either by 
their chaiqian agents or through less costly media channels, and let the gene of the 
market work on the anxious mind of the displacees. Numerous bulletin boards were 
set up at visible locations inside a targeted community to keep the displacees updated 
with the overall process.11 As soon as one family signed an agreement, clear marks 
would be made to warn the displacees of their diminishing choices.12 When the 
displacees were hesitant to buy the story of scarcity, according to displacees in 
Pudong, migrant workers were conveniently hired to dress up like the local residents 
and queue in front of a chaiqian bastion, creating a false impression that the longer 
the displacees hold out, the less opportunity to purchase an apartment they truly want, 
the higher possibility to live inside a property for the rest of their life unhappily. Of 
course, such vicious schemes were only possible with the cooperation of the 
displacees who either willingly withheld the process and content of negotiation offers 
(usually more than they could get) or were coerced not to disclose their final offers to 
their neighbours under explicit threat from the chaiqian agents, the penalty of which 
would be a nullification of the agreement (see Table 7.2).   
Table 7.2: Hampered Communication between the Displacees 
N=300 Frequency  Percentage  
Knowledge of Neighbour’s Compensation 40 13.3% 
Disclose Offer to Neighbours 51 17% 
Threats Not to Discuss with Outsiders to Your Family 196 65.3% 
Source: my own, 2012 
                                                            
11 See The Great Displacement in Pudong, p.12 
12 Some displacees told me that displacers in their neighbourhoods wrongfully did so to create 
pressure on them while those apartments were still available.   
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It should be pointed out the nullification was an empty threat. However, the party-
state led nature of the Expo-induced chaiqian, and the arbitrary exercise of state 
power, reduced the displacees’ capacity to think like a legal subject protected by the 
law or a rebellious subject against tyranny. The submission is further secured though 
routine repression carried out by the police during the displacement as a constant 
reminder of the dictatorial power of the state. Open comments, critiques, grumbling 
or gossip, with or without contentious intentions, were non-discriminatorily defined 
as deference or threat, and were punished through routine surveillance of the public 
space or meeting places—the potential sites for political dissents. In doing so, it 
reduced the possibility of spontaneous association and political mobilisation, and 
forced the displacees to retreat to ‘hidden’ sites and  take more disguised forms of 
resistance as greater safety came from anonymity, subtlety and indirectness (Scott, 
1990). Technology indeed offered such possibility that allowed the disgruntled 
displacees to communicate over the phone without being publically identified by the 
surveillance team. Yet, the ramifications on the psychology of the displacees were 
more profound, making such political alternatives incapable of mobilising the others. 
Repression by intention was to amplify the situational fear the displacees had already 
suffered and compellingly teach them the cost of political actions. A displacee 
recalled an incident in his neighbourhood in which a non-contentious hangout was 
conceived by the bulldozer regime as a threat and was suppressed by the police 
immediately. With the iron fist ready to hit, the displacers left no chance for hidden 
tactics of gossiping or rumouring13 to subvert their power.     
There was this guy named L in our neighbourhood. He was my next-door neighbour 
actually. We once were hanging out around a small shop owned by another 
neighbour. It was pretty normal. We always went there when we were free or after 
dinner. Gasanhu14 (chitchats on random issues, rumours or gossip). So we talked 
about chaiqian as well. My neighbour L made one comment that the chaiqian 
companies were not trustworthy. Somehow, this comment got back to the chaiqian 
companies. Someone must have overheard this. You know what happened to him? 
Chaiqian companies came to his home and threatened him. It was only a random 
conversation. Can you believe it? He was taken in by the police and charged with 
spreading rumours. He worked for a bank back then. It affected his job. [YZ: was he 
spreading rumours though?] It was not a rumour at all. It was only a comment! The 
police came after him for making a comment. [YZ: what happened afterwards?] 
Every one became cautious. No one dared to talk. Whoever talked, whoever got 
punished (male, 60s, displaced from Puxi, interview X46, 27/04/2012). 
                                                            
13 See Scott (1990) on rumours and gossip as hidden tactics of subordinates in the face of power.  
14 This is in local dialect.  
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The most inhibiting factor for open and organised actions perhaps lies in that protests, 
open or covert, would only prolong the dreadful experience, adding more pressure to 
their everyday life. A few delays here and there, justifiable as following bureaucratic 
procedures, could easily exhaust the displacees’ resources and manipulate their mind. 
This is based on the assumption that the justice system or the complaint system 
would perform their role as they were designed and act impartially to the displacees’ 
claims. As I have shown in previous chapters, the whole state apparatus was 
mobilised with a shared goal of destroying people’s homes without moral and legal 
limits. The role of the complaint system or the justice system was more to contain 
grievances rather than to serve justice. Sympathetic treatment to the displacees on 
such bureaucratic encounters was to instil a false hope to the displacees that further 
radical actions were unnecessary, at least not until the system proved to be failing 
them. Yet, inactions as a result of bureaucratic incapacity15 or collusion with the 
displacers were the more common and possible outcome the displacees could expect. 
Mrs Yang, a female displacee, joined collective petitions with her neighbours. She 
recalled how the officer at the municipal xinfang office supported their claims 
initially and even promised a timely response but again and again kept them waiting 
and eventually flipped sides and allied with the displacers16. Over and over again, 
denied justice through those bureaucratic encounters shaped the displacees’ 
expectations of what they could achieve through their actions. To quote from Auyero 
(2012: 7), such political interactions ‘provide the poor with political education or 
daily crash courses on the working of power’. When fighting became useless in 
practice, it fostered a growing sense of fatalism, and led to programmatic efforts to 
accept and get by with harsh realities of displacement. This would make better sense 
if we take into account the fact that fighting also incurs additional investment in time 
and money. Besides, the incentives of free-riding a collective action was not at all 
unappealing (Olson, 1971). As one displacee told me, ‘if they could have [more 
compensation after the fight], then I shall have too’.17 
                                                            
15 See Minzner (2006) and Chen (2012a) on the discussion of the institutional incapacity of the 
xinfang system. The sheer number of citizen complaints the xinfang agency received each year makes 
it difficult for the agency to investigate each case thoroughly. Also, their weak positions in the 
bureaucratic field itself discouraged a serious and effective attempt to resolve non-legitimacy 
damaging petitions.   
16 Interview, D97, 20/04/2012. 
17 Interview, 13/05/2012. 




The above analysis attempts to tease out the conditions and mechanisms that reduced 
available political options for the displacees and forced them to defend their interests 
in individualised, family-based and atomised forms. Before negotiating with the 
chaiqian operatives, displaced families usually had formal or informal discussions in 
terms of the resettlement arrangement and their family tactics to squeeze out a better 
offer. But, the decision of fighting or not and how to fight are further circumvented 
by the structure of authority and power within the displaced families, exploitable by 
the chaiqian agents. In many cases, this decision-making process can create more 
tensions between family members, destroy the last protection of the displacees, plant 
the seeds of familial conflicts and divide the displacees into atomised individuals in 
the war against a powerful bulldozer regime.  
It is worthwhile to restate that chaiqian is a process of dissolution and reformation of 
families owing to the inevitable changes of housing consumption. It destabilises the 
structure and routine politics within the displaced families and compels the 
displacees to enter into ritualistic negotiation, contestation and transfer of authority, 
power and wealth between different generations and amongst family members. As 
such, this is not always a democratic process, immune from patriarchal or masculine 
domination. The authority and power in making a collective decision, either to accept 
the offer or to bargain for a higher compensation package, does not necessarily 
derive from seniority in the family. But, the disciplinary power of filial obligations 
makes it a moral duty to respect the interests and opinions of the senior generations, 
whilst whether to respect their powerful positions at the time of chaiqian 
negotiations is subject to pre-existing family politics and the manipulation of those 
insidious chaiqian agents. It is beyond the capacity of this chapter to reduce a 
complicated picture of the internal politics of the displaced families in a few broad 
brushes as above given the diversity of their family histories, structures, trajectories 
and relations. One pattern however was quite clear to me that the knowledge 
acquisition of the regulatory frameworks tended to increase one’s chance to gain 
influence in making the decision for the whole family. After all, the negotiation 
process is not a bargain between equal footing market players based on the principles 
of equality and willingness. For most displacees, violence and other open protest 
actions were last resorts. The game, to be played well, must be played according to 
pre-determined government regulations on chaiqian and housing and avoiding 
making a foul act, which would significantly undermine their claims. Literacy and 
knowledge of those regulations therefore become crucial and access to such 
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knowledge is likely to increase a member’s likelihood to gain authority in this 
decision-making process.  
Yet, the entry ticket to the negotiation meetings was surveilled and manipulated by 
the chaiqian agents based on their observation of family dynamics. This is due to the 
inconsistency of legal and cultural construct of ownership to the appropriated 
properties. Chaiqian agents could selectively apply the definition that is most 
advantageous to them in a particular situation to get their jobs done most efficiently. 
Usually, since compensation was based on the residual value of the appropriated 
properties, the property owner as strictly specified in the Property Rights Certificate 
or the Land Use Rights Certificate was approached during initial contacts, excluding 
the members who might be de jure owners to the collective property under the Civil 
Law. Once their knowledge of the displaced families increased during the process of 
negotiation, they would easily choose to approach the formerly excluded members in 
the name of respecting the authoritative figures in the displaced family in practice, 
the collective ownership of family properties, or the head suggested in the hukou 
registration booklet. Such arbitrary power was further amplified by the eligibility test 
of a displacee under the ‘head count’ compensation standard, excluding ‘tough’ 
owners from compensation altogether. Let me quote the chaiqian experience of Mr 
Feng18 here, as an example. At the time of displacement, Feng had divorced his wife 
for a couple of years but they did not clearly settle the matrimonial property out of 
concern for the well-being of his wife and his single son who had no place to live 
other than this property. During displacement, he was not only denied as the 
legitimate owner of this property but also deprived of any right to represent his son to 
negotiate with the chaiqian agents. He did not qualify as a displacee as he lived 
elsewhere and was not in housing difficulty despite the fact that he was lodging in his 
sister’s apartment after the divorce. By controlling the entry to a negotiation meeting, 
chaiqian agents effectively secured domination throughout the negotiations and 
undermined the organisation of collective interest of a given displaced family.  
The bond between family members was further severed by the fact that the 
displacees experienced chaiqian in variegated ways, which was shaped by their 
personal memories of state repression and their tolerance of violence and pain, as 
well as their political agency. As Scott (1976: 227) reminds us well, ‘the memory of 
repression is one of the principal explanations for the absence of resistance and 
revolt’. On this point, let me first quote in full an account offered by Uncle Zhu, in 
                                                            
18 Interview, D113, 06/2012.  
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his late 50s, who lost his home to the Expo pavilions in Puxi without a meaningful 
fight.  
For the mass, political actions against the government are always futile. From the 
generation of my grandfather, to that of my father, to my generation, the political 
guts of each generation have been moulded and squeezed by the education of the 
Communist Party. The prophecy of ancestors is insightful—People cannot fight 
against government officers (min buy u guan dou)…. My grandfather fought against 
the state. The possessions of our ancestors passed down to my grandfather was 
confiscated by the communist regime. He was stigmatised as a member of the four 
social groups,19 an enemy of the nascent communist regime. He was expelled to the 
farm where he spent his whole life. This was not only about him. It affected our 
whole family. My father was defined as the son of the four social groups and was 
punished. The punishment against my father implicated my generation. Generation 
after generation, we no longer dare to fight. The right hand of the state is the police 
force. The left hand is the military. The back stands the prison. Fight against the 
state? Quit the pipe dream! (Interview, X11, 02/05/2012). 
His quote nicely illuminated the pedagogical function of political memory in 
developing the sense of political opportunities and grasping the permissible 
‘contentious repertories’ that emerged from experience of political struggles (Tilly, 
1978, 1993). Of greater interest to me as captured by this quote is the ‘geologically 
layered quality’ of Chinese families (Tang and Parish, 2000: 17), in reference to the 
stratification of life chances and political experiences according to the coming age of 
the population under rapidly changing political climates (i.e. pre-socialist time, the 
golden age of socialism, the cultural revolution, the early reform era and the 
neoliberal time). The political experiences and consciousness between different 
generations are quite different due to their personal trajectories, influencing their 
decisions to fight or leave cooperatively. For the oldest in my study (70s or above), 
they had the experience of hardships of war, emancipation in the golden days of 
socialism, the state terror during the Cultural Revolution and the material prosperity 
in the reform era. Their faith in the communist party and indoctrination in the party’s 
history writing and ideology, supported by their rapidly improving living conditions 
as compared to the experience of hardships in their formative years, are convincing 
enough for them to be grateful to the party as saviours to their lives and to support 
the party’s well-packaged programme. A grandma who represented her family in 
                                                            
19 This is a very ambiguous categorisation and prescription of people’s political identity under the 
communist regime. Strictly, it refers to people who were arbitrarily classified as landlords and rich 
peasants and whose actions were deemed as anti-revolution or non-conformity to the communist 
mores.  
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signing the first resettlement agreement in her neighbourhood attempted to convince 
me that she was not a victim of domicide.  
I have faith in the Communist Party. The party is good. Without the party, I would 
never have the chance to live in this kind of apartment. I am now very happy. 
Thanks to the party, I do not have to work but I still receive monthly pension. 
Without the party, I would have been dead for ages. If not for Chairman Mao and 
Premier Zhou, we would not have this happy life. Even in dreams, I cannot forget 
the greatness of the party (displaced from Pudong, interview, D69, 25/03/2012). 
For generations of Uncle Zhu’s age or younger, some share the sentiments of the 
older generations, either of heartfelt gratitude for the caring state in helping them to 
survive the hardest times of their lives or of their precarious position as long term 
state benefits recipients. But for a majority of them, their personal experience of state 
terror and repression to their parents and themselves during their formative years, the 
pain brought by the restructuring of the economy, growing inequalities in all spheres 
of their lives and rampant corruption shattered their faith in socialism and the party. 
Unlike the protesting farmers in Li’s (2004) study, there is no hierarchical difference 
in their distrust of the regime. The whole state apparatus is seen as corrupted. A one-
off experience of betrayal or punishment to any member of their family is enough to 
destroy their trust in the regime, let alone repeated exposure to political scandals. 
Aunt Zhou, a witty woman in her late 40s, was the granddaughter of a ‘landlord’ who 
was honoured by the tenants for frequent exemption of rents in bad years and kind 
loans in hard times but was harshly prosecuted by the Communist Party. Her 
memory of her childhood was defined by terror while she had to live in exile. Her 
father gave up all their family possessions in the socialist transformation era in order 
to escape the same fate of her granddad but the class label of her family as landlord 
severely limited the life chances of her family. Her husband’s loss of job due to the 
reform of state sector economy was the final blow completely destroying her 
remaining trust in the party.  
The Communist Party is a whore who wants a monument for its chastity. It robs you 
of your land and your home. Instead of compensating you for your loss, you have to 
be grateful to the party for the life changing opportunity. I suspect there aren’t any 
other parties in the world that can be as shameless as the Communist Party. The 
capitalist countries invade other weak countries and steal the wealth from other 
nations for the benefits of their own. The communist party on the other hand relies 
on robbing own citizens under its governance (Interview, D13, 03/2012). 
As a result of the layered quality, chaiqian was perceived in ambivalent and 
contradictory views by different members of a displaced family. So were the views 
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of the necessity and possibility of resisting actions. This further strained family 
relations and escalated contestation of the authority and power in their families in 
representing others whose life trajectory was shaped by different forces and their 
experiences of the state power were so different. This of course was exploited by the 
chaiqian agents. Those who have little knowledge of the mechanism of chaiqian 
other than a loyal heart for the Communist Party were frequently approached to 
negotiate the deal or to persuade the rest to comply with the political order from the 
party.  
The eventual choice of putting on a fight and the tactics of resistance also depended 
on the available resources and the costs of protesting actions perceived by the 
displaced families, as Moore (1978: 125) points out, ‘throughout the centuries one of 
the common man’s most frequent and effective responses to oppression is flight’.  
For the displacees, using the law to address their grievances or defend their legally 
defined rights is less effective and useful than exploiting the ambiguities and 
loopholes in the law as the powerful elites always do. They are rightful resisters 
appropriating the instruments and symbols for their practical agenda (O'Brien and Li, 
2006: 3). Moreover, this legalistic solution presumes that the displacees were able to 
find daring and sympathetic lawyers to represent them in courtrooms. As Michelson 
(2006, 2007) observed, political embeddness of Chinese lawyers in the political 
bureaucracy and their selective bias of legal cases may compromise the lawyers’ 
professional integrity and personal conviction in legal justice. Chaiqian is a 
politically sensitive matter. Lawyers on chaiqian in China are different than their 
counterparts on poverty in the United States who integrate their professions with the 
objective of the state in managing the poor, according to Katz’s (1982) ethnography. 
Lawyers on chaiqian are indeed abundant but when the case involves the local 
government, they gave up too easily and were too afraid to speak truth to power. A 
displaced family were once represented by a law firm practising in Shanghai but 
based in Beijing. Initially the lawyers were very sympathetic to their situation and 
only charged them a few thousand RMB for legal representation. But shortly after, 
they were told by the lawyers that the best option was to give up and take the offer as 
their firm had been warned explicitly about political revenge from the local 
government.20 
Bodily resistance exploiting the vague legal definition, the inconsistencies with other 
regulations and governing practices and the difficulties in effective control and 
monitoring of the implementation, offered the displacees an attractive yet morally 
                                                            
20 Interview, D109, 06/2012. 
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controversial and legally contentious option. The inconsistency in chaiqian 
regulation is created by the dual compensation standards, i.e. property-based 
compensation and head-count valuation, which allows the displacees to select a 
higher compensation package. Although the displacees must go through an eligibility 
test under the head-count (e.g. length of residence, length of pregnancy, marriage, 
hukou status, etc.), in practice it is difficult and time-consuming to authenticate the 
displacees’ bodily tactics. Under a tight chaiqian plan, some displacers may tacitly 
tolerate those actions as long as legitimate documents can be supplied by the 
displacees. To do this, there are two popular tactics, intra-city migration and 
contractual marriage. Extended family members could update their hukou 
registration to the address of the appropriated properties before chaiqian (Wu, 2004). 
The outcome depends on how stringent the local police are in enforcing the hukou 
regulation and freezing incoming migration to a place publically announced for 
demolition.  
The other popular tactic is marriage/divorce of convenience. A married couple with a 
single child, upon mutual agreement, may file a non-fault divorce, and then either or 
both quickly enter into contractual marriage(s) with other adult(s) with or without 
kids. In this way, it would at least double the original compensation, and in some 
cases may even triple the compensation, after paying off the contractual partners. It is 
a perilous act because if the chaiqian companies take the issue seriously and follow 
bureaucratic procedures to verify the authenticity of the marriages/divorces, they 
may press charges for fraud. Moreover, the displacees engaged in those dramatic 
measures must also bear the consequence of moral critique from their potential 
supporters, and the risks of damaging their marital relations when the contractual 
partners refuse to terminate the contract or blackmail for more money. Many 
politically docile displacees bemoaned that fake marriages/divorces were eroding 
social morality and failure to charge those frauds were signs of cowardly bullying by 
the state and undermined social justice.21 A retired teacher in her seventies who was 
only able to buy one resettlement apartment for a spacious two-floor old alley house 
went ballistic after learning about her neighbour’s ‘shameful’ shams:   
Can you believe it? They were a family of three, living in a 7-square metres room. 
The old couple filed for a divorce and married with others. Their son also quickly 
married a female migrant. They have exhausted all their means and managed to 
secure three resettlement apartments here. The old guy did not want to divorce again 
with the contractual partner before he died of a heart attack. Now his son is suing his 
                                                            
21 Again, their view of social justice is a comparative notion and best understood as fairness amongst 
people in their category.  
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fake stepmother for the ownership of the property under his father’s name. This is 
bullshit! They have no suzhi at all. But karma came after them (interview, X19, 
04/05/2012). 
But, are those couples to blame for the decaying morality or disobeying the law? For 
the couples who performed this kind of bodily resistances, which unfortunately I 
only met two during my fieldwork, they were willing to pursue this tactic only 
because they could not see other choices to secure or improve their livelihood. A 
woman in a contractual divorce with her husband at the time of my fieldwork 22 
humoured me with Petogfi’s poem with a Chinese flavour.   
Everything is about money nowadays. Marriage is nothing, family is nothing, both 
can be given up for money (12/04/2012).  
During chaiqian, romance or freedom is a false dichotomy choice when survival 
needs after chaiqian are primary concerns. In a society where everyone is so 
aggressively pursuing Deng Xiaoping’s ‘truism’—to get rich is glorious—the 
displacees simply embraced the elites discourse to the fullest extent in their capacity. 
Having said this, I do have my own sentiment for the moral dilemma raised by those 
performative acts. My view is closer to Sandel (2012) than to Zilizer (2005) and I 
believe that certain things cannot be put on sale on the market; a bottom line to 
defend the integrity of social morality. My intent here is neither to pass on my 
hypocritical judgement nor to discredit these resistances. After all, none of them got 
married under duress or under any pressure. My agenda is to make a repeated point 
on the symbolic violence of the perverse rationale of our time that sees and treats 
human bodies as properties from the point of the market, ‘a lower mode of valuation’ 
(Sandel, 2012: 33) inappropriate for respect and dignity.   
Manufacturing Conflicts, Destroying Families  
The structural tensions within the displaced families and the limited supply of 
available effective ammunition to fight back further reduced the potential for large 
scale, open resistance. But, for the displacers, this is not yet sufficient to ensure a 
sweeping victory in the land battle. Their domination in the legal field and the 
mobilisation of the state apparatus equipped them with more destructive tools to 
secure subordination. The displaced families frequently had to suffer additional pain 
from the strains of their social and family relations. In some cases, frustration in the 
confrontation with the state for reasonable compensation is internalised and turned 
                                                            
22 They divorced before the Expo-induced demolition of her mother’s property and did not get back 
together immediately because of their anticipation of demolition of her husband’s homes.  
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into family conflicts. Such conflicts, once provoked, often destroyed the more stable 
social relations based on unconditional loyalty and trust. The displacees were then 
divided into atomised individuals, if not fighting against each other, were fighting 
hopelessly alone in the war against their families. The neoliberal ethics of possessive 
individualism find expression  perfectly in this land war (Harvey, 2005a: 69). Suicide 
or murder became an act of desperation.  
The organised, family-based protest actions were usually sustained by the popular 
belief in collective ownership of the appropriated family properties, with moral 
authority derived  from traditional family values and practices of co-ownership of 
family property since imperial China (Eastman, 1988). Family members were legally 
and morally held responsible for each other’s well-being. The ownership of family 
property was patrimonial and patriarchal: without a proper ritual of fenjia (division 
of family assets), family property would remain collectively owned even though 
family members might live under different roofs (Yang, 1945). This tradition was 
partially acknowledged in early socialist China, although masculine domination was 
heavily attacked, at least in the legal text, for gender equality (Ocko, 1991). However, 
the boundary of family and the definition of family property were deliberately 
ambiguous in early legal texts because firstly, political campaigns soon confiscated 
most family properties and demanded absolute loyalty to the party over any other 
social organisations; and secondly the vaguely defined family as a legal unit reduced 
the costs for an incompetent caring socialist state to offer social benefits to all 
members (Ocko, 1991).  
The contradictions with the hegemonic legal discourses whose supply and 
interpretation is controlled by the party-state in the neoliberal era allowed the 
chaiqian agents not only to counter the resistance from the displacees but also to 
provoke and intensify conflicts and destroy the bonds within the displaced families. 
Protests grounding collective ownership of land and housing were harshly attacked 
for stripping the party of its fancy new clothes under current land-centred 
accumulation strategy. The truth is, however, the current state ownership of urban 
land capitalised on the violent taking of land and property during the Cultural 
Revolution (Hsing, 2010b) and arbitrarily nationalised the land of private self-built 
housing without the owners’ consent (Wilhelm, 2004). For peasants, although they 
are the de jure owners of the land within the boundaries of their rural collectives, the 
ambiguously defined ‘collective’ in legal text allows the grassroots state organs to 
act as de facto owners in speculating on the land development (Lin, 2009). Worse, in 
the event of land appropriation, the law grants the local states and their brokers the 
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unleashed power to proceed with appropriation without consent from existing land 
users and consensus amongst all legitimate property owners (Hsing, 2006). In the 
land ownership war against the state, the displacees were therefore doomed to defeat 
however morally legitimate their claim might be. For instance, Mr Zhu, a senior 
farmer, contends that the land has been passed down for generations in his family 
and private ownership survived the collectivisation and chaotic revolutionary 
campaigns. Therefore, he refused to accept that the land was owned by the collective 
or the state instead of his own family.23  
By suppressing all contestations on land ownership, the regime reduced the hope of a 
higher compensation, and effectively turned the displacees’ claims derived from co-
ownership into a family matter of assets division. By doing so, it increased the 
competition for collective resources between family members. Conflicts often arose 
when family members could not agree on the principle of distributing family assets 
among members who could no longer live together24 and arrive at consensus on the 
named property owners for all resettlement apartments. This provided an opportunity 
for the chaiqian agents to manipulate family relations of a displaced family, by 
advising a ‘fair’ distribution of compensation, or by threatening the deprivation of 
other member’s compensation because of another’s contestation or lianzuo in 
Chinese, or by alienating one member from another. This is the source of family 
dysfunctions or breakdowns I have heard over and over again in my fieldwork. The 
following account is quite representative in demonstrating the corrupted morality of 
the chaiqian agents in undermining the bond between family members.  
We used to live together. At the time of chaiqian, the chaiqian agents came to my 
husband and told us that they were ready to offer us a compensation package enough 
to purchase two two-bedroom apartments. But now they could only offer us a 
package enough to purchase a three-bedroom apartment because my brother-in-law 
rejected the initial plan and thought it was unfair. My husband was furious so he 
came to my brother-in-law to verify the story. My brother-in-law had no idea what 
my husband was talking about and denied it immediately because he had not yet met 
any chaiqian agents. A few days later, chaiqian agents came to negotiate with him 
and told him that my husband wanted to take all the compensation and would not 
share a penny with my brother-in-law. The two brothers were arguing and 
quarrelling. We then fell apart after this big row. We both took a smaller package 
and both were unable to have my father-in-law live with either of us. Now he lives 
alone. But two brothers never spoke to each other again. Every time we went to visit 
him, he cried desperately (Interview, D14, 03/2012). 
                                                            
23 Personal document. 
24 They cannot make a collective investment in the resettlement housing and had to negotiate money 
transactions in order to have an exclusionary ownership status to a resettlement apartment.  
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Families were particularly susceptible to manipulation because of the invasive nature 
of negotiations for compensation packages, which allowed the fieldwork chaiqian 
operatives to observe family dynamics and the power relations so as to apply the 
right pressure at minimal costs. Before initial contacts, chaiqian agents usually had 
done their homework to survey the family structure and property relations of their 
targeted families. They have the best tutors on their side, i.e. the residents’ 
committees/villagers’ committees, and the grassroots party-organs, thanks to the 
state-led nature of Expo-induced displacement. Both residents’ committees and 
villagers’ committees are not a formal part of the state apparatus. But, as grassroots 
organisations, they reify the power and the authority of the state in performing 
administrative activities. In this sense, they might better be seen as political 
appendages of the local states. Their daily job can range from bodily governance 
such as family planning, birth control, and certification of marital status, to social 
intervention in disputes between family members or neighbours, to organising 
grassroots civic organisations, to political representation of the residents in mediating 
and negotiating with higher levels of authority or economic/social organisations 
(Read, 2012, Zhu, 2010). These committees do not command substantial financial 
resources themselves but their discretion power in administering state almsgiving, 
certifying the eligibility of citizens for particular social benefits and organising civic 
activities (dance club, trips, basic health checks, etc.) enable them to occupy a prime 
position in their local milieus. In performing their daily duties, staffs of those 
committees, usually residents of the neighbourhood as well, may acquire intimate 
knowledge of the families within their jurisdictions through daily contacts with the 
residents in their quasi-official capacity or through their personal relations. Such 
information may include not only impersonal statistics on family structures, 
compositions, income level or employment status, but also much more personal 
information on family relations, social connections, family histories, etc. When 
assisting chaiqian companies were assigned to them as a political task, the leaders of 
those committees, with great interest to benefit from chaiqian politically and 
economically,25 proactively intervened in the negotiations, despite the fact that 
chaiqian was outside their purview.  
Owing to the mixtures of state agents and employees of the chaiqian companies in 
the field of domicide (see chapter 5), those grassroots organisations frequently 
                                                            
25 Politically, the leaders may advance their political career. Economically, their labour is paid by the 
chaiqian companies or the state in the form of bonus or overtime.   
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confused a request for assistance from a chaiqian company as a political order from 
their superiors. In a working report submitted to the township government office, the 
villagers committee portrayed the demolition permit as ‘policy’ and their assistance 
was ‘guided’ by the ‘spirit’ (jingshen) of this document’26 The managers of the 
chaiqian companies were addressed as ‘leaders’, implying an administrative 
hierarchy between chaiqian companies and the villagers’ committee. In the same 
report, they also outlined their major tasks during the displacement, including 
‘organising meetings with the displaced families’, ‘explaining the policy’, 
‘investigating each family’ and ‘visiting the families to be displaced’. In doing so, 
they acquired first-hand information of the displacees’ attitude of displacement and 
expectations of compensation. Such information was critical as it allowed the 
chaiqian company to tailor their compensation to targeted families and reduce the 
overall costs of chaiqian.  
The private information of the displaced families was coded, standardised and 
tabulated in computer software, specifically programmed for Expo-induced 
displacement in Pudong. In this digitalised panopticon, the software placed the 
private sphere of the displaced families under the gaze, surveillance and calculation 
of the displacers. It bears similarities with the policing technology of hukou 
registration system. But functionally and legally, they are categorically different. The 
registration of one’s hukou with the police implies consent to allow personal identity 
information to be used for social control and the policing system is limited in 
accessibility to assure confidentiality. But, the displacement software was designed 
to pry thoroughly into the private lives of the displaced families. From financial 
perspective, it is indeed cost-effective, reducing the time on intelligence gathering 
during the negotiation process. Less repressively, the software provides the street-
level chaiqian operatives the most updated accurate information about the property 
relations, family relations and the available housing stock. More repressively, each 
member of the displaced families was placed under the microscope to be studied by 
the displacers. Needless to say, the development of this database was behind the 
closed door of the state with no consent from the displacees for abusing such 
confidential information. The only agenda was to demolish their homes in an 
efficient and cheap way.  
The detailed knowledge of the displaced families allows the chaiqian agents to 
deploy a most unsettling tactic that takes advantage of families as a relational entity. 
They can easily bully the weakest member of the displaced families so that the whole 
                                                            
26 Personal Document.  
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family would compromise and leave without a fight. The weakness resides less in 
their personal tendency of conflict avoidance than in their embeddness in social 
relations, economic organisations and political institutions. To many displacees, 
chaiqian was a disruptive event, adding a new form of oppression to the pain they 
have already been suffering. As such, most displacees I spoke to tended to keep such 
disruption to a minimum. Yet, for chaiqian agents, forcing people to give up their 
homes is the only duty in their job description.27 With the unwavering back-up from 
the state, they carried out their work without any temporal and spatial boundaries, 
invading into the public life of the displacees and making the everyday well-hidden 
tactic of ‘foot dragging’ or ‘feigned ignorance’ (Scott, 1985: xvi) wishful thinking.  
Personal social relations of the displacees are vulnerable to the chaiqian agents’ 
manipulation. Mrs Yuan, a laid off worker, suffering from severe depression and 
heart problems, was grateful to the caring residents committees at her original place. 
The ‘cadres’ frequently came to her home for small chats to cheer her up, to invite 
her to join group activities, and to keep her informed about latest trendy topics in 
their neighbourhoods. Those activities sometimes are the duty of the cadres of the 
residents committee and sometimes out of care of friends and neighbours, were 
cultivating guanxi between them. As Yang (1994) points out, the craft of guanxi 
places a focus on long term reciprocity, obligations and bond rather than immediate 
materialist interests.  Mrs Yuan not only trusted these cadres but felt indebted to 
them, or in her words, qian renqing. When these cadres came to her home on behalf 
of the chaiqian company, she was under the moral pressure to comply in order not to 
jeopardise their relations. ‘For the sake of their face, I decided to move out. For one, 
they have been good to me all these years. For another, I might need them in the 
future. You cannot just break the tie with no room to manoeuvre in the future’.   
The zombie danwei system was also at the disposal of the chaiqian agents to 
intervene in chaiqian disputes and pressure the displacees working for them to move 
out under the threat of job security. A police officer told me about a ‘disciplinary’ 
meeting organised by Pudong District Government before his home was demolished. 
The attendees were limited to around 40 policemen working in Pudong whose homes 
were within the chaiqian red line. During this meeting, they were explicitly 
instructed not to provoke any disputes with the chaiqian companies and not to get 
involved in any conflicts on behalf of other family members. Moreover, they had to 
do the thought work of the rest of their families. Otherwise, they would be held 
                                                            
27 See The Grand Displacement in Pudong for numerous examples.  
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personally responsible for any consequences.28  Another respondent reported a 
similar account. His son, who is a young doctor, was called in by the head of the 
hospital while he as the head of the property owners was negotiating with the 
chaiqian companies. His son’s well-paying job at the hospital was threatened and he 
was instructed to pass the message on to him. Out of his concern for his son’s 
employment, he took whatever was put on the table by the chaiqian agents with the 
knowledge that the compensation package was far less than he could have received29.  
The employers of those displacees hardly had any vested interests in displacement. I 
suspect that their interference was based on political pressure from the local 
government due to their institutional links with the state apparatus. Even if they 
might have wanted to keep out of the private life of their employees—displacement 
is a private business after all, they may lack a powerful moral cause to justify their 
disobedience of political orders from the local states. On this point, educational 
establishments with a moral and legal duty to protect their students from harassment 
should not be exonerated from their responsibility in condoning the chaiqian agents 
to intrude onto the campus and bully the students who were about to lose their homes 
without the consent from their guardians. A girl recalled her humiliation when she 
was called out by the Director of Studies in the middle of a class for a ‘friendly’ chat 
with the chaiqian operatives. She never expected the chaiqian operatives would 
come after her to the university, so she refused. The whole class was disrupted and 
watching at her. To avoid further drama, she agreed to speak with those chaiqian 
company agents. In the meeting, she was told to persuade her parents to give up 
fighting even after she made it clear on numerous occasions before this incident that 
she was supportive of her parents and she had no influence in the negotiation.30  A 
similar story is represented in the Grand Displacement in Pudong but was 
promulgated to praise the initiative and persistence of a chaiqian agent with a ‘loving’ 
and ‘considerate’ heart. In this story, Mr Sun paid a visit to a teenage girl at her 
junior high school. Sun met this girl once during a visit to her family when making 
an offer to her parents and noticed the armband with three red strokes she was 
wearing. The armband indicated that she was a leader of the Young Pioneers.31 After 
a failed attempt to convince her parents to take the offer, Sun immediately visited the 
girl at her school with the tolerance of the schoolteacher on the second day and 
showed up at her school every day in order to have a ‘heart-to-heart’ conversation 
                                                            
28 Interview, D68, 25/03/2012. 
29 Interview, X43, 21/05/2012.  
30 Interview, D100, 20/04/2012. 
31 A child organisation created in the revolutionary time consists of children between eight to fourteen 
years old and remains an important institution in Chinese primary school for the symbolic rewards.  
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with the girl. Sun told the girl that her parents were still having concerns about 
chaiqian and were holding back the Expo project. The morning after this moving 
conversation, the couple took their daughter with them to the chaiqian office in their 
neighbourhood and signed the resettlement agreement’32 
The reason I am selecting those two accounts is not to insinuate that the young 
generation should be deprived of their political agency during chaiqian negotiations. 
On the contrary, I believe that, each member of a displaced family, regardless of age, 
gender or knowledge of displacement, should have a voice in the family decision 
concerning the fundamental change to their residential space. What concerns me 
most here is the penetration of the abusive power of the displacers deeply into every 
aspect of the displaced families’ everyday life. Family decisions on displacement and 
resettlement therefore no longer followed the economic rationale to maximise 
economic interest, or a social and cultural logic to rearrange family obligations and 
rights, but also a political logic of compromise, to minimise harm from the predatory 
regime. Numerous accounts I have presented so far show that this last one is most 
decisive for the displacees to make up their mind. By making everyone in the 
displacees’ network a subject of political discipline and punishment, the collective 
responsibility system rooted in China’s penal history successfully destroyed the 
support the displacees could have received and more maliciously, turned each one 
into a possible accessory to domicide. There is little wonder that families were so 
vulnerable to collapse in displacement.  
Conclusion  
What has this chapter contributed to the overall thesis? Firstly, this chapter offers a 
juxtaposition of the technocratic view and the popular view of the meanings of 
displacement and resettlement. I have attempted to carve out different logics 
underpinning those views and lay bare the tensions and contradictions. Specifically, 
as I maintain, the market based and legalistic view disembeds the appropriated 
properties from the historical context of their acquisition and the moral universe 
organised around them. As  E. P. Thompson (1978: 171) once argued,  ‘every 
contradiction is a conflict of value as well as a conflict of interest; that inside every 
“need” there is an affect, or “want”, on its way to becoming an “ought” (and vice 
versa); that every class struggle is at the same time a struggle over values’.  The 
suffering of the displacees as I documented in chapter 4 may also be explained by 
                                                            
32 The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p.103-104. 
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their failures to articulate a competing value system based on their moral economy 
and their subordination to the dominant view emphasising the exchange value. 
Secondly, this chapter tentatively provides an explanation of the prevalence of 
political acquiescence in the Expo-induced domicide. My analysis avoided seeing the 
displacees as a unified subordinate group and delved into the internal divisions that 
effectively undermined their solidarity and deprived them of the political resources to 
organise large-scale open defiance. As a result, families were at the centre of this 
land war. The war started with contestation against state expropriation, unfolded 
through family conflicts, disagreements and compromises, and frequently ended up 
in family tragedies: lost affections, betrayed trust, broken networks, calculative 
actions and self-serving competition; all became the advantage of the chaiqian agents. 
My analysis shows the disheartening breakdowns of families due to the politics of 
negotiation meetings and the manipulation of family relations in the chaiqian process. 
To my knowledge, no existing scholarship has yet reported similar findings. This is 
likely because we do not actually know much about the actual process of 
displacement so far and we tend to romanticise resistance in the study of the politics 
of displacement and forcible evictions. But it is more likely because of the corrupted 
conscience of the chaiqian agents who capitalised on the condition of exceptionality 
and the authoritarian political culture. It is also more likely because of the overdraft 
of mutual trust and support within families after repeated social engineering under 
the governance of the CPC, whether it is the class struggles that turned family 
members against each other under Mao, or the neoliberal ethics that encourages 
personal freedom and possessive individualism (Yan, 2003b, 2009b, 2009a, Whyte, 
2005, Meng, 2008). The logic of market in the reform era constantly destroys the 
bonds of families, kinships and community and undermines their capacity for 
effective resistance actions. When the law of the market prevails, as argued by 
Polanyi (2001[1944]), it shall ‘annihilate all organic forms of existence and to 
replace them by a different type of organisation, an atomistic and individualistic one’ 
(p. 171). The principle of ‘freedom of contract’ shall replace ‘non-contractual 
organisations of kinship, neighbourhood, profession, and creed were to be liquidated 
since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his[sic] 
freedom’  (p.171).  
The displacees are entrapped in the tension between individual freedom and group 
solidarity, and in most cases, the rationality of the market prevailed. Admittedly, the 
symbolic violence inherent in the dominant view must be placed at the centre of 
intellectual critique here. And, the utterly horrendous moral corruptions of the 
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chaiqian agents must be pinned down to contextualise the displacees’ choices. But, 
echoing the quote from Hilberg (1980: 35) in the beginning of this chapter, is it not 
the interactions between the displacees with their oppressors that determined their 
fate? This question might be quite unsettling and perhaps unfair to ask. After all, 
most displacees never had any prior experience of dealing with displacement or 
coping with purposely instigated family dramas of such intensity and frequency in 
their lifetime. But, hypothetically, had the displacees trusted their neighbours or their 
family members back then, could the story of displacement as this thesis has been 
authoring so far be told differently? The failure to defend their reasonable claims 
more powerfully and persistently foretells the fate of the displacees in the 
resettlement sites. This is the subject of the next chapter.  
 







So far this thesis has attempted to reconstruct the process of the Expo-induced 
chaiqian with a focus on the exercise of power in annihilating the Expo site and the 
interactions between different political actors in the production of massive suffering 
and immorality. The failed attempts from the displacees to resist state oppression 
more effectively and to take control of the domicide process—albeit not entirely a 
political agenda within their reach—foreshadowed prolonged injustice and pain the 
displaced have to endure. The objective of this chapter is to offer a description of the 
post-displacement lives and examine the real legacies of chaiqian caused by the 
Expo. As such, this chapter may be practically used as a reality check of the political 
rhetoric of fanshen or of the cliché, that chaiqian is a good thing for the uprooted. In 
doing so, we shall also be able to get closer to the pathological hypocrisy of the 
political economy of chaiqian in contemporary Chinese cities, especially when it is 
mixed with the logic of distributive justice (e.g. as a solution to housing shortage, 
poor living conditions, or housing inequalities under the socialist economy).  
In short, my analysis will show that the displacees are economically, socially, 
emotionally, physically and politically impaired by the Expo induced chaiqian. This 
is hardly a surprise given the violent process of chaiqian this thesis has captured. It is 
also in harmony with the conclusions from classic sociological studies of the 
outcomes of dislocation (Young and Willmott, 1957, Jennings, 1962, Erikson, 1976, 
Jacobs, 1961, Marris, 1961, Western, 1981), especially the compelling work on the 
infamous clearance of Boston’s west end (Gans, 1962, Fried, 1966, Hartman, 1964), 
‘Those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little 
account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men [sic] by craft, 
and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word’.  
‘Men [sic] ought either to be indulged or utterly destroyed, for if you merely 
offend them they take vengeance, but if you injure them greatly they are unable 
to retaliate, so that the injury done to a man ought to be such that vengeance 
cannot be feared’. 
Nicco Machiavelli, The Prince  
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and more recent studies on HOPE VI in the United States (Goetz, 2003, 2010, Manzo 
et al., 2008), as well as those research in other cities in the world (Olds, 1998, 
Fullilove, 2005, Fang, 2006, Meyer, 2008, Campanella, 2008, Porter, 2009, 
Desmond, 2012, Boo, 2012). These disheartening impacts of displacement are 
concisely summarised by Hartman (1983: 305-306), ‘in seeking a new place to live, 
the displaced tend to move as short distance as possible, in an effort to retain existing 
personal, commercial, and institutional ties and because of the economically and 
racially biased housing-market constraints they face. What they find usually costs 
more, has less adequate space, and is of inferior quality. Involuntary residential 
changes also produce a considerable amount of psychosocial stress, which in its most 
extreme form has been found analogous to the clinical description of grief’. Several 
themes as Hartman identified here can be found in my analysis, but to be sure, 
different cultural contexts (e.g. race) and institutional arrangements (e.g. the stock of 
public housing, hukou, the rural-urban divide, etc.) shall add complexities and 
nuances to this picture.  
The persisting and belated nature of the domicide trauma is another point this chapter 
will bring to our attention. Apart from the causes I outlined in prior chapters (e.g. 
brutal evictions, lack of participation, family breakdowns), I wish to point out that 
the repressive resettlement housing regime and the governing technology are adding 
further injuries and thus obstructing the healing process. Ostensibly, by making 
resettlement housing (mostly new and decently sized in planned communities) a 
mandatory part of the compensation package offered to the displacees at a discounted 
and acceptable rate with full private property ownership, the Chinese government has 
managed to effectively prevent the majority of the displaced from becoming 
homeless or living in inferior conditions. To outside observers, such arrangement 
seems to have transplanted a human face to the predatory growth regime, and 
assisted the displacees in coping with the aftermath of uprooting. This is a 
misinformed illusion. We must not overlook the fact that the production of the 
resettlement housing is an important moment in the process of primitive 
accumulation in Chinese cities. It is the manufactured demand of resettlement from 
the displaced that not only feeds chaiqian-related companies but also lubricates the 
whole land development and sustains the growth of the residential property market 
(Wang, 2011, Wei, 2013). With great dependence on this market segment, the 
displacees have neither much freedom nor any bargaining power; although this is not 
to say that their needs are handled with great care and moral sensibility in the first 
place (e.g. recall the speed of the whole process). After all, at the time of 
displacement, most resettlement neighbourhoods were not yet built. What the 
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displacees bought into were dreams of their would-be life in a community as 
advertised by the bulldozer regime rather than the reality. As they moved in and 
slowly settled down, many problems started to emerge. Caught up in the process of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the displacees are incapable of organising 
effective actions to seek remedies for their victimisation, to resist repeated 
oppression or to improve their conditions. As a result, the pain from losing their 
homes, as documented in chapter 5, are compounded and perpetuated, and the 
injustice they have to suffer becomes infinite.  
I build this last argument on the work from Sack (1986) and Hsing (2010a). 
Territoriality, as Sack (1986: 2) defines, is ‘a human strategy to affect, influence, and 
control’. I use deterritorialisation to refer to the process of losing control over a 
territoriality and reterritorialisation to refer to the process of regaining control. 
Evidently, this is about power struggle over the organisation of space and the 
meaning of place. Whilst the state-led growth regime uses (de/re)terrorisation as a 
governing technology and accumulation strategy (Hsing, 2010a, Ren, 2010), society 
may resist such forces to protect the social fabric from complete destruction as the 
double movement thesis from Polanyi (2001[1944]) reminds us. The predicament of 
the displacees resides in the fact that their old roots were completely brutally cut off 
yet their new roots have not yet fully laid down in their new places. Their wounds 
take time to heal. It takes more time when the previous social, economic and 
emotional ties are completely destroyed and when the resettlement sites are not a 
nurturing enough environment. It seems infinitely delayed when salt is constantly 
poured on the wounds as in intentional repression or in silent compulsion of the 
market (Marx, 1976 [1867]). For this reason, I share the sentiment of Fullilove (2005: 
12) that the trauma of displacement stays with the displaced for a lifetime and may 
affect generations after generations, not only through memory work and symbolic 
practices (Till, 2012), but also constantly reminded, activated and aggregated in 
place-making practices in the resettlement sites. It is also for this reason I suggest 
that we should remain open to the lingering impacts of Expo-induced domicide and 
refuse to put a temporal limit on charging against the injustice produced by the Expo 
regime.   
Politics of Siting Resettlement and Gangster Capitalism  
It was unprecedented in Shanghai’s city-building history to displace such a huge 
number of families for a single project all at once. Given the high political stake 
displacement entails, the Expo regime cleared two sites in Shanghai’s frontier to 
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build resettlement housing for those dislocated (see Figure 8.1). Both Sanlin Expo 
Homeland and Pujiang Expo Homeland are planned communities built from scratch 
on farmland reclaimed from the local rural collectives. Of a far larger scale, the 
resettlement site in Sanlin is closer to the Expo Park and was reserved to 
accommodate the displacees from the east section of the Expo site. Three clusters 
(Yongtai, Nanping and Sanlin Expo Homeland) were constructed between the 
borders of the Middle Ring Road and the Outer Ring Road in less than three years. In 
off-peak hours, it usually takes one hour to commute to the Expo Park by public 
transport and far longer to the city centre. The displacees from the west section on 
the other hand were forced to migrate to Pujiang Town (one of Shanghai’s infamous 
copycat projects) in Minhang district, 20 kilometres away from the Expo site on the 
shortest route via expressway. There is only one bus connecting this site to the old 
demolished neighbourhoods. Without traffic congestion, it normally takes two hours 
to travel to the original place. Although the commuting time has been shortened to 
half by the recently connected metro line, the costs go up as well. As Slater (2009: 
307) reminds us, a critical perspective on land economies must pay attention to the 
underlying structure of interests. Some logical questions to ask then are: why did the 
regime choose the suburbia? Why did they choose to resettle the displacees on two 
separate locations and why these two particular locations? If the intention was to 
respect the consumer sovereignty of the displacees by offering greater freedom of 
choice, would it not be more reasonable to allow them to choose where to live, even 
if their decision was limited to these two options only? These questions become more 
pertinent when we take into consideration the proximity of a waste incineration plant 
in Sanlin (about 500 yards from the closest neighbourhood) and the stock of empty 
resettlement apartments on both sites.1 The former raises the question of both 
distributive and procedural environment justice, and the latter casts doubt on 





1 There is no published data on this point. But at the time of my fieldwork, I did a small accounting 
exercise in a neighbourhood in Sanlin to get an overall impression on the availability of empty 
apartments. I selected twenty units (danyuan) in twenty six-story buildings, which I had access to 
inspect inside and counted empty apartments in these buildings. Five out of forty apartments were 
clearly empty, showing no sign of personal effects. My impression was frequently confirmed by the 
residents in interviews as well. Inside their buildings, there were always one or two empty apartments 
and more empty ones in highrises.   
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Figure 8.1: Two Major Resettlement Sites for Expo-induced Chaiqian 
Source: Based on the GIS base map of Shanghai on ArcGIS, accessed online 2014 
 
Considering that chaiqian was the precondition and an indispensable component of 
the Expo project, it seems reasonable to expect that the planners would have some 
critical thoughts on this matter. When these questions were thrown to the planning 
officers from the municipal government who oversees the land development on the 
Expo site, the intellectual merit of these questions were quickly dismissed as too 
‘natural’ and ‘normal’ from their technocratic point of view to build resettlement 
neighbourhoods in suburbia.2 To them, this is how chaiqian has been practised over 
the past two decades in the city and the Expo-induced chaiqian is for sure not an 
exception despite the fact that exceptionality is the ontological condition of the Expo 
project (see chapter 6). This line of reasoning seems to suggest that, the more 
chaiqian is practised this way, the more legitimate, inevitable and normal it becomes. 
The normalcy of such practice is further reinforced by the conviction that this is how 
chaiqian should be working, as it is a part of the larger process of rationalising the 
urban space that a modernising and globalising Shanghai can proudly dwell on. 
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Commerce, industry and residence each has a place of their own. Perin (1977) 
convincingly argues that any land use intervention is underpinned by a moral 
assumption of social categories and social relations between different groups. As 
such, the land use system is also a moral system that ‘reflects and assures social 
order’ (p. 4). What we could infer from their normative view here is a religious 
conversion into a neoclassical theorisation of urban spatial structure in contemporary 
Chinese cities and a new moral system premised on the purchasing power of the 
consumer subjects. Widely shared by the ruling elites, this conversion negates the 
socialist morality and spatial structure established under short-lived socialism, along 
with the repudiation of Maoist ideology and Marxism. Under this touted neoclassical 
land use model, urban space is to be organised under the doctrine of the exchange 
value of the land (Alonso, 1964). Through competitive bidding between various 
financially constrained ‘rational’ utility-maximising social actors in a functioning 
land market, the powerful device of land rent sorts activities and people into different 
locations. In this way, land defined as scarce resources according to the neoclassic 
theorists can be used in a most ‘efficient’ way and also the ‘best’ way.  
An extensive and compelling critique of the location theory can be found in David 
Harvey’s (1973: 162-194) classic text, Social Justice and the City. His brilliant 
analysis goes beyond ‘churlish criticism’ (p. 167) that narrowly focuses on the 
imperfections of the market in arriving at Pareto optimality. To expose this theory as 
deficient, he challenges its ontological negligence of the absolute quality of space 
and institutional settings, both condition the urban process over time. For Harvey, the 
land use occurs in sequential manner ‘across an urban space divided into a large but 
finite number of land parcels’ (p. 168), contra the neoclassical theory’s ignorance of 
time and space. Private property ownership, an ontological condition for capitalist 
production, grants the land owners monopoly control of the land, and in a 
competitive bidding model, this means that ‘the rich can command space whereas the 
poor are trapped in it’ (p. 171). The ‘success’ of the neoclassic theories in modelling 
urban land use and their seemingly empirical relevance, as Harvey points out, reside 
in the infusion of rent and location and their exclusive reliance on notion of 
differential rent (p.176, 188), assuming that rent declines the farther the distance 
away from the centre. The assumption of centricity then further challenges the 
mechanism of competitive bidding in such models, which presume that land use 
determines value whilst in practice the reverse mechanism that value determines land 
use is more common in capitalist cities (p. 189). When value determines use, warns 
Harvey,   
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The allocation can take place under the auspices of rampant speculation, 
artificially induced scarcities, and the like, and it loses any pretence of having 
anything at all to do with the efficient organisation of production and 
distribution…. Social policy, no matter how well-intentioned is helpless…the 
rentier will get that pound of flesh no matter what (p. 190-191). 
Harvey’s persuasive analysis of course can be extended to argue against the state-led 
spatial engineering in contemporary Shanghai. But, what I wish to emphasise in my 
analysis here is the underlying power struggle and the material and symbolic 
violence involved in producing such an oppressive spatial order and in normalising 
the doxic rules in the housing field. The rapid spatial restructuring in Shanghai is par 
excellence of Marx’s primitive accumulation. In refuting Adam Smith’s conservative 
treatment of primitive accumulation as an innocent process, Marx (1976 [1867]) 
compared it to the original sin and argued that primitive accumulation is ‘nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the producers from the means of 
production’ (p. 875). This is a brutal process, as Marx writes, ‘it is a notorious fact 
that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part’ (p. 
874). Marx’s reference to a mythological pre-historical past has received many 
critiques (Perelman, 2000, De Angelis, 2001, Harvey, 2005b, Sassen, 2010) pointing 
out the ongoing nature of primitive accumulation as a condition for the survival of 
capitalism. Given the modern techniques in primitive accumulation, Harvey (2005b) 
proposes a new term, ‘accumulation by dispossession’, to incorporate an array of 
processes and mechanisms in consolidating the domination of the ruling elites in 
today’s world, of similar nature to primitive accumulation. With historical and 
geographical peculiarities in mind, Harvey contends that the proactive role of the 
state in conspiring to the search of temporal, spatial and institutional fixes is a 
common feature.  
The Chinese experience is distinctive not so much in the techniques of primitive 
accumulation or accumulation by dispossession but in the persuasiveness of the party 
and the state in facilitating capital accumulation. What is witnessed in China over the 
last three decades is the rise of ‘a new robber baron class in league with the 
Communist Party’ (Walker, 2006: 6) whose wealth is accumulated through ‘a 
veritable orgy of corruption, embezzlement, bribery, kickbacks, graft, smuggling, 
currency manipulation, influence peddling, and theft of state funds to amass personal 
fortunes and privatise state monies, enterprises, and properties’  (Holmstrom and 
Smith, 2000: 10).  As we shall see below, the city-building business is an epitome. In 
this process, the ruling elites successfully established the hegemonic principles, 
values and structures and facilitated the ongoing spatialisation of class (Zhang, 2010). 
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In doing so, it also effectively disciplines the subjectivity and agency of those 
victimised.  
The reformers inherited many legacies from socialist urbanism—inefficiency, 
irrational, and fragmented are only a few salient ones. Under Maoist ideology, cities 
were built to facilitate socialist industrialisation in addition to the symbolic value in 
demonstrating the superiority of socialism over capitalism (Ma and Wu, 2005: 5). 
Dismissed as a commodity, land was freely allocated to the danwei for infinite use 
according to the overall economic plan in Mao’s China. Consequently, prime 
locations frequently were occupied by industrial clusters, sitting next to residential 
compounds (see chapter 4). Considering the bureaucratic inefficiency in allocating 
resources and the problem of soft budget constraints, the danwei were enticed to 
hoard a large parcel of land and building materials for future expansion despite that 
they did not have the capacity to materialise the plan yet (Lu, 2006: 91-97). Hoarding 
behaviour as such produced inequalities between danwei occupying different 
administrative hierarchies, and aggravated the shortage of resources and land. 
Situated within the judicial boundaries of territorial states, many danwei were 
subordinated to the leadership of the functional states of a higher administrative level, 
outranking the territorial state authorities (Hsing, 2010a). For this reason, these 
danwei frequently were operating like fortresses, outside the political control of the 
territorial states, trenching the property rights in socialist cities. They were also the 
basic cells in organising collective consumption within their own territories. The 
cellular organisation of collective consumption, compounded by the prioritisation of 
production in socialist accumulation, put severe constraints on housing provision and 
urban infrastructure development (Wu, 1997). The problem was further worsened by 
the Cultural Revolution during which industrial development further ate up vacant 
land in the city centre whilst investment in social reproduction was in stagnation. 
Political ideology aside, the root of the problem as the reformers argue is the 
ignorance of the economic value of the land. The solution, as informed by the 
capitalist other, is straightforward. The value of the land must be firmly respected 
and the rationalising device of land rent must be at the centre of urban process in the 
reform era. For the device to work properly, the Chinese state made a serial effort to 
construct a land market. First, it ironically legalised the violent robbery of private 
properties during the Cultural Revolution and nationalised all the land in the city 
(including the land underneath self-built properties) in 1982 (Hsing, 2010b, Wilhelm, 
2004). Second, it eventually resolved the legal tension by separating the Land Use 
Right (LUR) from land ownership in revising the Constitution in 1988 and allowing 
the LURs to be transacted and speculated in the land market without changing the 
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nature of state ownership. The territorial states on different levels are legally 
recognised to monopolise the supply and management of land within their 
administrative boundaries.  
The land reform creatively destroyed the institutional barrier for speculating land 
development by different agents without undermining the party-state’s legitimacy. In 
constructing a land market, it also created a huge rent gap between the capitalised 
ground rent depreciated by the current industrial use and poorly maintained working 
class housing, and the potential rent projected by highest and best use (Smith, 1979, 
Wu, 1997). It openly invites competition but mostly collusion between different 
actors for its appropriation. The transformation of the meaning and value of land also 
intensified the conflicts between territorial states (de jure land owners) and the 
working units as the functional states (de facto land owners), or what Hsing (2010a: 
24) calls ‘socialist land masters’. Both are interested in capitalising on the land stock 
on their turfs and engaging more proactively in land development for enormous 
economic gains. Development companies affiliated with them quickly sprung up 
(Wu, 1999). In the meantime, township and village corporations also grew rapidly 
with the assistance of local corporatist states in the countryside, converting large 
parcels of agricultural land for industrial development (Oi, 1995).  
However, this city-building game in general has been played to the disadvantage of 
the territorial states. In addition to their weaker owner status in law, the ongoing 
reform of the state economy sector pushes those danwei to operate like private firms, 
meaning that rent must be taken seriously in economic decisions, especially in terms 
of location choice. Meanwhile, planning technocrats, devotees of Alonso, allied with 
the territorial states, assisted the ‘natural’ sorting process by categorising land use 
and creating zoning controls (Chen, 2007: 48). In 1986, Shanghai announced the first 
urban master plan in the reform era, with an emphasis on the construction of CBD on 
the Bund area and the specialisation and concentration of industrial activities in 
many industrial clusters on the urban fringe.   
The land reform is only a small piece in completing the puzzle of building a market 
system. Of equal importance here are fiscal reform, housing reform, relaxation of 
hukou restrictions, reform of the state economy, rescaling of the state, and 
transformation of the financial sector. Those reforms have started to cause profound 
changes in the power structure and moral values established under the socialist era, 
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most evidently after the introduction of double-track pricing system3 (Sun, 2004). 
Despite their ongoing nature in the 1980s, the conservative impulse of socialist 
institutions and practises continue to influence the production of space. In this decade, 
Shanghai witnessed the first wave of residential displacement in post-reform era due 
to state-led redevelopment. Between 1979 and 1990, as many as 120,000 registered 
households lost their homes.4 However, the great majority of them were offered in 
situ in-kind resettlement akin to their acquisition of welfare housing under socialist 
era. Those redevelopment projects were financed through diverse mechanisms, 
deriving money mostly from the government but also from the danwei, the residents, 
private capital and loans. Small in scale and slow in process, as compared to 
chaiqian in the ensuing decade, such redevelopment efforts were valuable in 
protecting the interests of the inhabitants.  
Apart from the socialist legacy, the democratic efforts from the radical intellectuals 
and university students to some extent challenged the officialdom in marketizing 
their power in this process (Zhao, 2001). The factional conflicts within the party 
elites between the conservatives and the reformers also complicated the pathway to a 
market economy system (Fewsmith, 2001). It was the Tiananmen massacre that 
invited more aggressive measures to be taken with astonishing intensity and audacity. 
The discourse of wending (stability) in post-Tiananmen era mutes the radical 
intellectuals and democratic activists,5 and encourages the alliance between political 
and economic elites to carry out more radical measures to maintain their dominance 
(Sandby-Thomas, 2011). For Klein (2007), such political manoeuvring is an example 
of disaster capitalism, referring to the reliance of the neoliberal agenda on crisis 
moments to bring about the unthinkable changes. As the reform deepens after Deng 
Xiaoping’s ideological ‘breakthrough’ for a ‘socialist market economy’, gangster 
capitalism also sweeps into Chinese cities robbing public assets and accelerating 
social polarisation. Meanwhile, a cult of political elites known as the Shanghai Gang, 
with Jiang Zemin (promoted to national president after Tiananmen massacre) at the 
top, acquired greater influence in central leadership and impacted Shanghai’s 
development trajectory.  
                                                            
3 The double pricing system allowed socialist elites to trade raw materials acquired from the state at a 
fixed price and trade them at a higher market price. This allowed these elites to convert their political 
capital into economic capital. According to Sun Liping (2004), a renowned Chinese sociologist, this is 
a key mechanism for the reproduction of the ruling elites in contemporary Chinese society, different 
from the circulation of ruling elites in Eastern European countries (see Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995).   
4 Shanghai Construction Chronicle (1986-1991). 
5 Many radicals went into exile and some were imprisoned to this day whilst most allied with the 
market or resigned from public engagement. See Wang (2003b).  
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In 1992, the strategic importance of Shanghai was rediscovered and it was 
repositioned as the ‘dragon head’ in the Yangtze River region. In neoliberalising the 
economy, territorial states underwent drastic rescaling and restructuring. District 
boundaries were adjusted with most prominent changes in Pudong where an ad hoc 
new state agency was created to take control of the land development on the east 
bank of the Huangpu River, and also in suburbia where counties outside the outer 
Ring Road were incorporated into different districts (Hartog, 2010: 26). Apart from 
the expansion of their territorial boundary, district level states were delegated with 
more power in approving land use and land management, attracting FDIs, 
maintaining public infrastructures, etc. (He and Wu, 2009). In line with the general 
trend of fiscal decentralisation on national level, district authorities were also 
allowed to retain a significant portion of fiscal income from land related 
development. Take the land conveyance fee for example; only 15 per cent is required 
to be submitted to municipal government for collective consumption in infrastructure, 
education and maintenance and alike.6  
Administrative decentralisation further complicated the structure of the land battle. 
The financial gains from land development enticed those territorial and functional 
states to compete for a bigger share. A land enclosure of a far larger scale than that 
occurred in England was accelerated in the 1990s. Huge tracts of land were divided 
and controlled by developers of different nature through violence, under-table 
dealings, corruption, bribery and embezzlement of public funds.7 The differences and 
conflicts between socialist land masters also create persuasive ‘black land markets’ 
for different agencies to speculate LURs in both cities and the countryside against 
legal procedures (Lin, 2009: 94-101). By monopolising the land supply, the 
territorial states have great advantage in taking control of land development. In 
actively participating in the land battle, the role of the territorial states however went 
through categorical changes. Entrepreneurial states, frequently used in existing 
literature, is inadequate to capture all the dimensions (Solinger, 1992, Duckett, 1998, 
                                                            
6 Telephone Interview, 16/09/2013. In Pudong, all fiscal income is retained at the district level.   
7 The fall of Zhou Zhengyi and later the demise of the Shanghai Gang is an example here. The rise of 
Zhou Zhengyi in Shanghai’s property development sector benefited enormously from his political 
connections with local political elites. His downfall is related to the redevelopment of eight divided 
land parcels (known as dongbakuai) in Jin’an District in the city centre. His close contacts with 
political elites enabled him to acquire the land with no land conveyance fee under only one condition 
that the displaced must be resettled in his housing development. After acquiring the LURs, he refused 
to resettle the displacees and provoked furious residents to act collectively and petitioned in Beijing. 
Political opportunities were on the side of the displaced. Political opening was enlarged by the power 
shifts in the central leadership (Jiang’s retirement and the rise of Hu Jintao) at that time, rendering 
Zhou a primary target of factional struggle and eventually led to his imprisonment. Following him, the 
former Mayor of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, and a group of his underlings were found guilty in 
embezzling public funds and speculating on land development. See McGregor (2012). 
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Wank, 1999, Wu, 2003b). The state operates like private firms, as well as predators 
and robbers. Various government departments established their development 
companies with start-up capital from government fiscal transfers, bank loans, ‘shares’ 
from the employees and money from subcontractors (Hsing, 2010a: 42-43, Wang and 
Murie, 1999). Given their association with the state agencies, those development 
companies acquired easier access to the inchoate land market at a lower cost.8  
The political capital of state bureaucrats and party cadres now also acquired higher 
symbolic value and became the primary target of private entrepreneurs. Both 
political elites and the emerging business elites were interested in converting the 
capital they possessed in exchange for greater benefits in the frenzy land 
development. Many under-the-table deals were closed with the influence of the 
Shanghai Gang and their protégé. The collusion is made much easier by the ongoing 
reform of the state economy sector on the one hand and the xiahai (jumping ships) of 
the state bureaucrats on the other. With different justifications of the necessity of 
restructuring of SOEs (e.g. financial solvency, economic efficiency, increasing 
competitiveness) and through different measures (e.g. merger and acquisition, 
forming shareholding companies, selling out, etc.), the restructuring of the city-
building industry arrived at the same end like reforms in other spheres, that is to 
privatise the whole nation (Hsing, 2010a). The consequences were far-reaching. 
Public assets were split by those companies and viciously transferred to red 
capitalists as their private properties. The LURs acquired illegally by those 
development companies were also divided up and after various transfers and sales; it 
became extremely difficult for outsiders to track the LURs transaction records and 
became fertile ground for corruption and embezzlement.9 A few development 
companies with a strong state background emerged as the most powerful developers. 
With a huge parcel of land in their hands, in addition to their easier access to 
financial capital and the land market, these companies are able to monopolise the 
                                                            
8 Land development in Pudong is an excellent example here. In 1990, to develop Pudong, Shanghai 
municipality established the Pudong Development Company. Along with three other development 
companies, it acquired a huge piece of land in Lujiazui (the financial centre in Pudong) without 
actually paying a penny to the municipal government.  
9 A case in point here is the restructuring of Shanghai Economic Housing Development Centre 
(SEHDC). At the time of its reform, it possessed a huge land parcel of 1 million square metres, 
allocated by the municipal government for developing affordable housing. During its restructuring, the 
development company under SEHDC, headed by the Deputy Director of SEHDC, transferred 45 per 
cent of property share of the development company and the LUR to a private development company 
registered under his own name. Through similar tricks, two more private companies headed by red 
capitalists acquired the remaining shares of the development companies. The rest of the robbing of 
public wealth became quite straightforward. The red capitalists exchanged their shares and ‘naturally’ 
controlled the new shareholding companies. See Business Weekly, 10/2007. 
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property market.10 But, most importantly, the ‘marriage of convenience’ between 
economic elites and political elites accelerates the formation of a hegemonic bloc in 
the city-building field.   
Without effective demand, the land enclosure perhaps would not be so intense. The 
demand was manufactured and manipulated by the state through three measures to 
help the developers. Firstly, the housing reform extended the consumer revolution to 
the housing sector (Davis, 2000) and pushed the now consumer subjects to secure 
their own shelters in the commercial housing market. Secondly, the infamous 365 
urban renewal project in clearing the land in the city centre created a huge demand 
from the uprooted. In the 1990s alone, more than 600,000 registered households were 
evicted from the city centre.11 Despite that the Shanghai Chaiqian Bylaw 1991 
required on-site resettlement; the state colluded with the developers to build 
commercial properties and high-end residential properties on the cleared land for 
both parties to profit from the renewal projects. This made it difficult for the 
displaced to move back. In-kind resettlement projects sprawled in suburbia became 
the only option for the displaced, especially after on-site resettlement died away and 
monetised compensation came into dominance (see Figure 8.2). In 1997, Shanghai 
government made off-site resettlement in suburbia a standard practice in chaiqian 
and selected four sites on the edge of the Middle Ring Road and the Outer Ring Road 
to develop resettlement housing projects (see Figure 8.3), mixed in with commercial 
housing projects.  
                                                            
10 According to an influential financial newspaper, 60 per cent of the top 50 development companies 
in Shanghai are associated with the state, although their ownership is hard to define due to their giant 
corporate structure, with numerous shareholders from the private sector. See 21st Century Business 
Herald, 6/11/2006. 
11 My calculation based on Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2013).  




Figure 8.2: Distribution of Major Resettlement Sites in the 1990s 
Source: Based on the GIS base map of Shanghai on ArcGIS, accessed online 2014 
   
Figure 8.3: Distribution of Major Property Development Zones 
Source: Based on the GIS base map of Shanghai on ArcGIS, accessed online 2014 
Sanlin 
Sanlin 
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The city-building practices since the 1990s allowed for an oppressive social-spatial 
structure to take shape. The new hierarchies have been translated into a mental 
structure defined by the linguistic patterns, in correspondence with the employment 
structure and the economic power of different social groups. As the local saying goes, 
‘those who speak a foreign language live in the city centre, those who speak 
Mandarin live in the middle and those who speak Shanghai dialect live in the 
suburbia mixed with those who speak none of above’. The production of these 
hierarchies comes with a ‘naturalising effect’ (Bourdieu, 1999a: 124), legitimatising 
their reproduction. The account from Uncle Chen is germane here. He was acutely 
aware of the unjust nature of chaiqian; however, instead of challenging it; he went on 
rationalising the off-site resettlement arrangement. I confronted him on this point and 
he quoted a line from a Hindi movie Awara to justify,  
The son of a thief always turns out to be a thief and the son of a good man 
always turns out to be good. This is how society works…. If you have beijing 
(political background) or you are super rich, the city is your paradise. For the 
poor, this is your fate. Accept it (Interview, X15, 02/05/2012). 
Already victimised, the displacees were further injured by the Machiavellian power 
games between the city-builders and the lingering effects of the land enclosures in 
the 1990s. As we can see from the maps above, Sanlin has been the destination of 
resettlement since the first wave of chaiqian in Shanghai. For the planners, it seems 
logical to resettle the displacees from the Expo here. This choice is further backed up 
firstly by a rationalistic argument for cost-effectiveness given the relatively adequate 
basic infrastructures here compared to other locations, and secondly by an affective 
argument for staying close to the demolished neighbourhoods. Such rationalisation is 
pale once the veil of local land politics is stripped off. Most of the land in Sanlin has 
already been controlled by the development companies with government 
background.12 They did so through bypassing the legal procedure in acquiring huge 
parcels of land and undercompensated the original owners.13 Their dominant control 
of the land here allowed them to engage in both land development and LUR 
speculation. Locating the resettlement housing projects here enabled the developers 
                                                            
12 Major development companies with red background include China National Real Estate 
Development Corporation Group, Shanghai Real Estate Development Corporation Group, Pudong 
Real Estate Development Corporation Group, and Vanke.  
13 Each time I walked past the Sanlin Township government building, I saw many former farmers 
petitioning for the loss of their land. Before I left Shanghai, I witnessed an organised demonstration in 
front of the government building. Also, see 21st Century  Business Herald, 06/02/2009. 
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to profit without any financial risks.14 This however has not yet adequately addressed 
the realpolitik in land development here, which sacrificed the interests of the 
displaced from Puxi. A land parcel of 1.8 million square metres was planned to build 
resettlement housing for them however it was hoarded by a private developer, Zhou 
Xiaodi, who amassed enormous political and cultural capital during his business 
practices in Shanghai (Yang, 2008).15 His conflicts with his business partners (mostly 
development companies with state background), intersected with struggles with 
various politicians, caused troubles for the Expo regime who treasured timely 
resettlement to avoid social unrests. As a consequence, the displacees from Puxi had 
to be relocated elsewhere. The choice of Pujiang was not innocent, either. Pujiang 
Town is notoriously known as the backyard of the former mayor, Chen Liangyu. It is 
part of his image project of one-city-nine-towns, under which programme Shanghai 
transplanted the exotic landscape of ten foreign countries and built ghost luxury 
villas in those places. Pujiang was designed with an Italian flavour. In building this 
image project, large land plots were illegally acquired from the local collectives and 
hoarded by major developers in close contact with Chen. The Expo-induced 
resettlement need to be situated in this context. Suffice to say, it is neither natural nor 
normal to have resettled the displacees in suburbia. Profitability and efficient 
resettlement dominated the decision-making while ‘better life’ was never a primary 
concern for the displacers. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps easier to understand 
why many displacees comment on their chaiqian experience as ‘switching between 
hells’.  
Plans that Die Hard  
The resettlement apartments were offered to the displacees in the form of qifang 
(pre-sold housing), meaning that when the displacees agreed to sign the resettlement 
                                                            
14 Albeit sold at a discount, the resettlement apartments were purchased by the displacees with the 
money received as compensation. When the compensation was not enough, the displacees sometimes 
had to pay the difference. With such a stable and effective demand and the support from local 
authorities, the developers did not need to worry about sales, marketing and financing.  
15 According to the journalist, Yang Haipeng, Zhou maintained close contacts with many high level 
politicians and judges in Shanghai. His nightclub was once used as a brothel for corrupted politicians 
in the 1990s. To accumulate fame as well as to have easier access to the bureaucratic field, he 
frequently appeared at charity events and even won many titles from the local authorities. He joined 
China National Democratic Construction Association, one of the eight minor parties recognised by the 
CPC. His donation to Fudan University (QS ranking 88 in 2014) even secured him a seat on the 
university board. Moreover, through his political connections, he founded the first civilian-run higher 
education institution in Shanghai and financed two public hospitals in branching out in Pudong 
district. In doing so, he gained enormous influence in many fields. With willing assistance of 
politicians, he at a time became the untouchable. If not for the attempted murder of his business 
partner, it is hard to say if he will ever be brought to trial.   
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contracts and purchased their new apartments, these resettlement neighbourhoods 
were still under construction. For most displacees, the only information they could 
rely on before making a substantial investment was the advertised layouts of the 
overall resettlement sites, the buildings and apartments, enriched by the ‘compelling’ 
pitch from the domicide operatives during negotiation meetings and by the promises 
from the major political figures on their patronising visits (see table 8.1). Loaded 
with jargon and abstractions, the technical maps and plans were beyond the 
knowledge of many displacees. Since time is the essence for the Expo, some so-
called yangbanfang (showcase apartments), built with great care to showcase the 
quality of the resettlement housing, were open to visit and inspection in order to help 
those ‘defensive’ displacees make up their mind, especially those displaced from 
Puxi given the remote location of their new homes. Therefore, when the displacees 
decided to take the resettlement offers, they also accepted enormous uncertainties 
and risks. Although many of them were concerned about such arrangements, they 
agreed to take the offer any way. Their limited option to satisfy their housing needs 
is for sure one explanation. But, what convinced most displacees, as I learnt from my 
conversations with them, was their trust in the state to abide by the contract and to 
deliver on verbal promises. It was also such trust in a benevolent state that led them 
to agree willingly to the fact that public infrastructures would not be fully developed 
to accommodate their needs for several years after they moved in. For instance, the 
metro line did not extend to Pujiang until 2009, two years after the displacees settled 
in. By the time I left Shanghai, the residents in Pujiang, especially those seniors, 
were still living in fear that an urgent health issue would very likely lead to fatality as 
the promised hospital has not yet built, and the closest hospital with emergency 
services was more than an hour’s drive away. Most of them had to refrain from 
visiting friends or relatives in the city centre for too long because metro services 
stopped before midnight.  
As the producer of plans and maps, the Expo regime could easily manipulate the 
displacees by selectively (mis)representing the resettlement neighbourhoods. 
Because neither the plans nor the promises were included in the written resettlement 
contracts, they could alter the plans or break their promises once they secured 
consent from the displacees without taking any legal responsibility. Therefore, many 
displacees in Sanlin Expo homeland were ballistic about these unexpected changes. 
They did not realise that the incineration plant was so close to their new homes. 
Those who lived next to the Middle Ring Road were furious to find that the small 
road on the map was in fact an elevated expressway full of traffic day and night (see 
Figures 8.2 and 8.16). They were also shocked to discover that the big community 
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centre they were told about was now replaced by more than fifty additional 
apartment blocks, which were supposed to be built on the site of a big furniture 
shopping mall. Many were also disheartened by the fact that they had to pay a few 
thousand extra because the actual sizes of the resettlement apartments slightly exceed 
the sizes they agreed to on the resettlement contracts. The costs caused by the fault of 
the developers ironically had to be covered by the displacees.  
Table 8.1: The Displacees' Knowledge of Resettlement Housing during Chaiqian Negotiations   
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Source: my own survey, 2012 
With absolute control in producing the rehousing estates, the planners turned the 
resettlement site into a lab for practising their techniques. Both sites are what Bosker 
(2013) might call planning mimicries, although the traces of counterfeits were better 
concealed than simple transplanting. Whilst Sanlin Expo Homeland acknowledges 
the credits of Yuen Long in Hong Kong, Pujiang Expo Homeland claims valuable 
experiences from Italy. In transplanting the international ‘best practises’, the planners 
executed what Jane Jacobs feared most in modernist planning with strong 
determination and extraordinary treatment of planning as a piece of art featuring the 
dominance of visual aesthetical order (Jacobs, 1961: 387-405). As we can see from 
Figures 8.8 and 8.9, there is a clear spatial segregation between different functions. 
The land on each site was divided into smaller, regular and rectangular plots 
specialised in single use. All residential clusters were built with a mixture of low-rise 
(five to six stories) and highrise (eleven to seventeen stories) apartment buildings 
with modern facades. They were strictly separated from the shopping malls, leisure 
and cultural facilities. Outside the residential compounds, the road grid is a straight-
line with four to ten bus lanes and narrow sidewalks on both sides and minimum 
disruptions. They were planned to facilitate rapid flow of automobiles. The only two 
streets planned in a humane scale are Banquan Road in Sanlin and Puchi Road in 
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Pujiang because of the location of the clinics, the food markets and the schools. They 
are also the streets not completely dead, with some renqi (with some street life) 
(Holston, 1989, Zhang, 2006). Inside the residential compounds, functional divisions 
were also created to maintain a visual order. Apart from the huge block close to the 
elevated expressway in Sanlin, all planned communities were divided into several 
rows of apartment buildings, surrounding a communal green space at the centre. 
Some gymnastic equipment and playground facilities were installed in the green 
space after repeated requests from the displacees after they moved in. The inside 
road design also favours automobiles despite that most of the displacees do not own 
cars.  
 
Figure 8.4: Sanlin Expo Homeland 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Pujiang Expo Homeland 
Source: my own, Pujiang, 2012 
 
The planning of the rehousing estates is a material justification of the legitimacy of 
chaiqian. The planners constructed monumental space as an orthodox historical 
narrative of Expo-induced chaiqian as well as a reminder of how distressing past life 
was (see Figures 8.6 and 8.7), teaching the displacees to be grateful about what they 
have now. They also eradicated all the eyesores of the displacees’ old homes they 
invalidated in the planned communities, namely those many ‘lacks’—lack of visual 
order, of modern conveniences, of adequate green space, of efficient land use, of 
sanitary facilities and privacy (see chapter 4). When exercising their power in 
producing the new spaces, the planners were in fact imposing a new way of life. 
Peter Marris (1974: 57), paraphrasing Robert Weaver, points out that ‘what is to be 
accomplished is not the recreation of a way of life, without rats, dirt and 
overcrowding, but a miracle—a shock of enlightenment which, like a religious 
conversion, transforms a person overnight’. In making authoritarian planning 
decisions, the planners narcissistically see themselves as know-it-alls with a 
dictatorial power over every one’s peculiar interests and preferences. It violated 
many principles that are crucial for a vibrant community as James Scott (1998) and 
Jane Jacobs (1961) have argued. For Scott (1998: 143), the planning and 
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development of a neighbourhood is similar to the evolvement of a language, a social 
product of the speakers. It is true that the linguists and experts may develop 
professional knowledge about it, but they can never fully claim authority and 
dictatorship in everyday practises. The openness, diversity and the flexibility of a 
language are the main reasons that keep a language alive. In a similar vein, Jacobs 
(1961: 255, 387) warns that when planning is practised like taxidermy, ignoring a 
‘great range of unofficial plans, idea, and opportunities’, ‘the results impoverish life 
instead of enriching it’. With no input from the displaced concerning how they wish 
their new life would be, the planned Expo Homeland may look good from a plane 
but are rather ineffective in accommodating the daily needs of the displaced. In 
addition to the under-developed public transport and collective facilities, the modern 
neighbourhoods, advocated to offer all the conveniences, confront the displaced with 
many modern inconveniences, demanding extra efforts to cope with the changes to 
their lives.  
 
 
Figure 8.6: Sculpture of a 'Grateful' Displaced Family 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012  
 Figure 8.7: A Relocated Shikumen in a 
Mini-Park 
Source: my own, Pujiang, 2012  
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As I have mentioned in chapter 5, the supply of resettlement housing (one to three 
bedrooms apartments) forced many families, especially those extended ones, to 
renegotiate their living arrangements. A family of three or more generations who did 
not wish to live separately was very unlikely to find a proper apartment of a decent 
size and sunlight exposure from either site. Some families purchased two apartments 
on the same floor and creatively but illegally took down a wall to connect two 
separate apartments and live as a big family. Others had to live in separate locations. 
As land is money, the planners and the developers were stringent in constructing 
buildings not for profit. Within each neighbourhood, there was only one two-storied 
communal building ideally for public use. But these buildings have been mostly 
taken over by the newly established residents committees. There is no space inside 
those communities to accommodate activities in need of bigger or safer rooms than 
the displaced private homes. Consequently, ritualistic activities such as ancestor 
worships, death rituals and banquets were pushed to the streets and performed in 
public.  
 
Figure 8.10: A Mourning Hall inside the Camp 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
Figure 8.11: Ceremony of Worshiping Ancestors 
(Burning Joss Papers and Koutow) 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
Since there are no elevators in five to six storied apartment buildings and the 
highrises are more expensive in management charges, the seniors with mobility 
concerns and the physically handicapped had to compete for the ground level 
apartments, which are humid and dark, so as to avoid becoming ‘prisoners’ in their 
own homes. But even if they could luckily secure a ground-floor apartment, their 
mobility remained severely hampered by the absence of disabled access to the 
buildings. Neither could they move around independently because of the road bumps 
and steps intentionally built to slow down traffic inside their communities. Whilst the 
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small green space and the exercise equipment invite the inhabitants to walk around 
and socialise, the limited provision of benches kept many residents away. The 
understandable absence of public toilets confined many seniors and those with health 
conditions to a small radius of their homes in case of any emergencies. Such 
inconvenience further reduced popular use of the centrally-located green space and 
leisure facilities, problematising the adequacy and the distribution of the collective 
consumption. Many displacees attempted to resolve the issue in their own way. 
Those in the high rises made best use of their relatively spacious hallways and people 
could take their small stools downstairs and make the hallways their meeting spots. 
For those in the low-rises, the close-by bike shacks were converted to a small salon 
with recycled chairs and couches to escape from their matchbox like homes and meet 
their new neighbours.    
Figure 8.12: Socialising in the Hallway 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
Figure 8.13: A Bike-shack Salon 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
The planners in Pujiang seemed to be more considerate, conceiving the place as more 
than bedrooms for the displacees but an important site for contact, leisure and a 
flourishing life. To this agenda, they purposely practised the modernist planning 
technique of stilting in a few neighbourhoods; using concrete pillars to elevate the 
buildings and leaving the ground floor unoccupied16 (see Figure 8.14). The monolith 
apartment blocks above then were planned and designed with precision, calculating 
the use of living space ‘centimetre by centimetre’.17 The idea is that the unoccupied 
                                                            
16 Based on my observation, the planners seem to have invested most energy and resources in the 5th 
residential cluster, which was built as a show neighbourhood during chaiqian.  
17 See http://www.expo2010.cn/expo/sh_expo/zlzx/sbjxs/wqjm/userobject1ai23003.html 
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spacious floor would be used as meeting places or for collective activities. Clearly, 
such design bears the imprints of Le Corbusier (1967) whose notorious utopian 
vision of an ideal residential quarter is elevated on pilotis (stilt) so that the nature on 
the ground is intact and the circulation of traffic can be organised more efficiently. 
The top-down plan in Pujiang, turning blind eyes to both the criticism (Holston, 1989) 
and cultural differences, was doomed to fail. The displacees rarely use this open 
space as planners had envisaged. As a matter of fact, the function of this space was 
never communicated explicitly and the property right definition of this space is also 
rather ambiguous. As a result, such space receives minimum maintenance and is 
empty and dusty most of the time. In many places, it has been appropriated as a 
parking lot.  
 
Figure 8.14: Elevated Apartment Block 
Source: my own, Pujiang, 2012 
 
 
Figure 8.15: Mould in One Resettlement Apartment 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
Whereas the planners may rationalise the planning failures from experimenting in 
exotic planning exercises as a lack of deliberation, they cannot do the same for their 
ignorance of the limits of their professional knowledge and their alliance with the 
developers for economic interests. Because open green space is legally required for 
planned communities and more green space has been used as a marketing trick to sell 
the resettlement location, the planners fulfilled the requirement and promises by 
greening almost all empty land plots. However, they did so rarely with a fastidious 
eye to the visual and aesthetical order as in the same way they designed the buildings 
and created functional segregation. Vegetation was planted in the most cost-effective 
way, showing no evidence of gardening knowledge. For the residents on lower floors, 
they were frustrated by numerous mosquitos, bugs, flies and other insects hiding in 
the bushes or trees right outside their windows, in a far worse condition than in their 
demolished neighbourhoods. For the same reason, many residents refused to sit in 
the flower terraces and the small pavilions overarched by the vine trees during the 
summer. But, perhaps gardening is too trivial for the planners who were concerned 
with the overall big picture and specialised in designing residential space. What 
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disappointed many low-income families most lies in the planners’ presumptuousness, 
universalising their middle-class way of life, with remote knowledge about how the 
poor have to cope with life without modern equipment. The kitchen in many 
buildings was designed with the presumption that smoke ventilators would be 
installed by every family and therefore reduce reliance on windows for the same 
function. The problem is that the ventilators were not affordable by more families 
nor were the windows used in such a limited way. Seeing their kitchen window as a 
pure decoration, one displacee furiously asked, ‘Are those planners idiots with no 
practical knowledge in their life’?18  
In fact, the quality of the resettlement housing is a shared concern. The low-ceilings 
of the apartments, although standard in modern housing, failed most former self-built 
homeowners who are used to high ceilings in their former homes. Depressing is the 
common word when describing their experience. This not only applied to the seniors 
but the younger generation as well. For fear of breaching the resettlement contracts 
and thereby incurring additional costs, the developers completed the resettlement 
housing projects within the agreed guoduqi19 (transition period). Although Shanghai 
is known for the speed of transformation, it was astonishing for the displacees to 
witness hundreds of new apartment blocks rising from a vast vacant land in less than 
two years. Some displacees even compared the construction process to ‘playing with 
Legos’, building a new floor in no time. The metis they acquired from their life and 
working experiences, as embodied in the Chinese proverb, mangong chu xihuo 
(equivalent to small fire makes sweet malt in English), led to their belief in the poor 
quality of their new homes. Many families call the resettlement housing projects 
toufu projects (slapdash buildings). They are surely right. At the time of my 
fieldwork, their new homes were only six years old. The displacees were furious 
about the cracks in the building foundation, hollow wooden walls, mould in their 
bedrooms (see figure 8.15), the broken electronic door system, etc. What they found 
most unbearable was the lack of insulation. Because all the apartments were offered 
in raw concrete state, each family had to decorate their new homes when they moved 
in, creating a tremendous amount for noise for their neighbours. All displacees had 
the dreadful experience of living with a hammer and a driller right next to their ears. 
Even when there was no decorative work within their building, the displacees had to 
creep around inside their homes to avoid conflicts with their neighbours downstairs. 
                                                            
18 Survey interview, 18/07/2012. 
19 During which time, the displacees had to rent and live somewhere else before the resettlement 
housing was ready.  
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For those living next to the elevated expressway, insomnia now has become part of 
their life.  
     
Despite the fact that each neighbourhood is gated, guarded and surveilled, the 
displacees were frustrated by the prevalent petty theft and crimes. Following 
Newman (1976), I suggest that the planning and management of  these communities 
made theft and crimes much easier to commit and difficult to prevent. According to 
Newman, high crime rates may correlate with three features in building designs: 
anonymity, lack of surveillance and availability of escape routes. Unfortunately, the 
design of the resettlement communities checks all three traits. The displaced families 
did not move in all at once. All newcomers to the planned community, the displacees 
barely know each other, not even their next door neighbours.20 Their socialisation is 
prevented by the matchbox design apartments, partitioning at least twelve families on 
different floors in a single unit, with doors shut all the time. There is no semi-private 
or semi-public space as in the demolished neighbourhoods that cultivated 
interpersonal contacts. Worse, they are intimidated to (re)connect with others, let 
alone seek each other’s help.21 As many displacees believe, there is a particular set of 
values, cultures and practises associated with highrise buildings, treasuring privacy, 
anonymity and boundaries. Gone are the days where private life extends to public 
space. Everyone is treated and expected to act as separate beings. Such impersonal 
ambiance of the resettlement sites made it easier for thieves to blend in. It became 
even easier when there were few ‘eyes on the street’ as what Jane Jacobs (1961) 
might say. For one, although densely constructed, each neighbourhood is too big for 
people to keep an eye on things on their streets. In Sanlin, one resettlement 
neighbourhood consisted of almost 400 apartment buildings. For another, confined to 
                                                            
20 The displacees from Pujiang frequently quoted an example on this point. A man who lived alone 
was found dead almost a month after he died of a heart attack at home. No neighbour was concerned 
enough to call the police after not seeing him for nearly a month.   
21 An example here would be that many displacees refrained from visiting their former neighbours or 
friends who now live in the same building because they dislike the hassle of taking off their shoes or 
putting on a shoe cover in their homes.  
Figure 8.16: ‘My Home is a Living Hell’ 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
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their private homes, the displacees were prevented from looking out their windows 
due to the interior designs. Moreover, there was nothing for them to see. Streets 
inside the residential compounds are dead because of the strict functional division. 
This therefore fosters greater dependence on the surveillance cameras. Inadequately 
installed, the cameras are poorly maintained by short-staffed and irresponsible 
community security teams who shoulder too many responsibilities in maintaining the 
neighbourhoods. Mostly laid-off workers or migrant workers, the security guards 
lack the skills and training in combating and preventing crimes.  
The lack of security negatively influences the way the displaced viewed their 
chaiqian experience. Interviews were filled with their nostalgic accounts about the 
old days when they could leave their door wide open without worrying about crimes. 
A related complaint is the loss of renqing, the intimate interpersonal relations, that 
engenders a sense of belonging, comfort, security, trust and warmth. As Campanella 
(2008: 166) comments, ‘rebuilding a city’s broken infrastructure is one thing; 
rebuilding broken lives and wrecked communities is quite another’.  On this point, 
Fullilove (2005) is more sceptical as she argues that no effort of rebuilding or even 
replicating a demolished neighbourhood can ever repair the damaged mazeway so 
delicately organised, socially and geometrically. In her words, ‘those who were near 
are too far, those who were far are too near’ (Fullilove, 2005: 14). My study returned 
the same findings. At the time of my fieldwork, the sociological sense of community 
was largely missing. ‘“I” continue to exist, though damaged and maybe even 
permanently changed. “You” continue to exist, though distant and hard to relate to. 
But “we” no longer exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger communal 
body’ (Erikson, 1976: 154). Most displacees went through a long period of adaption 
to the emptiness and isolation in the resettlement. An old woman described to me her 
experience in the initial two years, ‘when I moved here, I stood on the street one day. 
Looking ahead, there was no one. Looking back, there was no one either. Finally 
someone came to ask me why I stood there. I told him I would go nuts (gangdu, in 
Shanghai dialect) if I entrap myself in the flat alone for the whole day. The whole 
neighbourhood was empty. There was no one’. Another woman quickly added, ‘Like 
I said earlier, if you shoot randomly with a machine gun, I can guarantee no one is 
going to be shot’.22 Many of them did not know where their old neighbours now live 
and did not know where to find them. They roughly know the faces of their new 
neighbours who moved in later and have not yet developed the tight, deep and 
reciprocal relations that they could reliably count on as they used to. One displacee 
                                                            
22 Interview, X21 and X22, 04/05/2012. 
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commented that, ‘everyone moves here from all corners of the city. No one cares 
about others. Geren zisao menqianxue (literally translated as everyone only sweeps 
the snow on his/her front door)’.23 His quote nicely captures the new mores for 
highrise living, distant and private. A figure from my survey results might also be 
indicative here. Only 30 per cent (91 respondents) reported that they have a mutually 
supportive relationship with their neighbours now compared to 70 per cent (211 
respondents) reported that they had so in the past. The loss of social connections 
provokes profound sense of loneliness, especially for the seniors in empty-nest 
families whose sons or daughters had to live in the downtown area for various 
reasons (job, study, dislike the location, etc.). When I asked their permission for a 
chat, some seniors would invite me to their homes and hold me there for hours. This 
was significant sociologically because most people I worked with were extremely 
suspicious of strangers. The coldness of the place and people led some seniors to 
joke that they moved into a morgue and everyday life is passively structured into 
‘three waiting’, waiting to eat, waiting to drink and waiting for the call of death.24  
 
Figure 8.17: Changes in Social Circles 
Source: own survey, 2012 
 
Such loss is magnified by the governing practises of these planned communities. As 
Cochrane (2007: 49) points out, the notion of community is rather elusive and 
ideologically slippery and the meanings have always been subject to contestation and 
moralisation in history. Owing to the growth of professional and technological 
knowledge related to administrative practises of the modern state, according to 
                                                            
23 Interview, X4, 01/05/2012. 
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Nicolas Rose (1999: 176), community has become a sector of government. Through 
different programmes, the practises of government through community ‘encourage 
and harness active practises of self-management and identity construction’ (ibid). At 
the centre of this process is the cultivation of entrepreneurial subjects. Since the mid-
1980s, community building emerges as a central subject in political discourses in 
China (Bray, 2006). It differs from western discourses and practises in that 
community is specifically defined with a fixed geographical boundary and the 
primary agenda underlying this enterprise is to consolidate the party-state’s power 
base in society when the danwei system started to fall apart. As the reform keeps 
destroying socialist institutions and traditional values, community building now takes 
a similar goal and trajectory as in the western context (Bray, 2006). However, it 
would stretch too far to see community building strategies as capable of ‘building an 
inclusive society’ (Staeheli, 2003: 816). Embedded in China’s overall social 
engineering process, this governing technology of community has been practised in 
correspondence with stratified citizenship (Tomba, 2009).  
For peculiarities in their formation, the resettlement communities are governed by 
diverse regimes, reflective of hybrid governmentalities (Sigley, 2006). Bought at a 
discounted rate, the resettlement apartments are banned from free market exchange 
for five years, meaning that the displaced cannot vote with their feet even if they 
realise that the new residential space is not an ideal place to live during this period. 
Ostensibly, it protects the interests of the displaced, as with the slow improvement of 
infrastructures and amenities; the land value will increase and reflect in their housing 
price. However, by imposing a strict ban, it also prescribes an inferior and defective 
identity to the resettlement housing and the displacees. It also forces many displacees 
to put their new apartments on the black market, bearing great economic and legal 
risks. Some others rent out their apartments and live elsewhere, mostly in better 
locations.  
Given the ‘rural’ nature of the resettlement locations, most displacees refused to 
update their hukou registrations for fear of losing their privileges, status and benefits 
as urbanites and Shanghai citizens, although the address they listed as their homes no 
longer exist on Shanghai’s maps. For most displacees, Shanghai is specifically 
reserved for Puxi, the western part of the city, and the rural places are not part of 
Shanghai. Resettlement in rural areas therefore is a punishment, relegating them to a 
lower social class, banishing them to become rural and therefore causing them 
identity crisis. Commenting on this point, a displacee repeatedly emphasised the 
meaning of location to the Shanghainese: ‘when we were in Shanghai, we belonged 
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to the First World. Now, we migrated to the Third World. Worse, Pujiang is the most 
backward bit of the Third World. The politicians never care about the Third 
World’.25 Complaints of this kind are not without reason. The uneven geographies of 
Shanghai as reflected in the contrasting landscapes, infrastructures, facilities, and 
public services are for sure a good start. Some families only keep their old 
registration so that their children can be admitted to a better school in the city centre. 
Whilst it is true that there is no regional difference in universal welfare provisions 
within Shanghai (e.g. medical insurance, pension, etc.), great regional disparities can 
also be found in the social benefits distributed through communities (e.g. caring for 
seniors, the sick, etc.). This is because the availability, form and value of the latter all 
depend on the fiscal prowess of the local states. Therefore, holding onto their old 
hukou registration may be interpreted as a form of resistance, symbolically defending 
their injured identity and materialistically preventing a total collapse of the security 
nest they relied on.  
However, without formally changing their hukou registration, the displacees are 
subject to old and new governing apparatus in both localities. An unintended 
outcome is that they are further economically and politically undermined. 
Economically, because urban planning and local decision-making are heavily relied 
on by the hukou institution and effective population management, inaccurate 
information on population distribution challenges the effectiveness of redistributive 
policies and delays the improvement of local infrastructures and public services. 
Instead of ameliorating social inequalities, it widens social gaps between the central 
and the periphery locations. Politically, it complicates the formation of collective 
interests and allows the bureaucratic system to sabotage collective actions by 
exploiting the incoherency. On the one hand, the displacees are disentitled to 
participate in political affairs that affect their well-being on everyday basis through 
formal institutions in the resettlement sites. This puts a strain on the political options 
for their rightful resistance. On the other, with a declining political interest and 
engagement in the public affairs in their old places, the displacees’ political 
participation such as voting became rather symbolic.  
From the onset, each community is under the management and administration of two 
grassroots institutions, namely the residents committees and the property 
management companies. The former reifies the power of the state carrying out 
everyday governance whilst the latter, subsidiaries to the development companies, 
pursues the logic of the market in performing their duties of property maintenance. In 
                                                            
25 Interview, X11, 02/05/2012. 
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practice, however, there are some overlaps in their duties, such as community 
security, maintaining social order, etc. As per regulation, members of the residents 
committee are supposed to be elected by the local residents, yet due to the urgency of 
penetrating state power from early on, the initial staff members were appointed by 
the local states. The assignment of local cadres from Sanlin and Pujiang to the 
resettlement residents’ committees intensified conflicts. ‘Rural’ in place of origin, 
these agents are believed to be incapable of managing the displacees occupying a 
higher social hierarchy. Whilst elections were organised later, the firm control of 
elections by the local states and the power politics within established residents’ 
communities betrays the intention of grassroots democracy and allows many 
appointed staffs to stay in the office. In one neighbourhood, a younger member with 
more votes than the head of the residents’ committee was denied as the winner of an 
election. Elections aside, there are also entry barriers to the residents’ committee 
such as age and education qualifications to keep up with the overall trend of 
professionalisation and entrepreneurialisation. In my study, I was not able to find any 
‘granny cadres’ (Pan, 2005a) in residents’ committees who invest in the job not for 
fame or political careers but for the interests of collective good. According to the 
displaced, the younger cadres, especially the college graduates, barely know them 
personally outside their professional capacity. Relying more on computers and cold 
phone calls than on home visits, the new way of governing does not meet the popular 
expectations for a more personal care and reciprocal relations. For those who relied 
on the personal contacts from residents’ committees as a source of security and 
belonging, the professional detached concern alienates them and undermines the 
political trust. A female displacee with severe depression and heart disease 
commented with tears in her eyes,  
in the past, if I did not feel well, I could phone the residents committees, they would 
send people immediately. If no one was available, they would call my families 
immediately. Here, nothing is going to happen….They [former cadres at residents 
committee] treated you like a family member. They knew me personally. You did 
not even have to ask for help. They would do it for you. You would feel so warm in 
heart. They always walked around every day. They would visit me at home, chatting 
with me and inviting me to many social activities. When I visit their office for help, 
they would make sure that I could get an answer right away. If the person in charge 
of my problem was not available, they would take notes and make sure I was visited 
later that day. Here, last time I went to ask about minimum allowance, no one cared 
enough to tell me the exact procedures for filing an application. They had to dig out 
my files. They just kept me waiting, waiting, and waiting (interview, X41, 
16/05/2012). 
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Another possible cause for the declining trust in residents’ committees lays in their 
overlapping responsibilities with property management companies, which allow 
them to exploit the ambiguities and download their workload. 26 The property 
management companies are not democratically selected, either. They were appointed 
by the developers. As private companies, they are naturally enticed to maximise their 
profits by offering their professional services in cleaning, repairing and security. 
Their income is supposed to derive from the monthly property management fees 
collected from the displacees, although their current pricing is subsidised by the state 
for the sake of the Expo brand. As the only legitimate provider in housing 
maintenance, they however frequently overcharge their services or extort from the 
displacees for petty work.27 To many displacees, especially the self-built housing 
owners, those costs put an additional financial pressure in meeting their needs. This 
pressure is particularly so for the former farmers who lost their land and have to pay 
everything for their subsistence. But, most of them agree to pay such fees on the 
expectation that quality services would be provided. Conflicts then arise when the 
services prove to be unsatisfactory. Seeing themselves as customers rather than 
subjects of the property companies, the disgruntled displacees stopped paying the 
monthly charges. They however are weakly protected by the law. A few families 
have already been served with a notice from the lawyers hired by the private 
companies for possible legal charges.  
In my fieldwork, I did not have the chance to speak with managers of the property 
management companies. However, I encountered a few security guards and 
repairmen during my intensive visits to many neighbourhoods. Paid a minimum 
wage, they are quite sympathetic to the displacees and agree that withholding 
payment is understandable. But, they also have a different story to tell. First, as a 
consequence of insufficient funding, the property management companies are 
increasingly incapable of providing services. Their ever expansive responsibilities 
also make them under-staffed.28 Second, whist some housing problems are fixable in 
their capacities, structural issues as a result of the poor housing quality are out of 
                                                            
26 In Sanlin, some public services and civic responsibilities have been shifted to an NGO based in the 
monumental building citizens centre. The membership charges however have kept many residents 
away. Also, many seniors, the main consumers of their services, find it difficult to travel the long 
distance to this place. They prefer a more decentralised provision of such services.  
27 Extortion is of course concealed. For the displacees, they expect timely maintenance and repair 
work. Yet, the property companies frequently kick them around or delay the services. To speed up the 
process, the displacees had to bribe them with small gifts.   
28 For instance, in one neighbourhood in Sanlin, there is only one security guard who is in charge of 
surveillance, gate-keeping and coordinating emergencies at the same time.  
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their hands. Given their testimonies, it seems to suggest that resistance from the 
displacees only leads to a vicious cycle, further undermining their interests.  
Unlike middle-class housing estates, where residents have strong awareness and 
resources in organising their interests through homeowners associations to counter 
the power of the property companies (see Tomba, 2005, Zhang, 2010), the displacees 
I worked with failed to form their own associations to sack or supervise the property 
management companies and to take control of the housing maintenance fund.29 A 
primary difficulty goes back to the broken social ties and the problem of socialisation 
in the new places. To file an application for establishing such associations, they 
would need at least five dedicated owners as main points of contact to deal with red 
tape and oversee the organisation of property owners and the election of 
representatives. But, what prohibits most residents from doing so were their lost trust 
in the residents’ committees who are legally responsible to take over the organisation 
process once an application has been registered, and a greater fear of retaliation from 
property management companies whose power is under assault. Without an 
organisation to represent and speak for them, the displacees are vulnerable to the 
oppression of both the state and the market power. 
With all the planning and governing failures in mind, it should not be too surprising 
to find that most displacees were dissatisfied with new homes and communities, 
although they felt more satisfied on matters related to their individual housing than to 
the communal facilities and environments. This is confirmed by the survey study on 
residential satisfaction. For this project, a five-point Likert scale (from 1, meaning 
‘very dissatisfied’ to 5, meaning ‘very satisfied’30) was used to ask the respondents to 
indicate their satisfaction level with different traits of their neighbourhoods. The 
selection of those traits was based on existing residential satisfaction measurements 
and the initial findings of my interviews. Before reading the results as presented in 
table 8.2, I must underscore the meaning of yiban, the midpoint, which may 
influence the way we interpret the data. I chose to use yiban instead of zhongli, the 
Chinese equivalent to neutral, in framing the midpoint. Yiban, which may be literally 
translated as indifference or tolerable, is more tilted to negative feelings in this 
context. This is based on my findings from interviews. In discussing their feelings 
                                                            
29 Only one neighbourhood established the homeowner association. Legally, the leaders of this 
association must be elected by all property owners. But strangely, the displacees I interviewed in this 
neighbourhood never heard of this association. I was not able to meet the leaders of this association 
either.    
30  During actual surveying, the midpoint was not read to the displacees to mitigate the desirability 
bias.  
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about the resettlement sites, the displacees frequently used yiban or mama huhu 
interchangeably. Their elaboration typically involved a rationalisation of their 
frustration of the status quo. What typically followed yiban or mama huhu is either a 
statement, ‘you cannot compare it to the commercial housing projects [which is 
supposed to be of better quality]’, or a rhetorical question, ‘what can you expect from 
a resettlement apartment’?31 For this reason, I interpreted and grouped the midpoint 
in the category of dissatisfied. The general conclusion from the survey results then is 
that the displacees felt overwhelmingly frustrated by the resettlement housing estates 
or at least felt restrained from a more decent living as they aspired to or as 
commercial housing dwellers. In this sense, their views toward the resettlement 
housing estates are mediated and disciplined by their perceptions of own positions in 
the social space, and are expressions of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991).  
As we can see from the table, only the provision of basic utilities and services were 
positively received by a majority of the displacees, although physical changes in 
floor plans and housing size were positively acknowledged by close to half of all 
survey respondents. The former finding is certainly not difficult to understand given 
the advancement in technology and utility infrastructure in Shanghai in general32 and 
the relatively low cost through centralised planning and supply. The latter two were 
at the top of the scale perhaps because the improvement in individual housing 
conditions, especially in terms of average floor size and ‘ordered’ building designs, 
has been the main selling point to legitimatise the chaiqian programme and secure 
the compliance of the displacees. Compared to the crowded and physically deprived 
housing conditions of many displacees, such changes in dwelling space are 
noticeable and easier to conjure up euphoric sentiments.   
Even if we ignore the influence of language here, the findings from my survey 
remain largely different from the studies of Wu (2004), Li and Song33 (2009) and 
Day (2013), where a majority of displacees reported their satisfaction with 
resettlement housing.  I see no point in performing advanced regression analysis, or 
any cross-category analysis (gender, age, income, etc.), as we can find in the work I 
just mentioned or hundreds of studies we may find on the same topic. Other than 
                                                            
31 In conducting the survey studies, I also discussed this matter with the surveyors, and we all strongly 
felt that yiban is not strictly neutral in attitude but more negative in this context.   
32 In 2000, tap water supply coverage reached 99.97 per cent in Shanghai. Gas supply to households 
increased by 11 times from 2000 to 2010. In the same decade, households with internet connection 
more than doubled (from 2.47  million to 5.17 million). See Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2013).  
33 The work by Li and Song (2009) is of most comparative value here. In their study, the mean scores 
of all 21 indicators are higher than 3, ranging from 3.01 to 3.61. In comparison, only 7 out of 24 
indicators in this study have a mean score higher than 3, ranging from 3.07 to 3.43.  
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showing that some displacees are more satisfied than others, analysis in that direction 
is politically futile and dangerous. At best, it may lead to more targeted redistributive 
policies to mitigate the negative impacts, presuming the state is a benign and 
responsive agent. This perhaps is delusional and dangerous since the CPC never 
pursues such philosophy itself. As one of the founders of the CPC, Chen Duxiu, 
passionately warns in 1916, ‘the servility in the hope for a good government 
conducted by elites with virtues is the same as in the wish of slaves for the blessings 
from their masters, and of subjects for greater benevolence from their emperors and 
ministers’ (in Li, 2008: 4). Apart from humanising domicide, it cannot challenge the 
structural forces and processes that constantly produce such effects. Worse, such 
findings can easily become accessories to the domicide machine claiming that 
chaiqian after all is not bad for all displaced, further undermining the weakening 
solidarity amongst the displacees. Of course, I have no intention of discrediting the 
value of such analysis but on reminding the politics of statistical representation. 
Given my own agenda is to lay bare the euphemised violence of resettlement 













Table 8.2: Residential Satisfaction Survey 
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Indicators  Very 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied yiban Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Mean  
 Internet and TV 
network connection 
1.7% 7.0% 40.0% 49.7% 1.7% 3.43
 Provision of water, 
electricity and gas 
2.0% 6.7% 41.0% 48.0% 2.3% 3.42
 Housing layouts  2.0% 16.7% 38.7% 40.3% 2.3% 3.24
 Housing size 4.0% 17.3% 35.3% 40.3% 3.0% 3.21
 Education 
establishment  
4.0% 10.7% 53.0% 30.7% 1.7% 3.15
 Community 
landscaping 
5.0% 17.7% 43.0% 31.7% 2.7% 3.09
 Architectural design 4.3% 14.0% 53.7% 26.7% 1.3% 3.07
 Public facilities 
maintenance   
5.3% 21.7% 43.7% 29.0 0.3% 2.97
Sanitary conditions  6.0% 23.3% 42.0% 26.3% 2.3% 2.96
Fire safety  5.7% 23.7% 44.7% 25.0% 1.0% 2.92
 Shopping  8.0% 28.7% 33.0% 28.0% 2.3% 2.88
Community cleaning 
services 
6.0% 26.6% 42.7% 24.7% 0.7% 2.88
 Overall ambience of 
the neighbourhood 
6.3% 21.7% 55.7% 16.0 0.3% 2.82
 Exercise, gymnastics, 
and playgrounds 
7.0% 30.0% 47.0% 15.0% 1.0% 2.73
 Community security 
management  
11.7% 30.3% 39.0% 18.7% 0.7% 2.67
 Leisure and amenities   8.3% 35.3% 38.3% 17.0% 1.0% 2.67
Public transport  12.7% 32.0% 33.0% 21.3% 1.0% 2.66
Parking management 11.0% 30.0% 43.0% 15.0% 1.0% 2.65
Sound proofing and 
noise control  
20.3% 30.7% 32.0% 15.3% 1.7% 2.47
Senior centre 18.3% 35.7% 29.7% 14.0% 2.3% 2.46
Property management  19.0% 32.3% 35.0% 12.3% 1.3% 2.45
Medical services  19.0% 38.0% 25.0% 16.3% 1.7% 2.44
Housing quality  20.3% 32.3% 31.7% 15.3% 0.3% 2.43
Sense of safety  25.7% 33.0% 28.0% 12.7% 0.7% 2.30
Source: my own survey (N=300), 2012 
 
Considering that the legitimacy of chaiqian is founded on a nurturing environment 
for a better life, survey findings show that the resettlement community itself became 
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a main source of distress, incapable of helping them lay down new roots, tearing up 
the political illusion to pieces in the same way as the regime destroyed the displacees’ 
homes. When hopes are high, we can expect grim reality slowly unfolding as such to 
aggravate the pain and loss from uprooting and triggers profound feelings of betrayal, 
disappointment, indignation, victimisation, nostalgia and loss. Such mixed feelings 
are conveyed in accounts like this,   
we all get nostalgic at some point. When you grow old, you always want to return 
home. We Chinese people have this set phrase, luoye guigen (Falling leaves settle on 
their roots). That is my home. The government wants my land for other purposes. 
Laobaixing (the mass) like me eventually has to give away. But, you (the 
government) cannot fail your promises. You cannot deceive me and trick me into 
this dumpster! (Interview, displaced from Puxi, X45, 21/05/2012). 
Or as reflected in the testimony offered by a woman,   
how to describe my feelings. Well, I miss it like missing a lost child. People say that 
a child is a flesh of the mother (haizi shi mama shenshang de yikuai rou). Moving 
here is to lose a child. What kind of mother would abandon her child? You cannot do 
anything about it. They want your land (Interview, displaced from Puxi, X41, 
16/05/2012). 
Her testimony here echoes Fried’s (1966) and Marris’ (1974) comments that people 
mourn for the loss of their place akin to grieving for a lost person. To many 
displacees, home is an extension of the body, and its annihilation is a permanent 
destruction of a part of the person. After six years living in the resettlement sites, 
many still find it difficult to identify with the new places. They continuously see 
themselves as ‘out of place’.  
I do not feel I belong here and will never belong to this place. My root is in 
Zhoujiadu. That is the place I belong. Give me a piece of land there, I will move 
back right away. I do not want to live here (Interview, displaced from Pudong, D79, 
28/03/2012). 
It is impossible to encapsulate all the disheartening effects of chaiqian upon the lives 
of the displacees in this short section. Before moving onto the next section, let me 
add a few additional comments to debunk the myth that the displacees made a great 
fortune out of chaiqian. First, the dispossessed farmers are permanently 
impoverished, as they were offered neither any employment opportunities nor any 
skill training. The land for citizenship programme pioneered by the Pudong 
government is utterly wrong in confusing universal citizenship rights with 
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compensation for the loss of land and homes.34 Second, costs such as decoration, 
purchasing new furniture and switching service providers, part of the whole 
resettlement process were not covered by the compensation package at all and used 
up much of their family savings. Third, for most families, their living expenses 
soared due to additional costs in transport, food and service charges.  
Deterritorialisation, Machiavellian Moments and Perpetuating Injustice 
In the last section, I have outlined the observable impacts of chaiqian upon the 
displacees. This section shall shift the analytical focus to the way the displacees cope 
with the long lasting trauma of chaiqian and make their lives tolerable. Or, more 
accurately, I wish to tease out the forces that prevent them from doing so, injuring 
them completely and permanently. In this sense, this section deals with the same 
issue as in chapter 7, looking into the subjectivities and agency of the displacees in 
securing a place to recover. In addition to the framework I used in chapter 7, this 
chapter incorporates a new perspective: territorialisation. I suggest that the failed 
attempts to seek justice and to mitigate the problems are combined effects of 
deterritorialisation and defeat in reterritorialisation. I will look into two cases 
unfolding in different trajectories and with different logics but somehow arrive at the 
same outcome: infinite injustice. 
The first one is a short story about an evicted family. In chapter 4, I described the 
sufferings of the evictees who were brutally removed from their own homes as homo 
sacer. Here, I only have space to offer Miss Fan’s account about her family’s 
ongoing journey in seeking justice after the initial uprooting. Although this is an 
individual account, her family story represents all forcible evicted families I 
managed to talk with. After eviction, Fan never received any resettlement offer. For 
so many years, she has been doubling up with her mother in a room that is fourteen 
square metres. Her son is now in college. Unlike most Shanghai students who prefer 
to exploit regional inequalities in education and stay in Shanghai, he went to northern 
                                                            
34 Farmers who lost their land for building the resettlement housing were incorporated in a social 
insurance scheme called xiao chengzhen, as compared to da chengzhen, the universal programme for 
the urbanites. In Chinese, xiao means small and da means big. The titles of these two programmes 
self-evidently explain the lasting stratified citizenship. The intention was never to fully include the 
farmers in the polity. Pension and medical expenses coverage are significantly lower than the receipts 
of da chengzhen. The middle-aged were victimised most for discrimination in the labour market. Their 
age and lack of skills are all barriers to get a job in the formal sector. But even if they do, their 
coverage in the xiao chengzhen allows the employers not to pay additional contributions to their 
insurances. If they could not find any job, the monthly allowance of 350 RMB (£ 35) is all that they 
have to rely on before they qualify for pension (the retirement age is 55 years old for women and 60 
years old for men).                          
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China and seldom visits home. After all, he has no foothold in Shanghai any more. 
Before he went to college, he moved from one rented room to another because his 
parents doubled up with relatives whose housing condition was crowded already. 
Behind this practical constraint lies in their parents’ greater concern for his safety 
and psychological well-being.  
After the eviction, Fan started petitioning at different levels of authorities and 
became a primary target of political persecution by the local state. Her life trajectory 
thereafter resembles Zhou, the kindergarten teacher who was forced to give up job 
and family to petition for justice, in Qin’s (2013) ethnography of domicide in 
Shanghai. This is because that registered caseload of petitioning on a higher level 
directly reflects the political career of the major politicians on lower levels (Chen, 
2012a, Minzner, 2006). The political discourses of weiwen in post-Tiananmen era 
creates what Yu (2010: 37) calls a political structure premised on rigid stability, 
discouragement, containment and suppression of political discontents through 
primarily state violence and ideological control. Whilst the petitioners conceived the 
fragmented bureaucracy as a political opportunity (O'Brien and Li, 2006), the 
petitioning system and the political structure turned political resistance in this 
direction into suicide, inflicting great pain on themselves. The higher level they 
attempted to visit, the greater state violence they had to counter, the greater pain they 
must endure. Losing faith in Shanghai government and legal justice, Fan chose to 
travel all the way to Beijing, seeking sympathy and justice from the emperor directly. 
Each visit requires considerable strength, determination and courage. She has to hide 
from the radar of local states and neutralise all the suppression both on the road and 
in Beijing before she can arrive at a petitioning office. If she were caught, she would 
be immediately detained and put under arrest in a hotel room or a black jail before 
she can be escorted back to another black jail or detention facility in Shanghai. 
Within the territory of the local states, abusive violence escalates. Beating by 
policemen as she describes becomes small punishment. She once attempted to escape 
from the stalking of local state agents and jumped off a moving train. Unfortunately, 
she permanently injured her leg.  
Having seized the power from barrels of a gun, the party-state knows aptly the war-
craft: to paralyse the enemies most effectively, they must hurt what people treasure 
most and destroy the supportive networks for good. Instead of targeting Fan alone, 
repression extended to every family member, especially their son. Her ex-husband 
was beaten up for checking on her whereabouts in the local police station. Her son 
was evicted by landlords several times because the local police notified the landlords 
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that Fan was ‘a contentious woman’. Their relatives were harassed by the police if 
Fan successfully covered up her trails and hid from surveillance. Her mother was put 
under house arrest as well whenever a major political event came up in Shanghai or 
in Beijing. To justify the constraints of her freedom from concerned neighbours, Fan 
was defamed as a procuress, polluting the moral order. On such occasions, she would 
also be unable to work, which gave her employer who had already been pressured by 
the local state a legitimate reason to sack her. In 2011, her case file was formally 
closed after a so-called xinfang zhongjie (case-closing) hearing, which forbade legal 
representation and was only accessible to her and government recruited ‘impartial’ 
reviewers. Despite the fact that she remains homeless, the hearing permanently 
closed the doors of justice through formal institutionalised channels.  
As human beings, we all need a place to lay down our roots, to socialise, to grow and 
to have a flourishing life. We need a place that we can return to, to feel in control or 
to find meaning, being this place a home, a neighbourhood, a workplace or a city. 
However ambivalent the relationship might evolve into, we need such a place to 
ground our life. What we can read in Fan’s case is a concerted effort in destroying 
every place that she could securely put down some roots, interact with people and 
amend her protective nest. If we see the territory we inhabit at different scales 
forming a protective structure like an onion, hers has been diced. The pain she has 
been enduring exceeds far beyond simple uprooting or domicide. The political 
machine has atomised her, imposing severe penalties for her attempts to be spatially 
and socially rooted again. She compares such experiences of repeated oppression as 
being raped, ‘raping (me) once is not enough. They have to do it over and over 
again’. Her testimony echoes earlier discussion that home is an extension of self. 
Dispossessing her home repeatedly is constant destruction of her sense of self. By 
making her permanently homeless and rootless, the regime has exterminated her as a 
social being. As Bourdieu (1999a: 124) argues, ‘anyone is said to be “without a 
home or hearth” or homeless is virtually without a social existence’.  
The second case I am examining now is about an ongoing collective action from the 
resettled displacees protesting against the construction of high voltage powerline 
towers in Sanlin (see the highlighted area on Figure 8.8). The territorial politics is 
much more complicated than in Fan’s case. Fan never had a moment for healing and 
is totally defenceless in the territorial struggle against a unified bureaucratic state. In 
the second case, both the difficulty of reterritorialisation for the displacees and the 
territorial conflicts within the state play a part in perpetuating injustice and 
victimisation. As I have mentioned in previous section, the displacees had no control 
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in the production of their new homes in the neighbourhood. As such, they were 
completely dominated by the developers and the hypocritical state. Despite the 
increased development density, the proximity to the incineration plant and the 
mismatches between building plans and reality, they moved in as agreed on in the 
resettlement contract without any resistance.    
There are several reasons for their inactions. First, they were so busy with decorating 
their new homes and moving on with their lives that such efforts restricted or even 
blinded their perceptions and experiences of the toxic environment (also see Auyero 
and Swistun, 2009). Second, they sensed no political opportunity to protest or seek 
justice given the authoritarian nature of the resettlement. They did not have a choice 
in terms of where to resettle. Besides, there is no concrete evidence or paper trail for 
them to sue the developers or the chaiqian regime for breaching the resettlement 
contracts. Because both the expressway and the incineration plant were planned and 
constructed before their neighbourhoods, they took their imprisonment in the new 
toxic habitat as their own fault or bad luck, knowing the negative effects of pollution 
upon their health. They coped with the industrial pollution in the past. As long as the 
situation was contained, they thought they could endure it again. Living with 
pollution is a routine part of their life. Third, the ecology of the resettlement 
neighbourhood also created formidable challenges for political mobilisation. As I 
have mentioned earlier, the highrise buildings discourages socialisation. 
Understandably, it contains the communication of political dissents.  
Finally, what also prevented them from acting was that they are acutely aware of the 
difficulty in connecting with total strangers to protect their collective interests as 
homeowners. As many studies on environmental activism have shown, proximity to 
the toxic facilities affects people’s perception of risks and impacts, and undermines 
the solidarity (Walker, 2009, Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012, Devine-Wright, 2013). 
Those most concerned about the pollution all live in the huge neighbourhood closest 
to the expressway and the incinerator. This neighbourhood is a mixture of indigenous 
farmers, the urban displacees and the renters who are socially excluded migrants. 
More concerned about cheap rents, the renters have no interests in joining the 
homeowners. Between the farmers and the urbanites, there is also a mutual 
distanciation preventing trust and cooperation from development (Bourdieu, 1999a). 
The farmers believe that the urbanites are the much blessed children of the paternalist 
state and the intruders who take away their land. The urbanites on the other hand see 
the farmers as culturally backward and politically narrowminded. Many urbanites 
even compare their forced relocation to live near farmers akin to the rusticity 
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programme under Mao. Socially disintegrated, the displacees are unable to challenge 
the authorities for site choice.  
In 2009, the construction of the high voltage powerline towers started, only a few 
metres away from the walls of this residential compound. The siting is rather cunning. 
It sits on the administrative border between Sanlin and Beicai. The existing power 
grids in Beicai section allows the company to create confusion that the project is an 
ongoing one rather than a new project, in the hope that the displacees would accept it 
as they accepted the incinerator plant. By constructing the towers right outside the 
compound, it also undermines the displacees’ claim for violating their property rights. 
But most critical to their vicious plan is the loophole in Chinese legal system. 
According to the Planning Act, land use changes proposed by a developer or existing 
LUR holder do not need to inform affected parties until they have formally secured 
approval from the authorities. Sensing potential resistance from the residents, the 
company did not even publicise the plan after it secured approval from the authorities 
as the law stipulates.  
The secrecy continued before the night of assembling the steel towers. In preparing 
the construction, they had deceived the concerned residents that they were going to 
build a community centre for the seniors. On a rainy night, the company erected two 
towers. The residents were shocked the next morning to discover two giant towers 
outside their windows. They could not stand further victimisation. So, they 
immediately sought information from the residents’ committee and the township 
authority, both of which claimed no knowledge of the project at all. In great anger, 
they reported to the petitioning office at Pudong district government on the grounds 
of electromagnetic radiation and health hazards. They were well received by the 
planning authorities that promised a swift investigation. This however did not stop 
the project. The conflict escalated into physical confrontation and several senior 
residents were severely beaten by the construction workers. Only until the arrival of 
the local police did the beatings stop and the seniors were sent to the hospital for 
emergency treatment.  




Figure 8.18: ‘Spider Web’ in Sanlin 
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012 
 
 
Figure 8.19: Protest against the High Voltage Powerline in 
2009 
(The white banner reads: where is the ‘blue sky’ (impartial 
officials)? Who is going to care about laobaixing (the 
mass)?) 
Source: Courtesy of a displacee (with mosaic effect to 
protect their identities) 
 
Initially, the township authorities and the residents’ committees were very 
sympathetic toward those displacees and supported their collective actions. The 
project was temporarily suspended for a couple of months. In the meantime, the 
displacees simultaneously sought to mobilise other displacees to join their collective 
actions and petition their case to higher level of authorities. With no legal grounds on 
this matter and considering the temporal delay, they did not consider the law as a 
weapon. The former effort was more successful than the latter. But even so, they 
were only able to reach the residents from buildings along the powerline.  
With a ticking clock of the Expo, the growing tension and their repeated petitioning 
and protesting attracted the attention from both district and municipal authorities for 
fear of damaging the face of the Shanghai government. Under pressure, the 
electricity company, knowing its violation of legal procedure, issued an urgent 
announcement of the construction plan. A meeting was organised by the Shanghai 
municipal government to intervene in the conflicts but failed to reach any agreement. 
A few months later, before the construction resumed on the following morning, the 
police with the cooperation of the residents’ committee tricked a few activists to a 
chat over tea and threatened to detain them. It signalled a significant shift in the 
territorial politics. The residents lost their allies inside the bureaucratic field.  
Infinite Injustice as the Real Legacy of the Expo │ 293 
 
On the second morning, hundreds of people dressed in army uniforms—
indistinguishable if they were truly army force, migrant workers paid off by the 
company to dress in this way, or private security force—were transported to guard 
the construction site. The displacees were furious to witness this scene. They did not 
wait to organise their resistance that day. A few ran into the construction site without 
worrying about their personal safety to prevent further construction. Mostly seniors, 
they were heavily beaten by the uniformed guards. Some displacees who saw the 
beating were appalled and rushed to help, whilst most were terrorised. The police 
arrested many displacees on the scene, including a breast-feeding mother and a 
woman who passed out. A few were released later that day but eight were held in 
detention overnight. Aunt Wang, in the police interview, questioned the legal ground 
of her arrest, and was shocked by the response from the police,  
if you want to sue, sue the Communist Party. We are taking orders from the 
Communist Party. We [the police force] are the gunmen of the party. We load 
the bullet, aim but only shoot those as the party boss instructed.  (Interview, 
06/2012) 
The trajectory of their activism and the framing they used so far resembles the 
NIMBY activism reported elsewhere. Fischer (2000:132) sees NIMBY conflicts as a 
result of the clashes between cultural rationality and technical rationality in the 
decision-making process. This is a rather simplified version of the social reality, 
ignoring the exercise of power in politics and the divisions within the epistemic 
community. As Auyero and Swistun (2009) bring to our attention, the epistemic 
community, with different interests and agendas, produce great confusion and shape 
the victims’ perceptions and agency. The politicians, including those in more 
technical positions (i.e. Planning Bureau and Environment Protection Bureau), 
visited this neighbourhood on several occasions to inspect the real situation. Their 
shocked expressions and reassuring comments on the proximity were interpreted 
literally by the displacees. Under the request from the displacees, the authorities also 
commissioned a public institution to conduct an environmental impact assessment. 
The technicians, lack of political crafts, also conveyed a message to the displacees 
that the radiation level was higher than regulation when they took the test onsite. 
Meanwhile, the displacees also collected many online articles on the health impacts 
of radiation and TV programmes on physical health to support their protest. 
Accredited health professionals also warned them about the risks of exposure to 
electromagnetic radiation, especially for the children.  
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To their great disappointment however, the final report of the impact assessment 
loaded with mathematical functions and technical jargon denied the legitimacy of 
their petition grounded on health concerns. Allegedly, the radiation level was far 
below the regulated level.35 Acting like health professionals, the environmental 
science specialists claimed that there was no risk for personal health. Planning 
department also came out to defend the agency claiming that the construction plan 
met legal regulation. According to their measurement, the closest line was 28 metres 
away from the apartment building, whilst the Planning Code only requires 20 metres 
distance from any structure, implying that there are no risks or health threats. The 
displacees refused to accept the report and continued their joint actions. The 
politicians rapidly intervened by promising a satisfactory solution after the Expo. 
This is a political tactic to drain away the raw emotions as well as a warning about 
the risks of sustained action. Under the moral and political pressure, the displacees 
decided to suspend temporarily their actions for six months. Their compromise 
missed the opportunity to connect with international media and tell their version of 
the story about Shanghai and a ‘best ever’ Expo. The anger soon died away and their 
reterritorialisation effort was sabotaged by more targeted repression tactics, for 
instance, threatening the job security of the activists’ family members. After the 
Expo, with all the international attention moving away, more orthodox political 
tactics such as delaying, shuffling around bureaucratic desks or simply ignoring them 
became the dominant strategy, in total break of the oral agreement with the displaced. 
In April 2012, the Expo Bureau as the agency coordinating the affairs within the 
territory of Expo site was formally dismissed. Legacy management was handed over 
to a development company whose sole organisational ethics was organised around 
profit maximisation.    
At the time of my involvement, their collective action was at a dead end, becoming 
rather symbolic. The prospect of failure was an elephant in the room that no one 
wanted to speak out to avoid completely destroying their efforts. Disheartened by the 
ineffectiveness of their actions and worried about their safety, many activists sold 
their new homes and moved elsewhere. Those without such an exit option continued 
their territorial struggle by visiting the petitioning office weekly. Each visit to the 
government office resulted in the same response, to wait. I tagged along to a few 
petitions during the fieldwork. In a typical xinfang encounter, it lasted less than 20 
minutes unless the displaced were determined to attract political attention by turning 
it into a spectacle. The conversation was not only cold and distant but also technical, 
                                                            
35 Report Number 20100023, photocopied from the displacees.  
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requiring the displacees to employ a particular set of political language. There was 
no detached concern like ‘what I can do for you’; only political jargon like ‘what is 
your suqiu (appeal)’. Like the activists observed in Eliasoph’s (1998) ethnography, 
the displacees’ colourful language in our conversations shrank rapidly in such 
encounters partly because of their awareness of the public nature of such meetings 
but most importantly because they do not have the linguistic capital in playing the 
political game.   
Initially, I had a research agenda in joining their petitions, mainly to observe the 
power dynamics in such encounters and the contestation of knowledge production. I 
looked into the health effects of high voltage powerlines in top medical journals and 
translated the conclusive findings from several articles published in the British 
Medical Journal and The New England Journal of Medicine. However, after a 
petitioning meeting with a specialist from the Environmental Protection Bureau, I 
realised that efforts in this direction could not achieve anything. The technocrats 
easily discredited those epidemiological studies by emphasising the different 
planning and technical standards in China. But, limiting my intervention to 
observations during such meetings allowed me to be more sensitive to the territorial 
politics, bureaucratic leviathan and the political artifice. Outranking the municipal 
government in the administrative structure, the electricity company was another 
untouchable socialist land master, headed by the brother of He Guoqiang who ranked 
the eighth of Chinese Politburo Standing Committee before his recent retirement. 
Pudong district government as the de jure land owner was coordinating this project 
between different agencies under its territory and had no actual influence in land use 
or planning. To avoid similar mistakes in making conflicted comments, the 
municipal government issued a secretive internal instruction for all frontline agents 
in relevant agencies. Little wonder the displacees were kicked around. It also brought 
to my attention by the unintentional disclosure of the state agents that the 
environmental impact evaluation was done at a time when the communities were not 
yet built; meaning the evaluation conveniently ignored the interests of future land 
users.   
On the other hand, I was intrigued that the displacees at those petition meetings 
completely subordinated the territorial game as homeowners. In petitioning letters as 
well as in those encounters, they rarely put moral pressure on the state agents by 
emphasising the repeated nature of their victimisation as seen in their petitioning 
letters or heard in their complaints during those meetings. Like state agents, they did 
not see the problem as an indispensable legacy of the Expo-induced chaiqian and 
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imposed a temporal limit on their own victimhood. It ran the risk of being accused of 
parochial interests and was defenceless against political ideology of 









Figure 8.20: Municipal 
Petitioning Office in Hospital 
Outpatient Design 




At one petitioning meeting, I was agitated by two state agents around my age who 
bullied the displacees by laughing at their lack of political vocabulary and clarity in 
articulating their claims. Although I was surely not politically articulate either, I 
decided to step in to confront them about the political manipulation and betrayal, 
which I believe are the root of all the problems. I was not fully aware of the 
consequences of my actions. The question conjured up the displacees’ memories of 
losing their homes and provoked their anger. That day, we held the state agent 
‘hostage’ until a high-level politician came to have a meaningful dialogue with us. 
Although we reached nothing that day, the framing of their protest started to 
incorporate moral claims. I advised the displacees to play down the emphasis on 
environmental impacts or health concerns, both are vulnerable to the tyranny of the 
experts. Before I exited from the field, we worked on a new frame, anchoring less on 
NIMBY than on moral contract, political responsibility and the legacy of chaiqian. 
We started to push some political boundaries. However, for fear of drawing 
unwanted political attention to them as well as to myself, given that I was already on 
the radar of the Public Security Bureau, I refrained from helping them organise the 
apathetic or sympathetic displacees from other parts of the resettlement sites to ally 
with them. I was concerned about hijacking their actions. After all, I had nothing 
really at stake there. They however would suffer all the consequences if actions went 
out of control. The morale on their side was not high, either. There were 
disagreements amongst the leadership in terms of their political agenda. Under the 
pressure from their families and work, they could not afford to invest further energies. 
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Some leaders also lost their hope for concrete outcomes and put their new homes in 
the ershoufang (second-hand housing) market, looking to move to other places. It 
remains too soon to say if they would overcome the difficulty in reterritorialisation 
and achieve what they wanted. I consciously maintained my distance from them after 
I resigned from my fieldwork. Given my phone calls to my parents are occasionally 
tapped; I cannot imagine what consequences might bring to them simply because I 
wanted to follow up on a political project of research interest. But, we must still ask, 
how long do they have to keep suffering from the violence and repression until they 
succeed? After the Broadway show on the Expo site, who will remember and care 
about those people who made such huge sacrifices yet remain locked in a living hell?    
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have shown that the symbolic and material practices in 
(re)producing the resettlement space is adding further injuries to the displacees, and 
preventing them from healing the wounds and rebuilding a nurturing community for 
their own well-being. No matter what the rhetoric might wish to claim, the 
production of chaiqian housing and the governing of the resettlement communities 
perpetuate rather than mitigate the domicide experience. The pain is reflected in their 
impoverishment, their persisting longing for the lost, the crisis of identity, the 
alienation from communality, and the pain in coping and adapting. The injustice they 
suffer is infinite.  
As a major life event, domicide ruptures individual and collective biographies. 
Domicide experience may reveal in variegated pace, intensity, duration, and 
sequence. It is shaping and will be shaped by later life experiences. It may be 
permanently suppressed and locked in personal memory. It can be triggered by 
(un)familiar scenes, places or faces at an unknown point in the future. It can also be 
transmitted to future generations through material or symbolic practises such as 
family inheritance or family history telling. In this sense, the domicide experience 
possesses a generational quality. Therefore, we should neither put a temporal limit on 
domicide experience nor rule domicide out from making sense of their later pain. 
This shall also lead us to ponder the political responsibility of remembering. Through 
material and symbolic practices, the bulldozer regime does not simply rob people’s 
past but redefines it to control the present and future. Here lies the political 
opportunity of resistance by strategising on the domicide experience. By taking 
control of how the past is remembered, we shall be able to contest the domination 
and envisage a more progressive alternative future.  





At a seminar entitled Neoliberalism and State Capitalism in Chinese Urban 
Development in Amsterdam 2013, I presented the stories of two evicted families in 
order to question the morality of neoliberal urbanism in China and propose a radical 
solution to end it. To my great dismay, two established Chinese scholars based in the 
Europe, discredited my over emotional involvement with the displacees. They 
suspected that my own emotions clouded my judgement and prevented me from 
seeing things in a more technocratic, hence ‘rational’ manner. Their favoured 
solution was to expand universal social security system and to safeguard the 
sacredness of private property ownership.  
I was shocked and deeply unsettled by their blindness and indifference to the extent 
of injustice and suffering the distant others had endured. Many questions popped to 
my head that day: where is our raw anger in witnessing and listening to stories about 
wounded life caused by the exercise of arbitrary power? Do we really know what it is 
about and how it feels being displaced before we utter all these ‘rational’ intellectual 
nonsense? If home matters to us because of the social values and affective bonds we 
attach to it rather than the exchange value in the housing market, why are we 
resistant to bring the emotional distress and frustration caused by the disruptions and 
ruptures of such bonds to our debates and to question the conduct of politics in 
modern China? Are we not subordinating to the symbolic violence of property 
discourses? Why do we conflate universal citizenship with a moral right to stay put? 
What corrupts our moral agency and weakens our sense of responsibility as relatively 
educated in a privileged social position to empathise and care about our fellow 
citizens?   
‘They had taken our past away and left the rubble. They had demolished our 
spirits and left broken bricks. They had destroyed our community and left dust 
and memories. And they had done all this for their own selfish and arrogant 
reasons. They had sought to regulate our present in order to control our future. 
And I asked aloud, “what men have the moral and political right to take away a 
people’s past? How will they answer on that day when they have to account for 
this? For the past will not be forgotten”.’  
Richard Rive, in District Six  
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Upon my return to Edinburgh, these questions motivated me to discard completely 
two draft chapters, one on the backstage dirty linen in securing the Expo bid and the 
other on the evolving regulatory frameworks on chaiqian in China and Shanghai, 
specifically. I mobilised all my strength to re-read the 887-page verbatim transcripts 
of the painful experiences of displacement and worked on this present thesis 
structure, which is more focused on the domicide process and consequences. This 
was a risky decision back then given the time and funding constraints. But the more I 
invested in this way of thinking and writing, the more worthwhile I feel it became. It 
became crystal clear how hypocritical the powerful, political and cultural elites are in 
making claims on public interests or diagnoses on displacement. Most of these 
discourses are problematic (e.g. Wu, 2004, Li and Song, 2009, Kearns and Mason, 
2013). They are uttered because we simply do not have enough courage to suspend 
our judgement and a priori frames and to make ourselves more vulnerable whilst 
listening patiently and carefully to the stories from actual dwellers about the ways 
they deal with sudden disruptions to their routines and cope with the annihilation of 
familiar place before we deliberate on the causal chains of human suffering. They are 
uttered because we lost our sociological imagination to think about alternative 
scenarios, under which displacement may be prevented or conducted differently, that 
may become sources of intellectual and political support for those who might be 
victimised. They are uttered because we see ourselves as different from the others we 
research on or work with for the professional knowledge we acquired but forget that 
we first and foremost are humans before we label ourselves as academic 
professionals (Slater, 2010).  
My motivation in following the analytical threads as I presented in this thesis is to 
document and reconstruct the violent history of the Expo-induced displacement and 
resettlement and the pain of those displaced. As Peter Marcuse (2010: 187) argues, 
‘If we do not understand and do not intuitively put ourselves in the place of those 
whose problems we examine, we will not understand them – either the people or the 
problems. If the pain of displacement is not a central component of what we are 
dealing with in studying gentrification – indeed, is not what brings us to the subject 
in the first place – we are not just missing one factor in a multi-factorial equation; we 
are missing the central point that needs to be addressed’. By putting people’s 
accounts in ink, I wish to preserve an episode of history rapidly fading in the 
collective memory about Shanghai’s transformation and remind us of the human 
costs behind modernist urban landscapes. If we are about to prevent nonsensical 
utterance, we need to know how people feel about being displaced. If we are about to 
make any sophisticated argument or political proposals, I hope this thesis has 
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supplied sufficient raw oral accounts and analysis to ponder. Most of those accounts 
may be read as a eulogy to the homes, places and identities that have been killed by 
the ‘best ever’ Expo. But I hope they can also serve as valid charges against the 
merciless elites in planning and implementing such destruction and can hold them 
personally as well as the structure they aim to produce accountable for the crimes 
and wrongs they have committed. This makes the bias of this study quite self-evident. 
I ally firmly with the displacees I worked with. I simply believe it is wrong to take 
away people’s homes against their will. Equally, it is wrong to restrain or manipulate 
their choices and aspirations about a decent life. In the remainder of this conclusion, 
what I intend to do first is to tie up my arguments and lay out key contributions of 
this thesis. I then invest the analytical energy in how to prevent and end domicide.  
The Expo‐Induced Domicide  
Displacement and forcible eviction are major political and moral evils. They have 
been an important theme in urban geography, most fruitfully in the literature on 
gentrification (Hartman, 1983, Hartman and Robinson, 2003, Atkinson, 2000b, 
2000a, Slater, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2013, Newman and Wyly, 2006, Davidson, 
2009, Lovering and Türkmen, 2011) where displacement is seen as the defining 
feature (Lees et al., 2010: 317). Compelling evidence was found to refute the denial 
of displacement as a widespread common problem and critically question the 
commercialisation of housing under the capitalist urban process. Yet, most of these 
studies focus on the causes and consequences of displacement and rarely do they 
offer rich accounts on the process of displacement, the way people lost their homes, 
and the meanings of such loss. This limitation can also be found in the limited 
literature specifically focusing on mega-events induced displacement (Olds, 1998, 
Greene, 2003). This thesis fills this huge gap in existing literature. It dwells less on 
the causes of displacement than on the conditions, mechanisms, tactics, contestations 
and consequences of displacement through an in-depth study of massive 
displacement caused by the Shanghai World Expo. Let me first summarise major 
arguments and findings of this thesis.  
First, this thesis proposes to reconcile objective victimisation with subjective 
victimhood to complete our understanding of complicated experiences of domicide. 
To fulfil this agenda, chapters 4 and 8 examined the urban process under neoliberal 
urbanism in contemporary Chinese cities and Shanghai in particular. It looked into 
creative destruction and reconstruction of political institutions and regulatory 
frames—such as hukou system, property regime, fiscal and administrative 
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decentralisation, political elites' promotion mechanism—in constructing a land-
centred accumulation regime that drives rapid reconfiguration of hierarchised urban 
spaces in Shanghai. One defining feature of this process is the pervasiveness of the 
party-state, which on the one hand manipulates and speculates on property 
development whilst on the other hand disciplines the consumer subjects and 
selectively accommodates or represses grassroots activism. The second feature lies in 
the rampant material violence and extra-legal means in dispossessing the mass, 
robbing of public wealth and transferring to a handful of red capitalists. In chapter 2 
and chapter 8, I argued that chaiqian in China should be seen as more than a violent 
prelude to rapid urbanisation in China. Instead, chaiqian itself is an indispensable 
element of the property-led development (contra Zhang, 2010). Apart from releasing 
a huge parcel of land in prime locations at relatively low financial costs, large-scale 
displacement since the 1990s in Shanghai manufactured a huge demand on the 
property market and sustained the housing bubble. Two consequences are prominent. 
First, the new propertied class is susceptible to the ethics of the market and property 
regime. Of course, there is a positive side in this in the political context of China as 
seen in the rise of property-owner activism across China where property rights 
supply a legitimate weapon, although not most effective, to curb the power of the 
developers and the local states (Shi and Cai, 2006, Read, 2008, Zhang, 2010, Blandy 
and Wang, 2013). However, following Harvey (2005a), they are prime potential 
victims of possessive individualism (also see Shin, 2013). It is highly likely for them 
to subordinate to market value system and parochially focus on the preservation or 
improvement of the exchange value of their properties. This may discipline the 
consciousness and tame the agency of these new homeowners. Second, under the 
current chaiqian arrangement, the displacees are pushed to the housing market to find 
a replacement apartment, although the chaiqian companies are legally obliged to 
provide assistance in securing an affordable one as long as the displacees request. 
This manufactured demand pushes up the housing prices and locked those who suffer 
from housing distress permanently at the bottom of the social and housing hierarchy. 
It affects their perceptions of social positions, their ambivalent bonds with their lived 
places, and their anticipation of life chances. The external force of chaiqian and the 
changes it may bring, especially the improvement and liquidity of the new 
commercial housing, may shape the aspirations and wants of those facing the threat 
of chaiqian and solicit their consent to the wholesale demolition and off-site 
resettlement. The problem, as chapters 4 and 7 argue is that this is a restrained 
imagination for upward mobility. The housing regime effectively constrains and 
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eliminates other routes to secure affordable and decent housing, and induces willing 
subordination to the symbolic power of prevailing property regime.  
It is against this backdrop we may start to peel back the variegated and layered 
experience of domicide. ‘Happy’ or ‘supportive’ movers, or those who may not 
experience acute domicide effects in general, are victims without noticing themselves 
being victimised. This may strike the chord of the controversial Marxist notion of 
false consciousness. In this thesis, I avoided this notion by using Bourdieu’s 
symbolic violence instead, but the elitist tone is certainly present in making this 
Bourdieusian argument. However, I agree with Swartz (2013) that this is analytically 
justified. An intellectual distance is essential to objectify any social game. The 
displacees cannot play the game of chaiqian whilst at the same time constantly 
questioning the rules of the game. But over time, as chapters 5 and 8 show, the 
displacees were able to reflect on their past experiences and come to realise their real 
interests.  
Second, this thesis calls for a critical study of both the temporal and spatial 
dimension of displacement and eviction. Displacement is about the annihilation of 
place. The layered meanings of place as conceived by insiders and outsiders have 
been at the core of existing studies on displacement (Porteous, 1989, Meyer, 2008). 
This thesis does not significantly deviate from this theme. In chapters 4, 5 and 7, this 
thesis explored the contestations of the meanings and values surrounding people’s 
homes and communities on the Expo site. It echoes existing literature in arguing that 
the cause of displacement lies in the victory of exchange value over the use value, 
and pointing out that the failed resistance from the displacees is a result of the 
absence of a competing value system, powerful enough to counter the ruthless force 
of the market. For the dwellers, home embodies the life trajectories and personal 
memories, offers sources of emotional comfort and security, and stabilises basic 
social reproduction unit. These historical, social and emotional properties of home 
are cruelly replaced and dominated by its economic aspect under current economic 
system. As a consequence, displacement robs people’s history, destroys their 
personal identity, disrupts their stable social networks, and severs their roots to 
familiar built environment. This is the root cause of emotional distress, or grief 
syndrome, from displacement (Fried, 1966, Qin, 2013). Findings on the spatial 
dimension of displacement in this thesis confirm existing literature on this point.  
One major contribution of this thesis is the focus on the temporalities of 
displacement. This is studied from three aspects. It first looks into the past 
experiences of displacement and the lingering effects upon the consciousness and 
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agency of the displacees. For instance, chapter 4 introduces and combines the notion 
of displacement in place (Feldman et al., 2011: 10) and of serial displacement 
(Fullilove, 2014: 141) to understand the conservative impulse (Marris, 1974: 5-22) of 
the displacees, which engenders ambivalent and even conflicting attitudes toward 
change and displacement. Second, it examined the domination of the calendar time 
of the Expo in undermining the solidarity between the displacees and reducing the 
possibility of collective resistance. Chapter 5 offers many detailed accounts on the 
manipulation of time, through controlling the timing, duration and frequency of 
negotiation meetings, in labouring on anxiety, stress, uncertainty and alienation, with 
consequences on the political agency of the displacees. Many families I worked with 
could not bear such stress and moved out without a satisfactory compensation 
package. This effectively prevented potential neighbourhood-based collective actions. 
It also added pressure on those families who attempted to defend their right to stay 
put. Third, although I took a pre/during/after displacement approach in my writing, 
this thesis emphasises the continuity rather than ruptures in temporal experiences of 
displacement. It rejects a premature closure of the domicide impacts. In chapter 8, I 
argued that the wounds from displacement take time to heal and may last for 
generations. The fate of the displacees may inextricably relate to their place-making 
practices and recovering efforts in the resettlement sites.  
Third, this thesis utilises the notion of exception in political geography to understand 
the conditions of event-induced domicide (Agamben, 1998, Ong, 2006). Primarily, I 
argued that the Expo, owing to its association with nationalist sentiments, creates a 
zone of exception (chapter 6), which mainly includes the territory of the Expo site 
but expands to those areas lined up for Expo-related facilities. The exceptional status 
of the Expo secured Shanghai’s privileges in national economic geography during 
the preparation of the Expo as reflected in the policy preferences, additional land use 
quota allowances, fiscal transfers, etc. It also enabled fast-track urban decision 
making and legal enforcement, with adverse impacts on democratic participation and 
disastrous consequences for the displaced. Many displacees were forcibly evicted 
before they had exhausted all legal and administrative channels. However, the most 
appalling effect of this exceptionality lies in the revocation of moral and legal 
boundaries and the coordination of divided state apparatus with a shared goal of 
clearing the land for the Expo regardless of the human costs. It rendered the residents 
within the Expo zone as exceptions to the moral and political landscape. They were 
deprived of legal protection under normal circumstances and political opportunities 
for collective or individual resistances. Chapters 5 and 6 provided many accounts on 
the revolting tactics used by the chaiqian agents to coerce, repress and trick them to 
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comply with the displacement plan, which inflicted enormous pain on the displacees 
and assaulted their dignity. I argued that the exceptionality of the Expo is a critical 
condition for the moral corruption of the chaiqian agents. 
Exception is also used to situate my findings in academic debates on displacement 
and actual existing neoliberalism in Chinese cities in general (see Liew, 2005, He 
and Wu, 2009). Although much of my understanding on displacement were 
structured by the exceptionality of the Expo and the particular context and practices 
of chaiqian in China, I argued in chapter 6 that exception is a prevailing political 
rationality under neoliberal capitalism that aims to secure the flow of the capital 
through selective manipulation of citizenship. Many tactics and mechanisms, such as 
territorial stigmatisation (chapter 4), legal abandonment (chapters 5 and 6) and state 
violence (chapters 5 and 8) can be found in other cases in different countries 
(Wacquant, 2008, Feldman et al., 2011). Throughout the thesis, I also argued against 
China exceptionalism. Chapter 2 offered a tentative synthesis on the formation of 
neoliberal state in China’s context through the lens of the Expo-induced 
displacement. My observations of the underlying logics in China do not show any 
significant difference from Wacquant’s findings (2012) based on his observation of 
Latin America and advanced economies. The examination of territorial 
stigmatisation and the impacts upon the dwellers in chapter 4 also shows similarities 
with findings reported from advanced economies (Wacquant, 2007). Chapter 8 
further confirmed the disheartening consequences of displacement and eviction as 
found across the world (Young and Willmott, 1957, Gans, 1962, Marris, 1974). 
However, this is not to say that theories and concepts developed in western context 
should be uncritically embraced. Nor do I have any intention to claim that there is no 
substantial difference between Chinese cities and cities from other cultural contexts. 
I repeatedly emphasised Chinese flavour on many occasions and called for great 
reflexivity on theories and positionality. In chapter 2, I warned about the patronising 
effect of the theoretical gaze of right to the city in understanding popular grievances 
and grassroots activism. Similarly, I underscored the hybrid governing practises in 
perpetuating the injustice from displacement in chapter 8, which is a distinctive 
finding.  
The fourth contribution perhaps lies in the development of Harvey’s (2005a, 2005b) 
concept ‘accumulation by dispossession’ by adding great depth to the ethics, 
infrastructures and tactics of constructing a property regime that is most supportive 
for capital accumulation in Chinese cities. In chapter 6, I dissected the bureaucratic 
apparatus involved in dispossessing the land and housing through economic but most 
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commonly extra-economic means. My analysis there focused on both the political 
agents and the bureaucratic apparatus. I argued that modern bureaucracy provides 
fertile soil for moral corruption because of minute social and hierarchical division of 
labour, which narrows the moral region of the bureaucratic agents and grants them 
the opportunity to download personal, political responsibility (Bauman, 1989, Adams 
and Balfour, 1998). However, I argued that it is contentious to attribute moral 
corruption to floating responsibility and procedural rationality in modern 
bureaucracy or to psychological mechanism of denial, distanciation or splitting. 
Instead, I took a Bourdieusian conceptualisation of interest and charged the 
bureaucratic apparatus for creating structural incentives for the bureaucratic agents to 
transcend legal and moral boundaries and resort to tactics such as deception, violence 
and denial to expel people from their homes and land in order to maximise their own 
interest in this social game of chaiqian. In chapters 7 and 8, I also outlined the major 
changes in institutional arrangement that attempt to demarcate clearer separation of 
bundles of rights in property, including amongst others the division of land 
ownership from land use right, the difference between collective ownership in the 
countryside and state ownership in the city, and the separation of housing ownership 
and land ownership. In chapter 7, I showed how such property regime constrains the 
political imagination of the displacees and prevented them from building cross-class 
or cross-territory alliance in fighting against displacement. The most original yet 
disheartening finding there was the breakdown of families as an outcome of internal 
strife and manufactured conflicts. The root however lies in the nascent property 
regime, which allowed the chaiqian agents to manipulate the definition and 
interpretation of collective ownership to family properties, to provoke mutual distrust 
between family members and to escalate latent conflicts. The selective 
inclusion/exclusion of family members from negotiation meetings and compensation 
calculations obstructed communication and created conflicts within displaced 
families. Such tactics worked effectively to atomise the displacees and diminish their 
resources to fight collectively. This finding on the one hand challenged the 
intellectual romanticism of radical resistance against displacement, and on the other 
hand questioned the ideological tenet of individualism with familialism that 
underpins the accumulation regime in contemporary Chinese cities. As a result of 
failures in collective actions, resistance typically took atomised, bodily, rightful and 
boundary-expanding forms such as marriage/divorce of convenience, which 
powerfully exposed the indecency of contemporary Chinese society (Margalit, 1996).  
Last, this thesis wrestles with the roots of domination and the mechanism of its 
reproduction through the lens of chaiqian. I did so by keeping a dialogue with 
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Bourdieusian, Gramscian and Scottian literature on the mechanics of power in 
securing as well as obscuring the exercise of power. Throughout the thesis, I avoided 
choosing sides and instead used them pragmatically to understand the political 
consciousness and agency of the displacees. I attempted to answer why some 
displacees willingly consented or cooperated with the destruction of their homes 
without putting up an effective fight. My inquiry running from chapters 4 to 7 
returned with Bourdieusian evidence of symbolic violence as expressed by the rule 
of law project, the discourse on homeownership and property rights, the coercive 
ethics of competition and collective memories of state violence; with Gramscian 
evidence of hegemony and consent, as in the concessions in offering resettlement 
housing, identification with popular aspirations for housing improvement and decent 
life and the selective accommodation of popular grievances; and with Scottian 
evidence of hidden transcripts and weapons of the weak, as in discrediting the 
euphemism of resettlement, the profound sense of powerlessness and inevitability, 
and the strategic use of rhetoric and discourses of the elites in negotiating for a better 
compensation deal. Misrecognition, mystification and strategic compliance are all 
plausible explanations for prevalent acquiescence and for the absence of effective 
resistance during chaiqian process. They contribute to the production and 
reproduction of an oppressive spatial structure with the compliance of the displacees. 
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power and symbolic violence are also used to assist 
my understanding of the internalisation of territorial stigma amongst some displacees 
(chapter 4) and the deprivation of the supportive environment for the displacees to 
recover from domicide effects through the planning, architectural and governing 
practices in the resettlement sites (chapter 8). I argued that such symbolic violence, 
together with other forms of domination and violence, exacerbates the vulnerabilities 
of the displacees and perpetuates the injustice they have to endure. Perhaps, it is in 
this sense that the fatalist sentiment as conveyed by the title of this thesis is justified. 
However, this is not to say that there is nothing we could do about it if it is fate. To 
say something is fate, as Mills (1959a: 21) teaches us, it has ‘to with events in history 
that are beyond the control of any circle or groups of men [sic] (1) compact enough 
to be identifiable (2) powerful enough to decide with consequences, and (3) in a 
position to foresee the consequences and so to be held accountable for historical 
events’. The displacees’ suffering cannot be attributed to fate and the injustice they 
wrongfully endured can be addressed. Their loss of dignity, attachment, social 
support, and their pain are socially produced by concrete political agents, cultural 
elites and economic tycoons whose coalition dominates the society and paralyses the 
progress toward a more democratic and decent China. It is ‘sociologically realistic, 
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morally fair, and politically imperative to make demands upon men [sic] of power 
and to hold them responsible for specific course of events’ (Mills, 1959a: 100). This 
is the route we should take to right the wrongs the displacees had suffered and to stop 
ruthless destruction of homes under the current accumulation regime in China. How 
to do this shall be discussed after a short reflection on research practice and 
theoretical reflections.  
Reflections and Future Research Directions 
Although much of my reflection on theories (particularly different theoretical 
approaches to durable domination and subordination), informed by empirical studies, 
was put in chapter 2, let me pause here to chart out the process of the production of 
chapter two and to reflect upon their implications for this finished product and future 
research agenda. Academic product tends to be presented in a linear process, 
beginning with neatly presented literature/theoretical framework and well-thought 
methodological design, followed by theoretically-informed empirical analysis, and 
concluded with polished concepts. In fact, at least for me, the process is much 
messier. The value of Bourdieu’s political sociology was appreciated too late in my 
research but the magic of Bourdieu’s thoughts is that, once engaged, it makes you 
question, think and reason in a much more complex, reflexive and spiral way. On the 
one hand, it results in a slight rupture in my research interest, moving from the 
causes to the persistence of displacement and forcible eviction, which sometimes was 
sustained by the displaced. This also led to my departure from David Harvey, whose 
masterpieces I find inadequate to capture forces outside the economic realm, 
particularly regarding subjective experiences and symbolic domination. Harvey’s 
analysis on the three circuits of capital is insightful to understand the logic of land 
centred accumulation in China - the first break in Bourdieusian sense - yet it falls 
short of examining the subjective experiences of social agents and understanding 
how exploitative relations can be supported, consented or perpetuated by the victims 
of such asymmetrical power relations. Thinking with Bourdieu’s conceptual tools, 
my thesis attempted to attend to the subjective dimension of displacement and to 
make the second Bourdieusian break, see the mechanisms that sustain such 
exploitative land-centred accumulation. This is to enrich the notion of domicide and 
sharpen the knife-edge of critical scholarship in the battle against displacement. 
Those ‘willing’ or ‘happy’ movers, under current mode of accumulation, are victims 
of symbolic violence, authors of their own durable subordination. Our mission tasks 
us to expose rather than subscribe to such symbolic violence. My characterisation of 
them as victims is not to stigmatise them but to utilise the potential of victimhood in 
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constructing a shared identity and to unite and empower the displacees to fight 
together against displacement. 
On the other hand, my reading of Bourdieu convinced me to run intertwined 
analytical lines with James Scott and Gramsci (although my thesis dwells much less 
on Gramsci) who influenced my thinking at an earlier stage. All three authors can 
shed light on the mechanisms of durable inequalities and injustices and sociological 
question of actions with constraints, yet none of them seem to deliver a most 
convincing and complete explanation. Scott’s work alerts me to the microphysics of 
power, locating radicalism and rebellion not in actions but in beliefs. Following his 
footsteps, it is necessary to separate insurgent consciousness and contentious actions, 
transcripts announced in public and radical beliefs conveyed in public. Resistance is 
constant and everywhere but less in open defiance than in covert forms in some 
power-laden contexts. In deciphering the nature and meaning of political insurgency 
of the powerless, we need to reconcile the dimensions of contentious beliefs and 
contentious repertoires that are structured by both durable mental structure and 
contingent assessment of political opportunities, particularly, in authoritarian context 
like China. In my fieldwork, I was puzzled by many displacees’ deep sense of 
injustice and their political docility. Fighting to stay put or even to squeeze more out 
of the displacers were considered by many displacees as a useless act. Scott’s insight 
on the political constraints led to my analysis of the mechanisms divided and 
atomised the displacees in this land war, preventing militarised, open, and organised 
resistance (chapter 7).  
Drawing from this analysis, we may see the way the party-state maintained its 
domination despite significant changes that rapidly shaped many spheres of everyday 
life in late socialist China. The organisation of Chinese society before the reform was 
metaphorically compared to cells in biology (Shue, 1988), in reference to communes 
in rural society and danwei system in the city. Those collective organisations 
maintained dominance and effective control of the party-state in society through 
organised dependence, ideological indoctrination and disciplinary practices (Walder, 
1986). The most significant change brought by the reform in the city is to strip off 
the burden of welfare provision from those danwei, and transform or privatise those 
danwei as corporate entities to organise their activities responsive to the market 
(Bray, 2005, Lu, 1989). However, my empirical analysis shows that danwei is not 
completely dead and its legacy, particularly the political function remains very much 
alive (Chen, 2006a). The examples of the police officer, the doctor’s father and the 
students in chapter 7 show that zombie danwei can be mobilised to exploit the 
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embeddness of the displacees in the political establishments and repress political 
actions, especially in cases where the state is fought against. In late socialist China, 
the state is rolling back from strict control of the economic sphere, yet the state is 
rolling out its political and ideological control through new means. Media and civil 
organisations remain under heavy censorship and regulation of the party-state (Brady, 
2008, Fewsmith, 2013). The roots of the party-state, such as residents committees, 
are penetrating further and growing even stronger under the community building 
project (Read, 2012). Moreover, through selective change of political and economic 
institutions (e.g. land, hukou, housing), the state contributes to rapid stratification and 
formation of a hegemonic bloc comprising of private entrepreneurs (i.e. red 
capitalists) and upper rung of society. These changes fuel the illusion of social 
mobility for those on the lower rung but in reality, reinforce and solidify class 
boundary. Consistent ideological indoctrination and moral education (Bakken, 2000), 
such as nationalism, harmony, socialist morality (e.g. Eight Honors and Eight 
Shames), demonstrate the capacity of the state in effectively controlling and adapting 
to changed political circumstance and consolidate its ideological legitimacy. This of 
course cannot be successful without the labour of intellectuals with vested interests 
in either the established order or ability to identify with politically insensitive 
discourses, constantly mystifying the arbitrariness of established social order (new 
urbanism, creative class, Hayek’s project, etc.)(Wang, 2003b, 2009).   
Against this background, it is easier to understand the profound sense of 
powerlessness and uselessness of political actions amongst the displaced as well as 
many others on the lower rung of society. It is also easier to understand why 
resistances from the displacees were mostly in individualised, bodily and rightful 
forms. The cracks between domination ideology and social reality in breeding 
rebellious consciousness also offer the most legitimate weapon for the weak to fight 
back in a most effective way. It is also against this background that we can try to 
understand why political claims are mostly centring on economic rights and 
resistances were more in covert and elementary forms. The strong feelings of 
powerlessness and uselessness are also found in many ‘willing’ or ‘voluntary’ 
movers in this project. However, Scott’s analysis falls short of explaining two issues 
in my fieldwork, which Bourdieu’s misrecognition and symbolic violence, if I 
understand correctly, can shed light on. The first is to what extent the consent to 
displacement and perceptions of political opportunities are shaped by schemata that 
are more durable or a result of misrecognising the arbitrariness of the power relations 
in the first place? A pertinent example here is the strong identification with the state 
amongst the senior generation. In my thesis, I cited this as an example to show how 
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the geologically layered quality of Chinese families in the event of displacement 
laboured ambivalent attitudes and divided family members to fight against the 
displacement. I did not pursue further the mechanisms that foster such identification 
with the state that secures and obscures exploitive land regime at the same time. In 
Bourdieu’s term, we could understand this through the discourse of fanshen, 
ideological indoctrination and more generally, through past experiences of a ‘caring’ 
state. Their past encounters with the state may be seen as disciplinary practices in 
producing loyal and docile political subjects. In the event of displacement, consent to 
displacement is secured and obscured by the representations of domicide as a project 
of national significance and a project in the best interest of the displaced as well (e.g. 
better housing), and by practices from the feminist hand of the state as in gift 
exchanges, righting injustices created from past regime (e.g. zhiqing, extreme 
poverty, housing distress, etc.). Subjective experience of a ‘caring’ state 
misrecognises the objective exploitative social relations. However, we cannot forget 
the dividing power of such representation and practices of domicide. They 
significantly undermined the basis of effective collective actions, even within a 
family. Return to the issue of perception of political opportunity, utilising Bourdieu’s 
tool propels me to think to what extent such perception is shaped by the displacees’ 
sense of their positions in society, even when the objective opening in political 
structure was bigger than they perceive? Is it not their perceptions of the power 
structure a product of mystification or misrecognition of asymmetrical power 
relations in the first place? The most effective exercise power is to paralyse the 
ability to think in a rational way. Bourdieu’s work can also be used to understand the 
exercise of power in much more subtle ways such as through time and space. Our 
unconscious engagement with time-space, where symbolic domination expressed in 
most covert ways, already misrecognises arbitrarily power relations that dominate 
our life.    
By keeping three theoretical lines running in my thesis, I was struggling with the 
question, how deep one can go to understand the mechanisms of durable inequalities 
and injustice. All three theorists agree upon the immanence of power in everyday life. 
The differences are registered in their perspectives on the depth of power in our 
evaluation of resistance and acquiescence in power-laden social situations. Bourdieu 
goes too deep, focusing on habitus predisposing social agents to act in a certain way 
and leaving an impression that resistance or change is barely possible. Scott on the 
other hand is too loose, instilling hope that resistance and change is always there and 
emerging, but inadequate to explain how mystification and durable beliefs reinforce 
each other and make constant resistance an overly optimistic theoretical construct.  
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Gramsci’s middle ground on the level of ideology and ideological struggle allows 
greater flexibility yet this also makes him vulnerable to critiques from both 
Bourdiesusian and Scottian perspectives. Instead of trying to defend the superiority 
of one approach over the other, it perhaps, at least my empirical data suggests so, is 
more fruitful to derive inspirations from all of them to understand a much more 
complex social reality.  
This short reflection on theories can also contribute to recent discussion on the 
insurgency of property rights activism from the ‘new middle class’. But, let me first 
briefly summarise the implications of this middle class upon Chinese society and 
displacement. My research touched upon several implications of this social group 
upon domicide. But, I did not pursue enough this line due to my empirical focus on 
the domicidees from the resettlement sites whose continued perception of their 
homes as dwelling space led to my distinction of them from the middle class who are 
socially and economically much more mobile (after Allen, 2008). My analysis of the 
construction of housing and land market in chapters 4 and 8 can be seen as a 
component of the state-led production of new middle class in Chinese cities. The 
privatisation and redistribution of state assets in the consumer revolution created a 
huge number of private homeowners, crucial members of the middle class1 (Tomba, 
2004). Most of them were formerly privileged members of political establishment 
and danwei system, reproducing social inequalities established under socialist era 
(Wu and Li, 2005). The construction of the land-centred accumulation allowed these 
members to benefit from their command of political capital to ‘capture’ material 
capital (after Bridge, 2001b). With vested interests in this land-centred accumulation, 
this new middle class are likely to support and protect the accumulation regime from 
collapsing. Politically, as existing literature suggests, they might be conservative or 
moderate (Tomba, 2004, Cai, 2005). Their command of material capital can also be 
easily converted into or used to ‘capture’ cultural capital to distinguish themselves 
further from other social groups (Tomba, 2004, Zhang, 2010). Their tastes in housing, 
affected by the market, may in turn lead to further diversification of the housing 
market with variegated sensitivity to existing built environment (Zhang, 2010). One 
visible consequence of this can already be found in Shanghai’s landscape where 
fancy gates and walls have become an effective marker of social distinction and 
spatial boundaries, segregating different social groups (Pow and Kong, 2007). In a 
way, the demand from them may sustain and reinforce the spatial order, keeping the 
wheels of gentrification running and sanctioning displacement of those residents that 
                                                            
1 As of 2000s, 82 per cent public housing sales went to public employees in Shanghai (Du and Qiu in 
Cai (2005)).  
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are deemed as ‘out of place’. In chapter 4, the thesis has discussed how negative 
symbolic capital of a place – stigma - can be appropriated to serve the interest of 
speculative development, eroding the dwellers’ perception of their positions in the 
world and manipulating the desires of these dwellers through the circulation and 
demonstration of middle class values, lifestyles and consumption patterns. The 
consolation prize of new private properties with modern facades in planned 
communities may fix the displacees on those resettlement neighbourhoods, and 
cultivate their dependence on the current land regime to avoid their interest from 
being significantly undermined. The inclusion of the relegated population in this 
system may foster their consent or subordination to the new rule of game.  
Two directions I hope I can explore in further research are the mechanism of social 
distanciation in Bourdieusian spirit and a contingent assessment of the political 
conservativenss of the middle class through Scottian perspective. Citing my reading 
of Dwelling Narrowness and my conversation with my ‘middle class’ friends in 
chapter 4, I pointed out the issue of distanciation in contributing to the symbolic 
appropriation of xiaozhijiao and the impacts on the displacees. It seems worthwhile 
to explore the positional understanding of housing of the middle class, particularly in 
relation to risks, uncertainties, dominant values and tastes. This shall lead to further 
insight into their durable cognitive structure and their sense of self in the world. It 
may also yield fruitful results to see how the differences lead to social distanciation 
rather than empathetic understanding. By looking into the mental structure of the 
middle class, particularly their sense of limits in relation to perception and 
engagement with the state power, we may also contribute to the discussion on 
whether this group is a progressive agent to push forward democratisation in China. 
By incorporating with Scottian literature along this line, we may have a nuanced 
understanding of the ‘conservativeness’ of the middle class or their property-based 
activism. Strategic appearances may not correspond to their progressive minds (Scott, 
1985). In doing this, we can also tease out the way durable cognitive structure, 
preventing from effective progressive actions and consciousness, is reinforced by 
their encounter with state power and fostering their ‘conservativeness’. We can also 
wrestle with the tension between their durable beliefs and strategic performances, the 
latter of which can be informed by their cautious manoeuvre of political 
opportunities in different social contexts.   
There are a few other avenues to pursue in future research. First, researchers may 
want to avoid the temporal rupture and follow up on the whole domicide process to 
observe the mechanics of power in real time and space. This may lead to more 
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nuanced understanding of the experiences of domicide, particularly the political 
interactions between the domicide operatives and the domicidees. It would also 
reveal a much more complicated picture of claims making and resistance tactics in 
this process. Second, this thesis missed and was denied the opportunity to involve the 
displacers in the research process. I relied primarily on secondary resources, 
particularly the textual products published by the domiciders and the recollections of 
important episodes from the displacees. A political ethnography of the domiciders 
would further add complexity and depth to the politics and morality of domicide I 
have painted in this thesis. This may involve a careful examination of the ways that 
tension between personal and professional ethics is negotiated and the roles of those 
domicide operatives in translating and exercising state power. This exercise will also 
further enrich our understanding about the exceptionality of the Expo and the 
capacity of the Chinese state in contemporary times. The Expo-induced displacement 
is ‘exceptional’ in the sense that the demolition and construction of this space in such 
a condensed time and without meaningful protests to a great extent must be attributed 
to the mobilisation of the entire state apparatus, which temporarily suspended the 
tensions and conflicts within the bureaucratic field (i.e. between the central 
government and the local government, between feminist hand and masculine hands 
of the state on different levels, between Shanghai and other regions). Such 
exceptionality also created enabling conditions to suspend legal protections and to 
exonerate the responsibilities of bulldozer crews to pursue any means possible and 
necessary to fulfil their task and pursue their personal interests without overly 
worrying about transgressing legal or moral boundaries. Existing studies on 
displacement outside the context of mega-events have shown that the central-local 
tension and the conflicts between different government agencies can be used 
effectively for political actions to resist or challenge the land-centred accumulation 
regime (O'Brien, 1996, Hsing, 2010a, McGregor, 2012). In such cases, the 
fragmentation and conflicts within the state are more visible. The microphysics of 
power and macro power structure may show some differences from what I have 
attempted to capture here (Zhang, 2001, Ho, 2013a, 2013b, Wei, 2013). However, 
the disturbing logic that displacement is facilitated by the state’s selective suspension 
of law and manipulation of citizenship through its monopoly of violence and 
legitimate power to serve the interest of capital accumulation are the same, and I 
suspect it will show categorical differences from the underlying logics as examined 
from western context (Schinkel and van den Berg, 2011, Gray and Porter, 2014). The 
process may unfold in different ways due to diverse political, cultural and regulatory 
contexts. These differences can be attributed to the capacity of the state, particularly 
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the strong central government, in mobilising the entire apparatus, the structure of the 
bureaucratic field (i.e. the dictatorship of a Leninist Party and the legacy of danwei 
system) and the weakness of the legal system, all conductive to create exceptional 
spaces. But the logic underpinning the neoliberal growth from my point of view is 
the same: activation of state power to manufacture subjectivities and manipulate 
citizenship to serve the interest of capitalistic accumulation. In this sense, the Expo is 
nothing but ordinary and routine in our time. However, this observation may need 
further research to confirm.  
End Mega‐events Induced Domicide  
The first step to end mega-events induced domicide is to question the rationalities of 
mega-events and the necessity for their continued existence in modern society. They 
were created to promulgate the values and cultures of the ruling elites in order to 
consolidate their political legitimacy. Till this day, they are still invested to perform 
such ideological and political function. They have become the most helpful maidens 
to global financial capitalism, destroying institutional and geographical frictions for 
the flow of capital. We need to interrogate more closely the rationales underlying the 
bids for those events, and particularly, the production of such rationalities, in order to 
restrain the speculative impulse of the growth machine and pursue a more viable and 
sustainable development path. Our challenge to the legitimacy of mega-events should 
also extend to the international bodies that govern them. Despite that the events they 
govern have become major violators of human rights, those institutions until this day 
remain unwilling to accept human rights protection as their organisational ethics and 
refuse to shoulder the political responsibility to safeguard human rights protection in 
their capacity. What makes it more contentious is that these international bodies 
claim no accountability to any sovereignty states yet have the power to make a 
decision affecting millions of people for a prolonged time. A more unsettling issue 
arises from the corrupted politics inside those institutions, such as bribes, kickbacks, 
gift-giving, vote-in-exchange-for-investment, conducted by undemocratically elected 
business, political and cultural elites in the global arena (Lenskyj, 2000).We need to 
deliberate more thoroughly if we need those events at all given the unsatisfactory 
financial performance of those events and the enormous risks and uncertainties we 
have to bear. Also, we need to arrive at an answer whether we want to surrender the 
future of our cities to the dictatorship of a few global elites with remote care for our 
well-being other than their business interest?  
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Of course, global mega-events are only one cause of domicide under neoliberal 
capitalism. To end everyday domicide in other circumstances, we need to stop 
putting a price tag on a basic human need and a basic human right. We must take full 
account of the social, historical and affective dimensions of homes and communities 
before we make any decision that may lead to the destruction of those structures. 
Indeed, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect the buildings we dwell in be constructed to 
last forever. But I concur with Porteous and Smith (2001) that the decision to 
demolish them must always come from the dwellers, free from any kind of coercion, 
threat or pressure. It is morally wrong to impose a legal or political order and force 
existing users to give away their homes. Under certain circumstances, especially 
when a dwelling becomes physically dangerous and unhealthy for continued 
residence, displacement may become an option but this must fulfil three conditions: 
(1) physical deterioration is not an outcome of long-term disinvestment in an area;  
(2) the dwellers genuinely consent to an improvement in their housing, are fully 
informed about the land use changes after they move out and given the opportunity 
to capture the surplus value; (3) the dwellers are offered a wide range of options to 
choose where to live and how they wish to be resettled. The first rules out structural 
injustice; the second in place is to defeat sugar-coated gentrification or 
redevelopment; and the third is to democratise further the process and ensure that the 
displaced can make a choice based on their own needs. The intention is that there 
must be a democratic discussion on the necessity of displacement before a decision is 
made.  
When plans involving displacement do occur, we need to put displacement and 
relocation as a priority rather than secondary to the development plan, and we must 
treat the displaced as a person with dignity and respect (Gans, 1968). What I have in 
mind is a moral agent, reflexive enough of their social and political conducts and 
responsible enough for intended or unintended consequences of their political actions. 
In talking and working with the displacees, they need to put the housing needs of 
those families at heart and treat them as fellow citizens rather than consumers or 
worse, political subjects. This is not a call for strategic manipulation of emotions 
through workshops, consultations or counselling to talk through anger, frustration 
and loss. I had a fair taste of this when I was evicted from my office. I appreciate the 
value of such effort. I must make it clear that such professional effort should never 
be used to induce consent from the dwellers or as a reactive response to deal with 
harms done by arbitrary eviction. In the former circumstance, it is a gross violation 
of professional ethics. In the latter, although necessary for psychological well-being 
of the displaced, it willingly subordinates to the authoritarian ‘react-and-cure’ model 
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(Porteous and Smith, 2001: 210) of political undertakings and further insults the 
dignity of the victims. Professional therapeutic support should always be limited to 
help the displacees cope with loss, grief and emotional distress from losing their 
homes and communities. By making displacement a priority, we need to plan 
carefully the process, the impacts upon the displaced and the available resources to 
mitigate such impacts. This requires a democratisation of this overall process. The 
principle of all-affected must apply: all affected residents must be involved in the 
planning of displacement and resettlement at all stages (Barnett and Bridge, 2013: 
1025). Such participation cannot stay as tokenism, which I am referring to in the 
hearing and feedback model of political decision making as in Arnstein’s (1969) 
ladder of participation. It must allow the displaced to take control with the assistance 
from planning, legal and other professionals when necessary. They must be given as 
much time and financial resources they may need to deliberate carefully on the 
consequences, gather information and evidence, consult third parties, etc. A detailed 
displacement and relocation plan must be developed in partnership with the displaced 
and implemented with great care and reflexivity. Task forces must be established to 
supervise the overall process and deal with emerging problems. The impacts upon 
the relocated families must also be regularly monitored to avoid gradual 
impoverishment or decline of quality of life for the displaced families. Given that 
family is the basic unit of displacement, all family members must be consulted in this 
process and any impact assessment must take into account the generational quality. 
To this agenda, we need to perform two tasks: first, an impact assessment must 
consult all generations and second, the impact assessment must last for at least two or 
three generations (Porteous and Smith, 2001).  
In China, to end domicide, we will also need a more effective system to reign in the 
power of the party-state. If rule of law is to be taken seriously, then the party-state 
should no longer stay outside the cage (Lubman, 1999) and should be disciplined and 
punished first by the law of the society rather than the law of the party. This however 
is far from adequate, as this thesis, following Marxist tradition, has repeatedly argued 
against blind faith in law. Law historically has been used as a tool by the ruling elites 
to materialise their interests (Thompson, 1975). It is more imperative to bring 
ideological debates back to the centre of politics, particularly China’s pathways to 
modernisation and the relations between the nation, the state and the party in the 
political sphere. This entails a challenge to the historical writing of the Communist 
Party, particularly the state-led nationalism, which may undermine the political 
legitimacy of the party and create more political openings for democratisation. It also 
involves a systematic interrogation of current land-centred accumulation regime. 
Conclusion │ 318 
 
 
Particularly, we might want to start to rethink the ownership of land. We need to 
reacquire popular control of the land. Any land use changes can only be made after 
public debates rather than remotely by some bureaucratic technocrats in marriage 
with the business elites. We might also want to modify the current cadre promotion 
system. The new one should prioritise the social well-being of the citizens rather than 
the economic performance or political stability. In the case of chaiqian, rather than 
punishing the ruling elites based on the registered number of political complaints, 
which frequently leads to violent oppression, it is perhaps not a bad idea to tie 
aforementioned impact assessments with the career prospects of related state agents. 
Moreover, we may make efforts to abolish the demeaning hukou system, unjustly 
restraining the life chances and forcing people to capitalise on their bodies for a 
better livelihood.  
The political project to end domicide will not succeed without effective resistance 
from potential victims. The task here first is to identify the domiciders and hold them 
accountable to the suffering of the displacees. Calvino (1978: 165) nicely puts this 
point, ‘there are two ways to escape suffering it [the inferno]. The first is easy for 
many: accept the inferno and becomes such a part of it that you can no longer see it. 
The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and 
learn to recognise who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then 
make them endure, give them space’. To do so, we will also need to identify the 
political differences and obstacles that prevent and suppress popular uprisings and 
organised collective actions. This is not to support the effort to impose a 
romanticised political imagination to the domicide victims. What I am arguing is that 
the displaced need better knowledge about their common interests and shared 
problems under the disguise of dominant values and ideologies2 (Shin, 2013). This 
should serve as a starting point to organise their interests, mobilise support and 
prepare for effective collective actions. In choosing repertoires, we need to 
strategically utilise and expand the political openings, push the political boundaries 
and in a more practical sense, make the best out of the worst situation. For most 
people facing the threat of domicide, they have already been under many sources of 
domination. It is unrealistic and perhaps unethical to hijack their activism against 
domicide, which impacts their livelihood, for our own radical political plan. For 
those displaced by the Expo, a contentious but practical political solution to improve 
                                                            
2 In chapter 7, I have shown that the displacees were immersed in their own microcosms and 
constructed many differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which undermined the potential for collective 
resistance against the bulldozer regime. Some differences were expressions of doxic submission to 
dominant values, discourses and rules, such as property regime, hukou institutions, etc.    
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their current conditions is to take control of the empty apartments in their 
neighbourhoods, either using them as senior centres and small community libraries 
for instance, or simply squatting in them given that many families remain homeless. 
In fact, a few displaced have already taken this strategy and had some success in 
seizing their fate in their own hands.  
This project will also need contributions from academics who occupy a privileged 
position in the society given the institutional support we receive to produce and 
critically examine the production of knowledge. We must live up to the institutional 
responsibility entrusted by the society to make positive changes in the world. To this 
agenda, we need to remain constantly vigilant to the symbolic power exercised in the 
academic site and in the political circle in producing, legitimating and contributing to 
ideological mystification and symbolic violence. This entails a reflexive gaze to our 
own positions in the society as well as the discipline we practice in. In working with 
people we aim to identify with, we need to stop thinking of ourselves as 
professionals in/from the academic community, but instead first and foremost as a 
human being with knowledge that we wish to share (Slater, 2010, Marcuse, 2010). 
For Chinese social scientists, perhaps it is about time to think about our motivations 
to work in academia in the first place. Is it because we love the frequent exchange of 
ideas and heated debates on political ideals, or is it because of the fame, the political 
prospect in the party-state, or the opportunities promised by the market force? What 
we also need to do is to transcend the artificial temporal boundaries of our writing 
and become more politically and spontaneously engaged in various moments of our 
academic practices and scholarly activism (Routledge, 1996, 2008).  
On a final note, given that mega-events induced domicide or domicide in general is a 
global phenomenon, there is a potential to build connections between protesting 
actions in different places and scale up local resistances. As the challenge to 
domicide is a challenge to the distribution of power and to the prevailing value 
system in defining our social existence, it is easier to locate a common ground with 
collective actions or movements with other progressive agendas and to grow power 
through political alliances. This is exactly the politics David Harvey (2000) envisions. 
It is politically imperative to translate local militant particularism to a more 
progressive universal politics against neoliberal capitalism in order to put a halt on 
the running wheels of bulldozers.  
Although my thesis ends here, the political project against domicide and the ruling 
elites are still on in Shanghai. It will never end until the ruling elites admit their 
wrongs and address popular grievances. It will never end until home ceases to be 
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treated as a commodity but a place of memory and attachment and a part of our 
identity. It will never end until ethics and morality become guiding principles of 
political conducts. It will never end until the displacees are treated as people in flesh 
and blood who deserve care and respect. A final message to the displaced: domicide 
victims, united!  
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Appendix I: Sample Interview Guide with Displacees 
Sample Interview Guide [Displacees] 
[Description] 
Interview: Time, place (public/private), language (Shanghai dialect/Mandarin) 
Interviewee: emotional state  
Part A: Pre-displacement 
1. Migration History  
a. When and from where did you move to your old place? How long had 
you lived in your old place? 
b. Where were you initially from? Would you call yourself Shanghai 
citizens? Place of origin?  
2. Biography:  
a.  What was your job? Where do you work? Describe your job? 
Commuting hours? Means of transport? Nature of your work unit 
(danwei)? When did you retire?  
b. Family: family structure (partner, siblings or offspring; age; education); 
family relationship;   
3. Housing history  
a. Housing: describe your initial housing. Property ownership? Housing 
conditions? Any reparations or renovations? Floor area? Facilities? How 
many people lived there? Renting? Rented to whom? Do you know 
anything about the renters? Where did they come from? What were they 
doing in Shanghai? How do you think of their life? Property value?  
b. Meaning of homes: What does your previous home mean to you?  
4. Place History: Describe your previous neighbourhood.  
a. What is the history of the place?  
b. The first words that come to your mind when you are describing the place? 
c. What makes that neighbourhood special?  
d. How was your relationship with your neighbours? How was the 
relationship between neighbours in general? 
e. Who did you normally come to for help if you were in trouble? 
f. What did you do in your spare time in that place? Leisure activities and 
leisure place? 
g. Were there any changes in the neighbourhood when you lived there? 
Government funding to improve the housing conditions? If not, what do 
you think are the major reasons?  
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h. Your  community compared with surrounding new development? 
Contrast?  
i. What does this place mean to you? 
Ask if they have any pictures of their old places. Or took any photos. Or show them 
the pictures from the two books. Ask, do you recognise your home from those photos 
or pictures?  
Part B: Displacement Process 
5. Process  
a. Information about displacement? From where? Who? First reactions? 
Any preparations?  
b. Negotiating meetings: who? How many times? Talk about what? 
Disagreements？How to handle conflicts? Family conflicts? Trust? How 
do you feel? Describe one or two typical incidents?    
c. What are the first words that come to your mind related to Chaiqian? 
What did you feel when the red circle was drawn on your house?  
d. Knowledge?  
i. Policy 
ii. Law?  
iii. Rights? 
e. Overall process 
i. Length 
ii. Strategies? 
iii. Transition housing? Who and where? Why? Any help? 
iv. Happy about compensation? Why accept the offer?  
v. Knowledge of any harassment?  
f. Comments on chaiqian in general 
i. Fair? Justice?  
ii. Yangguang dongqian? How do you feel? What do you think? 
iii. Political connections?  Do you think you may be treated 
differently if you or your family members have a higher education 
background, work in state-owned enterprises, or be a party 
member? Please explain. 
iv. Forcible evictions: Do you know any forcible evictions or any 
families reluctant to move? What do you think are the major 
reasons? Are their claims reasonable? Were there any conflicts 
between displacers and those families?  
 
Part C: After Displacement 
6. Resettlement 
a. Why choose here?  
b. Other options?  
c. Moving-in costs?  
d. Ownership structure? Private ownership as main reason for accepting 
offer? 
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7. Major changes in family 
a. Living arrangement  
b. Work arrangement 
8. Social contacts:  
a. Making new friends? Relations with others? Ask them for help?  
b. Relations with old friends? Still close-by?  
c. How spend free time?  
9. Feelings about displacement?  
a. Feelings about demolished homes.  
i. How often do you think about your former neighbourhood?   
ii. Regular visits? Feelings about the changes?  
10. Identification  
a. Do you consider your new home as part of the ‘city centre’ or ‘rural 
villages’ (xiangxia)? 
b. Do you feel you belong here?  
11. Have you experienced any difficulties after displacement? What are your 
difficulties and why? Do you still have those now? 
12. How do you feel about this neighbourhood? How would you introduce it to 
strangers or your relatives? Compared with your previous residency, what are the 
major advantages and disadvantages of this neighbourhood?  
13. Are you involved in the planning of this new neighbourhood? Did the planning 
firm talk to you with regard to your needs? How were the major facilities and 
public infrastructures when you first moved in? Were there any changes made 
over the years? Was it through your community’s appeal or public planning and 
investment? 
14. How would you compare your displacement experience with others in the inner 
city or with those being displaced before you? Do you think you are better 
compensated than they were?  
 
Other Questions 
15. Political participation: what’s your job title? Work unit? Member of any political 
organisations? Any rewards?  
16. What do you think constitutes a good life? How do you interpret the theme of 
Shanghai Expo? 
17. How do you think the government can manage chaiqian better? 
18. If you were the mayor of Shanghai now, where would you like to locate Expo 
site? Do you want to demolish your neighbourhood? If so, where would you 
relocate the neighbourhood? Do you believe that the Expo strategy was an 
effective tool to regenerate your inner city and stimulate new round of economic 
boom in Shanghai? 
19. Do you have any knowledge of forcible displacement in your neighbourhood 
back in 2005 and 2006? What were the conflicts? 
 





Sample Interview Guide (Artists) 
[Opening] 
Introduce my research project and research objectives 
Ask permission for recording;  
[Interview Questions] 
1. What is your motivation in producing a sketch of the Expo site before the demolition? 
2. Who commissioned your research? To what extent did they have the power to decide 
the direction of your project? Was the final publication your own idea or were there 
some politics involved? 
3. Why choose this book title? Who chose it? Why?  
4. Could you please tell me some stories of your project?  
5. I noticed that a lot of your work is about the everyday life of the people who lived 
there rather than pure architecture, what is your purpose in doing so?  
6. On many occasions, I sense your ambivalent attitude toward the housing quality and 
the peaceful life of the displacees, why do you have such mixed feelings?  
7. What do you think of that place while you worked there? How was the generous 
atmosphere in the neighbourhood before the displacement and during the 
displacement?  
8. What attracts you the most to those places? Pudong and Puxi respectively? What are 
the differences between Pudong and Puxi? 
9. A lot of your work is about documenting the old Shanghai in its authentic form 
before it vanishes under the rapid urban gentrification/regeneration, would you 
compare yourself to Ai Weiwei considering your work as some sort of activism? In 
documenting the ‘old’ Shanghai, what do you think in general about what we are 
losing, forgetting and missing? What do you think is at stake now? What is the 
relationship between old and new, between developmentalism and conservation?  
10. What do you think about the Expo-induced displacement? From your point of view, 
what are the impacts upon the displacees, their homes and their communities?  
 [Closing] 
Thank the interviewee. If possible, ask for contact information for further inquiries.  
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Appendix III: Sample Interview Guide with Planning Officers 
Sample Interview Guide (Planning Officer) 
1. The interviewee and his main responsibilities 
1.1  May I know exactly your job description? 
1.2 There was an administrative merger with the land management bureau a few 
years ago, so what exactly is the municipal planning bureau in charge of now? Is 
it only a bureau with two distinctive divisions or is there actually re-organisation 
within the bureau?  
1.3 How big is this Bureau before the merger and now? What are its major 
responsibilities for the development of the city? And the planners? 
1.4 Any conflicts between the two divisions bureaucratically, financially and 
professionally? 
1.5  I noticed that the Expo Bureau serves as a coordinator for anything that relates to 
the Expo. But in terms of planning, what are the relations between your 
department and the Expo bureau? Particularly, what is the relationship with the 
Expo Land Reserve Centre? What are the roles of your department in each stage 
of preparation and construction of the expo site? 
1.6 What is your involvement with the Expo-related planning issues? 
 
2. On the Expo Project 
2.1 There are numerous papers and documentaries that traces Shanghai’s and China’s 
link with the Expo, also huge amounts about the background regarding 
Shanghai’s decision to bid for this project. But why choose the Expo? Could it be 
any other major events or projects? Were there any alternatives back then? 
2.2 Did the decision to bid for the Expo come from the municipality or the central 
government?  
2.3  There has been some unofficial information going around that the Party gave 
Shanghai the Expo because Beijing already got the Olympics. Were there any 
tensions between Beijing and Shanghai back then? Was the choice of Shanghai 
out of the Party’s decision to balance the power of regional development centre? 
2.4 What does Shanghai or the central government want to achieve through this 
project? 
2.5 Hosting the Expo is a huge undertaking. Where does the money come from, 
especially for the investment of the major infrastructures? 
2.6 Were there any downsizing of the original Expo project and why? 
 
3. On the Expo, Planning and Shanghai’s development 
 
3.1 How does the Expo project fit in Shanghai’s master plan and Shanghai’s overall 
transformation toward the four international centres? 
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3.2 How does the Expo project contribute to the overall waterfront redevelopment of 
Huangpu River? The key rationales behind the Huangpu River Waterfront 
redevelopment plan? The cross-river links between Puxi section and Pudong 
section? 
3.3 The event supporters always quote from Mayor Wang Daohan that the Expo was 
going to make long lasting impacts upon Shanghai’s development for at least 50 
years. Do you agree? What do you think are the major impacts to Shanghai? Are 
you still convinced that such impacts are going to last for 50 years?  
3.4 Were there any projects delayed or cancelled because of the shift of priorities 
since most resources have been diverted to the Expo? 
3.5 The expo is themed on city and city life. And it explicitly expresses its strong 
interest to demonstrate and promote best practices for a better city and better life. 
Could you please give me an example that Shanghai offered to the world? 
3.6 Back to the theme, what do you think contributes to a good life exactly? Such 
good life is for whom?  
3.7 We both are clear that the English translation of the Expo theme does not 
correspond to the Chinese theme at all. My question is which version came up 
first? And, why, as the Chinese theme indicates, cities make life better? Isn’t it 
bizarre that the last sub-theme focuses upon the urban-rural integration whilst the 
theme contains a discriminative element against the countryside and promotes 
further urban-rural divide? How do you interpret the theme of the Shanghai 
World Expo? 
3.8 Expo has not only facilitated the transformation of the space at the Expo site, but 
also other huge parts of the city, especially inner city of Shanghai –which is 
labelled as Penghuqu or Weipengjianwu? Why did those parts that are unrelated 
to the Expo have to be demolished as well if not for the project at all? Why 
cannot slow the pace of redevelopment?  
 
4. ON EXPO-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT 
4.1 Why choose the current site for hosing the Expo? Were there any other options 
available back then? If yes, who evaluated those options? The decision is based 
on what criteria? When was the final site chosen? Who made the decision or 
which department? Collective wisdom and party boss’s will?   
4.2 Were there any different voices in regard to the choice of Expo site from 
different sides, government, academics, activists, the citizens and more 
importantly people who lived on the Expo site? Why were they rejected?  
4.3   I noticed a term, ‘Planning Coordination Zone’ from the Expo Planning 
Document. May I know if it is a new creation? Were they purely residential? 
Based on what criteria were they chosen? Was it all about economic reasons to 
reduce the costs of relocation? Regarding the architecture within such planning 
coordination zones, were all the changes surgical, as ‘modernising’ the facade? 
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With whose investment? To your knowledge, were there any collective actions 
that were able to influence/change the expo planning and enlist their residential 
blocks to such zones? Also, to what extent do the residents have a say in terms of 
the changes to their homes and communities? 
4.4  I heard that there was considerable preparatory research for the Expo planning. I 
am wondering if those documents were ever made public. Why and why not? At 
what stage was the general public involved?  
4.5  A related question is about the residents and the business owners who used to 
live on the Expo site, i.e. the displacees. Did they participate in the Expo 
planning and in terms of what? Did your department conduct any social surveys 
researching their attitude about the development and consequential displacement 
conducted or outsourced by the planning department? If not, who is in charge of 
that? Was it all about a sound living condition? What about their community ties 
and social bonds? 
4.6 From The Land Use Map in the compiled planning document of the Expo, I 
noticed some categorisations of the land, will you please explain the difference 
between the second category, the third category and the fourth for residential land? 
Based on what criteria? 
4.7  Also, it seems that a large portion was labelled or generalised as Penghuqu or 
Weipengjianhu, will you please explain how Pendhuqu is defined in the 
profession of planning?   
4.8 Why were Sanlin and Pujiang chosen as major sites to resettle the Expo-induced 
displacees? How are these two resettlement towns related to Shanghai’s master 
plan? How do they fit in Shanghai’s ‘One City and Nine Towns’ strategy and the 
“1966” Plan? How was the land acquired from the farmers? Are these two 
resettlement projects intended to be developed as demonstration case for better 
life? Also, what does ‘Expo’ really mean to those resettlement projects? 
A SIDE QUESTION WOULD BE THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE CHANGE 
FROM THE FORMER TO THE LATTER? 
Relevant question: 1. Is there a physical geographical boundary of Shanghai’s city centre 
versus Shanghai’s countryside? 
2. The metro lines: Line 8 and Line 6: I learnt from my respondents in Pujiang that Line 8 
was planned long before their displacement. When exactly was it planned? Also, 
comparatively, Line 8 is closer to the resettlement project in Pujiang whilst Line 6 in Sanlin 
is quite far, why is there such a difference for the displacees? Was it a purely technical 
decision? Does it have something to do with Pujiang’s status as one of the pilot projects of 
Shanghai’s One City Nine Towns project? 
4.9 What is the role of the municipal planning for the planning and design of those two new 
resettlement projects? ASKING FOR REFERENCE TO BOTH PLANNERS IF 
POSSIBLE!  
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4.10 Return to the question of displacement, a large portion of the land used to be of 
industrial use. There were two major factories in the Expo site, i.e. the Jiangnan 
Shipyard and the Shanghai Steel Manufacturing companies. Before the Expo, were there 
any plans from the bureau to relocate these two factories since they were claimed to be a 
major source of pollution? Did those plans fail? Why or why not? And why was the 
Expo able to facilitate this process?  
4.11 The Expo is now over. A critical issue would be the evaluation of the post-Expo 
impact. And many scholars have brought up the issue of Expo legacies. What do you 
think are the legacies? Do you think these legacies could justify the cost in hosting it?  
4.12 With regard to the post-Expo planning, could you please elaborate a bit more on how 
the land was going to be re-developed? Were there any changes from the initial plan 
included in the bidding book or the planning book? Was the general public aware of 
such plan? Why would the Urban Exhibition Hall charge entrance fee to go inside and 
check out the plans for the future development of the post-Expo planning? Were there 
any plans for affordable housing?  
4.13 For the two resettlement housing projects, what are the future plans to improve the 
community there? 
 
5. ON POLITICS 
5.1 There was political turbulence during the Expo. The former Mayor, Chen Liangyu, was 
arrested because of embezzlement of public social security funds although rumours around 
that he was pushed out from office because of the political struggles within the party in 
Beijing. My interest is how does his stepping down from office influence the development of 
the Expo? Pujiang and Sanlin? And Shanghai in general? Did it create any shock to the 
planning department?  
 
ASKING FOR REFERENCE TO ACCESS  
1. Minhang District Planning Bureau—Pujiang Town 
2. Pudong New District Planning Department—Sanlin Town 
3. Huangpu River Waterfront Redevelopment Office 
4. Other contacts he knows might answer some questions I have raised? 




Interview Guide (Residents Committee) 
1. On Residents Committee: 
a. When was the residents committee set up? Through what channel, election or 
appointment? Re-election?  
b. What are the major responsibilities of the residents committee? Who usually 
comes to the committee meetings? Why? Ask for an example? 
c. The structure of the residents committee. And the relations with the Party? 
d. The personnel of the committee? Their demographic characteristics (esp. their 
party membership; education; employment status before working in this 
organisation) 
e. The administrative ties with the residents committee or jiedao where the 
displacees come from? 
f. The administrative relations with Sanlin Township government/Pujiang 
Township government, and with the property management companies? 
g. The Expo tie: as a resource or brand, has it been used in any activity in 
community management or liaisons, or bargaining for support?  
 
2.  On the population profile and the community 
a. Asking the interviewee to introduce the community. E.g. What makes this place 
special? If possible, ask the interviewee briefly to introduce the history of this 
place? Any particular moments or events in this place (symbolic visits from 
officials of the Expo Bureau or Shanghai municipality, etc.)? 
b. The population profile of this community.  
i. How many households currently live in this place? Empty flats? 
ii. The general profile of the displacees: age group; gender; 
employment; education; etc. 
iii. Renters? 
iv. Hukou status; and the consequential issue of how to manage 
those people who haven’t updated their hukou status at this 
place? 
3. On the community environment/facilities 
a. What is the responsibility of the residents committees in maintaining the 
facilities? 
4. On the community management 
a. The conflicts with the property management company. Vegetable planting in 
the public space; parking; pets raising; chicken keeping; death rituals;  
b. The population management: (if possible, asking the respondents to provide 
concrete examples): 
i. Relief-providing? 
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ii. Community organisations: association of the seniors; the youth; the 
kids;  
iii. Community activities; (esp. Expo-related) 
iv. Other activities or organisations that aim to reconfigure the 
community bonds;  
c. Community safety;  
d. Community management: programmes; difficulties;  
e. Property owners association;  
5. The role of RC in the situation of conflicts: 
a. Within-household conflicts? 
b. Conflicts between neighbours? How do they intervene and based on what 
principles? 
c. Conflicts or tensions between residents with the up-level authorities?   
d. For The No.1 committee only: the issue of the high voltage power towers 
e. Maintaining social stability; (letters and visits from the residents) 
NB: if the respondents have worked in their original neighbourhoods where they were 
displaced, then ask them about the displacement experience and their role in mobilising the 
rest.  
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Mr. Jie Lu  Photographer   Interview 02/2012 
Mr. Xingping Chen  Artist     Interview  03/2012 
Mr. Zhifeng Xu  Artist, filmmaker   Interview  07/2012 
 
Planners 
 Mr. Harry Den Hartog  Planner, writer   Interview  06/2012  
and also  07/2012 
 
Human Rights Activists  
Activist 1 Lawyer/International/activist  Interview 02/2012 
Activist 2 Lawyer /Chinese   Interview 07/2012 
 
Government Authorities  
Pudong District Government    Telephone Inquiry  06/2012 
Shanghai Municipal Planning Bureau   Interview 07/2012   




 Dr. Xiang Feng     Interview  04/2012 and 07/2012 
 Professor Chen Yingfang   Interview  03/2012 
Mr. Chen Retired Electricity Grid Engineer  Interview 04/2012 
 
 




Displacees (as in Recorded and Transcribed Conversations and Interviews) 
Notes:  
To protect the identity of some displacees, some information are removed (dates of the 
interviews; especially in the event of group interviews); CD is short for cannot disclosed; D 
indicates the displacees were displaced from Pudong and X indicates that displacees were 
displaced from Puxi.  
Number Gender Age 
Group 
Profession  Date of Interview Remarks 
D1 Female  60s Retired  08/03/2012 Individual  
D2 Female 50s Retired 08/03/2012 
 
D2 and D3 are 




joined in the 
middle 
D3 Male 60s Freelance 
D4 
Female  60s Retired 
D5 Male  80s Retired  09/03/2012 Individual 
D6 Female 80s Retired 09/03/2012 Mother and 
Son; son joined 
later 
D7 
Male 50s Pedicab 
driver 
09/03/2012 
D8 Female 70s Retired 09/03/2012 Individual 
D9 Female 60s Retired  09/03/2012 D10 joined in 
the middle and 
D9 quit soon D10 Female  50s Retired 09/03/2012 
D11 
Female 50s Early 
retirement 
09/03/2012 Individual 
D12 Female 50s Retired 03/2012 Individual 
D13 Female  40s CD 03/2012  Group; follow-
up visits were 
made to D14, 
D15, D17, D19 
and D20 from 
April to July; 
D14 female 50s CD 
D15 Female 40s CD 
D16 Female 60s CD 
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D18 Female 40s CD 
D19 Male  30s CD 
D20 Male 50s CD 
D21 Male  40s CD 
D22 Male 50s Barber 10/03/2012 Individual  
D23 Female 50s Unknown 10/03/2012 
 
Group, D23 
quit soon, D24 
and D25 are 
mother-
daughter 
D24 Female 40s unemployed 
D25 
Female 70s Farmer  
D26 Male  60s CD 03/2012 Individual 
D27 Male  40s worker 11/03/2012 Individual  
D28 Female  40s unemployed 11/03/2012 Individual 




03/2012 D31 joined in 
the middle; 
follow-up to 
D31 in April 
and June D31 
Male  60s Retired 
D32 Female 80s Retired 12/03/2012 D33 joined in 
the middle 
D33 Female 30s Cleaner 12/03/2012 
D34 Male 70s Retired  15/03/2012 D35, D36, D37, 
D38, D39 and 
D40 joined later D35 Male 50s Unknown 
D36 Female 60s Unknown 
D37 Female  50s Unknown 
D38 Female  50s Unknown 
D39 Female 40s Unknown 
D40 Male 60s unknown 
D41 Male  70s Pensioner 03/2012 D41 quit after 




Male  60s Retired 03/2012 D42 joined; 
Follow-up to 
D42 in April 
D43 Male 60s Retired 03/2012 Individual 
D44 Male  60s Retired 03/2012 Couple 
D45 Female 60s Retired 03/2012 
D46 Male 60s CD 03/2012 Individual  
D47 Male CD Party organ 03/2012 Individual 
D48 Male 50s CD 19/03/2012 Limited input 
from D49; D49, 
D50 and D51 
joined in the 
middle; D48 
was followed 
up in April and 
June 
D49 
Male 70s Retired 
teacher 
D50 Male 50s CD 
D51 
Male 40s CD 
D52 Female 50s unknown 21/03/2012 Individual 
D53 Female 70s retired 21/03/2012 Group; D56 
quit soon 
D54 Male 60s Unknown 
D55 Male 80s Retired 
D56 Female 40s Unemployed 
D57 Female 60s Retired 
D58 Male 60s unknown 
D59 Female  70s unknown 22/03/2012 Group 
D60 Female 80s unknown 
D61 Female 40s unemployed 03/2012 Naturally 
emerged Group; 
D64 was 
followed up in 
April; D65 was 
followed in July 
D62 Female 40s unemployed 
D63 Female 40s Unemployed 
D64 Male 60s Retired  
D65 Female 40s Unemployed 
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D66 Female 60s Retired 
D67 Female 40s unemployed 
D68 Male CD Policeman 25/03/2012 Individual  
D69 Female 70s Retired 25/03/2012 Group; D72 is 
the son of D71 
(D72 joined 
later) 
D70 Female 80s Retired 
D71 Female 70s Retired 
D72 Male  40s unknown 
D73 Male 70s Retired 26/03/2012 Individual 
D74 Male 50s unknown 26/03/2012 Group 
D75 Female 50s Retired 




D77 Female 50s Unknown 
D78 Female 60s Unknown 
D79 Female 70s Unknown  
D80 Male 60s Retired 
D81 
Male 50s Early 
Retirement 
31/03/2012 Individual 
D82 Female 60s Retired 31/03/2012 D81 joined later 
D83 




Male 60s CD 31/03/2012 Individual; 
followed up on 
04/05/2012 




D86 Female 60s Retired 01/04/2012 
D87 Male  60s CD 01/04/2012 
D88 Female 60s unknown 16/03/2012 Naturally 
emerged group; 
only D91,D97, D89 Female 60s unknown 
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D90 Female 70s unknown D98, and D99 
stayed until the 
end; D97 was 
revisited for 
follow-up;  
D91 Male 50s CD 
D92 Female 60s unknown 
D93 Male 60s retired 
D94 Male 60s Shop owner 
D95 Female 60s retired 
D96 Female 70s unknown 
D97 Female 50s CD 
D98 Female 60s CD 
D99 Male 50s CD 
D100 Female 20s CD 20/04/2012 With D97 
D101 Male 60s Retired 18/04/2012 Individual 
D102 
Female 70s Retired 18/04/2012 D101 joined 
later 
D103 
Female 50s Sick 
retirement 
20/04/2012 Individual 
D104 Male  60s Retired 12/04/2012 D105 joined in 
the middle 
D105 Male  50s unknown 
D106 Female CD CD 12/04/2012 Individual 
D107 
Male 50s CD 04/2012 Individual; 
followed up in 
July  
D108 Female 80s CD 05/2012 Individual  
D109 Female CD CD 06/2012 D110 joined 
later 
D110 Male CD CD 
D111 Female CD CD 06/2012 Group; D111 
was followed 
up three times 
from June to 
July;   
D112 Female CD CD 06/2012 
D113 
Male CD CD 06/2012 
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D114 Female CD CD 06/2012 with D111 
D115 Female 60s CD 07/2012 Individual  
D116 
Male 60s Demobilised 
Solider  
07/2012 Individual 
D117 Female 50s CD 04/2012-07/2012 Case approach 
      
X1 Male  60s Retired  28/04/2012 Individual  
X2 Female  30s Teacher 29/04/2012 Group (mother-
daughter) 
X3 Female  50s Retired  
X4 Male 60s Retired 
policemen 
01/05/2012 X4 and X5 
joined after X6 
decided to quit 
X5 Female 70s retired 
X6 Male  80s Retired 
X7 Male  30s CD 03/05/2012 Individual  
X8 Male 70s Retired 02/05/2012 Group; X11 
was consulted 
twice in June 
and July 
X9 Male  70s Retired 
X10 Male 60s Retired 
X11 Male  50s CD 
X12 Male 60s Retired  
X13 Male 50s Retired  
X14 Female 50s unknown 
X15 Male 50s SOE worker 
X16 Male 40s SOE worker 
X17 Male 40s SOE worker 
X18 Male  70s Retired   04/05/2012 Individual 
X19 Female 70s Retired 04/05/2012 Individual  
X20 Male 20s student 04/05/2012 Individual 
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X21 Female 70s Retired 04/05/2012 
 
X22 joined in 
the middle  
X22 Female 60s Retired 
X23 Male 50s unknown 05/05/2012 Individual  
X24 Male 50s sick 
retirement 
05/05/2012 Individual 
X25 Male 50s CD 07/05/2012 Individual 
X26 Male 50s unemployed 07/05/2012 Individual 
X27 Female 50s CD 08/05/2012 Group 
X28 Female 60s CD 
X29 Female 40s CD 
X30 Female 50s unknown 09/05/2012 X31 joined later 
X31 Male 60s CD 
X32 Male 70s Retired 10/05/2012 Individual 
X33 Female 60s Retired 12/05/2012 Group  
X34 Female 70s Retired 
X35  Female 60s Retired 
X36 Female 70s Retired CCP 




X38, X39, and 
X40 one after 
another; X40 
was called to 
quit by her 
neighbour;  
X38 Female 40s Unknown 
X39 Female 60s Unknown  
X40 Female 80s Unknown 
X41 Female 50s CD 16/05/2012 Individual 
X42 Female 60s Retired  05/2012 Individual; a 
follow-up in 
July 
X43 Male  60s Retired 21/05/2012 X44 and X45 
joined in the 
middle, X43 X44 Male 60s Unknown  
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X45 Female 60s Retired quit soon;  
X46 Male  60s Retired 27/04/2012 X47 joined 
around the end 
of the interview X47 Female 60s Retired  
X48 Female 80s Retired 29/05/2012 Individual 
X49 Female 70s Retired 29/05/2012 Group 
X50 Female 40s Unknown 
X51 Male 40s Unknown  
X52 Male 80s Retired  
X53 Female 50s Retired 19/05/2012 Group 
X54 Male 60s Retired 
X55 Male 60s Unknown 
X56 Female 40s Unknown 
X57 Female 50s unknown 
X58 Male 50s unknown 
X59 Male  70s Retired 06/06/2012 Individual 
X60 Female 60s Retired 06/06/2012 Individual 
X61 Female 70s Retired 06/2012 Individual 
X62 Female 40s unemployed 06/2012 Individual  
X63 Female  50s CD 16/06/2012 
 
Couple 
X64 Male 50s Self-
employed 
X65 Male 50s Sick 
retirement 
05/07/2012 Individual 
X66 Female 40s CD 09/07/2012 Individual 
X67 Female 50s Unemployed 15/07/2012 individual 
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